- PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · PGR2022-00052 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · PGR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled claims 1–27 and denied substitute claims 28–51 because the original disclosure lacked written-description support for the claimed CSP limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exclusion of “at least” because it introduces ambiguity. Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner “does not dispute the Board’s findings on the qualifications of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] for purposes of this proceeding.” See RMTA 13. We determine that Petitioner’s definition, with the exclusion of “at least,” is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’034 patent and we use this level of skill here in the evaluation of the Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that “claim construction is not necessary” and that “the meaning of the claims would be easily understood by a POSA.” RMTA 13. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions for the terms “client device” and “first server,” and the original claims were rendered obvious under this construction. Pet. 23–27. Petitioner does not assert that the substitute claims of the Revised Motion to Amend are anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art or are patent ineligible. See generally RMTA Opp. Nor does Petitioner’s patentability challenge of the substitute claims contend that express construction is needed. See generally id. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that express claim construction is unnecessary. We need only construe terms that are necessary to resolve disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied
“written description requirement. In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1989); All Dental Prodx LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The issue here, however, is whether the disclosure of the ’034 patent would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill that the inventors had possession of the CSP Limitations. Ariad, 598” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“to cancelling claims 1–27; and deny-in-part the Motion to Amend as to proposed substitute claims 28–51. In summary: Motion to Amend Outcome Claim(s) Original Claims Cancelled by Amendment 1–27 Substitute Claims Proposed in the Amendment 28–51 Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Granted Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Denied” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,272,034 - PTAB · Mar 14, 2024 · PGR2022-00061 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · PGR · Final written decision
The Board granted Patent Owner’s non-contingent motion to amend, cancelling claims 1–34 and replacing them with substitute claims 35–66 supported by the written description.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“complies with the legal requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 326(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.221. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4, 7–8. Specifically, Patent Owner must show that the amendments do not enlarge the scope of the claims or introduce “new matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii)). Lectrosonics describes “new matter” as follows:” slip op. at 4
- 112 supportGranted
“description support for the proposed substitute claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(9); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221; Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 7–8. The written description test is met when the original disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with this argument because it is not consistent with the ’953 patent specification or the plain meaning of “replace.” Neither party requested a special construction of the term “replace.” We see no merit in Petitioner’s contention that the plain meaning of “replace” in Figure 32 does not require removal of the device being replaced. The contention that the plain meaning of “replace” does not require “removing” was explored with Petitioner’s counsel at the oral argument: THE BOARD: If you replace a player in a football game or baseball game, a new player goes in and replaces that player. You don't add a 12th, a 12th player or a 10th player to a baseball team. You replace the player that’s there with a different player. Isn’t that what replacement is all about? COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Your Honor, in that context, it absolutely is. Because there’s no other way to understand that. You know, but we’re not talking about baseball or people here obviously. Hearing Tr. 18:23–19:3 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 15
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 11,349,953 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2023 · IPR2018-00767 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Remand
The Board held that judicial estoppel and waiver preclude reliance on the inventorship certificates, leaving the prior final written decisions finding claims 1–3, 8, 11, and 17 unpatentable unchanged.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“For the foregoing reasons, we determine that judicial estoppel and waiver apply. Accordingly, the certificates of correction for inventorship have no impact on the Final Written Decisions in these cases. We also note that if judicial estoppel and waiver had been found not to apply and these proceedings were recommenced under changed inventorship, Petitioner should be permitted the opportunity to respond to Patent Owner’s new inventorship of the patents-at-issue at least by being allowed additional briefing in order to comply with due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Pet. Remand Br. 1. Additionally, if judicial estoppel and waiver had been found not to apply, we also would likely have to determine whether the source code evidence, in view of the related testimonial evidence and argument that is already in the trial record, supports the actual reduction to practice prior to Janevski’s effective date, as Patent Owner argues it does. See Paper 13, 28–31; Paper 22, 12–22. Amongst other things, this determination would likely entail resolving a claim construction dispute between the parties that may affect the determination of whether the source code practices the claimed invention. See Paper 22, 15–16. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s certificates of correction of inventorship have no impact on the Final Written Decisions.” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner
“Here, unlike Egenera, Patent Owner represented and provided evidence on its asserted correct inventorship directly to the Board. As discussed, Patent Owner asserted and provided evidence that Messrs. Balassanian and Bradley were the inventors of the patents and Mr. Carpenter implemented the invention. Paper 13, 19–20; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 6, 33, 42, 46; see also Ex. 1019, 59:9–18. Patent Owner’s representations were not contested by Petitioner during trial, and Patent Owner’s representations were further consistent with the argument and evidence developed and considered by the Board during trial. Now, Patent Owner’s position on inventorship is inconsistent with its earlier position and Petitioner would be prejudiced absent estoppel. Accordingly, in this particular circumstance, judicial estoppel applies. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prohibits a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same or related proceedings and its purpose is “to protect the integrity of the judicial process.”” slip op. at 20
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that after Patent Owner was unsuccessful at trial due to the failure of its own evidence, Patent Owner now seeks to have the evidence reconsidered under changed inventorship. Pet. Remand Br. 8– 9. Patent Owner had in its sole possession the evidence of inventorship, and we believe that under these circumstances, Patent Owner should be held to the consequences of its choices as to the representations and evidence of antedating that it presented at trial. To hold otherwise would result in prejudice to Petitioner. We consider the potential prejudice to be significant; as discussed, redoing these proceedings would require Petitioner to expend additional resources. Further, under these specific circumstances where Patent Owner has made the inventorship change under its volition, Patent Owner would be afforded the unfair advantage of a “do-over,” absent the application of judicial estoppel. Accordingly, under these specific circumstances, we determine that judicial estoppel applies precluding Patent Owner from relying on the certificates of correction of inventorship in these proceedings.” slip op. at 21
NonePatents in suitUS 8,942,252 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2023 · IPR2018-00766 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held that judicial estoppel and waiver bar reliance on the inventorship certificates, which have no impact on the final written decisions.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for petitioner
“For the foregoing reasons, we determine that judicial estoppel and waiver apply. Accordingly, the certificates of correction for inventorship have no impact on the Final Written Decisions in these cases.” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“review on the grounds presented in the Petition as to whether claims 1–3, 6– 9, 12, 16, 19, and 23–25 of the ’791 patent are anticipated by Janevski2 or would have been obvious over Janevski alone and in combination with other prior art. IPR766, Paper 10. On September 19, 2018, in IPR767, we also instituted inter partes review on the grounds presented in the Petition as to whether claims 1–3, 8, 11, and 17 of the ’252 patent would have been obvious in view of Janevski alone and in combination with other prior art. IPR767, Paper 8.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner
“B. Judicial Estoppel Petitioner argues that judicial estoppel applies here to preclude the retroactive effect of § 256. Pet. Remand Br. 6–9. Petitioner asserts that judicial estoppel applies against a party when: (1) the party takes a later position that is “clearly inconsistent” with an earlier position; (2) the party succeeds in persuading a court to adopt the earlier position (which thus poses a “risk of inconsistent court determinations”); and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id. at 7 (citing Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc., 474 F.3d 1298, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Petitioner contends that all three factors are met because Patent Owner asserted that Mr. Balassanian and Mr. Bradley were inventors and communicated the invention to Carpenter for his subsequent reduction to practice, the Board accepted the premise for the purposes of making findings of fact and rulings of law, and Patent Owner now seeks to derive the unfair advantage of revisiting the Final Written Decisions. Id. at 7–9.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,391,791 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision
The Board found claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 not shown unpatentable: Bensimon did not disclose the claimed restricted-access mode, and Takahashi did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner states––and Patent Owner does not dispute––that “a person having ordinary skill in the art of secure computer data storage devices (i.e. in the art for the ’459 patent) would have had (i) a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and (ii) approximately two years of experience in the design or research of secure computer data storage devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). We agree with Petitioner’s statement of the level skill of an ordinary artisan at the time and adopt it as our own. Although Patent Owner does not directly address an ordinary artisan’s level of skill, Petitioner’s description of the level of skill accords with that of Patent Owner’s witness Dr. Goldschlag. Compare id., with Ex. 2004 ¶ 21 (opining that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or equivalent training, as well as two to three years of technical experience in the field of computer security and storage devices.”). We further find the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“within an electronic circuit embedded within the storage device.” Ex. 1001, 9:58–59, 10:34–35. Although these claims are not at issue in this case, they evince the patentee’s desire to employ each of the terms “unique” and “specific” where each is intended. It is well established that ordinarily different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings. . . .”); CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Further, the Specification describes that, depending on the selected security level, a cryptographic key can be generated using in part “device-specific security information derived from the unique format information of the removable storage device.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:1. The Specification thus describes the format information of the removable storage device as “unique” but describes the security information of the device merely as “specific,” not “unique.” Finally, the Specification discloses “for exemplary purposes only” an embodiment wherein “a unique, device-specific security information can be generated from the unique characteristics of the underlying storage medium.” Id. at 7:43–47 (emphasis added). The Specification thus describes device-specific security information as unique in a particular, non-limiting example and explicitly indicates that the device-specific security information derived in that example is “unique.” See id. In light of the foregoing description, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that “specific” in the context of the claim term “device-specific security information” means unique. Construing “specific” to mean “unique” as Patent Owner urges would render meaningless the subsequent use of “unique” in claims 9 and 17, without a clear indication in the Specification of such an intent. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Instead, we accord the word “specific” its ordinary and customary meaning and construe “device-specific security information” as meaning “information particular to, but not necessarily unique to, a storage device and used to secure access to the storage device.” Although we construe the disputed term “device-specific security information,” our determination that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the Instituted Claims are unpatentable is not dependent upon our construction, as detailed below.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not identified in Bensimon explicit or inherent disclosure of the claimed restricted-access mode. Claim 1 requires operating in restrictedaccess mode “when the storage device does not have the device-specific security information.” Ex. 1001, 9:24–26. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, either alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as meeting the claimed device-specific security information. Reply 13; Pet. 22. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of claim 1, Petitioner is required to show that Bensimon discloses operating in restricted-access mode when the storage device does not have the read/write password, or alternatively does not have the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to show anticipation, claimed elements must be arranged as required by the claim). Petitioner does not make the required showing. As Petitioner argues: “these claims recite operating in one mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is present, and operating in another mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is not present.” Reply 16. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device. See id. at 16–22. Rather, Bensimon describes two different possible modes of operation when the read/write password is absent from the storage device, namely either no protection or write protection. Ex. 1004, 5:33–39, 6:3–4, 6:13–29. Contrary to the claim language, operation in Bensimon’s write protection mode depends upon the presence of the write protection password, not upon the absence of the read/write password and password-enabling flag (i.e. the claimed device-specific security information). Ex. 1004, 6:13–23; see also Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 18) (asserting the claimed restricted-access mode is met “when Bensimon’s storage device 100 only has the write-protection (read-only) password”). This disclosure is insufficient to establish anticipation because claim 1 requires operating in restricted access mode when the storage device does not have the device-specific storage information, which Petitioner asserts is the read/write password and password-enabling flag. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We similarly are not persuaded that Bensimon inherently anticipates claim 1. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the cited disclosure identifies two possible modes of operation when the read/write password and password-enabling flag are absent from Bensimon’s storage device, neither of which necessarily must occur.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“E. Obviousness of Claims 2 and 34 based on Bensimon in combination with Takahashi Petitioner asserts dependent claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. Pet. 36–40 (analysis of claim 2) and 42–43 (analysis of claim 34). Petitioner’s analysis of these claims does not repair the deficiencies described above with regard to the claimed restrictedaccess mode. See id.; see also Reply 25. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above in the context of claim 1 and based on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. See supra Section III.D.2.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,968,459 - PTAB · Dec 26, 2017 · IPR2017-02201 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Order
The Board dismissed the petition and terminated the proceeding as to all parties because the parties had settled their dispute.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Other
“and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, these sections relate, respectively, to termination of “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter” and to termination of “trial,” which “means a contested case instituted by the Board based upon a petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 317; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.2, 42.72. This proceeding is in the preliminary stage, and no decision whether to institute a trial has been made. As such, we treat the parties’ request as seeking dismissal of the Petition to thereby terminate the proceeding.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“U.S. Patent No. 6,684,060 B1. Mot. 3–4. The parties represent that “there are no other agreements or understandings, oral or written, between DTS and Avago, including any collateral agreements, made in connection with, or in contemplation of, the termination of the present proceeding.” Mot. 3. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to dismiss the Petition (Paper 1) and terminate this proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.71(a), 42.74(a). We also determine that it is appropriate to treat the Agreements as business confidential information to be kept separate from the patent file. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,684,060 - PTAB · Sep 17, 2015 · IPR2015-00531 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Order
The Board terminated the proceedings as to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc., vacated the scheduling orders, and continued the proceedings as to Bandspeed, Inc.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“IPR2015-01581, and IPR2015-01582 (“the related proceedings”). In each of the related proceedings, a petition was filed by Qualcomm Incorporated on July 12, 2015, with a motion to join a respective one of these proceedings. Papers 1, 2 in each of the related proceedings. We note that the joinder motions in the related proceedings were filed before the instant motions to terminate were filed in these proceedings. Patent Owner opposes the joinder motions in the related proceedings. Paper 8 in each of the related proceedings. If the joinder motions are not granted, the related proceedings are barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Patent Owner has not yet filed a preliminary response in any of the related proceedings, the deadline for which is October 28, 2015, nor sought to expedite the related proceedings by filing a waiver under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b). It is thus 2 Citations are to IPR2015-00314. premature to decide the joinder motions in the related proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Nevertheless, we discern no compelling interest to be served by delaying termination of these proceedings with respect to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc., both of which have settled with Patent Owner. See 35 U.S.C. § 317 (“An inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed” (emphasis added)). These proceedings are at an early stage, and no motions are pending in any of these proceedings. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these proceedings with respect to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc. We exercise the discretion afforded under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) to decline, at this time, to terminate these proceedings with respect to Patent Owner. Because no petitioner remains in these proceedings, we vacate the Scheduling Order in each proceeding (Paper 13 in IPR2015-00314, IPR2015-00316, and IPR2015-00531; and Paper 15 in IPR2015-00315). If necessary, we will revisit scheduling for these proceedings after decisions on the joinder motions are made in the related proceedings. If appropriate, we will also revisit the Motions to Terminate as to Patent Owner after ruling on the motions for joinder in the related proceedings.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The Joint Motions to Seal are granted to the extent that they request that the agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the patent files under 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) but otherwise denied. The requests should not have been filed as “Motions to Seal,” which has other meaning, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.14, with respect to the underlying document in the context of the proceeding, e.g., expungement or made public under certain circumstances.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,542,643 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2014 · IPR2014-00560 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated IPR2014-00560 without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties stated in their joint motion that they have settled their dispute and have reached agreement to terminate this inter partes review. Paper 10, 2. Patent Owner has not yet filed a preliminary response or a waiver under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107. We are persuaded that, under these circumstances, it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate this proceeding is GRANTED and this proceeding is hereby terminated; and” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 5,592,555 - PTAB · May 2, 2014 · IPR2014-00229 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the proceedings as to all parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Other
“The instant proceedings are in the preliminary stage. Patent Owner has filed preliminary responses in each of the instant proceedings.5 The Board, however, has not determined whether trial will be instituted for any of the requests for inter partes review. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In the motions to terminate, the parties state that they have settled their dispute with respect to the patents involved in the proceedings, and have reached agreement to terminate these proceedings. Paper 9, 1. Furthermore, the joint motion indicates that the parties have agreed to dismiss Petitioner and other real parties-in-interest identified by 2 IPR2014-00229, Paper 9; IPR2014-00230, Paper 10, IPR2014-00231, Paper 9. 3 IPR2014-00229, Ex. 1047; IPR2014-00230, Ex. 1047, IPR2014-00231, Ex. 1047. 4 IPR2014-00229, Paper 10; IPR2014-00230, Paper 11, IPR2014-00231, Paper 10. 5 IPR2014-00229, Paper 7; IPR2014-00230, Paper 8; IPR2014-00231, Paper 7.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The Board generally expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the early stage of these proceedings, we agree with the parties that terminating the instant proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. The Board is persuaded that, under these circumstances, it is appropriate to enter judgment6 without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the joint motions to terminate these proceedings are granted, and that these proceedings are hereby terminated as to all parties, including Petitioner and Patent Owner;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,131,121 - PTAB · May 2, 2014 · IPR2014-00230 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions to terminate the proceedings as to all parties and granted the requests to keep the settlement agreement confidential.
RulingsOther- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The Board generally expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and the early stage of these proceedings, we agree with the parties that terminating the instant proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. The Board is persuaded that, under these circumstances, it is appropriate to enter judgment6 without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the joint motions to terminate these proceedings are granted, and that these proceedings are hereby terminated as to all parties, including Petitioner and Patent Owner;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,108,704
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.