• Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01358 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–11, 15–19, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4–6, 12–14, and 20–22 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach the claimed received-signal feedback and transmitter-model update.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that: Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with of radio communication systems and machine learning. Additional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Patent Owner does not appear to challenge this level of skill. We use Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and ’704 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “parameters “associated with the base station.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Id. at 31. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner offers no reason to believe that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Pet. Reply 4–5; see also id. at 3–6 (entire argument). A plain reading of a “model associated with a base station” would encompass a model that operates in a base station. We do not see anything in the ’704 specification that would indicate “associated with” has any special meaning, or has a meaning contrary to our understanding of the plain meaning. We do not see the word “associated” outside the claims, whereas we see the word “implement” throughout the specification, generally in reference to an actual use of a model (consistent with our plain reading). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:35–39, 6:3–17, 10:55–11:3 (discussing “implementations” where the model or some other feature of the system is used in a particular way). Accordingly, we construe a model “implemented in a base station” to be “associated with the base station.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “scenarios” (see PO Resp. 16–21), Patent Owner argues that “Jüschke does not disclose any association of the weight or bias parameters, . . . to any deployment scenario, and . . . base station” (id. at 19). For the reasons explained in our claim construction section above, we construe “deployment scenarios” to include “inline mode” models located within a base station, according to the list of deployment scenarios set out in the ’704 patent. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–65. The in-line deployment scenario depicted in Figure 6A of the ’704 patent bears a striking resemblance to the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 of Jüschke. In both figures, the analog radio signal is fed directly into the model and then the model directly outputs the signal to the amplifier. Compare Ex. 1001, Fig. 6A, with Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. As construed, the “deployment scenarios” represent the physical configurations of the device in which the model is found, such as “in-line.” Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Jüschke’s similar in-line configuration is a “deployment scenario” as claimed because it teaches an inline model for a cellular system transmitter (i.e., base station). Pet. 26–29 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–147); see also Ex. 1001, 2:37–41 (stating that “[t]he particular deployment scenario[] may be . . . sending a radio transmission from a cellular base station that includes the . . . model . . . in an inline mode”).” slip op. at 26

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on our claim construction analysis of claim 4, above, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 4 requires an actually transmitted signal and an update of the transmitter’s model. This claim construction eliminates Petitioner’s position regarding Holt teaching a modeled signal. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 17–23. We then turn to Petitioner’s argument that Holt teaches updating a model using an actually transmitted signal. See Pet. 59–60. There, Petitioner relies on a disclosure in Holt of an “actual communication channel 302 used to train the channel model 208.” Ex. 1006, 18:1–2. This is depicted in Figure 6 of Holt, in connection with a “fourth loss function” which is used to “train the decoder model.” Id. at 18:42–48; see generally id. at 17:58–18:51 (describing Figure 6). Whether training the channel model or the decoder model, Holt here does not disclose using the actual communication channel to train the encoder, i.e., transmitter. In sum, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “obtaining a received radio signal,” and even if it did, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “updating the value of the model parameters” in the manner required by claim 4. Claims 12 and 20 are nearly identical to claim 4, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons. See Pet. 76. Claims 5, 6, 13, 14, 21 and 22 depend from claims 4, 12, and 20, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons as those claims. See id. at 77–80.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,018,704 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,018,704
• Kia Corp. / Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01167 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–21 are unpatentable over Kleve-based grounds; claim 6 was not shown unpatentable because the record did not support obviousness of key sharing.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, automotive engineering, or a closely related field and at least two years of experience in the field of access control systems, vehicle electronics, and/or cryptography.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 85). Dr. Almeroth supports Petitioner’s position and further testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 85. Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and appears to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Malek, explicitly adopts Dr. Almeroth’s level of skill in the art but states that his opinions would be applicable under any reasonable definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan at the critical time. See Ex. 2021 ¶ 38. For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’659 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts Kleve. See PO Resp. 27–29. Rather, as discussed previously, we find that Kleve’s vehicle owner can set a restriction, such as the rental start period, prior to step 214 in Kleve’s Figure 2 and that such restrictions can be associated with the e-key. We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that (1) Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts his deposition testimony or that (2) Dr. Almeroth “admitted his testimony was wrong.” See PO Sur-Reply 7 (citing PO Resp. 47–48 (citing Ex. 2022, 27:5–10, 27:21–28:1; Ex. 2021 ¶ 96)). In a particular embodiment to which Dr. Almeroth was citing, he noted that the e-key is always generated after the rental agreement. See Ex. 2022, 26:14– 20. Then the following exchange occurs: Q. So you use typically and always. So always does not refer to all of the embodiments of Kleve, is that fair? A. I think a person of skill in the art could read Kleve and understand that there are probably multiple ways in which the flow of actions among the parties could occur. And I think thinking about a real world scenario, in most cases you have an agreement before you would generate an eKey, but maybe, maybe not. I don’t -- I don’t know that the real world is necessarily cut and dry. So reading -- a person reading Kleve would understand it’s describing embodiments where it’s scenario, but I don’t know that it would necessarily be a hard and fast rule in every embodiment or in the understanding a person of skill in the art would have. Id. at 28:3–20. There is nothing in the deposition testimony by Dr. Almeroth that appears inconsistent with his declaration testimony nor does there appear to be the kind of admission touted by Patent Owner. Instead, it is Dr. Malek who takes an overly narrow view of Kleve that appears inconsistent with Kleve’s disclosure when read as a whole. See, e.g., Ex. 2021 ¶¶ 82–88. Therefore, we do not credit or agree with Dr. Malek’s testimony that Kleve fails to teach the concept of a virtual key created with the agreed-upon rental period as a restriction. See id. ¶ 57. Thus, based on the entire trial record, we find that Petitioner has” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “After review of the arguments and evidence, we agree with Petitioner’s position. Specifically, we agree that (1) both Kleve and Hatton are directed to use of electronic key systems for vehicles (see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7– 9, 39, 63; Ex. 1008, 1:48–52, 1:61–2:2, 5:25–34) and (2) encrypted communications would have been understood to be effective in preventing unauthorized access to the vehicle, something that is taught explicitly by Hatton (see Ex. 1008, 9:50–63). Given these disclosures by Kleve and Hatton, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a at the challenged claims. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Kleve with that of Hatton.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s argument appears to be purely hindsight analysis based on the teachings of the ’659 patent and the limitations of challenged claim 6 because there is insufficient evidence or teachings in the cited prior art to suggest the sharing of virtual keys. Petitioner’s argument that having “rental microbusiness” implemented as a “smart phone application” that enables sharing virtual keys is insufficient to show obviousness, because, as noted by Patent Owner, certain embodiments in Kleve appear to discourage or even hinder the sharing of virtual keys. These embodiments require the use of credentials associated with the virtual key, where the credentials can be “facial recognition, voice print recognition, matrix barcode (ex. two-dimensional code), code word or phrase for speech recognition, temporary mobile web login IDs and password, or other types service.” See Ex. 1005 ¶ 37. Dr. Almeroth testifies that multiple people could be authorized on the same vehicle if they collectively rent a vehicle and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would “have been motivated to enable each user to share the virtual key with other authorized users associated with the same rental request.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 55. But given Kleve’s disclosure that the system handles key generation and distribution (Ex. 1005 ¶ 39), the evidence does not show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have wanted to give this control to each authorized user who has received an e-key. “It is impermissible to use the claimed invention as an instruction manual or ‘template’ to piece together the teachings of the prior art so that the claimed invention is rendered obvious.” Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Kleve’s teachings undermine Petitioner’s position, and do not support a finding of obviousness. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Kleve alone or in combination with Hatton would have rendered dependent claim 6 obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,738,659 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,738,659
• PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00209 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 and 13–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Ho and Aoki; claims 12 and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Jiau and Aoki or Jiau and Kim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues for a slightly different level of ordinary skill in the art: “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). Patent Owner further argues that the person having ordinary skill in the art “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require experience in programming video games. Id. at 3. However, Patent Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” Id. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of “downloading” excludes “real-time fetching of data by a client from a server system.” PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 16–17; Tr. 32:22–34:7. Because we need not expressly construe any claim terms, we do not construe any terms of the ’662 patent. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “date of the ’662 patent, Ho is not a “printed publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). PO Resp. 30–33; PO Sur-reply 15–16. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that: a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Ho, which is a prior art printed publication, and either Aoki or Kim.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Aoki’s teaching of using user-identification information as part of the request for an advertisement with Ho’s system, which also teaches a client device sending information to a server to request hot spot information, such as advertisements. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107, 111, 114, 117. Because both Ho and Aoki are directed to improvements in game design and monetization from using advertisements (id. ¶ 106; Ex. 1004, 1:26–28; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8), a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked at both Ho and Aoki and combined the relevant features with a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 106, 117). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that using Aoki’s teaching of sending user-identification information with Ho, which includes sending information with a request for information relating to interactive information elements (hot spots), allows for targeted advertisements, which was a known advantage in advertising. Id. ¶ 117; Ex. 10089 ¶¶ 54–55 (describing advantages of targeted advertising).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,427,662 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,427,662
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 3, 2022 · IPR2020-01624 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Gauthier, Groen, and Shumarayev, with Huang for certain dependent claims; claim 17 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “speed links, or equivalent academic experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). At institution, we applied Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. Inst. Dec. 8. During the trial, Patent Owner stated that it does not object to this level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 7. Based on the parties’ agreement on this issue, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision and apply that level of ordinary skill in the analysis below.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The parties dispute the scope of “independent.” Petitioner argues that using separate current setting signals for separate devices describes the “independent” aspect of these claims. Pet. 31–35; see also Pet. Reply 3–9 (setting forth claim construction arguments). Patent Owner argues that the ’132 patent does not set forth a special definition for “independent” and, therefore, that the plain meaning applies—“not determined or influenced by someone or something else.” PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2005). Thus, Patent Owner argues that “independent of” means “not determined or influenced by.” PO Resp. 8–17; PO Sur-reply 2–7. As discussed below, we conclude that Petitioner has proven obviousness of the subject matter in claims 1–16 and 18 under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, and the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions for claim 17 are not related to the definition of “independent.” Thus, we need not resolve this claim construction dispute to issue a final written decision on all claims. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “At institution, we preliminarily agreed with Petitioner that these phrases are means-plus-function. Inst. Dec. 13–15. Patent Owner argues that these phrases are not means-plus-function limitations and that “[e]ach claimed ‘current selection module’ is simply a circuit or collection of circuit[r]y that selects current, with additional structural limitations provided by the surrounding claim language.” PO Resp. 17–21. Patent Owner, however, also states that “[t]he Board need not construe the ‘current selection module’ terms because analysis of the prior art does not turn on claim construction.” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner states it “is not disputing that the prior art discloses ‘current selection modules,’ per se, regardless of which claim construction the Board adopts”; rather, Patent Owner contends “that the current selection modules in the prior art fail to satisfy other claim requirements.” PO Resp. 18. Because there is no dispute between the parties the resolution of which turns on whether the “current selection module” phrases of claims 1 and 12 invoke § 112 ¶ 6, we need not resolve this issue to decide the patentability challenges before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1368.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “for the combination and that “Petitioner cites no disclosure from any of the references or background materials suggesting that the cited current supplies were known, interchangeable alternatives.” PO Resp. 60–61. We disagree. As discussed above, Shumarayev discloses separate and independent programmable current supplies for the main driver and the pre-emphasis driver. Ex. 1007, 6:10–17, 6:24–27, Fig. 6. This is an alternative to Groen’s disclosure of separately controlled current select modules (DACs 400 and 402) where DAC 402’s input reference current is the current that is output from DAC 400. Ex. 1004, 5:4–8, Fig. 4. Patent Owner also argues that making a control circuit programmable is more complex than making a non-programmable circuit because “a designer would need to add means to store what is programmed, thus involving more than simple PMOS and NMOS transistors” and requiring additional fabrication steps. PO Resp. 62–63 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 70). Both Groen and Shumarayev, however, disclose programmable current sources for pre-emphasis and drive circuitry. Groen’s DAC 400 produces a reference current based on a 5-bit code, and Groen’s DAC 402 produces an emphasis current based on a 3-bit code. Ex. 1004, 4:51–58, Fig. 4. Shumarayev’s driver 44a includes programmable current supplies 56a and 56b, and pre-emphasis driver 44b includes current supplies 58a and 58b that produce an “amount of current that . . . may be controlled by programming how Petitioner’s reliance on Shumarayev’s teachings of separate and independent current sources for main and pre-emphasis drivers introduces any complexity due to the need to make the current sources programmable. Patent Owner also points to Shumarayev’s statement that “there may be consequences of providing too much programmable circuitry” (Ex. 1007, 8:3–4) as suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Shumarayev’s teachings with Groen and Gauthier. PO Resp. 64 (quoting Ex. 1007, 8:3–4). According to Patent Owner, Shumarayev’s statement “suggests that the inventors of the ’132 patent, who were able to build successful circuits with independently programmable primary and pre-emphasis current levels, had to overcome various design challenges.” PO Resp. 64 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Groen discloses programmability to address “a need in the art for a driver circuit that can select from numerous possible data communication operating modes.” Ex. 1004, 1:32–38. The whole purpose of Groen is to accommodate different driver modes by controlling the drive and emphasis currents. Ex. 1004, 3:50–59 (Table 1), 4:1–13 (Table 2), 5:55–67. Shumarayev, similarly, teaches programmable circuitry to accommodate different “I/O standards such as LVPECL, LVDS, PCML, etc.” Ex. 1007, 6:20–23, 7:57–67. Shumarayev then teaches a simplifying alternative, namely, “replac[ing] some or all of the programmable circuitry in I/O circuits 16 with hardwired circuitry.” Ex. 1007, 8:4–7. Thus, we hardly see why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be discouraged from the combination by the alleged complexities of programmability when both Groen and Shumarayev are expressly directed to such programmability.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 6,975,132 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,975,132
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 13, 2022 · IPR2020-01596 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–12, and 15–17 are unpatentable as obvious over OneChip and ORT8850; claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because QL80FC was excluded.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Dr. Nelson’s opinion that a person skilled in the art would have had at least the education and experience indicated necessarily encompasses persons having the minimum level of education and experience. It is axiomatic that something that was known or would have been obvious to a person having a minimum level of education and experience would necessarily have been known or obvious to a person having the same or a higher level of education or experience. As we indicated in our Institution Decision, “the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In our analysis below, we consider all evidence as if viewed by a person having the minimum level of education and experience identified by Dr. Nelson, i.e., having “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or related field and 3-5 years of professional experience in computer systems design, circuit design, or equivalent academic experience.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “the parties, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and that the dates printed on the faces of Exhibit 1008 and Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration are hearsay. Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration contains two archived versions, dated September 3, 2000 and October 23, 2000, of the webpage www.quicklogic.com/devices/QuickFC/Default.html. Ex. 1019, Ex. A. The “second page” of the archived webpage contains a link entitled “QuickFC Device DataSheet.” Id. However, as Patent Owner correctly argues, “the Rosenberg Affidavit only purports to ‘attest[] to the authenticity of the archived and dated QuickFC webpages’—not the purportedly linked to [QL80FC] exhibits” and “[t]he Rosenberg Affidavit neither references QL80FC nor makes any assertion of a connection between QL80FC and the webpages shown in the printouts.” PO Resp. 53–54. Petitioner offers no testimony from a custodian of records for the QL80FC product, as they did for the ORT8850 product, to support a finding that Exhibit 1008 is what Petitioner purports it to be. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Moreover, we disagree with Petitioner’s contentions that FREs 703, 901(b)(4) or 902(7) authenticate or provide a basis to forego excluding Exhibit 1008. FRE 703 allows an expert to base his or her opinion on facts or data an expert in the field would reasonably rely on, even if they are not themselves admissible. Id. 703. They do not prohibit the exclusion of inadmissible evidence or allow for the admission of otherwise excludable evidence. Although FRE 901(b)(4) does allow evidence to be admitted based on its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,” Petitioner has not shown that Exhibit 1008 contains sufficient distinctive characteristics to authenticate it. The only characteristic of Exhibit 1008 that tends to show that it is a QuickLogic datasheet for the QL80FC product is the appearance of QuickLogic’s name and logo on the datasheet. See Ex, 1008. But Petitioner fails to present authenticated versions of other QuickLogic data sheets to demonstrate how the structure, format, and appearance of QL80FC is consistent with their structure, format, and appearance. See Pet. Reply 22–23; Opp. 14–15. Finally, FRE 902(7) does not authenticate Exhibit 1008, it only authenticates any “inscription[s], sign[s], tag[s], or label[s]” affixed to Exhibit 1008. See Fed.R.Evid. 902(7). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and we exclude Exhibit 1008 from this proceeding.” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “1. Programmable Fabric / Programmable Fabric Circuitry Petitioner contends these terms “refer to user programmable circuitry capable of being programmed to implement arbitrary, as opposed to specific, logic functions.” Pet. 10. In our Institution Decision, we determined the precise meanings of these terms were not in dispute and, therefore, declined to expressly construe them. See Dec. Inst. 19–20 (citing Nidec Motor, 868 F.3d at 1017). Neither party disputes that finding, which we maintain here. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 3–30.” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “maintain our preliminary construction that the plain and ordinary meaning of the transceiver component limitation requires the LOS detector to be “a transceiver component having selectable values that is configured by the plurality of configuration memory cells.” The limitation requires “a plurality of transceivers containing respective components having selectable values,” wherein “said components [are] configured by . . . memory cells,” and wherein “one of said components is a loss of synchronization detector.” Ex. 1001, 6:32–36 (emphases added). Thus, the LOS detector is one of the transceiver components referred to earlier, i.e., one of “said components” “having selectable values” that is “configured by . . . memory cells.” Id. The Specification is consistent with this interpretation. It discloses a transceiver whose receiver side includes deserializer/comma detector 174, decoder 178, elastic buffer 182, CRC 186, and LOS 188.10 Id., Fig. 3. Each of these components is described as being configurable and having selectable values. Id. at 4:54–6:7. Moreover, our interpretation does not render superfluous the use of the term “configurable” in other limitations. To the contrary, the transceiver components limitation only requires transceiver components identified as “one of said components,” i.e., as one of the “respective components having selectable values” to be configurable. It does not require every transceiver component to be configurable because not every transceiver component has to be identified as “one of said components.” Thus, because the serializer and deserializer are not identified as “one of said components” in the “transceiver components” limitation, that limitation does not require that they be configurable. As a result, the claim’s later requirement of “a configurable serializer” and “a configurable deserializer” is not superfluous.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,187,709 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,187,709
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01597 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 12, and 13 are unpatentable; claim 6 was not shown unpatentable because Young does not disclose claim 5’s flip-flop limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Patent Owner that the phrase “modules for implementing tasks, the module being reconfigurable” in independent claims 1 and 5 was not a “means-plus-function” limitation that must be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. Inst. Dec. 15–18. We also construed the term “module” as “logic configured to perform a task that can receive and/or transmit communication signals.” Id. at 21. In doing so, we rejected Patent Owner’s argument that “‘reconfigurable modules” are not “logic that ‘may be programmed or reconfigured’ to implement tasks,” but rather “are circuits that have already been programmed to implement tasks and can then be updated.” Id. at 18–21 (quoting Prelim. Resp. 9). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner included a footnote stating that it “maintains that this limitation should be construed to require that existing modules be updatable.” PO Resp. 12, n.1. Patent Owner, however, does not provide additional elaboration or set forth arguments explaining why the reasoning in our Institution Decision is in error. See id. (“For the remainder of this Petition, however, [Patent Owner] assumes that the Board’s broader construction is correct.”). Based on the complete record, we adhere to the interpretation set forth in our Institution Decision for the reasons discussed therein. See Inst. Dec. 18–21.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Patent Owner that the phrase “modules for implementing tasks, the module being reconfigurable” in independent claims 1 and 5 was not a “means-plus-function” limitation that must be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. Inst. Dec. 15–18. We also construed the term “module” as “logic configured to perform a task that can receive and/or transmit communication signals.” Id. at 21. In doing so, we rejected Patent Owner’s argument that “‘reconfigurable modules” are not “logic that ‘may be programmed or reconfigured’ to implement tasks,” but rather “are circuits that have already been programmed to implement tasks and can then be updated.” Id. at 18–21 (quoting Prelim. Resp. 9). In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner included a footnote stating that it “maintains that this limitation should be construed to require that existing modules be updatable.” PO Resp. 12, n.1. Patent Owner, however, does not provide additional elaboration or set forth arguments explaining why the reasoning in our Institution Decision is in error. See id. (“For the remainder of this Petition, however, [Patent Owner] assumes that the Board’s broader construction is correct.”). Based on the complete record, we adhere to the interpretation set forth in our Institution Decision for the reasons discussed therein. See Inst. Dec. 18–21.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner stated that it did not object to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 7. In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” finding that this level of skill is consistent with the ’184 patent and the asserted prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 23. In its Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not object to the” level of skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 11–12 (citing Inst. Dec. 23); see also Ex. 2012 ¶ 57 (Dr. Brogioli’s testimony that he does “not object to the Board’s finding in the Institution Decision on the level of skill in the art.”). Based on the complete record, we adhere to the level of ordinary skill adopted in our Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 23.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Eggers is deficient because it “does not disclose the existence of reconfiguration data for the Shift Register and Output Connections modules or any means of generating such data.” PO Resp. 13. Claim 1 does not require “reconfiguration data” or a configuration memory, and thus Eggers need not expressly disclose such data or memory to anticipate. To the extent Patent Owner argues that configuration data is necessary for a reconfigurable module, the evidence indicates that one of ordinary skill would have understood that such data would be used in the modules of Eggers. In this regard, Dr. Nelson testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that the AT6000 device is not sold ‘out-of-the-box’ with a shift register and output connections modules pre-configured” and that “Eggers necessarily had to reconfigure the AT6000 from its default state to implement these modules,” which would require reconfiguration data. Ex. 1033 ¶ 12. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges that the AT600 is necessarily loaded with configuration data to configure the shift register and output connections modules on startup. PO Sur-reply 3. We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the configuration data for the shift register and output connections modules is not “reconfiguration” data because “[t]he ’184 patent establishes that ‘reconfiguration’ refers to reprogramming after startup, not programming on startup.” PO Sur-reply 3. As noted above, claim 1 does not require “reconfiguration data;” it only requires “modules” that are “reconfigurable.” Ex. 1001, 10:20–21. We therefore need not enter into a debate about the precise definition of “reconfiguration data” because the evidence shows that Eggers discloses modules that are reconfigurable, as claim 1 requires. As discussed above, one of ordinary skill would have understood that Eggers’s shift register and output connections modules are “reconfigurable” because they are created with reconfigurable logic in the Atmel AT6000. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 92–93. Consequently, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Eggers discloses limitation 1[a].” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,224,184 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,224,184
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 1, 2022 · IPR2020-01531 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7–9, 13–17, and 19 are unpatentable as anticipated by Xia; claims 12 and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Xia or Iwata.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “the time of the invention as someone who would have had “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and four or more years of experience in analog circuit design.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23). In our Institution Decision, we identified a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as someone with “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or its equivalent, and four years of experience in analog 1 Petitioner also relies upon the Declarations of Un-Ku Moon, Ph.D. (Exs. 1003, 1031) and Sylvia Hall-Ellis, Ph.D. (Ex. 1022). Patent Owner relies on the Declaration of Dr. Marwan Hassoun (Ex. 2008). we maintain here. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 2–28.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Owner, we maintain our preliminary construction of the connection limitation. Claims 1 and 8 require a programmable interconnect circuit coupled between an I/O port and a plurality of ADCs that enables a connection of the ADCs to the I/O port. Ex. 1001, 14:21–26, 14:51–53, 14:57–62. Figure 9 of the ’071 patent illustrates such “a programmable interconnect circuit.” Id. at 9:20–21, Fig. 9. It can be “implemented as an ADC interface, or more particularly, the routing network 704 or 804.” Id. at 9:22–24. In Figure 10, routing network 804 “enables the coupling of the analog input signal at input/output port 604 to each of 8 ADC circuits 602.” Id. at 10:3–8, Fig. 10. In Figure 11, routing network 804 together with sampler 1102 “enable[s] t[he] routing of a sample of the analog input signal periodically change the routing of the sampled signal to a different ADC.” Id.at 10:60–11:2, Fig. 11. Thus, the programmable interconnect circuit or routing network 804 enables both direct and continuous connections between the I/O port and ADC circuits as shown in Figure 10, and indirect and periodic connections as shown in Figure 11. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find the connection limitation has its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes enabling both a direct and continuous connection of the I/O port to the plurality of ADCs and an indirect and periodic connection.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We agree with Patent Owner. First, as discussed above, claims 12 and 18 are directed to the embodiment of Figure 10 of the ’071 patent, while claims 13 and 19 are directed to the embodiment of Figure 11. The Specification makes this clear by using language similar to that in claims 12 and 18 to describe the Figure 10 embodiment, and using language similar to that in claims 13 and 19 to describe the Figure 11 embodiment. For example, the Specification contrasts “coupling the analog input signal to each analog-to-digital converter circuit of the plurality of analog-to-digital converter circuits” (the same language used in claim 18) with the “alternative[]” embodiment of “periodically coupling a sample of the analog input signal to an analog-to-digital converter circuit of the plurality of analog-to-digital converter circuits” (the same language used in claim 19). Ex. 1001, 2:50–59. Similarly, the Specification contrasts “rout[ing] the analog input signal to each of the ADC circuits 602 of a group of ADC circuits” (similar to the language of claim 12) as shown in Figure 10 with input signal to a selected ADC circuit 606” (similar to the language of claim 13) as shown in Figure 11. Id. at 10:56–66. Based on these disclosures, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the language of claims 12 and 18 to require routing the analog input signal received at the input/output port to each analog-to-digital converter without the use of a sampler, as shown in the Figure 10 embodiment. The use of a sampler is covered by claims 13 and 19, which cover the alternative Figure 11 embodiment.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached

    “E. Obviousness over Iwata and Hsueh Petitioner argues claim 2, which depends from claim 1, would have been obvious over the combination of Iwata and Hsueh. See Pet. 100–102. Patent Owner disagrees. See PO Resp. 53. As discussed in § II.C.4, supra, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claim 2 is anticipated by Xia. Therefore, we need not consider whether Petitioner has also demonstrated that claim 2 would have been obvious over the combination of Iwata and Hsueh. See Beloit, 742 F.2d at 1423.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 8,548,071 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,548,071
• Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2020-00878 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–15, 17, 18, 20–23, and 25–29 are unpatentable; claims 3, 8, 16, 19, 24, and 30 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–15, 17, 18, 20–23, and 25–29 of the ’897 patent are unpatentable and that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 3, 8, 16, 19, 24, and 30 of the ’897 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would include someone who had, at the priority date of the ’897 Patent, (i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing multi-lens optical systems. Such a person would have had experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multi-lens systems for manufacturing, and would have been familiar with the specifications of lens systems and their fabrication. In addition, a POSITA [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, or Zemax, and would have taken a lens design course. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner applied the same level of skill for the purposes of this IPR. PO Resp. 14–15 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 19). We regard Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Therefore, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’897 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues that no “dispute between the parties in this IPR depends on the construction of EFL, TTL, or of any other claim term [and] submits that the Board should refrain from construing any terms in the patent for the purposes of this proceeding.” PO Resp. 17. Petitioner does not respond to this argument. See generally Pet. Reply. We agree with Patent Owner. If we were to adopt either construction, it would not change the determination made in this Decision. Thus, we decline to construe any claim terms for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Ogino. Pet. 10–40. Patent Owner does not present arguments related to this ground. See generally PO Resp. For the reasons that follow, we are persuaded that the evidence supports Petitioner’s arguments and thus, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 4, 9–15, 17, 20, and 25–29 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Ogino.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,330,897 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,330,897
• Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2021 · IPR2020-00877 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 11–13, 15, 16, 18, 20, and 21 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3 and 4 were not shown unpatentable because the May combination was insufficiently supported.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). Furthermore, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum, 829 F.3d at 1380. Thus, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combinations of prior art render the challenged claims unpatentable. slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends [A] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would include someone who had, as of the priority date of the ’840 Patent (i) a Bachelor’s degree in Physics, Optical Sciences, or equivalent training, as well as (ii) approximately three years of experience in designing miniature lens systems for mobile device applications. . . . Such a person would have had experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multi-lens systems, and would have been familiar with the specifications of lens systems, especially lenses configured for use in mobile devices, such as cell phones. . . . In addition, a POSITA would have known how to use lens design software such as Code V, Oslo, or Zemax, and would have taken a lens design course. . . . Such a POSITA would have been familiar with photographic lenses and with mechanical and electronic devices. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003, 10). Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art set forth in the petition and used by the Board in its Institution Decision.” PO Resp. 3 (Inst. Dec. 8). We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’840 patent and the asserted prior art. We apply Petitioner’s definition in making the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Independent claim 1 recites “the Telephoto lens unit and the Wide lens unit having, respectively, total track length (TTL)/effective focal length (EFL) ratios smaller and larger than 1 and defining separate Telephoto and Wide optical paths.” Ex. 1001, 19:48–52. Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would find, in light of the specification, the term ‘total track length (TTL)’ to include ‘the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and the image plane.’” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 20) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner further asserts that, although the Specification of the ’840 patent does not expressly define EFL, “its meaning is well known in the art, as exemplified in Li ([Ex.] 1007), which states that ‘[t]he focal length of a lens assembly [is] also referred to as the effective focal length[.]’” Pet. 8–9 (quoting Ex. 1007, 2:59–61) (alterations in the original). Patent Owner “does not believe that any terms require construction to resolve the disputes addressed in this response.” PO Resp. 3. We do not discern a dispute as to the claim terms TTL and EFL in this proceeding and as such, we need not expressly construe these terms. Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. .” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “(2) Discussion of Rationale for Combining We have reviewed the record developed at trial including the cited portions of Parulski, Huang, and Tang. We determine that Petitioner has supported its seven reasons for combining Parulski, Huang, and Tang with sufficient rational underpinning evidenced by the exhibits cited above. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale for combining. See generally PO Resp. We determine that Petitioner has shown that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Parulski, Huang, and Tang, and that such motivation is supported by sufficient rational underpinning. Based on the complete record developed at trial, we determine that cited portions of Parulski, Huang, and Tang sufficiently support Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the telephoto lens unit and the wide lens unit as claimed.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,288,840 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,288,840
• Metall Zug AG / Haag-Streit AG et al. v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2021 · IPR2020-00300 · APJ Amber L Hagy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 21–26 were held unpatentable as obvious over Huber, Everett, and Lexer; claims 2, 27, 40, and 42 were not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 44 and 45 were entered.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “(7) Claim 1 Conclusion After having analyzed the entirety of the trial record and assigning” slip op. at 31

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “For the above reasons, Petitioner has not met its burden to” slip op. at 72

  Patent outcomesUS 8,690,330 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 8,690,330

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.