• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Emerachem Holdings, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Jan 30, 2019 · IPR2014-01558 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Volkswagen’s rehearing request, leaving claims 3, 16, and 20 not shown unpatentable because Saito, read in context, did not establish the claimed regeneration limitations.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “We find Petitioner’s position to be lacking in substance. The quotation provided by Petitioner is only a partial quotation. The complete quotation from Saito, with appropriate following context italicized, is as follows: The method of reducing NOx using a reducing agent such as hydrogen is widely known as a nonselective catalytic reduction method, but in this method, if large amounts of oxygen are present in the exhaust gas [amounts of] reducing agent sufficient to react with the oxygen will be added and the NOx will be reduced, which is not economical in so much as large amounts of reducing agent are consumed, and thus the use of nonselective catalytic reduction methods was limited to situations in which oxygen was not present, or situations in which the oxygen concentration had been greatly lowered. In the method of the present invention, the amount of reducing agent consumed is the amount necessary to reduce and remove the NOx that has been absorbed by the catalyst, which is a very small amount, and therefore this is very economically advantageous. Ex. 1008A, 3 column 1, lines 38–54 (emphasis added). The italicized language, to us, indicates that this discussion in Saito is not that simply of one nonpreferred specific embodiment of catalyst renewal taught, but rather a discussion of the reasons why nonselective catalytic reduction methods of exhaust gas directly were not generally used due to their prohibitive costs. Moreover, it is a stretch to say that catalytic reduction methods are the same as renewing a devitalized catalyst as alleged in Petitioner’s request for rehearing. In this we agree with the Patent Owner that this disclosure of a prior art “non-selective catalytic reduction method does not render claims 3, 16, and 20 obvious.” Paper 75, 10. To the extent that Petitioner asserts we did not consider this argument, we have again considered it and again find it to be unpersuasive based upon Saito itself, when taken in complete context. As noted before, Saito’s example is explicit that Saito uses two catalyst beds and regenerates each catalyst bed independently of each other. PO Resp. 21, 24. By the use of valving, the reducing agent is introduced into the catalyst bed through which exhaust gas is not flowing. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1008B, 3). As to the several pages of additional argument and evidence provided in the request for rehearing beyond that originally found in the Petition and Reply, we shall not consider it, as it is an improper use of the rehearing process. See 37 C.F.R. § 71(d). The request for rehearing is therefore DENIED.” slip op. at 12

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther

    “As to the several pages of additional argument and evidence provided in the request for rehearing beyond that originally found in the Petition and Reply, we shall not consider it, as it is an improper use of the rehearing process. See 37 C.F.R. § 71(d).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyNot reached
  None
  Patents in suitUS 5,599,758
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00440 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–7, 10–16, 18, and 20 are unpatentable; claims 5 and 8 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21, 30, and 38 are unpatentable as obvious over Sackier and Kirsch.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “3. Dr. Nicosia’s Declaration in support of its Opposition to Patent” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. “clip” The Parties now agree that “clip,” as the term is generally understood,” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

    “as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing this element to be present in Sackier because Petitioner combines features from distinct embodiments in Sackier without establishing persuasively that those embodiments are so directly related to each other such that one of ordinary skill in the art, looking at the reference as a whole, would recognize a disclosure of the invention as claimed. Accordingly, although a very close call, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate anticipation of claims 1, 12, and 20 by Sackier for this reason.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,271,731 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,271,731
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00435 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Malecki; the contingent motion to amend was denied as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “construction more persuasive because it is grounded in, and most consistent with, the specification of the ’731 patent. Contrastingly, Petitioner does not offer a specific interpretation of “inner walls” and its arguments are generally based on extrinsic evidence, including claim charts from the related district court litigation (Pet. 15), arguments from related proceedings (Pet. Reply 3), and the prior art reference (Malecki) relied on to challenge the claims (id. at 3–4). Petitioner criticizes the Patent Owner’s position but provides no express interpretation of “inner walls of the first and second clip arms;” instead, Petitioner argues why Patent Owner’s proposed construction is wrong. Pet. Reply 4–5. Dr. Nicosia does not expressly define or otherwise persuasively explain the definition of “inner walls” in his declarations either. See generally Exs. 1037, 1095, and 1109.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the filing of the application that became the ’731 patent would have possessed the knowledge and skill of an engineer or similar professional 5 The parties have not introduced evidence of secondary considerations in this proceeding. with at least an undergraduate degree in engineering, or a physician having experience with designing medical devices. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1037 ¶ 11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and we adopt it based on the final record before us. It is also consistent with the level of skill evidenced by the references.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the final trial record, including our interpretation of “inner walls of the first and second clip arms” to mean “the exterior surfaces of the first and second clip arms that are inward-facing relative to the longitudinal axis of the clip,” Petitioner has not persuasively established that Malecki Embodiment #1 discloses this limitation. We find persuasive the testimony of Dr. Vaitekunas, that “[t]he jaws of Malecki Embodiment #1 have four walls,” and a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand Figure 28A to illustrate links 404, 406 connecting to the side walls of jaws 308C, 310C on the side or lateral wall opposite (or underneath) the one shown in Figure 28A.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 66, 68. We agree with Dr. Vaitekunas that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider side or lateral walls as “inner walls” under the broadest reasonable interpretation of that term. Thus, the portion of the jaw identified by Petitioner as shaded in green (Pet. 26) is a portion of the side/lateral wall, not an inward-facing wall. See Ex. 2010 ¶ 68. Petitioner has also not persuasively established that linkages 404, 406 contact any outside portion of the inner wall. As noted by Patent Owner above, Petitioner’s expert admits that Malecki does not disclose links 404, 406 contacting the radially inward-facing walls. See Ex. 2012 at 274:12–23. We also do not find persuasive Petitioner’s pin engagement theory. First, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Nicosia persuasively establish that a slot and pin channel (Pet. 15) is used in Malecki Embodiment #1. See Ex. 1095 ¶ 27. As pointed out by Dr. Vaitekunas, Petitioner’s theory that an engagement between a pin and a pin hole satisfies the “engaging the inner walls of the first and second clip arms” limitation is based on structure that is simply not disclosed in Malecki. Ex. 2010 ¶ 69. Further, we agree with Dr. Vaitekunas that “[e]ven if contact does occur between a pin and a pinhole, the contact occurs in the pin hole, not the exterior surface of a radially inward-facing wall.” Id.” slip op. at 25

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the final trial record, including our interpretation of “inner walls of the first and second clip arms” to mean “the exterior surfaces of the first and second clip arms that are inward-facing relative to the longitudinal axis of the clip,” Petitioner has not persuasively established that Malecki Embodiment #1 discloses this limitation. We find persuasive the testimony of Dr. Vaitekunas, that “[t]he jaws of Malecki Embodiment #1 have four walls,” and a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand Figure 28A to illustrate links 404, 406 connecting to the side walls of jaws 308C, 310C on the side or lateral wall opposite (or underneath) the one shown in Figure 28A.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 66, 68. We agree with Dr. Vaitekunas that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider side or lateral walls as “inner walls” under the broadest reasonable interpretation of that term. Thus, the portion of the jaw identified by Petitioner as shaded in green (Pet. 26) is a portion of the side/lateral wall, not an inward-facing wall. See Ex. 2010 ¶ 68. Petitioner has also not persuasively established that linkages 404, 406 contact any outside portion of the inner wall. As noted by Patent Owner above, Petitioner’s expert admits that Malecki does not disclose links 404, 406 contacting the radially inward-facing walls. See Ex. 2012 at 274:12–23. We also do not find persuasive Petitioner’s pin engagement theory. First, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Nicosia persuasively establish that a slot and pin channel (Pet. 15) is used in Malecki Embodiment #1. See Ex. 1095 ¶ 27. As pointed out by Dr. Vaitekunas, Petitioner’s theory that an engagement between a pin and a pin hole satisfies the “engaging the inner walls of the first and second clip arms” limitation is based on structure that is simply not disclosed in Malecki. Ex. 2010 ¶ 69. Further, we agree with Dr. Vaitekunas that “[e]ven if contact does occur between a pin and a pinhole, the contact occurs in the pin hole, not the exterior surface of a radially inward-facing wall.” Id. Finally, Petitioner seems to recognize that a modification would be” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,271,731 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,271,731
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2017-00135 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–5, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Kimura (claims 1, 3–5) and Kimura with Sackier (claim 10); claims 7, 11–15, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the filing of the application that became the ’371 patent would have possessed the knowledge and skill of an engineer or similar professional with at least an undergraduate degree in engineering, or a physician having experience with designing medical devices. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶ 11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The issue we have with Patent Owner’s contentions, as pointed out by Petitioner, is that Patent Owner does not establish persuasively how its claims require the “reversible open/close” feature and the “tactile feel features.” See Pet. Reply 27–29. Even presuming that these features did indeed drive tremendous commercial success and industry praise for the commercial products, Patent Owner does not adequately explain in its analysis how the claims of the challenged patent require these particular features that drive commercial success. Patent Owner seems to suggest that a break section in the control wire will fracture and that this feature in the commercial product relates to the tactile feel. PO Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 91–93) (“After the yoke has disengaged, if the handle spool is moved further proximally, a break section in the control wire will fracture, leaving the ball within the yoke and uncoupling the control wire from the distal components of the device.”). This “break section in the control wire” is not, however, claimed or covered in claim 1, the claim that purportedly embodies the commercial product. The claims alleged to cover the product do not specifically require any “tactile feel feature.”3 Likewise, while the claims may allow for an opening and closing of the clip assembly, there is no requirement in these claims that the clip assembly, as “demanded” by physicians, repeatedly open and close. Thus, both of the drivers of commercial success and industry praise are not commensurate in scope with the claims of the patented invention. See Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 23–29 (explaining how features are not claimed).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “district court proceeding, Petitioner contends that “coupled to the sheath” means “slideable inside the sheath” and “the sheath confines the bushing.” Pet. 9. Petitioner provides no additional support. The district court tentatively rejected this broad interpretation. See Ex. 2003, 27–28 (“[T]he Court recommends that ‘coupled to the sheath’ be construed as ‘linked together, connected, or joined, but not slidable inside the sheath.’”). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed construction of “coupled to the sheath” is “unreasonably broad,” but provides little citation to the intrinsic record before us. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. Instead, Patent Owner notes that the plain and ordinary meaning of coupled is “linked together, connected, or joined,” citing to an unrelated Federal Circuit decision as well as the related district court determination. Id. at 14; Ex. 2003, 28. In our proceeding, Petitioner has not provided persuasive evidence or argument to support its claim interpretation by merely pointing to what Patent Owner purportedly argued in district court. Based on the final record before us, “coupled to the sheath” means “linked together, connected, or joined” to the sheath. Our construction is consistent with the district court’s analysis and reflects the common understanding of the term “coupled” in the mechanical arts to require more than simply abutting or contacting. See generally Ex Parte Paul Robert Homrich, Appeal 2014-005786, 2016 WL 3541285, at *3 (PTAB, June 27, 2016) (“When used in mechanical systems, the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘coupled’ means to link together or connect,” and coupled requires more than contact or abut.).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Adams discloses “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath,” (Ex. 1027, 17:4–5) as required by claim 1 of the ’371 patent. Based on the final record, Petitioner’s contention that retainer 110 [bushing] is slidable inside the sheath, or confined by the sheath, does not establish persuasively that the proximal end of the bushing is coupled to the sheath as required by claim 1. The claimed coupling must be “proximal coupling” and Petitioner can only point to distal coupling via distal tabs 118, 119 (Pet. Supp. Reply 6) – this is not “proximal” coupling. Further, for the bushing and the sheath to be coupled requires them to be “linked together, connected, or joined” in some manner and Petitioner has not established any such connection for proximal coupling. Petitioner also has failed to establish a persuasive reason for linking or connecting retainer 110 and sheath 112 – indeed, doing so would negatively impact the ability of retainer 110 to freely slide out of sheath 112. See Prelim. Resp. 27. Adams suggest that when control wire 108 is actuated and the clip is locked into the lock sleeve, retainer release 109 pulls retainer 110 back, disengaging retainer tabs 118, 119 from the two retainer holes as depicted in Figure 4.” Ex. 1023, 7:26–44 Finally, we note that our decision would not change if we adopted the district court’s claim interpretation. The district court adopted a claim construction of “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath” as “linked together, connected, or joined, but not slidable inside the sheath.” Ex. 2003, 28 (emphasis added). Should the district court’s interpretation be the correct one, Patent Owner’s position is much stronger whereas Petitioner’s theory is based on slidable movement. See Pet. 9 (arguing for “slideable inside the sheath” and “the sheath confines the bushing”); Pet. Supp. Reply 6. Having now considered the evidence in the complete record established during trial, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been anticipated by Adams. Petitioner has not established persuasively that Adams discloses “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath.” For this reason, Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Adams anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,974,371 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,974,371
• K/S Himpp v. III Holdings 4, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00496 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Topholm and Michael because the cited art did not teach adjusting a hearing aid profile.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The problem we find with this position is that the Petitioner is reading claim elements into the description of these references. Patent Owner points out that the profiles are not being adjusted, but rather being selected from twenty-four previously stored profiles. Resp. 30–31. While the ear module operational profile changes, we observe that this is because it is using a different profile, which was just uploaded from the control unit. The act of moving the finger around on the screen to us perhaps appears to change the profile, when it is in fact moving through a set of preexisting profiles and uploading them to the hearing aid instead, changing operation of the hearing aid itself but not adjusting the profile itself. Michael states: This permits the user to select a hearing profile by simply moving visual indicator 924 over main region 922 while listening to a sound stream broadcast by ear 35 module 10; the sound stream being heard by the user reflects the hearing profile corresponding to the current position of the visual indicator 924 in real-time. Ex. 1005, 8:32–37.” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “4 Petitioner also relies upon the declaration testimony of Dr. Robert E. Morley, Jr. (Ex. 1002). Both references appear to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We find Dr. Morley, by virtue of his education and experience, qualified to testify to the subject matter of this proceeding. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 2–14 and Exhibit A thereto. We are cognizant of Patent Owner’s suggestion that we give his testimony “little, if any, weight” because of the similarity of the testimony with Petitioner’s arguments and discrepancies between it and his deposition testimony. PO Resp. 34–36. We give Dr. Morley’s testimony appropriate contextual weight herein based upon the content of the testimony itself, and any contrary testimony in Exhibit 2006. We decline to assign generally no weight to his testimony, however.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “These underlying factual considerations consist of: (1) the “level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art,”5 (2) the “scope and content of the prior art,” (3) the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” and (4) “secondary considerations” of non-obviousness such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.”6 KSR, 550 U.S. at 406 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18). 5 Petitioner defines the level of ordinary skill in the art as someone with a B.S. degree in electrical or computer engineering, or the equivalent, and at least two years of experience in the design of audiological products. Pet. 7-8 (citing Ex. 1002, ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not challenge this level. PO Resp., passim. The references in the record tend to support a finding that this is the appropriate level.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,761,421 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,761,421
• K/S Himpp v. III Holdings 4, LLCOther
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00414 · APJ James T Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over either Cohen and Martin or Holmes and Martin because the combinations did not establish the claimed separate shaping before mixing.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “As used herein, the term “hearing aid profile” refers to a collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid 102, which are used by a processor 110 to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for the user's hearing loss. Ex. 1001, 3:11–15. Petitioner states that Patent Owner defined this term in the ’538 patent as “a collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid 102, which are used by processor 110 to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for the user’s hearing loss.” Pet. 15. According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, relying upon the testimony of its witness Dr. Les Atlas. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38).10 Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction. Resp. 10–11. 10 Dr. Les Atlas is the Petitioner’s witness in this matter. We find him qualified to testify as to the subject matter of this proceeding, by virtue of his education and experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 4, and Appendix A thereto. We are cognizant of Patent Owner’s suggestion that we give his testimony “little, if any, weight” because of the similarity of the testimony with Petitioner’s arguments and discrepancies between it and his deposition testimony. Resp. 31–34. We give Dr. Atlas’ testimony appropriate contextual weight herein based upon the content of the testimony itself, and any contrary testimony in Exhibit 2005. We decline to assign generally no weight to his testimony, however. supports, and is consistent with, Petitioner’s proposal. Ex. 1001, 3:12–16. Accordingly, we determine that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the specification of the ’538 patent, of the term “hearing aid profile” is a “collection of acoustic configuration settings for hearing aid, which are used by a processor to shape electrical signals related to sounds to compensate for a user’s hearing loss.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “For the purposes of our decision, we determine that no other claim terms need explicit construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (citation omitted).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “11 Petitioner defines the level of ordinary skill in the art as someone with a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and at least two years of experience in the field of audio engineering. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition. Resp. passim. The references in the record support a finding that this is the appropriate level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of skill in the art). 12 The record contains no allegations or evidence of secondary considerations.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “We find the testimony of Dr. Atlas on the key point of obviousness of pre-mixing processing to be less persuasive than that of Mr. Brown. We also find Dr. Atlas’ testimony falls short of adequately explaining how the combination of Cohen and Martin teaches a nexus (i.e., the “based on both the first [shaped] output signal and the second [shaped] output signal” (emphasis added) (hereinafter, “based on both limitation”) limitation recited in claim 1) between the claim 1 requirements of: (1) a condition precedent of shaping both a first output signal and a second output signal; and (2) a subsequent result of using both the first shaped output signal and the second shaped output signal if the hearing aid is in a third mode. Dr. Atlas assumes that one of ordinary skill in the art would process separately each signal and then mix them. Ex. 1003 ¶ 66. We find Dr. Atlas’ assumption is flawed. Specifically, in making this assumption, Dr. Atlas does not address adequately how the combination of Cohen and Martin opines “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art” (emphasis added), his later sentences appears to base his opinion principally on the reason one of ordinary skill in the art could do it. Id. In particular, he testifies: Because Cohen’s hearing aid applies different hearing aid profiles to different input sources, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to add the functionality of the combination mode as taught by Martin to Cohen’s hearing aid such that the speaker would produce an audible sound based on the output signals of the processor. Combining two signals such that both signals are sent to a speaker to an audible combination of sounds, that is where each signal is sufficiently perceived, was well within the technical ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art. To accomplish this would require that each one of the two signals is passed through an appropriate hearing aid profile. For example, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art that a different hearing aid profiles could be used for an audio coil inputs and that of a neighboring conversation and environmental sounds through a microphone. Namely, it is commonly known that the different frequency sensitivity of an audio telecoil versus a microphone can be beneficially compensated for. (Rodriquez, Ex. 1011, Abstract)” slip op. at 24

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,649,538
• Hyperbranch Medical Technology, Inc. v. Incept LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 9, 2018 · IPR2016-01836 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–12 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Rhee ’500 or Rhee ’587, each combined with Bass or Tse.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Upon review of the parties’ respective definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as a person with either: (1) a Ph.D. in the field of chemistry, polymer chemistry, chemical engineering, materials science and/or a related field and having at least one year of educational or work experience in the synthesis and development of biocompatible polymer materials; (2) a bachelor’s degree in in [sic] the field of chemistry, polymer chemistry, chemical engineering, materials science and/or a related field and at least two years of work experience in the synthesis and development of biocompatible polymer materials; or (3) any education and experience equivalent to (1) or (2). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). We find that Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, i.e., a person having “a Ph.D. degree, or equivalent education, in polymer chemistry, or a bachelor of science degree in chemistry or a closely related field and several years of experience in the development and manufacture of polymer materials for use as tissue sealants,” PO Resp. 15–16 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 27), does not differ materially from Petitioner’s definition. Furthermore, our analysis would be the same under either parties’ definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “visualization agent” In its Petition, Petitioner proposed interpretations of certain claim terms. Pet. 18–22. The Board determined in its Institution Decision, however, that only the term “visualization agent” required express interpretation. Inst. Dec. 8 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). The Board set forth the broadest reasonable interpretation of “visualization agent” as “an agent that reflects or emits light at a wavelength detectable to a human eye so that a human eye may visualize the hydrogel coating.” Id. at 9. Neither party challenges that interpretation. See, e.g., Third Tr. 6:15–17. We have reassessed that determination in light of the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, and maintain that determination based on the full record.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “Conversely, a preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Id. Here, we determine that the preamble phrase “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” is not merely a statement of purpose, but instead represents the “essence or a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention.” Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In Vizio, the Federal Circuit held that a preamble reciting “for decoding” certain data “is properly construed as a claim limitation” because the apparatus and method claims reciting that preamble “would have little meaning without the intended objective of decoding.” Id. at 1341. Similarly here, we determine that the method step of claim 1—namely, mixing reactive nucleophilic precursor species, electrophilic precursor species, and a visualization agent—would have little meaning without the intended objective of forming a hydrogel coating on the tissue of a patient. Put differently, there would be no reason to perform the method step of claim 1 but for forming a hydrogel coating on the patient’s tissue. See Ex. 1001, 39:56–40:2 (claim 1) (providing that the reactive precursors crosslink after contact with the tissue to form a hydrogel in the form of a coating). Thus, we determine that “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” is limiting in this case because it gives “life and meaning” to method claim 1. We further find that the arguments and evidence in this case show that skilled artisans would reasonably interpret “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” as encompassing a biocompatibility requirement. Although Petitioner correctly notes that “[n]one of challenged claims recite the term ‘biocompatible,” Petitioner acknowledges that skilled artisans understand “that hydrogels are, by their nature as water-swelled materials, known to be biocompatible.” Pet. Suppl. Br. 4–5. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lowman, declared that “biocompatibility is presumed as a fundamental aspect of the claimed and disclosed inventions.” Ex. 2018 ¶ 40. And in his deposition, Dr. Lowman testified that skilled artisans would understand “biocompatible” to mean that the hydrogel composition is “suitable for use and tolerated by a patient.” Ex. 2019, 13:2–11 (emphasis added). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that “suitable to coat a tissue of a patient” reasonably encompasses a biocompatibility requirement for the hydrogel composition. slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “3. Motivation to combine the prior art references and reasonable expectation of success Even “[i]f all elements of the claims are found in a combination of prior art references,” “the factfinder should further consider whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would [have been] motivated to combine those references, and whether in making that combination, a person of ordinary skill would have [had] a reasonable expectation of success.” Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The “motivation to combine” and “reasonable expectation of success” factors are subsidiary requirements for obviousness subsumed within the Graham factors. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,009,034 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,009,034
• Argentum Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Cipla Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2017 · IPR2017-00807 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in declining to construe the terms or in reserving disputed motivation and reasonable-expectation issues for trial.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “We are not persuaded that the Board abused its discretion by declining to expressly interpret “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” in the Institution Decision. As the Board explained in the Institution Decision, Petitioner showed sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the prior art teaches pharmaceutical compositions in the form of nasal sprays. Instit. Dec. 14. Specifically, the Board found that the prior-art references explicitly teach nasal sprays that are administered nasally. See id. (citing Ex. 1007 (Hettche), 1:28–30, 2:12–17, 41–43), 15 (citing Ex. 1009 (Phillips), 32:57– 60, 33:12–14). Patent Owner does not allege its proposed construction of “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” is different from the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Id. at 4–6; see also Prelim. Resp. 9–11. As a consequence, we are not persuaded that the Board overlooked or misapprehended this matter or that the Board would have declined institution on the obviousness grounds had it explicitly adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation.” slip op. at 4

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “osmolality, poor spray quality, and unacceptable settling and caking” resulting from the attempted formulation of Cramer’s Example III. Id. at 8– 10; see also Prelim. Resp. 25. The Board, however, addressed those issues in the Institution Decision and determined that “Patent Owner’s arguments and expert testimony highlight disputed issues of fact about whether the skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Hettche, Phillipps, and Segal to arrive at the claimed subject matter, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success.” Instit. Dec. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002, 268–87; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 40–47; Ex. 2111, 1; Ex. 2044, 1–2). The Board concluded that those “issues are best resolved following trial with the benefit of a full record.” Id. We are still of that view. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Board misapprehended or overlooked the issue of reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenOther

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on petition, we review 1 Helmut Hettche, U.S. Patent No. 5,164,194 (Nov. 17, 1992) (“Hettche”). Ex. 1007. 2 Gordon H. Phillipps, et al., U.S. Patent No. 4,335,121 (Jun. 15, 1982) (“Phillipps”). Ex. 1009. 3 Catherine A. Segal, Int’l Publication No. WO 98/48839 (Nov. 5, 1998) (“Segal”). Ex. 1012. 4 FLONASE® (fluticasone propionate) Nasal Spray, 50 mcg Product Information (Dec. 1998) (“Flonase Label”). Ex. 1010. the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “In the Institution Decision, the Board determined that “no claim term requires express interpretation for purposes of this Decision.” Instit. Dec. 7. In its Rehearing Request, Patent Owner argues that the Board “misapprehended or overlooked the importance of construing the terms ‘nasal spray’ and ‘suitable for nasal administration’” found in all the challenged claims. Reh’g Req. 2. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that those terms mean “pharmaceutical formulations that are tolerable to patients, homogeneous, and can be suitably deposited onto the nasal mucosa.” Id. (citing Paper 7, Preliminary Response (“Prelim. Resp.”), 9). Patent Owner alleges that, had the Board construed “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration,” then the Board would have denied the obviousness grounds because “none of the combinations of cited art teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make the claimed fixed-dose combination ‘nasal spray’ or formulation ‘suitable for nasal administration’ with a reasonable expectation of success.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Prelim. Resp. 9). We are not persuaded that the Board abused its discretion by declining to expressly interpret “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” in the Institution Decision. As the Board explained in the Institution Decision, Petitioner showed sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the prior art teaches pharmaceutical compositions in the form of nasal sprays. Instit. Dec. 14. Specifically, the Board found that the prior-art references explicitly teach nasal sprays that are administered nasally. See id. (citing Ex. 1007 (Hettche), 1:28–30, 2:12–17, 41–43), 15 (citing Ex. 1009 (Phillips), 32:57– 60, 33:12–14). Patent Owner does not allege its proposed construction of “nasal spray” and “suitable for nasal administration” is different from the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms to an ordinarily skilled artisan. Id. at 4–6; see also Prelim. Resp. 9–11. As a consequence, we are not persuaded that the Board overlooked or misapprehended this matter or that the Board would have declined institution on the obviousness grounds had it explicitly adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation.” slip op. at 3

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,168,620
• Duane Brockman v. Wesley BainterInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 11, 2017 · DER2016-00002 · APJ Jameson Lee · DER · Institution

  The Board denied institution of a derivation proceeding because the petition did not provide substantial evidence that the challenged claims were the same or substantially the same as the invention conceived and communicated.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “required to show (1) that the challenged claims are drawn to the same or substantially the same invention as the invention he disclosed to Respondent, (2) that Petitioner has at least one claim that is the same or substantially the same as the Respondent’s claimed invention, and (3) that Petitioner has at least one claim that is the same or substantially the same as the invention Petitioner disclosed to the Respondent. For these requirements, the Petition contains only a general citation to “Ex. 1003; Ex. 1004; Ex. 1005.” Pet. 7–11. As noted above, Exhibit 1003 is a declaration from Petitioner; Exhibit 1004 is a declaration of Tyler Brockman; and Exhibit 1005 is an affidavit of Scott Sproul. None of the testimony from Petitioner, Tyler Brockman, and Scott Sproul, however, addresses the specifics of any claim. With regard to the first requirement, it cannot simply be assumed that the challenged claims are drawn to the same or substantially the same invention as that which Petitioner has conceived and communicated to Respondent. The Petitioner provides no reasoning or analysis in that regard. Several features in the challenged claims demand a meaningful accounting by Petitioner, relative to the invention conceived by Petitioner and communicated by Petitioner to Respondent. Challenged claims 1, 2, and 6 are independent and all other challenged claims depend, directly or indirectly, from one of claims 1, 2, and 6. Claim 1 requires an actuator, mounted to an irrigation tower and separate from the anchor member, that has a retracted position and an extended position. According to claim 1, the anchor member is mounted to the actuator. Also according to claim 1, when the actuator is in its retracted position, the anchor member is retracted above the soil surface, and when the actuator is in its extended position, the anchor member penetrates the soil surface. The invention conceived by Petitioner and as communicated by Petitioner to Respondent, as identified above, however, includes no such actuator. More particularly, lacking from the Petitioner’s conceived and communicated invention is a sufficient disclosure or description of an actuator that, itself, translates between extended and retracted positions, and lacking from the Petition is any reasoning to account for the obviousness of such a feature to one with ordinary skill in the art. Similarly, claim 2 requires a motor, in an actuator, that is slidably mounted to the frame for movement between a retracted position and an extended position. The invention conceived by Petitioner and communicated by Petitioner to Respondent, as identified above, however, includes no such actuator and motor, and the Petition does not account for such a feature. Claim 6 requires a motor movably mounted to a frame for translation between a retracted position and an extended position, and a control unit that causes both the motor and the anchor member to move from a retracted position to an extended position and from an extended position to a retracted position. The invention conceived by Petitioner and communicated by Petitioner to Respondent, as identified above, however, includes no such motor and control module, and the Petition does not account for such a feature.” slip op. at 8

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied

    “II. Discussion In its Response to the Show Cause Order, Petitioner argues that 35 U.S.C. § 135 does not require a petitioner’s involved application to be maintained after a derivation petition has been filed, that Petitioner’s entire purpose for filing the Petition was for the Board to direct that “the Petitioner be added as a named inventor [in] Respondent[’s] Application,” and that “the Respondent be removed as a named inventor from the Respondent Application.” Paper 6, 1–2. Under the circumstances here, we do not enter adverse judgment against Petitioner for having abandoned the ’929 Application. Hereinafter, we discuss the merits of the Petition for purposes of determining whether a derivation proceeding should be instituted.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “required to show (1) that the challenged claims are drawn to the same or substantially the same invention as the invention he disclosed to Respondent, (2) that Petitioner has at least one claim that is the same or substantially the same as the Respondent’s claimed invention, and (3) that Petitioner has at least one claim that is the same or substantially the same as the invention Petitioner disclosed to the Respondent. For these requirements, the Petition contains only a general citation to “Ex. 1003; Ex. 1004; Ex. 1005.” Pet. 7–11. As noted above, Exhibit 1003 is a declaration from Petitioner; Exhibit 1004 is a declaration of Tyler Brockman; and Exhibit 1005 is an affidavit of Scott Sproul. None of the testimony from Petitioner, Tyler Brockman, and Scott Sproul, however, addresses the specifics of any claim. With regard to the first requirement, it cannot simply be assumed that the challenged claims are drawn to the same or substantially the same invention as that which Petitioner has conceived and communicated to Respondent. The Petitioner provides no reasoning or analysis in that regard. Several features in the challenged claims demand a meaningful accounting by Petitioner, relative to the invention conceived by Petitioner and communicated by Petitioner to Respondent. Challenged claims 1, 2, and 6 are independent and all other challenged claims depend, directly or indirectly, from one of claims 1, 2, and 6. Claim 1 requires an actuator, mounted to an irrigation tower and separate from the anchor member, that has a retracted position and an extended position. According to claim 1, the anchor member is mounted to the actuator. Also according to claim 1, when the actuator is in its retracted position, the anchor member is retracted above the soil surface, and when the actuator is in its extended position, the anchor member penetrates the soil surface. The invention conceived by Petitioner and as communicated by Petitioner to Respondent, as identified above, however, includes no such actuator. More particularly, lacking from the Petitioner’s conceived and communicated invention is a sufficient disclosure or description of an actuator that, itself, translates between extended and retracted positions, and lacking from the Petition is any reasoning to account for the obviousness of such a feature to one with ordinary skill in the art. Similarly, claim 2 requires a motor, in an actuator, that is slidably mounted to the frame for movement between a retracted position and an extended position. The invention conceived by Petitioner and communicated by Petitioner to Respondent, as identified above, however, includes no such actuator and motor, and the Petition does not account for such a feature.” slip op. at 8

  None
  Patents in suitUS 9,215,847
• Geosys-Intl, Inc. v. Farmers Edge Precision Consulting Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 17, 2016 · IPR2015-00709 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not show claim 25 would have been obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Johannsen, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the field of this invention “would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Agricultural Systems Management, Agriculture, Agronomy, or a related degree and would have had several years of experience with precision farming.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 16. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Heiniger, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in this field would have “at least a Bachelor of Science degree in agronomy or a related field, and at least a Masters Degree in a discipline that involves engineering systems using remote sensing data or comparable work experience. Such a person would have had some practical experience integrating these remote sensing systems.” Ex. 2033 ¶ 18; see also PO Resp. 26 (same). Although Dr. Heiniger’s position is not exactly the same as Dr. Johannsen’s, Dr. Heiniger adds that the “[d]ifferences between who Dr. Johannsen and I view as a person of ordinary skill in the art are not material to my opinions . . . .” Ex. 2033 ¶ 19. The differences between Dr. Johannsen’s and Dr. Heiniger’s articulations of the level of ordinary skill in the art are fairly minor. Our analysis below, including the conclusions we reach, would be substantially the same under either proposal. Nevertheless, after considering the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Heiniger’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision to Institute, we construed the phrase “calculating a map”5 in claims 1, 6, 8, 13, 15, 17–19, and 24 to mean “performing calculations to produce a map.” Dec. to Inst. 7. With respect to the phrase “maximum possible crop yield” in claims 1, 8, and 15, we declined to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “yield goal” and instead applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language. Id. at 8–9. We further determined that no other claim term required express construction. Id. at 9. Following institution, neither party challenged those constructions or proposed other terms for construction. Therefore, for the reasons explained in the Decision to Institute, we maintain the constructions set forth therein. 5 We understand the phrase “calculating a map” to have the same construction, regardless of whether it appears as “calculating . . . a map,” “calculate . . . a map,” or “calculating a map.”” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “calculating nitrogen needs for a field.” Ex. 1001, 1:39–40. Hauwiller’s system is open to a variety of recommendation equations, as Patent Owner’s declarant agrees. See Ex. 1006, 8:36–48, 9:18–21, 9:34–38, 13:30–35, 13:39–45; Ex. 1020, 8:11–16. This openness supports the obviousness of employing within Hauwiller’s system a conventional equation (or certain aspects of a conventional equation) such as the one set forth in the Background of the ’912 patent. Further, while the conventional equation includes several variables, a basic teaching of the equation is that in calculating the fertilizer recommendation, the amount of nitrogen already present should be subtracted from the nitrogen needed to realize the yield goal. See Ex. 1001, 1:39–50. Dr. Johannsen’s testimony that “subtraction of existing nutrients from the nutrient amount was a conventional thing to do particularly because it helps reduce leaching due to over fertilization” is consistent with this understanding of the conventional equation. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 71. We also recognize that the ’912 patent describes the equation as being a conventional approach for calculating nitrogen needs “for a field” rather than for a specific site within the field. Ex. 1001, 1:39–40. But Hauwiller recognizes that “[d]esired yield potential varies depending upon the soil characteristics by location” and, for that reason, describes the desirability of constructing “a yield goal map for creating an application map based upon site specific yield goals.” Ex. 1006, 9:32–41 (emphasis added). Thus, Hauwiller teaches the advantages and desirability of a site specific approach. We agree with Petitioner that the “subtracting” step would have been obvious by applying the teachings of the equation in the Background of the ’912 patent to the site-specific approach of Hauwiller. The evidence supports Petitioner’s contentions summarized above, and we agree with Petitioner that claim 15 would have been obvious based on Hauwiller and the prior art described in the Background of the ’912 patent, even taking into account the secondary considerations discussed in Section II.E. below. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, but we do not find them persuasive for the reasons discussed below.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not shown the required nexus between the alleged objective indicia of nonobviousness and the merits of the claimed invention. Although the agreements between Petitioner and the former owner of the ’912 patent convey rights under the ’912 patent, they involve significantly more than the pertinent licenses. The 2008 and 2011 agreements convey licenses to a broader portfolio of U.S. and Canadian patents as well as copyrights, trademarks, and a domain name. Ex. 2022, 4–6; Ex. 2023, 4–6. Moreover, the licenses to intellectual property are just one facet of these agreements, the primary purpose of which is “to set forth the terms upon which Geosys shall provide sales, marketing and support for Field InSite as part of the Geosys FarmSat Platform.” Ex. 2022, 2; Ex. 2023, 2. Similarly, the 2012 agreement conveys rights beyond the ’912 patent. Ex. 2024, 2–3. Patent Owner does not point to, and we do not find, any portion of these agreements assigning a particular royalty rate or value for the ’912 patent. Given the breadth of the agreements and the absence of evidence or explanation from Patent Owner concerning nexus, any determination of how much of the value of the agreements is attributable to the ’912 patent would be speculative. See In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 703 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Further, the 2012 agreement calls for a lump sum payment for all of the rights conveyed, the amount of which is less than a reasonable estimate of potential litigation costs. Ex. 2024, 2–3. This detracts further from Patent Owner’s argument that the agreements support the nonobviousness of the ’912 patent. See EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907– 08 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that licensing programs “are not infallible guides to patentability. They sometimes succeed because they are mutually beneficial to the licensed group or because of business judgments that it is cheaper to take licenses than to defend infringement suits, or for other reasons unrelated to the unobviousness of the licensed subject matter.”). Patent Owner’s argument based on its acquisition of the ’912 patent is also unpersuasive. The evidence that Patent Owner cites in support of that argument shows only that The Mosaic Company filed and subsequently dismissed a Canadian patent infringement suit against Patent Owner. See Exs. 2025, 2026.8 Patent Owner does not cite to the agreement by which ownership of the ’912 patent was transferred, nor does Patent Owner provide the details of that agreement. The evidence Patent Owner relies on does not support Patent Owner’s argument that its decision to acquire the ’912 patent constitutes objective evidence of nonobviousness of the ’912 patent. Finally, the commercial success argument Patent Owner presents in a” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 7,171,912 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,171,912

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.