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  • PTAB · Dec 4, 2017 · IPR2017-00649 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution on claims 1–30 because Petitioner did not show that the Board overlooked or misapprehended its obviousness arguments.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “The Decision Denying Institution considered Petitioner’s argument regarding combining Bonella’s power reduction technique and Bonella’s power loss algorithm as it was presented in the Petition. Thus, Petitioner has not established the proposition that the Board overlooked or misapprehended some evidence in the record. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. Thus, we are not persuaded by this argument.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot reached

      “disclosed the specific feature alleged to be obvious. Req. Reh’g 12. We disagree. The Decision Denying Institution found that Long and Ashmore did not provide motivation for the specific combination advanced by Petitioner, stating “Petitioner does not point to a motivation to adjust the frequency of the memory banks specifically, simply a general motivation to reduce battery power during power loss.” Inst. Dec. 13. Thus, the Decision Denying Institution stated “we are not persuaded Ashmore [or Long] supports that contention that running at the frequency associated with Power Level 4 during a power loss would have been obvious.” Id. 13–14. “[T]o establish obviousness based on a combination of the elements disclosed in the prior art, there must be some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the applicant.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citation omitted)(emphasis added)). “A determination of obviousness cannot be reached where the record lacks ‘explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’” Hyundai Motor Co. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC, Case IPR2016-01476, slip op. at 32 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2017) (Paper 12) (quoting Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The Decision Denying Institution properly followed this precedent in requiring a specific motivation to make the combination alleged by Petitioner to meet the claimed combination.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “CONCLUSION The Request for Rehearing does not demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters raised in the Petition declining to institute review of claims 1–30.” slip op. at 7

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,301,833
  • PTAB · Dec 4, 2017 · IPR2017-01441 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments, the fact that two references relate to the same general subject matter is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to modify one reference in view of the other; it demonstrates at most that the two references are in the same field of endeavor. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Nor is an alleged admission that Fife and Stephenson are prior art to the ’075 patent sufficient to explain why these two references would be combined in a manner necessary to arrive at the claimed invention. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 389, 418–19 (2007) (“[I]nventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.”). In support of the Petition, Mr. Frost generally reiterates Petitioner’s arguments, stating: “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of Fife and Stephenson since both Fife and Stephenson relate to methods for producing tantalum electrolytic capacitors, and both Fife and Stephenson constitute admitted prior art mentioned specifically in the ’075 Patent.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 32. Mr. Frost does not explain, however, why either of these factors would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to use Stephenson’s higher formation voltages in Fife. Thus, this testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expert testimony regarding motivation to combine is insufficient if it is “generic and bears no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements” and “fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does”); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “[l]ack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations” may “render the testimony of little probative value”). As Petitioner provides insufficient rationale to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the disclosures of Fife and Stephenson in a manner necessary to achieve the claimed invention, it has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over those references. And, because challenged claims 2–11 and 13–18 each depend from claim 1, and because the deficiencies in Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding claim 1 are not remedied by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding claims 2–11 and 13–18, Petitioner has likewise not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the subject matter of those claims would have been obvious over Fife and Stephenson.6” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “In support of the Petition, Mr. Frost generally reiterates Petitioner’s arguments, stating: “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine the teachings of Fife and Stephenson since both Fife and Stephenson relate to methods for producing tantalum electrolytic capacitors, and both Fife and Stephenson constitute admitted prior art mentioned specifically in the ’075 Patent.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 32. Mr. Frost does not explain, however, why either of these factors would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to use Stephenson’s higher formation voltages in Fife. Thus, this testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expert testimony regarding motivation to combine is insufficient if it is “generic and bears no relation to any specific combination of prior art elements” and “fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined elements from specific references in the way the claimed invention does”); see also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that “[l]ack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations” may “render the testimony of little probative value”).” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,312,075
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01869 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 3–8, 10–12, 14–18, 20–23, 25, and 27–29 unpatentable over Shuen and RFC1234, and claim 19 unpatentable over Bellovin.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successDecided for petitioner

      “mapping for the network address translation” under the Board’s construction of that phrase, i.e., “a property associated with the mapping in which the mapping expires after it has not been used in the translation of a packet for a period of time associated with the mapping,” the Petition cites the following language from Shuen:” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Disclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “from various documents into a host document . . . by citing such material in a manner that makes clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein.” Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.” Id. (citations omitted). Whether and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into a host document is a question of law. Id.” slip op. at 8

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

      “Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Notably, Patent Owner did not raise this argument (i.e., that Shuen’s “time to live” does not satisfy the recited “time out . . .” under the Board’s construction) in its Patent Owner Response. Patent Owner asserts, however, it “noted this deficiency of Petitioner’s proofs in the January 18, 2017 hearing” and “[t]his deficiency of Shuen was first raised in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response.” Req. Reh’g. 4. However, our rules do not allow Patent Owner to incorporate arguments by reference from its Preliminary Response (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference form one document into another document”)), and our Scheduling Order provides that any arguments and evidence not contained in the Patent Owner Response will be “deemed waived” (Paper 9, 3). Petitioner asserted at the oral hearing that the argument was new and, as such, Petitioner did not have a reasonable ability to respond to the argument. Tr. 43:8–14. We determine Patent Owner has waived its argument that Shuen does not disclose the “has not been used” portion of our construction of the phrase “time out of the mapping for the network address translation.”” slip op. at 3

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,544,079
  • PTAB · Aug 28, 2017 · IPR2016-00593 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held that claims 12–15, 21–23, 25–27, 33–38, 44, and 45 were not shown unpatentable because Pictometry was not established as a publicly accessible printed publication.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “Version 2.7 (“EFS 2.7 User Guide,” “Pictometry,” or “User Guide”) and, as the name suggests, is a user guide for the Pictometry software product. See Ex. 1004, xiii. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not demonstrate that Pictometry is prior art. PO Resp. 5–10. In our Final Written Decision in IPR2016-00594, we considered substantively the same arguments and evidence Patent Owner and Petitioner raise in this case. See IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29; compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 31, 13–20 with PO Resp. 6– 13; and compare IPR2016-00594 Paper 33, 3–9 with Reply 4–11. In IPR2016-00594, we found Pictometry’s limited dissemination to some governmental entities subject to licensing restrictions was not sufficient to show public dissemination or public accessibility. IPR2016-00594 FWD 17–29. We adopt that same finding here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we find that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 311(b).” slip op. at 6

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

      “substantively the same as the arguments made in IPR2016-00594. In IPR2016-00594, we denied Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 1004 (Pictometry), Exhibit 1011 (a Merriam-Webster Dictionary Definition “database” copied from a web page), Exhibit 2010 (Cohasset Town Report 2008), 2011 (LARIAC1 Pictometry Training), Exhibit 2012 (LAR-IAC2 Product Guide), Exhibit 2020 (“GIS: Pictometry: Oblique Imagery training), Exhibit 2021 (“Pictometry License Guidelines”), and Exhibit 2022 (“Pictometry – April 19, 2007”). IPR2016-00594 FWD 5–17. We granted Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibit 2013 (article titled “Los Angeles County Extends its License Agreement with Pictometry for New Oblique Aerial Photos”), Exhibit 2014 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2015 (“Information about TXWILM Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2016 (“Pictometry Administrative Training”), Exhibit 2019 (“GIS Working Group Meeting Minutes”), Exhibit 2023 (“Welcome to Your End User Training”), Exhibit 2024 (“Electronic Field Study Getting Started Guide”), Exhibit 2025 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals1”), and Exhibit 2026 (“Pictometry Announces Technical Advancements for GIS Professionals2”). Id. We adopt the same findings and conclusions here. For the reasons explained in IPR2016-00594, we deny the motion to exclude Exhibits 1004, 1011, 2010, 2011, 2020, 2021, and 2022, but grant the motion to exclude Exhibits 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026. See id.” slip op. at 5

    Patent outcomesUS 8,823,732 not shown unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 8,823,732
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2017 · IPR2017-00887 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution for claims 1–15 under § 314(a), finding the second petition an inadequately explained follow-on challenge filed after Petitioner saw the earlier response and decision.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “because (1) it would be inequitable to Patent Owner to allow Petitioner’s second challenge to the same claims when Petitioner had the opportunity to see Patent Owner’s preliminary response and the Board’s Decision Denying Institution in Case IPR2016-01371, and (2) Petitioner was aware or should have been aware of the primary prior art references asserted in the Second Petition before the filing of its First Petition in Case IPR2016-01371. Prelim. Resp. 4–5, 21–26 (citing Synaptics Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., Case IPR2017-00085, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Apr. 18, 2017) (Paper 12). We are persuaded that the specific circumstances of this case invoke a concern, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), over the potential inequity of Petitioner filing multiple attacks, with the benefit of having seen Patent Owner’s contentions and the Board’s decision regarding a prior challenge by the same Petitioner to the same patent.” slip op. at 5

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,619,051
  • PTAB · Aug 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00594 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Petitioner did not prove claims 1–10 and 13–20 unpatentable because it failed to establish that Pictometry was a publicly accessible printed publication.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMixed

      “Mot. Reply 3. Given the sequence of events, there is no prejudice to Petitioner, who introduced these documents and was served objections at an early stage. Patent Owner apparently cited to the documents in its Patent Owner Response to preserve the right to substantively respond to these documents rather than wait to see if they were presented in Petitioner’s Reply. Pursuant to our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3), we do not dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude due to allegedly untimely filed objections.” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

      “are also prohibited. Id. The MAPC Agreement states under “Confidentiality of Licensed Products” that the Licensed Products are commercially valuable, proprietary products owned by Pictometry and are treated by Pictometry as confidential and contain substantial trade secrets of Pictometry. Ex. 2009, 16, Article 8.4. The licensee agrees that it will not disclose, provide a copy of, or disseminate the Licensed Products and that its personnel will protect the Licensed Products from unauthorized use, disclosure, copying, and dissemination, and that access to the Licensed Products and each part thereof will be strictly limited. Id. We acknowledge that these represent significant limitations on the dissemination of the User Guide.” slip op. at 21

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “involving the EFS software and provides no evidence that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were actually maintained confidential by the parties of the MAPC Agreement, or that the EFS software and the EFS 2.7 User Guide were inaccessible to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Reply 9. However, this improperly puts the burden to disprove public accessibility on Patent Owner. Although Patent Owner challenges whether Pictometry is a printed publication, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable, and one aspect of such a showing is that the references relied upon are patents or printed publications. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b) 316(e).” slip op. at 22

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “preponderance of the evidence that Pictometry was publicly accessible so as to render it a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). C. Anticipation of Claims by Pictometry Petitioner asserts that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry. Pet. 16. As noted above, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that Pictometry is a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that that claims 1–10 and 13–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Pictometry.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 8,542,880 not shown unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 8,542,880
  • PTAB · Aug 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00896 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on claims 1–7 and 23–29, rejecting the Rosenberg grounds under §325(d) and declining institution under §314(a) due to the repeated, evolving challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “Section 325(d) provides, in pertinent part In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphases added). It is undisputed that Rosenberg ’373 and Rosenberg ’846 asserted by Petitioner in this case are the same prior art references previously presented by Petitioner in IPR2016-01372. As discussed above, Petitioner challenges the same claims on the same grounds which were previously considered and denied in IPR2016-01372. See 1372 Dec. on Inst. 41–45.” slip op. at 8

    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “(a) whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; (b) whether the petitioner knew or should have known of the prior art asserted in the later petition when it filed its earlier petition; (c) whether at the time of filing of the later petition, the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the earlier petition; (d) the length of time that elapsed between when the petitioner had the patent owner’s or Board’s analysis on the earlier petition and when petitioner filed the later petition; and (e) whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation why we should permit another attack on the same claims of the same patent.” slip op. at 12

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,659,571
  • PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00591 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3, 6, 9, 12-14, 16, 19, 22, and 23 are unpatentable as anticipated by Avrahami; claims 10, 15, and 25 were not shown obvious.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We agree with Petitioner. Avrahami describes its algorithm as providing “for semi-automatic 3D spatial polygon extraction from a pair of colored aerial images with a known external model solution.” Ex. 1004, 43 (emphasis added). Avrahami touts that one of the advantages of its system is that “the operator can identify at a glance which buildings can be mapped by this method so as to combine it with traditional manual extraction or other semi-automatic method.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added). Further to this point, Figure 1 shows a side-by-side comparison of the images in the pair. See id. at Fig. 1 (displaying left and right polygons going through Avrahami’s iterative matching process). Further, we credit the testimony from Petitioner’s Expert, Mr. Schuch, that one skilled in the art would understand Avrahami’s images to be what “you see . . . on a computer screen” as “part of the production.” Ex. 2017, 69:20–21; see also id. at 71:2–4 (explaining that “[t]his is an actual production image”). Therefore, we find that Petitioner has proffered sufficient evidence that Avrahami discloses the disputed limitation.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

      “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s extensive evidence of nexus between its Render House and Twister products and the challenged claims. Patent Owner steps through each challenged claim on an element-by-element basis and directs us to images and specific passages from its Render House and Twister user guides that it argues embody the limitations of each challenged claim. PO. Resp. 50–58. Patent Owner also supports its assertion of nexus with testimony in the form of a Declaration from Dr. Chandrajit L. Bajaj that includes a claim chart detailing where each limitation of the challenged claim is found in its Twister and Render House products. Ex. 2010, 44–91.5 The Federal Circuit has held that “if the marketed product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them, then a nexus is presumed and the burden shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evidence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Patent Owner has put forth sufficient evidence to show that its Twister and Render House products embody the elements of the challenged claims and thus, we look to Petitioner to rebut this presumed nexus and acknowledge that the presumption “cannot be rebutted with mere argument; evidence must be put” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

      “with the purportedly unique characteristics of the claimed invention and that for which there is alleged commercial success.” Reply 23–24. Our reviewing court has held that for evidence of commercial success to be relevant, “the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010). As noted above, however, Patent Owner has provided extensive evidence that the Twister and Render House products are coextensive with claims 10, 15, and 25 and that the reports sold were created using the Twister and Render House products. Thus, we are persuaded that nexus exists between the challenged claims and the commercially successful products at issue. Petitioner also asserts that “Patent Owner has failed to make any showing as to market share, thus rendering their sales figures irrelevant and not adequately defined.” Reply 24. Patent Owner provided unrebutted evidence that “approximately 96 percent of the top 25 insurance carriers rely on [Eagle View Technologies 3D aerial roof measurement reports] in their claims departments.” Ex. 2020, 1; see also Ex. 2029, 8 (Verisk Analytics presentation noting that 24 of top 25 insurance companies and 30,000 contractors are Eagle View customers). In addition, Patent Owner’s evidence shows that its products are used by “about one-fifth of the roofing contractor market, according to an estimate by market researcher IbisWorld.” Ex. 2024. Patent Owner’s financial reports show both that it sold a significant number of roofing reports and that its sales grew significantly between 2009 and 2015. See PO Resp. 60–61. We find that this information, taken together with statement from others in the industry (see Ex. 2029) gives us a view of Patent Owner’s place in the relevant market and persuades us that Patent Owner’s Twister and Render House products experienced significant commercial success and wide-spread use in the industry.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseDecided for patent owner

      “iii. Industry Praise Praise from industry participants, especially competitors, is probative as to obviousness because such participants “are not likely to praise an obvious advance over the known art. Thus, if there is evidence of industry praise of the claimed invention in the record, it weighs in favor of the non-obviousness of the claimed invention.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner described Patent Owner’s products as “[u]sing aerial photography and patent-pending software [to] accurately calculate[] measurements for the roof’s ridges, rafters, valleys, slopes and more.” Ex. 2021, 1. Petitioner further noted that the “process saves contractors and roofers hours of time spent measuring and scoping a roof.” Id.” slip op. at 23

    Patent outcomesUS 8,209,152 mixed
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,209,152
  • PTAB · Aug 14, 2017 · IPR2016-00590 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 10, 11, 14, and 19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the asserted art lacked a required movable-marker limitation and objective indicia outweighed the obviousness evidence.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “We do not agree with Petitioner that Avrahami’s pointing to and identifying seed points, constitutes movement of a first visual marker. Rather, as Patent Owner explains, “prior to the user’s click, the seed point does not exist, and thus there is nothing to move.” See PO Resp. 18 (citing 2008 ¶ 56). Avrahami’s characterization of the already-placed seed point as the “initial 2D seed point” supports Patent Owner’s position. See Ex. 1003, 44. The user cannot move an object that does not yet exist, and Petitioner offers no support to suggest that Avrahami’s seed points somehow exist before the user places them by clicking. See Pet. 14; Reply 2–4. There is also no indication that after placing the seed point, the user can move its location. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 56. To the contrary, Avrahami describes the algorithm as “fully automatic” after the user places the seed point. Ex. 1003, 43.” slip op. at 9

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “We note that in Reply, Petitioner makes an alternative argument that “placement of subsequent seed points after placement of a first seed point, as well as the addition of segmentations around such seed points, qualifies as ‘movement.’” Reply 3. We decline to reach this argument, however, because Petitioner raised it for the first time in its Reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5) (requiring that a petition must identify “the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised, including identifying specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge” and explaining that “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge”).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner
    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Commercial successObjective indicia outweighedDecided for patent owner
    Patent outcomesUS 8,818,770 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,818,770
  • PTAB · Jul 26, 2017 · IPR2016-00449 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–21 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over Reddy and Hornbacker.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Patent Owner’s argument against a master’s degree is unpersuasive because “[t]he actual inventor’s skill is irrelevant” to the level of skill of a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, the parties’ definitions are not necessarily inconsistent because Dr. Agouris opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had at least two years of experience in image and graphics processing including developing, designing, or programming client-server software for computer networked environments beyond a bachelor’s degree. Ex. 2003 ¶ 17. First, we do not perceive any meaningful difference between the parties’ definitions of the technical field of the required experience. Second, the parties do not argue, nor do we find, that the difference between two and five years of experience by a person of ordinary skill in the art would impact the obviousness inquiry in any way in this proceeding. Based on the foregoing, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’506 patent would have had a Bachelor of Science or equivalent degree in electrical engineering or computer science as well as two to five years of experience in a technical field related to geographic information system or the transmission of digital image data over a computer network.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “4. Reasons for Combining Reddy and Hornbacker Having determined that the combination of Reddy and Hornbacker discloses the elements recited in claims 1–21, we address the question of whether a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these references. The motivation to combine need not be found in the references sought to be combined, but may be found in any number of sources, including common knowledge, the prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F. 3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006). There is no requirement that the prior art contain an express suggestion to combine known elements to achieve the claimed invention; the suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art. Id. (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Petitioner states that Reddy and Hornbacker seek to achieve similar objectives, i.e., transmission of large images (Pet. 23), and take a similar approach, i.e., using tiled images and accessing the database through the world wide web (id. at 22–23). Petitioner contends Reddy teaches an overall system that enables a standard computer, such a PC or laptop, to access large scale geographic information, but does not disclose the use of compression. Id. at 22–23. Petitioner cites Hornbacker as analogous art for its disclosure of GIF compression of image data for efficient transmission on the Web. Id. at 23. Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Reddy and Hornbacker because Reddy teaches the need for a system that can operate on a conventional computing device to access large amounts of geographic information, and Hornbacker, relying on similar network and Internet technologies, teaches operating on limited bandwidth connections (e.g., 28.8 Kbytes/sec) to allow a client to request specific image view data, e.g., in a manner closely related to Reddy’s flyover capability. Id. at 24–25.” slip op. at 58

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Perhaps most persuasive, however, are statements in Reddy that using VRML offers cartographers and geographers the potential to disseminate 3- D maps and spatial data over the World Wide Web, that as one zooms into a region, higher resolution data such as elevation and imagery are progressively downloaded and displayed, that the functionality is implemented in a standard VRML browser for downloading data over the World Wide Web and that, but for its essential management of a level of detail using the view dependent techniques disclosed (including projected screen size to decide when to reduce terrain detail), the time required to download and render such a model would prohibit real-time interaction using the current generation of VRML browsers. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 3, 9, 12, 42, We note, in particular, Reddy’s disclosure of view dependent level of detail techniques and are not persuaded that Reddy teaches away from operation on a limited bandwidth communications device. In other words, the key feature disclosed in Reddy that enables real- time interactions (even over the World Wide Web link) is the view dependent level of detail techniques, not any technique that would operate only on high speed network connections. We do not perceive, nor does Patent Owner identify, anything in Reddy’s view dependent level of detail techniques that implicates or specifies the speed or bandwidth of the communication connection over which the techniques are designed to operate. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Reddy teaches away from operation on a limited bandwidth communications device.” slip op. at 62

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “presumption of nexus because its evidence is tied to specific products that embody the claims of the ’506 patent. PO Resp. 53 (citing Declaration of Mr. Isaac Levanon (“Levanon Decl.”)7 ¶¶ 1–94; Exs. 2013, 2021, 2044, 2055). In support of its contention, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of the Declaration of Mr. Isaac Levanon, all 94 paragraphs of it, as well as four exhibits, without explaining what is discussed in the Levanon Declaration, what the cited exhibits are, what the significance of the exhibits is, and how the cited evidence show the claimed invention is embodied in which specific Patent Owner product. Without Patent Owner’s explanation to guide us through the evidence, we are unable to determine whether Patent Owner’s evidence is tied to specific products that embody the claimed invention. Therefore, Patent Owner does not demonstrate that it is entitled to a presumption of nexus. Accordingly, we consider the issue of nexus in the context of the specific objective considerations presented by Patent Owner in what follows.” slip op. at 65

    Patent outcomesUS 8,924,506 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,924,506
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