• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. / Funai Electric Co., Ltd. et al. v. Gold Charm Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01416 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Fujii, Fujii and Nakamura, or Fujii and Tsutsui, as applicable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “In essence, Patent Owner’s construction of the term “light shield area” as requiring an observable effect on the quantity of light leakage in order to improve the quality of the display to the user imports a term of degree into claims that recite this feature. “When a ‘word of degree’ is used [in a claim], . . . the patent [must provide] ‘some standard for measuring that degree.’” Enzo Biochem v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). “The claims, when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, must provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “When a claim term ‘depend[s] solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular individual purportedly practicing the invention,’ without sufficient guidance in the specification to provide objective direction to one of skill in the art, the term is indefinite.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The phrases “observable” and “quality to the user” are highly subjective and, on their face, provide little guidance to one of skill in the art. These phrases are not recited explicitly in the claims themselves. Patent Owner has not directed us to any disclosure in the written description, nor can we find such a disclosure, relevant to determining a standard for 11 measuring the necessary degree of observability or quality.3 Consequently, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction of the term “light shield area” because it would inject unnecessary ambiguity into the claims that recite this feature. Instead, we maintain our initial determination that “light shield area” should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning (i.e. area that shields light), which, in our view, is a broad, yet reasonable construction in light of the Specification and claims of the ’275 patent.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner relies on Allergan for the proposition that Fujii’s criticism of blocking light means that it cannot be relied on as prior art in this case. PO Resp. 26 (citing Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. 796 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Patent Owner asserts that, “[i]n Allergan, the court found that the prior art criticized the claimed formulation [BAK] because the reference taught one of ordinary skill in the art to minimize the amount of a particular claimed element in order to avoid certain problems. PO Resp. 26 (citing Allergan, 796 F.3d at 1305–06.). However, Patent Owner does not explain that, in Allergan, “the prior art taught that BAK should be minimized in ophthalmic formulations to avoid safety problems.” Allergan, 796 F.3d at 1305. In Allergan, “the prior art [also] taught that BAK would not increase the permeability of bimatoprost, but might instead decrease it.” Id. at 1306. Thus, in Allergan, the prior art taught that the formulation at issue caused safety problems and caused the opposite effect than the one desired by the patent at issue. Here, in contrast, Fujii teaches that the metal auxiliary terminals will cause the exact effect desired (or intended result) in the ’275 patent, even though that same effect, i.e. blocking light, is disfavored by the Fujii inventors. In fact, Fujii suggests that the light blockage above the maximum width would block light and “darken[] the screen.” Ex. 1003, 16:11–32. This disclosure is Fujii is supported by the testimony of Dr. Chiang. Ex. 1008 ¶ 52 (testifying that chromium wiring materials disclosed in Fujii may be used as opaque light shield areas used to darken a screen). 15 Also relevant to Patent Owner’s argument presented here is its’ assertion in its claims construction argument that light shield areas must have an observable effect or “there would be no point in providing the light shield areas.” PO Resp. 20. Were we to accept that logic, then we would also apply the same logic here that there would be no point in reducing darkening in Fujii unless the darkening described was an observable effect. “A finding that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems . . . is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another.” Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). While Fujii suggests limiting the width of the metal auxiliary electrodes to avoid darkening of the screen and maintaining a consistent gap between the top and bottom substrates, it also teaches one of ordinary skill that widening of the metal auxiliary electrodes shields light to the screen. See, e.g., Ex. 1003, 16:29–33 (disclosing that “[w]hen the width of the metal auxiliary electrode 56 is increased to further reduce the wiring resistance, the display opening factor of the liquid crystal device is reduced darkening the screen”). Finally, in our claim construction section above, we construed “light” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Fujii explicitly states that “the invention [of Fujii] can also be applied to an active matrix liquid crystal display,” and further states that the electrodes could be replaced by “scanning signal . . . or video signal lines.” Ex. 1003, 1:7–12, 12:54–67. As mentioned previously, Fujii states that the auxiliary electrodes may cause a darkening of the panel. Id. at 16:29–33. This is the same effect that the inventors of the ’275 patent were trying to achieve. Ex. 1001, 2:39–43. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. A person of ordinary skill is a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. Id. at 421. Thus, because Fujii explicitly contemplates that its teachings may be applied to an active matrix liquid crystal display, and Fujii shares a common objective with the inventors of the ’275 patent— namely, resolving uneven brightness or darkening of a panel—Fujii provides sufficient teachings such that one of ordinary skill in would implement the claimed light shield areas in an active matrix crystal display. Pet. 19; Pet. Reply 9. Patent Owner does not address separately Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence with respect to claims 2 and 4, which depend from claim 1. We have reviewed Petitioner’s proposed ground of obviousness by Fujii against claims 1, 2, and 4, and we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s 20 analysis. Based on the record developed during trial, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, and 4 would have been obvious over Fujii.” slip op. at 20

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude the ’163 patent introduced by Petitioner with its Reply as improper reply evidence and as irrelevant. Mot. to Exclude 1. Petitioner relies on the ’163 patent to support Dr. Watts’s purported admission that “in the embodiment of the ’275 patent where light shield areas are comprised of strips of light shield material (as shown in blue 27 coloration in Figure 6), the strips are on the order of 10–20 microns wide.” Pet. Reply 11 n.2. This issue is moot because this Final Written Decision does not cite to or rely upon the ’163 patent. In addition, we do not rely on any assertion by Petitioner that light shield material in the ’275 patent is on the order of 10–20 microns wide. For that reason, we do not address the matter on the merits and dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 5,850,275 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,850,275
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. / Funai Electric Co., Ltd. et al. v. Gold Charm Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01417 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 3, 5, and 6 are unpatentable: claims 3, 5, and 6 as anticipated by Takizawa; claim 2 as obvious over Takizawa and Hoshino; and claims 2, 3, and 6 as anticipated by Hoshino.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “The Federal Circuit “counsels the PTO to avoid the temptation to limit broad claim terms solely on the basis of specification passages.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Absent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition.” Id. Additionally, “‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion’ or ‘explicit’ disclaimers in the specification are necessary to disavow claim scope.” Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Whether the order of the steps recited in a method claim must be performed in a particular order is properly a part of claim construction. See, e.g., Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Generally, steps may be performed in any order so long as “nothing in the intrinsic evidence” compels otherwise. Id. at 1370. “Interactive Gift recites a two-part test for determining if the steps of a method claim that do not otherwise recite an order, must nonetheless be performed in the order in which they are written.” Altiris, 318 F.3d 1369 (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). “First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, they must be performed in the order written.” Id. “If not, we next look to the rest of the specification to determine whether it directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction.” Id. at 1370. (citation omitted). If not, the sequence in which such steps are written is not a requirement.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Takizawa does require forming an etch-stop (or channel protection layer, referred to as “the protecting film 18” in Takizawa) prior to (and as a necessary prerequisite to) forming the operative semiconductor of the TFT. Ex. 1003 at 15:1–32. However, Takizawa still performs only five patterning steps. In fact, Patent Owner admits that Takizawa performs only five etching/patterning steps. Tr. 40:23–41:9 (“there are five steps in Takizawa”); Ex. 2025 ¶ 49. Patent Owner suggests that to meet the claims limitations, step (c) must be performed before, in a separate and distinct manner from step (d). PO Resp. 47–48. Petitioner states that, although Takizawa may not perform step (c) of claim 1 before step (d), this claim do not require a specific order of steps. Pet. Reply 16. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on construing claim 1 to require performing step (c) of the claim before step (d). As we explained above in the claim construction section, we did not so limit this claim; thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. See supra Section II.A.2. Patent Owner does not address separately Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence with respect to claims 3, 5, and 6. See generally PO Resp. 47–48. We have reviewed Petitioner’s proposed ground of anticipation by Takizawa against claims 3, 5, and 6, and we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s analysis. Based on the record developed during trial, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Takizawa anticipates claims 3, 5, and 6.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the TFT array operates best when the ACBL receives a consistent voltage, which is provided by driving circuitry through the ACBL terminal. Thus, to create a properly operating device, [a person of ordinary skill in the art] would seek out methods of providing a reference voltage to the capacitive electrodes and would incorporate the ACBL terminal of Hoshino into the Takizawa device in order to do so. Pet. 29; Ex. 1012 ¶ 70. We agree and adopt this stated rationale because it provides specific motivation to make the combination. We credit Petitioner’s declarant who testifies that “the [a person of ordinary skill in the art] would know how to etch the ACBL contact hole and gate bus line 24 contact hole in the same photolithography step because Hoshino provides an example of doing so.” Ex. 1012 ¶ 70. Hoshino itself provides the “how” to achieve the claims limitation.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 5,966,589 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,966,589
• Funai Electric Co., Ltd. / Samsung Display Co., Ltd. et al. v. Gold Charm Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01468 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamada because the Board found the claimed connecting structure and limitations obvious in light of Yamada.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The record supports Petitioner’s position and the claim construction determined in the Institution Decision. The ’053 patent specification broadly describes a protrusion as having any configuration: “The configuration of the protrusion 17a is any provided that it can be connected to the GND line in the connecting substrate and the width and length of the protrusion 17a can be changed on demand.” Ex. 1001, 11:42–45. According to a general dictionary cited in the Institution Decision, the plain meaning of “protrusion” is “something that protrudes,” and “protrude” means “[t]o push or thrust outward” or “[t]o jut out; project.” Ex. 3001; Inst. Dec. 6 (citing Ex. 3001). The ’053 patent specification shows protrusions that correspond to this evidence of plain meaning. For example, Figures 6A–6C show protrusions 17a projecting from an edge of wiring pattern portion 17b of a bonding assist portion. See, e.g., Fig. 6C supra. Our claim construction and the plain meaning (as evidenced by the cited dictionary definition (Ex. 3001)) also comport with the statement in the specification that the protrusion configuration “is any” provided “it can be connected to the GND line” and “the width and length of the protrusion 17a can be changed on demand.” Ex. 1001, 11:42–45 (emphases added).” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “C. Real Parties in Interest Patent Owner argued in its Preliminary Response that Petitioner fails to name all real parties in interest (RPIs) in its Petition as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Patent Owner does not present this argument in its Patent Owner Response and, therefore, has waived it. See Paper 15, 3 (“[P]atent owner is cautioned that any arguments for patentability not raised in the response will be deemed waived.). Assuming for the sake of argument that Patent Owner did not waive the RPI issue, we rely on, and incorporate, our findings and determination in the Institution Decision. See Inst. Dec. 20–28.” slip op. at 49

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “that Yamada teaches connecting the bonding assist region to ground in order to eliminate electrical noise through shielding. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 5, 7, 22, 30). Considering the teaching in Yamada of a necessary connection to ground for shielding, Petitioner cites Mr. Flasck, who declares that “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’053 [invention] would have known that some electrical protrusion would be inherently necessary to connect the bonding assist portions to a fixed potential.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 79 (emphasis added); Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79). Petitioner also contends that “locating a protrusion” centrally or “at a different location is nothing more than a design choice,” or skilled artisans 8 Compare Wagner, 63 F.2d at 986–87 (relying on drawings), Seid, 161 F.2d at 231 (relying on accidental drawings), Mraz, 455 F.2d at 1072 (relying on drawings), and Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1566 (relying solely on design patent drawings for written description of relative proportions), with Hockerson- Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l., Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating “it is well established that patent drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the specification is completely silent on the issue.”). As discussed above, notwithstanding the reasoning in Hockerson-Halberstadt, Yamada’s specification is not “completely silent” on the issue, as it disclose ranges for wiring widths, implying all widths need not be equal. Also, notwithstanding the dicta regarding drawings, the holding in Hockerson- Halberstadt turned on patent owner’s disavowal of claim scope based on prosecution history that overcame defendant’s argument that relied on alleged drawing dimensions that the patent owner had distinguished during prosecution. See id. at 956–57. “would be guided by design options.” Pet. 36–37 (citing 1002 ¶¶ 121–122). In other words, the thrust of Petitioner’s showing as summarized in the Institution Decision is that it would have been obvious to employ a protrusion somewhere in Yamada’s bonding assist region in order to ensure a ground connection and to prevent noise––a connection that Yamada discloses. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 70, 72–73, 79; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 5, 7, 22, 30; Pet. 11, 35–37; Inst. Dec. 10 (connection to ground), 11 n.4, 14 (obviousness), 18 (obviousness); see also PO Resp. 32 (joining the issue and arguing the opposite: “Yamada does not . . . teach or suggest . . . a protrusion connected to ground” as claimed in the ’053 patent). Petitioner’s contentions are persuasive to show the obviousness of connecting Yamada’s bonding assist region using a simple protrusion or contact extension, for the purpose of ensuring the electrical connection disclosed by Yamada. The claimed “connecting structure . . . comprising: . . . a bonding assist region . . . including” a “protrusion” (an electrical contact), as claims 1 and 4 recite, constitutes “the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); see also In re Kuhle, 526 F.2d 553, 555 (CCPA 1975) (“We also agree that the particular placement of the contact provides no novel or unexpected result. The manner in which electrical contact is made for Smith’s battery would be an obvious matter of design choice within the skill of the art.”).” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Yamada’s teachings or indicate a clear intent for the layers not to have “substantially the same height,” as called for in claim 2. See Ex. 1009, Fig. 9.11 Petitioner persuasively explains that using the same material and process to create both wiring portions, wherein a PCB nominally begins with a wiring layer as Patent Owner admits, would have been obvious as a matter of efficiency in terms of bonding and would have simplified the process by using the same existing materials. See Pet. 19–20; 1002 ¶¶ 85–86, 88; Prelim. Resp. 37 (“such wirings of a printed circuit board would presumably be comprised of copper, as would be known to those of ordinary skill in the art”); Inst. Dec. 17 (discussing showing of efficiency). Yamada uses predetermined bonding assist patterns 5 to improve bonding reliability between existing wiring layers and overcome defective bonding. See Ex. 1009, Abstract, ¶¶ 6, 8–11, 24, 27, 29, 31. Yamada at least suggests forming the two wiring portions using the same material and processes at the same time: “As illustrated in Fig. 1, the wiring terminals 4 and the conductive layer 5 are formed on the PWB 1 together.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments about alleged “reasons . . . to have different heights” (PO Resp. 46 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 68, 69)), Patent Owner does not address the “efficiency” reasons advanced by Petitioner for suggesting substantially the same height at the side-by-side metal regions of Yamada. See PO Resp. 45–46. 11 Patent Owner argues that Petitioner inconsistently relies on what Figure 5 portrays and ignores what Figure 9 portrays. See PO Resp. 4–5 n.1, 38. That argument overlooks that drawings must be interpreted in view of what the full disclosure portrays to artisans of ordinary skill. Also, Yamada does not disclose adding other material or different material to wiring portions 4a-h and 5. Responding to Patent Owner’s position, Petitioner relies on Mr. Flasck, who testifies that “to those of ordinary skill in the art,” Yamada teaches making the bonding assist region and terminal region of the same material and thickness. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 41; Ex. 1015 ¶ 45). As noted above, at the cited paragraph of Yamada, Yamada discloses that “the wiring terminals 4 and the conductive layer 5 are formed on the PWB 1 together.” Ex. 1009 ¶ 41. This at least suggests forming them of the same material––i.e., using the material of the printed circuit board. Mr. Flasck testifies that “to the average practitioner at the time, in this context, ‘together’ would have had the natural meaning of ‘formed of the same material at the same time.’” Ex. 1015 ¶ 46.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 6,909,053 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,909,053
• Toshiba Corp. / Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Gold Charm LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01497 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8, 9, 13, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over the ’512 Publication and APA because their combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Petitioner explains sufficiently how the ’512 Publication and the APA together teach each limitation of each of the challenged claims (see Pet. 29–59 and evidence cited therein), as well as the reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those teachings (see id. at 33, 41–42, 48, 51–52, 57 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 90, 101, 111, 118, 129, 130)), so as to meet its burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of the claims would have been obvious over the proffered combination. Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Petition, Petitioner proposed two alternate constructions for the claim 1 term “a drive means for driving the display,” depending on whether that term is properly construed as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Pet. 26–28. Patent Owner responds that neither of Petitioner’s proposed constructions is proper, but that, “for purposes of this proceeding only,” Patent Owner relies upon those constructions. PO Resp. 22–23. According to Patent Owner, “even if one of Petitioners’ proposed constructions were adopted by the Board, the Petition nevertheless fails to a [sic] establish a prima facie case of obviousness.” PO Resp. 23. In our Decision on Institution, we concluded on the record then before us that it was not necessary for our determination of whether to institute an inter partes review to construe expressly any terms of the challenged claims. Dec. on Inst. 8. Because this Final Written Decision does not turn on the construction of “a drive means for driving the display” or of any other specific claim term, we again conclude that it is unnecessary to construe expressly any term of the challenged claims. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Silzars, testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art as of the July 28, 1994, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’092 patent, “would generally have had at least a Bachelor’s of Science degree in electrical engineering or physics, or equivalent, and several years of relevant experience relating to the design and fabrication of liquid crystal displays,” or, “[a]bsent a formal degree, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have additional years of work experience.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13, 33; see Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 13). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. den Boer, essentially agrees, opining that one of ordinary skill in the art as of July 28, 1994, would have been “someone with at least a Bachelor’s of Science degree in a relevant field, such as electrical engineering, and with several years of experience in the field of design, development and fabrication of liquid crystal displays,” and stating “[i]n this specific regard, I agree with Dr. Silzars.” Ex. 2024 ¶ 9; see PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2024 ¶ 9). Dr. Silzars and Dr. den Boer also agree that the person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the prior art as discussed herein. Ex. 1002 ¶ 13; Ex. 2024 ¶ 9. We determine that the differences in the declarants’ assertions are negligible and that both assessments are consistent with the ’092 patent and the referenced prior art. For the purposes of the analysis below, we adopt Dr. den Boer’s assessment.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Digest paper “concluded that only the dot mode polarity inversion method addresses and solves both the flicker and cross-talk problems,” “a person of ordinary skill in the art and familiar with the prior art of [the] ’092 [patent] and the SID92 Digest paper would employ dot mode polarity inversion over column inversion and row inversion, because it provides the best image quality.” Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 26–27. Irrespective of whether dot mode reversion would provide a still better image, however, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason, based on the APA, to add column polarity reversion to the ’512 Publication technique, in order to improve that technique in the same manner that the APA taught dot mode reversion provided an improvement over row polarity reversion. As the Supreme Court explained in KSR, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” 550 U.S. at 417. As cited above, the APA taught that row polarity reversion eliminated crosstalk, but still suffered from flicker, whereas dot mode reversion, which effectively combines row polarity reversion with column polarity reversion, eliminated both crosstalk and flicker. We are persuaded, therefore, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add column polarity reversion of the APA to the double row polarity reversion of the ’512 Publication, to result in the driving method claimed in the ’092 patent. We further agree with Petitioner (see Tr. 7:7–14) that Patent Owner’s arguments that “adopting portions of the APA techniques as suggested would likely have little, if any positive effect on the power consumption by the ’512 Publication display” (PO Resp. 3) and that “power consumption may actually be exacerbated by this combination” (id.) focus on the wrong comparison and do not address our finding in the Decision on Institution that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to pursue a combination of the ’512 Publication’s teachings with the APA in an attempt to solve the problem of excessive power dissipation by the APA’s dot mode polarity reversion (see Dec. on Inst. 17–18). Whereas Patent Owner’s argument focuses on a comparison of power consumption between the ’512 Publication display and a display having column inversion added to the ’512 Publication (Tr. 19:25–20:2), we agree with Petitioner (see Pet. Reply 20) that the relevant comparison is instead between the combination and the dot mode polarity reversion scheme of the APA. Nonetheless, because we are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, for the reasons set forth above, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the APA with those of the ’512 Publication in the manner proposed by Petitioner rather than adopting dot mode polarity reversion in its entirety, and that such a combination would have rendered the subject matter of each of claims 1–4, 8, 9, 13, and 14 of the ’092 patent obvious, we need not reach Petitioner’s further argument that a desire to reduce power consumption would have provided additional reason to make that combination.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 5,790,092 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,790,092
• Microsoft Corporation v. Bradium Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 21, 2016 · IPR2015-01432 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 2 were not shown unpatentable because Microsoft did not establish that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Rutledge, Ligtenberg, and Cooper.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Obviousness requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination—obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention. Unigene Labs v. Apotex, Inc, 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir 2011). Petitioner contends that, in addition to his educational background, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least five years of experience in a technical field related to geographic inform systems (GIS). Pet. 11–12. The Patent Owner Response does not dispute explicitly Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Nevertheless, Petitioner contends there is a dispute as to the level of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Chandrajit Bajaj, ignores the teachings in the ’794 Patent concerning the relevance of geographic information systems (GIS) and that, unlike Petitioner’s expert, Dr. William Michalson, there is no suggestion on the record that Dr. Bajaj has any experience in GIS systems. Pet. Reply. 2; Hr’g. Tr. 6–8. Petitioner undermines its position that qualifying as a one of ordinary skill requires five years of experience in GIS by arguing the even a person without GIS experience would consider GIS highly relevant to the problem presented in the ’794 Patent and would not ignore this issue. Pet. Reply 2. Thus, although Petitioner attacks the credibility of Dr. Bajaj based on his testimony concerning the applicability of the references, we do not discern any genuine dispute as to the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “in Rutledge or Ligtenberg and that the Petition does not assert that Rutledge or Ligtenberg discloses a priority system. Hr’g Tr. 48. Although Petitioner contends that Rutledge and Ligtenberg suggest a priority system (id.), Petitioner argues “[b]ut the reason we added Cooper is because there was nothing specific as to how you would actually do that or how you could possibly do that” (id. at 19). Thus, Petitioner appears to acknowledge hindsight reasoning in its analysis and does not answer our question as to why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to apply the priority techniques in Cooper to Rutledge and Ligtenberg. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner frames its argument at a level of generality that obscures the incompatibility of Cooper with Rutledge and Ligtenberg. PO Resp. 31. We agree with Patent Owner that the level of abstraction argued by Petitioner is insufficient to overcome the incompatibility issues identified by Patent Owner. Id. at 31–32. The Petition does not explain why or how a person of ordinary skill would have applied the importance values Cooper uses to determine priority in a 3D environment to Rutledge and Ligtenberg’s 2D environment. Id. at 32–34. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rutledge and Ligtenberg with the priority teaching of Cooper.” slip op. at 22

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Notwithstanding Dr. Michalson’s incorporation of his earlier declaration by reference, Petitioner contends that it was improper for Patent Owner to cross-examine Dr. Michalson on the subject matter of his first declaration, because Patent Owner waived the opportunity to conduct such cross-examination when it filed its Patent Owner Response without taking any testimony from Dr. Michalson and that Patent Owner’s cross-examination and Motion for Observations on Cross-Examination (Paper 40) should have been limited only to matters in Dr. Michalson’s second declaration submitted in support of Petitioner’s Reply. Mot. to Exclude. 2. This issue is moot because this Final Written Decision does not cite to any of the Subject Exhibits. For that reason, we do not address the matter on the merits and dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,139,794 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,139,794
• Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2016 · IPR2015-01020 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence or arguments in the final written decisions.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Section 42.71(d) further provides that the request must identify where each matter was previously addressed.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 7,881,150
• Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2016 · IPR2015-01021 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests in IPR2015-01020 and IPR2015-01021, finding no overlooked or misapprehended evidence or arguments.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “106 of the first Jagannathan declaration, filed concurrently with the Petition, he testified, “[t]hus, when a chip-select output from the bank control unit is used to enable a particular DDR SDRAM device, it is also used to enable the bit switch.” Final Dec. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106) (emphasis added). This described Petitioner’s evidence on the chip select signal, namely, that Dr. Jagannathan did not testify that the chip select signal “is also the bit switch enable signal,” but rather, that the chip select signal “is used to” generate the enable signals to the bit switch. In Petitioner’s post-hearing brief (Paper 30), Petitioner cited to pages 35 and 36 of the Petition, and to Dr. Jagannathan’s deposition testimony: Q. So what I’m trying to understand is, in that paragraph, it seems that you’re saying it’s the same signal that’s being used. A. No, I don’t -- I disagree with that. What I am trying to say here is the chip select signal -- those signals that I talked about earlier in the sentence, they’re effectively being used to generate the enable signals. Paper 30 (citing Ex. 2002, 218:6–17). Petitioner asserted in its post-hearing brief, “[w]hen taken as a whole, in context, Dr. Jagannathan’s testimony supports the rationale in the Petition.” Paper 30, 4. As set forth in the Final Written Decision, we agree. Nothing argued by Patent Owner persuades us that in the Final Written Decision we misapprehended or overlooked the nature of Dr. Jagannathan’s testimony in his first declaration.” slip op. at 3

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,081,536
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2016 · IPR2016-01111 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 9, 15, 62–65, 69–73, or 75 were unpatentable over either asserted § 103 combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner proposes a construction for one claim phrase: “dried without the loss of substantial uniformity,” appearing in independent claims 1 and 62. Pet. 15. According to Petitioner, that claim phrase should be construed broadly to mean “any method of drying.” Id. In support of that construction, Petitioner asserts only that Patent Owner’s expert witness in a co-pending litigation “testified that the claims were not limited to any particular form of drying, or any particular drying parameters.” Id. Patent Owner correctly notes that Petitioner has not explained why it has failed to account for the phrase “without the loss of substantial uniformity” in its proposed construction. Prelim. Resp. 8. Further, Patent Owner proposes that, under the broadest reasonable construction standard, the claim phrase “dried without the loss of substantial uniformity” should be given its plain meaning. Id. Based on the record, we agree.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Nor has Petitioner explained persuasively that a skilled artisan would have understood that individual doses of a pharmaceutical film cut by a rotary die can only be manufactured this way if the film does not vary more than 10%. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Celik’s testimony in that regard rely upon a statement in the challenged patent that “[c]urrently, as required by various world regulatory authorities, dosage forms may not vary more than 10% in the amount of active present.” Pet. 32; Ex. 1003 ¶ 101; Ex. 1001, 2:42–45. Petitioner and Dr. Celik acknowledge, however, that not all regulatory authorities require that limit. Specifically, Petitioner and Dr. Celik recognize that in the United States, “any given dose of the drug must have the same amount of active as any other dose, within a variance of 15%,” referring to the standard set by the United States Food and Drug Administration. Pet. 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Thus, at best, Petitioner’s reliance on the disclosure of the challenged patent regarding the standards set by the FDA or “various world regulatory authorities” provides a motivation for a person of skill in the art to modify the cited prior art to achieve a product film wherein the individual unit doses do not vary by more than 15%, or perhaps not more than 10%. However, even if such motivation exists, Petitioner has not shown how that the cited prior art or other knowledge in the art at the time of the invention would have informed an artisan how to reach that goal. As Patent Owner correctly asserts, “[r]ecognition of a need does not render obvious the achievement that meets that need.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (quoting Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Insofar as Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have needed only routine experimentation to make films within the claimed variance limitation, we are unpersuaded. Pet. 27, 34. In a somewhat cursory manner, Petitioner supports that contention by asserting that a person of skill in the art “would have understood that mixing, de-gassing, viscosity and drying are all important variables to control in order to ensure uniformity, and would have been able to make routine adjustments of these variables in Chen’s process to meet the 10% limit.” Pet. 34. Dr. Celik makes a similar statement in his declaration. Ex. 1003 ¶ 104. However, neither statement by Petitioner or Dr. Celik includes a discussion of facts allegedly supporting those assertions.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “indicating near-maximal release, and that the final values for the drug release “are clustered within ±10% of 100.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 103. According to Dr. Çelik, “[f]rom these data, a person of ordinary skill would reasonably have concluded that the films were within the claimed 10% limit.” Id. We are unpersuaded. In particular, what is missing from Dr. Çelik’s testimony is an explanation of his data analysis. Chen’s Figure 5 is reproduced below: Ex. 1005, Fig. 5. Chen’s Figure 5 shows the release profile of four active agents from films according to Chen’s Examples 5–8. Ex. 1005, 16:27–28. Chen does not discuss the data represented in Figure 5 or otherwise provide it.2 Nor does 2 Petitioner asserts that the Board “has found on appeal in three reexaminations directed to similar subject matter that Chen discloses substantial uniformity.” Pet. 35. As discussed, infra, those decisions did not Dr. Çelik present his opinion regarding the relevant specific data points reflected in Figure 5. Rather, Dr. Çelik opines, in a conclusory fashion, that the data shows, despite the unexplained error bars in the figure and lack of specific data points provided, that “the final recorded values for the data collected . . . fall at or within ‡ 10% of 100% (i.e., 90% to 110%),” and that a person of skill in the art would, therefore, conclude that “Chen’s films had at least the claimed uniformity.” Ex. 1003, 38 n.7. Because Dr. Çelik has not provided a reliable factual basis for his opinion on this matter, those opinions are not entitled to persuasive weight. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (a declaration expressing an opinion of an expert without disclosing underlying facts may be given no weight).” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,603,514
• Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Ltd. / Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Monosol RX, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2016 · IPR2016-01112 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner correctly notes that Petitioner does not rely on its proposed claim construction in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 7. Nor does Petitioner provide any discussion supporting its position that the construction that it proposes represents the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent, other than asserting that it is the same construction that was proffered in a district court proceeding. For purposes of this decision, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrases apply. Id. at 7. In any event, this Decision does not turn on the claim phrases for which Petitioner has proposed a construction.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “particular, Petitioner has not explained adequately why a person of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Chen and Shiraldi. As discussed, supra, Chen describes using a mixture of two or more types of the same hydrocolloid that differ only in molecular weights and Shiraldi describes selecting and blending various polymers. Petitioner has not shown that a person of skill in the art would have understood that Shiraldi teaches or suggests selecting various polymers based upon high and low molecular weights. Nor has Petitioner established that Chen’s teaching to combine two or more types of the same hydrocolloid having differing molecular weights involved selecting a mixture of high and low molecular weights in the manner claimed. Indeed, neither reference provides a teaching or an example of such a practice. The example in Chen relied upon by Petitioner includes only a low molecular weight polyethylene oxide. Pet. 32 (referring to Chen Example 11 using a polyethylene oxide having an average molecular weight of 100,000 Da). In contrast to Chen, Schiraldi preferred and exemplified only high molecular weight polyethylene, in a range well beyond that recited in the claims for that component. That is, Schiraldi describes the ethylene oxide useful for its invention as having “a relatively high molecular weight” and preferring molecular weights above 3,000,000, whereas the claims recite a molecular weight range of 600,000 to 900,000. See Ex. 1004, 4:25–31. Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that the cited prior art, alone or in combination, taught or suggested a film comprising both low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide in the respective ranges recited by the claims, or with the specific percentage of the low molecular weight component required. The portions of Dr. Mumper’s declaration cited by Petitioner do not provide any further support for Petitioner’s position. We note that Dr. Mumper does not explain why the polyethylene oxides molecular weights limitation would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill over the combined teachings of the prior art. Instead, Dr. Mumper opines only that the skilled artisan “would be highly motivated to vary the amounts of the low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide to achieve the desired effects including, but not limited to drug solubility, mucoadhesion and drug release rate.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. That opinion does not address a skilled artisan’s motivation, ability, or reasonable expectation of successfully achieving a film comprising the specific ranges and proportion of low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxides required by the claims. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1074 (a showing of obviousness must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The portions of Dr. Mumper’s declaration cited by Petitioner do not provide any further support for Petitioner’s position. We note that Dr. Mumper does not explain why the polyethylene oxides molecular weights limitation would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill over the combined teachings of the prior art. Instead, Dr. Mumper opines only that the skilled artisan “would be highly motivated to vary the amounts of the low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxide to achieve the desired effects including, but not limited to drug solubility, mucoadhesion and drug release rate.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. That opinion does not address a skilled artisan’s motivation, ability, or reasonable expectation of successfully achieving a film comprising the specific ranges and proportion of low and high molecular weight polyethylene oxides required by the claims. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1074 (a showing of obviousness must be supported by evidence, as shown by some objective teaching in the prior art or by knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art that would have led that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 8,017,150
• Presidio Components, Inc. v. Avx CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2016 · IPR2015-01332 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–12 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish a sufficient reason to modify Galvagni’s capacitor.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Harperizing, or “corner rounding,” is typical. It merely describes one exemplary capacitor manufacturing process in which “the surfaces are cleaned of adhering lead contaminations and the edges and corners are eroded, i.e., rounded off, so that after the scrubbing the inside electrodes . . . are made substantially flush to the end faces of the monolithic ceramic body.” Florian, 10:16–22. On the other hand, Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shanfield, testifies that “Galvagni does not Harperize or corner round its components,” and that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have avoided Harperization not least because it would have added processing time to an already labor-intensive process of Galvagni that could lead to longer cycle time, as well as dimensional variability that could lead to lower yield.”) Shanfield Decl. ¶¶ 71–72; see also id. at ¶ 73 (not Harperizing to contain or reduce manufacturing cost). On this record, we credit the testimony of Dr. Shanfield. We are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that it was “typical” to Harperize the ends 18 of capacitor 16 taught in Galvagni prior to the vapor deposition of layer 21 illustrated in Figure 4 of Galvagni.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we construed the phrase “negligibly over the top surface” (independent claims 1 and 12) to mean “a small amount of material is formed on the top surface.” Dec. to Inst. 7–9. Neither party disputes our determination or proposes additional terms for construction. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we maintain this construction.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On this issue, we agree with Patent Owner. Galvagni’s teachings of in-circuit testing of individual components are limited to using the ends, not the tops, of those components. Ex. 1002, 3:7–10, 6:24–30. Petitioner’s argument that testing probes of 0.05 mm were commercially available is not persuasive because Petitioner makes a comparison only to the dimensions taught in the ’547 patent without providing sufficient evidence that any negligible termination resulting from Harperization of Galvagni’s capacitor would also have been 0.05 mm. Even if it were, any negligible termination on a top surface of Galvagni’s capacitor would be very small relative to the end surface of Galvagni’s capacitor, and, therefore, would not “make it easier to access the capacitor for in-circuit test” (Pet. 17). Finally, even assuming Petitioner is right that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “test the individual components in a manner that minimizes wasted PCB (printed circuit board) space” (Pet. 15), Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence that such a person would have valued that factor more highly than the other considerations identified by Dr. Shanfield—i.e., (1) the efficiency of testing groups of components rather than individual components, or (2) using pads on the PCB to reduce the risk of damage to components. After weighing the arguments and evidence, including the testimony of both parties’ experts, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by the purported advantages for in-circuit testing to modify Galvagni’s capacitor 16 to include terminations extending negligibly over a top surface.” slip op. at 13

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “We decline to assess the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude. As discussed above, even considering the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 6,144,547 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,144,547

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.