- PTAB · Apr 6, 2022 · DER2017-00031 · APJ Jameson Lee · DER · Institution
The Board instituted a derivation proceeding as to Respondent’s claims 24–36, finding sufficient evidence that claims 24–30 and 32–35 matched the disclosed invention.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The threshold showing for institution of a derivation proceeding is whether the petition demonstrates substantial evidence, which if unrebutted, would support the assertion of derivation.5 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(c). For establishing derivation, a petitioner must show that the respondent, without authorization, filed an application claiming a derived invention. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.405(b)(2). The party asserting derivation must establish prior conception of an invention and communication of that conception to an inventor of the other party. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (CCPA 1974).” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Exhibits 1026, 1028, 1041, and 1042, constitute sufficient evidence, under the substantial evidence standard, to support Petitioner’s assertion of conception, except for the requirement of independent corroboration. For instance, there is no declaration testimony from any of the recipients of the email communications or people who were copied on those email communications to corroborate those email communications. There is no testimony from anyone at Pro-Tech to corroborate the nature and existence of the signed manufacturing outline that is Exhibit 1042.” slip op. at 9
None - Snap Inc. v. Sanderling Management Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 9, 2021 · IPR2021-00778 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, and 4–12 would have been obvious over Hogeg and claim 3 over Hogeg and Arujunan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We agree with Petitioner that this factor weighs against discretionary denial. As Wyze explained, the reason a stay favors institution is because it “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Because the [district] court decided an issue that does not overlap with those presented in this proceeding, and the [district] court is not likely to address the obviousness issues before our final written decision (if it addresses the issues at all), the [district] court’s ruling has allayed any concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts between us and the [district] court. Wyze, Paper 14 at 10. The same reasoning applies here. The district court’s judgment of invalidity under § 101 and Patent Owner’s appeal of that judgment virtually assures that the district court will not be considering the same obviousness issues presented in this Petition during the course of this proceeding.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We agree with Patent Owner that the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’412 patent. There is no dispute that Hogeg was at least considered by the Examiner, even if the Examiner never discussed Hogeg or relied on it in any manner. See Ex. 1002, 63. Although Petitioner correctly points out that Arujunan was not of record during prosecution of the ’412 patent, Petitioner only relies on Arujunan for its challenge to dependent claim 3. See Pet. 10–11, 71. Petitioner relies on Hogeg alone for its challenge to claims 1, 2, and 4–12. See id. at 11. Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics satisfied because the prior art before the Examiner was substantially the same as the prior art relied on in the Petition.” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 314(a) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the briefing thus far, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds.1” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“(2) The Remaining Limitations Patent Owner does not offer any arguments specifically addressing the remaining limitations of claim 1 or Petitioner’s reasons to modify Hogeg as proposed. See Prelim. Resp. 18–30; Prelim. Sur-reply. We have reviewed these aspects of Petitioner’s contentions, and determine that the Petition provides a sufficient showing, at this stage of the proceeding, that Hogeg, when modified as proposed, satisfies each limitation and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify Hogeg as proposed. For the reasons above, we determine, based on the current record, that the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Hogeg.” slip op. at 40
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,355,412 - Snap Inc. v. Sanderling Management Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 9, 2021 · IPR2021-00781 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3, 18, and 20 were obvious over Hogeg and claims 3, 7, 17, 20, 24, and 34 over Hogeg and …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We agree with Petitioner that this factor weighs against discretionary denial. As Wyze explained, the reason a stay favors institution is because it “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Because the [district] court decided an issue that does not overlap with those presented in this proceeding, and the [district] court is not likely to address the obviousness issues before our final written decision (if it addresses the issues at all), the [district] court’s ruling has allayed any concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts between us and the [district] court. Wyze, Paper 14 at 10. The same reasoning applies here. The district court’s judgment of invalidity under § 101 and Patent Owner’s appeal of that judgment virtually assures that the district court will not be considering the same obviousness issues presented in this Petition during the course of this proceeding.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We agree with Patent Owner that the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’986 patent. There is no dispute that Hogeg was at least considered by the Examiner, even if the Examiner never discussed Hogeg or applied it in a rejection. See Ex. 1002, 502. Advanced Bionics Part One asks whether a reference was previously presented to the Office, not whether the Office formed a rejection based on the reference. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS).”). Although Petitioner correctly points out that Arujunan was not of record during prosecution of the ’986 patent, Petitioner relies on Hogeg alone for its challenge to claims 1, 3, 18, and 20. See Pet. 11, 18. Under these circumstances, we find Advanced Bionics Part One satisfied because the prior art before the Examiner was substantially the same as the prior art relied on in the Petition.” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its contention that claim 1 would have been obvious over Hogeg. 3. Claims 3, 18, and 20 Claim 18 is a system claim that recites many limitations similar to those recited in claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 24:55–25:14. Petitioner contends that Hogeg teaches or renders obvious each of the limitations of claim 18, referring back to its arguments regarding claim 1 for common subject matter. See Pet. 59–65. Claims 3 and 20 recite similar features but depend from different claims: claim 3 depends from claim 1, while claim 20 depends from claim 18. See Ex. 1001, 24:3–7, 25:17–21. Petitioner asserts, with detailed citations to the record, that Hogeg teaches the limitations of claims 3 and 20. See Pet. 57–59, 65. We determine, on the current record, that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its contention that claims 3, 18, and 20 would have been obvious over Hogeg.” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree, or the equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, and 2–3 years of experience in research, design, or development of mobile imaging systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 21. According to Petitioner, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more education and less experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173–174). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,108,986 - Snap Inc. v. Sanderling Management Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 9, 2021 · IPR2021-00780 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–16, 18, 19, 21–23, and 25–33 because Snap showed a reasonable likelihood they would have been obvious over Hogeg.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Concerning [1b], Petitioner relies on Hogeg’s system 100, which includes network servers, as the claimed “at least one hardware processor,” and the visual content editing functions stored in Hogeg’s repository 104 as the claimed “one or more digital media content processing functions.” Id. at 28–32. Petitioner argues that Hogeg teaches that its visual content editing functions are “associated with at least one distribution rule defining a sensor data condition” as claimed because a subset of functions are selected and distributed based on sensed conditions such as client terminal location. Id. at 33–41. Turning to [1c], Petitioner argues that Hogeg teaches receiving over network 101 sensor data from client terminals 102 that is determined according to outputs of GPS units of client terminals 102. Id. at 42–46. As to [1d], Petitioner argues that Hogeg teaches distributing digital media content processing functions to mobile devices “based on a match between the sensor data condition . . . and the sensor data of the at least one mobile device” as claimed because it describes sending a subset of visual content editing functions to a client terminal based on matching the GPS data from the mobile device with location information related to the visual editing functions stored in system 100. Id. at 46–50. Finally, with respect to [1e], Petitioner asserts that Hogeg teaches that “the at least one digital media content processing function is configured to be used by an application executed on the at least one mobile device” as claimed because Hogeg describes that its visual content editing function is configured to be used by an app, widget, or add-on in client terminal 102. Id. at 50–52. Further, Petitioner asserts that Hogeg’s content editing function “process[es] a digital media content to create an output digital media content” as claimed because it processes an image on a client terminal and creates a new image, which is a modified version of the original image. Id. at 50, 52–55. Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has” slip op. at 31
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“because it “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Because the [district] court decided an issue that does not overlap with those presented in this proceeding, and the [district] court is not likely to address the obviousness issues before our final written decision (if it addresses the issues at all), the [district] court’s ruling has allayed any concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts between us and the [district] court. Wyze, Paper 14 at 10. The same reasoning applies here. The district court’s judgment of invalidity under § 101 and Patent Owner’s appeal of that judgment virtually assures that the district court will not be considering the same obviousness issues presented in this Petition during the course of this proceeding.” slip op. at 13
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“We are satisfied that Petitioner has provided an adequate justification for filing two petitions to challenge the ’986 patent. The Board’s Practice Guide notes that a need to address a large number of claims is one example of a circumstance where more than one petition may be necessary. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, at 59 (Nov. 2019). Beyond the number of challenged claims, it is reasonable for Petitioner to question how it could effectively challenge in a single petition a claim set that, by itself, fills out 10% of the permissible word count. Finally, Petitioner shows that the two petitions have been structured in a way to minimize the burden on the Board and Patent Owner, by presenting a small number of grounds with consistent arguments that rely on the same art. See, e.g., Google LLC v. Jenam Tech, LLC, IPR2021-00629, Paper 11 at 9 (PTAB Sept. 20, 2021) (finding that Petitioner had provided a satisfactory explanation for filing two petitions against a single patent because “[e]ach petition challenges different claims and presents only one ground against each claim,” as opposed to “a situation where a petitioner is using two petitions to lodge multiple parallel challenges to the same claims”).” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the current record, we find that Petitioner has shown that the Examiner erred in failing to reject the claims based on Hogeg. As noted previously, the prosecution history of the ’986 patent includes no analysis or discussion of Hogeg. “[I]f the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. The Examiner’s explanation of why the claims were allowable over the prior art of record focused on “the combination of distribution rule defining a sensor data condition and sensor data.” Ex. 1002, 498. However, Petitioner provides a detailed discussion of why Hogeg discloses those features. See Pet. 28–42, 44–46. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not contest Petition’s contentions regarding these limitations (or any other aspect of the merits of Petitioner’s challenges). See Prelim. Resp. 1–16. As discussed below, we determine on the current record that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in demonstrating that the challenged claims would have been obvious based on Hogeg. We also find Petitioner’s showing sufficient to establish that the Examiner erred. The parties’ reliance on the prosecution of related patents involving allegedly similar claims does not impact the outcome of our analysis. See Pet. 17 (mentioning, without elaboration or citation, the EPO rejection of claims); Prelim. Resp. 14–15 (addressing allowance of claims over Hogeg and other material). Because we find that Petitioner made a sufficient showing of Examiner error without relying on the EPO rejection of allegedly similar claims, we need not assess the probative value of the EPO’s rejection, the details of which are not discussed in this Petition. As to Patent Owner’s reliance on the prosecution history of related claims before different Examiners that considered Hogeg and related materials, those arguments do not undermine Petitioner’s showing of Examiner error. First, Patent Owner acknowledges that although the Examiners considered Hogeg, “neither Examiner specifically discussed Hogeg in allowing claims” that were at issue. Prelim. Resp. 15. Second, even if the claims in the related applications are “similar” to the challenged claims, Patent Owner’s briefing does not provide any detailed analysis of the related claims sufficient to determine how the claims in later applications differ from the challenged claims here, and whether those differences are material. See id. at 14–15. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the Examiners’ allowance of the claims in other applications over Hogeg amounted to a finding that Hogeg fails to disclose one of the limitations in the challenged claims here. Further, even if we agreed that such an implicit finding was made during later prosecution, Petitioner’s challenge based on Hogeg in the Petition provides more compelling evidence of Examiner error than the prosecution of related claims that lack any direct discussion of Hogeg. 5. Conclusion Based on our review of the current record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that the Examiner erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,108,986 - Snap Inc. v. Sanderling Management Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 9, 2021 · IPR2021-00779 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Snap would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 314(a) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the briefing thus far, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); PTAB Rules of Practice for Instituting on All Challenged Patent Claims and All Grounds and Eliminating the Presumption at Institution Favoring Petitioner as to Testimonial Evidence (“PTAB Rules”), 85 Fed. Reg. 79,120, 79,120 (Dec. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (“[T]he Board will either institute review on all of the challenged claims and grounds of unpatentability presented in the petition or deny the petition.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We agree with Petitioner that this factor weighs against discretionary denial. As Wyze explained, the reason a stay favors institution is because it “allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. Because the [district] court decided an issue that does not overlap with those presented in this proceeding, and the [district] court is not likely to address the obviousness issues before our final written decision (if it addresses the issues at all), the [district] court’s ruling has allayed any concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts between us and the [district] court. Wyze, Paper 14 at 10. The same reasoning applies here. The district court’s judgment of invalidity under § 101 and Patent Owner’s appeal of that judgment virtually assures that the district court will not be considering the same obviousness issues presented in this Petition during the course of this proceeding.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We agree with Patent Owner that the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’866 patent. There is no dispute that Hogeg was at least considered by the Examiner, even if the Examiner never discussed Hogeg or relied on it in any manner. See Ex. 1002 at 132. Although Petitioner correctly points out that neither Svendsen nor Arujunan was of record during prosecution of the ’866 patent, Petitioner only relies on those references for its challenges to dependent claims 3 and 11. See Pet. 63–77. Petitioner relies on Hogeg alone for its challenge to claims 1, 2, and 4–10. See Pet. 27–63. Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics satisfied because the prior art before the Examiner was substantially the same as the prior art relied on in the Petition.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, with accompanying declaration testimony, that a person having ordinary skill in the art “at the time of the alleged invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree, or the equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, and 2–3 years of experience in research, design, or development of mobile imaging systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 23–24. According to Petitioner, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more education and less experience, may also meet this standard.” Pet. 24 (citing Parulski Decl. ¶¶ 186–187). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,639,866
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.