- PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · PGR2022-00025 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Remand
The Board granted PGR of claims 1–19, finding claim 1 more likely than not anticipated by Grigoriadis and claims 1–19 more likely than not lacking written-description support.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of post-grant review is authorized by statute only when “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon considering the Petition, Patent Owner Preliminary Response, and the cited evidence in light of the Director’s Decision, we conclude that Petitioner has satisfied its burden under 35 U.S.C. § 324 to show that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Therefore, we grant institution of a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factual indicators of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “the various prior art approaches employed, the types of problems encountered in the art, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology involved, and the educational background of those actively working in the field.” Jacobson Bros., Inc. v. U.S., 512 F.2d 1065, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1975); see also Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting with approval Jacobson Bros.).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Independent claim 1 recites a method of treating CAH by reducing an A4 level “from baseline” after administering a CRF1 receptor antagonist to a CAH patient. See Ex. 1001, 47:51–48:5. The Specification expressly teaches that, with respect to the clinical phase 2 trial described in Example 4, “Patients will have overnight [pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamics] PK/PD assessments performed at baseline, which include an [sic] pre-dose overnight assessment and a post-dose overnight assessment for PK/PD following administration of the first dose.” Ex. 1001, 41:55–59. This is the same quotation and clinical trial relied upon by Dr. Barnes in his Declaration, and is the only definition of a “baseline” in the ’201 patent. See Ex. 1037, 36–37. We note that placebos were evidently not employed in the phase 2 clinical study of Example 4.5 Given the sole exemplary description of “baseline” in Example 4 of the Specification, we construe the claim term reciting “reduced from baseline” as meaning “a reduction in A4 level compared to an A4 level measurement made prior to, and/or at the beginning of, administration of the drug.”” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Reference is prior artInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only when “every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A reference may inherently anticipate if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed “is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, the “very essence of inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a reference unavoidably teaches the property in question.” Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,007,201 - PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · PGR2021-00088 · APJ John G New · PGR · Remand
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–25 on all five grounds, finding the threshold met based on likely anticipation, obviousness, and lack of written-description support.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324, the Board “may not authorize a post-grant review to be instituted unless … the information presented in the petition … if such information is not rebutted would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” In conformance with the Director’s Decision, and for the reasons we explain herein, we institute post-grant review of the ’908 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The Specification expressly teaches that, with respect to the clinical phase 2 trial described in Example 4, “Patients will have overnight [pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamics] PK/PD assessments performed at baseline, which include an [sic] pre-dose overnight assessment and a post-dose overnight assessment for PK/PD following administration of the first dose.” Ex. 1001, col.42, ll. 12–16. This is the same quotation and clinical trial relied upon by Dr. Barnes in his Declaration, and is the only definition of a “baseline” in the ’908 patent. See Ex. 1002, 36–37. We note that placebos were evidently not employed in the phase 2 clinical study of Example 4.3 Given the sole exemplary description of “baseline” in Example 4 of the Specification, we construe the claim term reciting “reduced by at least 10% from baseline” as meaning “a reduction of at least 10% in the level of ACTH (claim 1) or 17-OHP (claim 11) compared to measurements of ACTH or 17-OHP made prior to, and/or at the beginning of, administration of the drug.”” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would typically possess a medical degree or a Ph.D. in a field related to endocrinology, and would have knowledge of hormone regulation and disorders, as well as knowledge of the treatment regimens employed to treat such disorders. Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 34). Petitioner argues that such a person of ordinary skill would also have at least three years of experience conducting research concerning endocrine disorders, including CAH or other adrenal disorders. Id. Patent Owner does not expressly contest this definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, because we find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the demonstrable level of skill in the art (see, e.g., Exs. 1009, 1025, 2003, 2004,” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundInstituted
“A claim is unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only when “every element and limitation of the claim was previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A reference may inherently anticipate if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed “is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, the “very essence of inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a reference unavoidably teaches the property in question.” Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,849,908 - PTAB · Apr 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00123 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled original claim 1 and denied substitute claim 2 for lack of written-description support; it did not reach the obviousness or enablement grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill is inappropriate because it “requires qualifications that exclude even the sole inventor of the ’190 Patent, Dr. Edward Neuwelt.” MTA Opp. 1. According to Petitioner, Dr. Neuwelt is “a neurosurgeon,” not a pediatric oncologist, and lacks the requisite “at least 2 years” experience in platinum-based therapies. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, 18; Ex. 1038, 98:9–17, 100:15–101, 4). We agree with Petitioner. It is well settled that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner presents persuasive evidence to show that under Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill, Dr. Neuwelt, the sole inventor, would not qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan, because he is not a pediatric oncologist, even though he is considered “one of the world leading experts on this compound [STS] and otoprotection” and “an expert in the area of [STS] as a . . . drug to use in children with medulloblastoma.” Ex. 1038, 98:9–17, 99:17–18, 101:18–102:13.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Paragraph 102 of Dr. Rassekh’s Declaration, however, does not support Patent Owner’s assertion. Instead, Dr. Rassekh testifies that [t]he stratum of previous craniospinal radiation therapy contained 8 participants: 2 of the 4 (50%) participants receiving STS had hearing loss compared to 4 of the 4 (100%) participants not receiving STS, and none of the hearing loss assessments were changed at the 1 year follow up period. (Ex. 1001 at 20: 28-32, 47-50.) Ex. 2024 ¶ 102. Dr. Rassekh offers no opinion on how many osteosarcoma patients with prior cranial irradiation and how many medulloblastoma patients with prior cranial irradiation had hearing loss.” slip op. at 20
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“In sum, we find the disclosures of the ’243 application that Patent Owner relies on do not provide sufficient written-description support for the ototoxicity efficacy limitation.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“F. Petitioner’s Asserted Unpatentability Grounds In light of our determination above that Patent Owner has not shown sufficient written-description support for proposed substitute claim 2 in the ’243 application, we do not reach the grounds of unpatentability set forth in Petitioner’s Opposition. See Revised MTA Opp. 17–25 (alleging non-enablement and obviousness).” slip op. at 26
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,596,190 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2020 · IPR2019-00995 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted the non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 2, 8, 10, 18, 19, 28–30, 32–34, 37, 38, 40–42, 45, and 47 and substituting claims 48–62, which were not shown obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“minimal probative value because Patent Owner has not adequately demonstrated a nexus between the asserted objective indicia and the merits of the claimed invention. Mot. to Exclude 3–4; Reply Mot. to Exclude 1–2. This argument attacks the merits of Patent Owner’s substantive arguments on objective indicia and does not establish an evidentiary basis for excluding Mr. Van Vliet’s testimony. We agree with Patent Owner that Mr. Van Vliet’s testimony is relevant to the issue of objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Opp. Mot. to Exclude 1–2. Petitioner also argues that Mr. Van Vliet’s declaration should be excluded because it contains hearsay. Mot. to Exclude 4–6; Reply Mot. to Exclude 2. Petitioner states that it “is not moving to exclude based on the fact that the Declaration itself [is] hearsay, but rather that it contains a multitude of statements therein that are themselves hearsay, made by persons other than Van Vliet . . . .” Mot. to Exclude 5. However, as Patent Owner points out, Petitioner does not identify any specific statements in the declaration that constitute hearsay. Opp. Mot. to Exclude 4. Even after Patent Owner pointed out this lack of specificity, Petitioner’s Reply still does not clarify which specific statements in the declaration are alleged to be hearsay and instead simply repeats the assertion there are “a multitude of statements therein that are themselves hearsay.” Reply Mot. to Exclude 2.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“however, we first consider whether Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. To satisfy those requirements, Patent Owner must demonstrate that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter; and (4) the proposed claims are supported in the original disclosure (and any earlier filed disclosure for which the benefit of filing date is sought). See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2018).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“We determine that the plain language of the claim, which requires that the fuel delivery connections “compris[e]” the fuel level sensor, shows that the fuel level sensor is structurally connected to the fuel level sensor. As Petitioner agrees, this claim language requires that the fuel delivery connection includes the fuel level sensor. Tr. 34:17–20. Both the fuel delivery connections and the fuel level sensor are structures, so for one to include the other, they must be physically connected. Petitioner’s argument give effect to the word “comprising.” Because a fuel delivery connection and a fuel level sensor would be operationally connected in any system that has both items, Petitioner’s interpretation essentially reads out the word “comprising” and treats the claim phrase as if it recited “fuel delivery connections and a fuel level sensor.” Our interpretation that the fuel delivery connections must be physically connected to the fuel level sensor is more faithful to the claim’s recitation that the fuel delivery connections “compris[e]” the fuel level sensor. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”) (quoting Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“a low and high fuel level in the tanks to which the fuel delivery connection is connected.” RMTA A1. Patent Owner proposes that “low” fuel level means “empty or nearly empty” and “high” means “full or nearly full.” Id. at 5 nn.16–17 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:1–4, 6:7–12; Ex. 2002, 10). Petitioner does not contest Patent Owner’s proposed constructions or offer competing constructions for these terms. See generally Opp. RMTA; Tr. 13:17–15:14. Although Patent Owner’s argument in support of these constructions is truncated, we determine that Patent Owner’s proposals are supported by the evidence of record. The ’906 patent describes that operators can be provided with “visual representations or displays showing the fuel level in each of the tanks 12. Any visual representation or display may be used that shows at least a high level condition (tank full) and a low level condition (tank empty or nearly empty) and preferably also shows actual fuel level.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:4; see also id. at 6:7–10 (explaining that “[t]he control station 56 may be provided with a full readout or display for each fuel tank 12 being filled that shows the level of fuel in the fuel tank 12 including when the fuel tank 12 is near empty and near full. An alternative is to provide only fuel empty (low sensor dry) or fuel full (high sensor wet) signals.”). These descriptions equate a high fuel level with the tank being full or nearly full and a low fuel level with the tank being empty or nearly empty. Patent” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,029,906 - PTAB · Aug 12, 2020 · PGR2019-00032 · APJ David Cotta · PGR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claim 8 and denied entry of substitute claim 11 because Petitioner showed it would have been obvious over Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In our Institution Decision, we agreed with the position Patent Owners took in their Preliminary Response – i.e, that the focus of the challenged claims was enzyme-based biosensors and thus the POSA would have more than just a familiarity with enzyme-based biosensors and protein chemistry. Inst. Dec. 8–9. Accordingly, based on the record before us at the time, we accepted the definition provided in Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response, which was consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references and in the specification of the ‘987 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Neither party challenges the identification of the POSA set forth in our Institution Decision. See generally, R. Mot.; Opp.; Reply; Sur-reply. Additionally, we find that the fully developed trial record supports the POSA identification we made in our Institution Decision. Accordingly, in this decision, we apply the identification of the POSA set forth in our Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 9.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of this decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“first, substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over Omura in view of the knowledge of the POSA, and second, substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura and Tsuji in view of the knowledge of the POSA. Opp. 7–24. We have considered the question of patentability in view of all the evidence and arguments presented in this proceeding. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of the POSA. Because Petitioner has proven that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious, as discussed in detail below, we do not consider whether Patent Owners’ motion otherwise complies with the statutory and regulatory requirements for a motion to amend. See, 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(1)(B) (requiring that the amendment propose a “reasonable number of substitute claims” and requiring that the substitute claims do “not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221 (additionally providing, inter alia, that a motion to amend “may be denied where . . . [t]he amendment does not respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial”). Similarly, because we have determined that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of the POSA, as discussed in detail below, we do not reach the question of whether substitute claim 11 would also have been obvious over only Omura in view of knowledge of the POSA.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“includes “research experience and/or knowledge in enzymology . . . and biosensors,” we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to a POSA to substitute FAD-conjugated glucose dehydrogenase derived from the claimed strain of Aspergillus oryzae for FAD-conjugated glucose dehydrogenase derived from Aspergillus terreus as disclosed in Omura.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,976,125 - PTAB · Nov 26, 2014 · IPR2014-01438 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding as to all parties before deciding whether to institute review.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Preliminary Response has not been filed, and a decision whether to institute a trial has not been rendered. Patent Owner represents that there is no currently pending district court litigation or ITC proceeding regarding the ’990 patent, and no decision has been made regarding future litigation. Mot. 1–2. Patent Owner also represents that there is no other related proceeding regarding the ’990 patent in the Office. Id. at 2. Based on the facts of this case, we determine it is appropriate to enter judgment terminating this proceeding with respect to all parties. We further find sufficient cause to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information. Therefore, we grant the joint motion to terminate and the joint request to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information. III. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate is granted, and this proceeding is terminated as to all parties; and” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,844,990 - PTAB · Oct 28, 2014 · IPR2014-00059 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions, terminated the instituted review as to all parties, and entered judgment after settlement before deciding the merits.
RulingsOther- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceedings. Id. In their Joint Motions to Terminate, the parties indicate that they have settled all of their disputes involving the Rackspace inter partes reviews, as well as the related district court proceeding styled PersonalWeb Tech. LLC v. Rackspace US, Inc., No. 6-12-cv-00659 (E.D. Tex.). Mot. 1, 4. The parties also indicate that they concurrently filed their Stipulation of Dismissal, as to only the Rackspace Defendants with prejudice, in that related district court proceeding. Id.; Ex. 2019. More importantly, the parties expressly state that “no other disputes between the parties remain,” and “[t]here is no other litigation or dispute in any court or forum involving [Rackspace and PersonalWeb].” Id. at 4. Upon consideration of the facts before us, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate the Rackspace inter partes reviews as to both parties, and enter judgment.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“3. However, Google’s Petitions were not filed timely in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).3 Google could have, but did not, file a petition for inter partes review with the one-year time period. More significantly, Google’s Motions for Joinder were not filed timely in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”).4 Google fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why we should exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive the one-month time limit for filing a Motion for Joinder.5” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 6,415,280 - PTAB · Oct 28, 2014 · IPR2014-00066 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions, terminated the Rackspace inter partes reviews as to all parties, and granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties further argue that maintaining the Rackspace inter partes reviews, after the parties have settled their disputes, would be contrary to public policy and would discourage future settlements by removing a significant motivation for settlement. Mot. 5. In view of the circumstances, we agree. Indeed, there are strong public policy reasons to favor settlement between the parties to a proceeding. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Generally, the Board expects that” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“3. However, Google’s Petitions were not filed timely in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).3 Google could have, but did not, file a petition for inter partes review with the one-year time period. More significantly, Google’s Motions for Joinder were not filed timely in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”).4 Google fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why we should exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive the one-month time limit for filing a Motion for Joinder.5” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“3. However, Google’s Petitions were not filed timely in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).3 Google could have, but did not, file a petition for inter partes review with the one-year time period. More significantly, Google’s Motions for Joinder were not filed timely in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”).4 Google fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why we should exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive the one-month time limit for filing a Motion for Joinder.5” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 6,928,442 - PTAB · Oct 28, 2014 · IPR2014-00062 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motion and terminated IPR2014-00062 as to all parties after settlement, before deciding the merits.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“reviews, after the parties have settled their disputes, would be contrary to public policy and would discourage future settlements by removing a significant motivation for settlement. Mot. 5. In view of the circumstances, we agree. Indeed, there are strong public policy reasons to favor settlement between the parties to a proceeding. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Generally, the Board expects that” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“3. However, Google’s Petitions were not filed timely in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).3 Google could have, but did not, file a petition for inter partes review with the one-year time period. More significantly, Google’s Motions for Joinder were not filed timely in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”).4 Google fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why we should exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive the one-month time limit for filing a Motion for Joinder.5” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,802,310 - PTAB · Oct 28, 2014 · IPR2014-00058 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions, terminated the Rackspace inter partes reviews as to all parties, and granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Hosting, Inc. (collectively, “Rackspace”) and Patent Owner PersonalWeb Technologies, LLC and Level 3 Communications (collectively, PersonalWeb) filed a Joint Motion to Terminate in each of the above-identified inter partes reviews (“the Rackspace inter partes reviews”). Paper 34, “Mot.”2 The parties also filed a true copy of their Written Settlement Agreement, made in connection with the termination of the Rackspace inter partes reviews, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(b). Ex. 1014. Additionally, the parties submitted a Joint Request to have their Written Settlement Agreement treated as confidential business information under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). Paper 33. For the reasons set forth below, the Joint Motions to Terminate and the Requests to have their Written Settlement Agreement treated as confidential business information are granted.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“court proceedings involving PersonalWeb and third parties. Mot. 6–7. However, except for EMC Corporation and VMWare, Inc. (collectively “EMC”) and Apple, Inc. (“Apple”), none of the third parties elected to file a Petition for inter partes review within the one-year statutory period under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id. at 7. We note that the termination of the Rackspace inter partes reviews would not affect the inter partes reviews that involve EMC and Apple. We are cognizant that Google, Inc. and YouTube, LLC (collectively “Google”) filed four Petitions—IPR2014-00977, IPR2014- 00978, IPR2014-00979, and IPR2014-00980—and Motions for Joinder with four of the Rackspace inter partes reviews. See, e.g., IPR2014-00977, Paper 3. However, Google’s Petitions were not filed timely in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner . . . is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).3 Google could have, but did not, file a petition for inter partes review with the one-year time period. More significantly, Google’s Motions for Joinder were not filed timely in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (“[a]ny request for joinder must be filed, as a motion under § 42.22, no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.”).4 Google fails to provide sufficient reasons as to why we should exercise our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) to waive the one-month time limit for filing a Motion for Joinder.5” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,099,420
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.