- Salvacion USA, Inc. v. Trutek CorpAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00711 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen, Baker, Wahi ’005, and, for claims 1, 2, and 8, Rolf; the Board also finds them obvious over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as it was undisputed at the time and consistent with the evidence of record. Inst. Dec. 7–8. Based on our consideration of the full record, we maintain our determination that a POSITA at the time the application for the ’802 patent was filed “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in pharmacy, chemistry, biochemistry, biomedical engineering or a closely related field, such that the POSITA generally understand[s] pharmaceutical formulation.” Pet. 12. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that “[a] POSITA would be familiar with the chemical ingredients in the [’802] Patent, biocidic agents, and cationic agents, have knowledge of airborne particles including viruses and bacteria, and understand electrostatic fields, electrostatic attraction and repulsion, adhesion and cohesion.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 7–8. The parties do not dispute our construction of the preambles of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply 2–4. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. Id. Briefly, the preamble of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 limits the challenged claims as both the preamble and the body are used to define the subject matter claimed. See Allen Engineering Corp., v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning and vitality” to the claim, see id., because it provides the only description in the claim for the application site of the formulation, i.e., “to skin or tissue of nasal passages,” and how the formulation is applied, i.e., “in a thin film.”” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction. From our perspective, the claims themselves support this construction as the claims expand upon the term “electrostatically inhibiting” with specific means for achieving such inhibition. Specifically, claims 1 and 2 recite electrostatically attracting the particulate matter, holding the matter in place, and inactivating the matter. Additionally, the Specification supports our construction as it describes the use of “an electrostatic field such that oppositely charged airborne particulates (including microorganisms) in the vicinity of the surface are electrostatically trapped, held thereto and one or more of the microorganisms so captured is neutralized, killed, inactivated, and rendered harmless.” Ex. 1001, 3:36–40; PO Resp. 10 n.6.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We adopt the parties’ construction of “adequate impermeability” that has been accepted in the related district court litigation: “Adequate impermeability” refers to the “thin film holding harmful particles in place and inhibiting them from penetrating the thin film and contacting the skin or tissue of an individual’s nasal passages. This is done by varying the concentration of ingredients . . .[,] thereby adjusting the adhesion and cohesion of the thin film.” Pet. Reply 3 (quoting Ex. 1010, 17). Furthermore, as stated in our Institution Decision, along with that term, the claim language explains that the thin film is meant to stick to the skin or tissue and to hold the particulate matter in place. Inst. Dec. 9–10. The claim language also explains that the cohesion of the formulation is adjusted to provide adequate impermeability to the thin film. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the recited impermeability is a function of the cohesive properties of the thin film, and that such impermeability refers to a property of the thin film, i.e., inhibiting the penetration or passage of matter through it onto the skin or tissue at the application site.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 8,163,802 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,163,802 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Jan 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00276 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on all challenged claims, 1–3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19, after their disclaimer, and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Request For Adverse Judgment. Paper 21 (“Mot.”). In the Joint Motion, the parties “jointly move to terminate the present inter partes review proceeding in light of the disclaimer filed by Patent Owner disclaiming all challenged claims.” Mot. 1 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73; Ex. 2001). The cited exhibit is a disclaimer, filed October 24, 2024, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), of claims 1–3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’194 patent, which constitute all of the claims challenged in the inter partes review. Ex. 2001. In view of the disclaimer, “Patent Owner requests entry of adverse judgment as to [the challenged and now disclaimed] claims.” Mot. 1. We grant the Motion. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner as” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,415,194 - PTAB · Jan 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00275 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on all challenged, disclaimed claims and terminated the inter partes review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“C.F.R. § 1.321(a), of claims 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–24, 44, and 46 of the ’597 patent, which constitute all of the claims challenged in the inter partes review. Ex. 2001. In view of the disclaimer, “Patent Owner requests entry of adverse judgment as to [the challenged and now disclaimed] claims.” Mot. 1. We grant the Motion. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner as to claims 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22–24, 44, and 46 of U.S. Patent No. 9,072,597 B2; and FURTHER ORDERED that the inter partes review is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,072,597 - Apotex Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/SInstitutedPTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00631 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, and granted Apotex’s motion to join the Mylan IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), the Board set forth six non-exclusive factors for determining “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. These factors are as follows: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Id. at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we take a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review. Id. at 6. The Director has also issued interim guidance to the Board on applying the factors. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), we “may waive or suspend a requirement of [part 42 of the Board’s rules] and may place conditions on the waiver or suspension.” Here, we agree with Petitioner that it has shown sufficient reason for us to waive the one-month from institution joinder motion deadline. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner waited until it had a sufficient business reason to file this Petition, and subsequently promptly filed its Petition and Motion for Joinder. Most critically, Petitioner raises no new unpatentability grounds, the trial schedule for the Mylan IPR need not be adjusted, and Petitioner agrees to serve in a silent understudy role. We determine that joinder with the Mylan IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,335,462 - Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Regents Of The University Of Michigan And University Of South FloridaAdverse judgmentPTAB · Aug 28, 2024 · IPR2023-01347 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and cancelled claim 16 after Patent Owner disclaimed all interest in it.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“DISCUSSION Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” While the motion for adverse judgment was initiated by Petitioner, Patent Owner does not oppose the motion and the record shows that Patent Owner has disclaimed all interest in claim 161 such that Patent Owner has no remaining claim in the trial, actions that are construed to be a request for adverse judgment. Id.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,633,344 - Duration Media LLC v. Rich Media Club LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2023-00953 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 were not proven unpatentable under either §103 ground because the evidence did not show the claimed viewability determination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive. Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioner’s proposal accounts for the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. See Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256 (identifying these factors, among others, as “a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art”). Nor does Petitioner, in its Reply, address, let alone rebut, Patent Owner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had some experience and/or knowledge in internet advertising. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner proposes that a “person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar major involving computer programming (or at least four years of practical computer programming experience) and at least two years of experience (in or out of college) in the field of internet advertising.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2045 ¶54). We agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have some experience in internet advertising, although we fail to see why one year would not be enough to familiarize sufficiently a computer scientist and/or programmer with the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. Based on the competing proposals, arguments, and evidence before us, we adopt and apply the following level of skill in assessing Petitioner’s challenges to the patentability of the claims of the ’329 patent: a person that would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical (or similar) engineering with about three years of experience being in the field of internet advertising.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s resurrected argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of § 311(b). Section 311(b) provides: “A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed cancel the claims of the ’329 patent on the basis of Badros, Harkins, and Krassner. Pet. 11. Petitioner did not base its request, in whole or in part, on the Krassner publication. Id. Krassner clearly is a patent. It issued on August 13, 2019, far too late to be § 102(b) prior art. Even if we assume Krassner is also a “printed publication” withing the meaning of § 311(b), the same date would apply: August 13, 2019. Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the document that is Krassner was published prior to when it issued on August 13, 2019. That another document (the Krassner publication), which published much earlier, may contain the same or similar disclosure is not relevant to when Krassner was patented or published. In sum, Krassner is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). b) Whether Krassner is Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Although Krassner is not prior under 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b), we” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner responds that, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, “Harkins teaches that its invention can be used in web pages.” Pet. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶30). Although Petitioner’s citation is off by one paragraph, Petitioner’s response about what Harkins teaches is correct. See Ex. 1004 ¶29 (“The present invention may be implemented for provision of virtually any type of advertising (e.g., print, radio, television, Internet, billboard, etc.) via any type of advertising medium (e.g., newspaper, magazine, radio broadcast, Web pages, billboards, etc.) without departing from the scope of the present invention.”). We find that Harkins is from the same field based on its express statement that it is applicable to “virtually any type of advertising” and “any type of advertising medium,” including “Web pages.” Ex. 1004 ¶29. Further, even if this were insufficient to place Harkins in the same field as the ’329 patent, we find that Harkins is reasonably pertinent to the particular problems with which the ’329 patent inventors were involved. In sum, we find that Harkins is analogous art to the ’329 patent.” slip op. at 19
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“Paper 60 (“PO Mot. To Exclude”), 9–10.6 Patent Owner is correct in this regard and, thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude with respect to the testimony in the second Smedley Declaration and the Madansky Declaration opining that Badros teaches the determination limitation. Paper 60, 9–12. Petitioner, in its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, argues that Patent Owner’s arguments about the “viewability test” were “surprising.” Paper 62, 8. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. The “viewability test” is a claim limitation. Petitioner should have anticipated that Patent Owner would argue that limitation. See In re Gardner, 449 F. App’x 914, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has held that when evaluating claims for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, all the limitations of the claims must be considered and given weight.” (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Univ. of Strathclyde v. 6 Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude seeks to exclude, in part or in whole, Exhibits 1020–1022, 1025–1030, and 1034–1040, which were submitted with Petitioner’s Reply, of which Exhibits 1026 and 1027 are the declaration by Dr. Madansky and the second declaration by Dr. Smedley, respectively. Mot. To Exclude. The Motion to Exclude also seeks to exclude “Exhibits” 1017 and 1018, which are not filed or of record in this case but which are referenced in the Reply. Id. For example, Exhibit 1017 is the Krassner publication, which Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to add to the record as supplemental information. See Paper 21, 3 n.1 (expunging the Krassner publication and stating that it “need not -- and indeed may not -- be re-filed under a new exhibit number”). Apart from the portions of Dr. Smedley’s second declaration and Dr. Madansky’s declaration opining that Badros teaches the “determination” limitation, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot. obviousness determination generally requires a finding that “all claimed limitations are disclosed in the prior art’.” (citing PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner argues that “[v]iewability tests were well known for well over a decade prior to the ’329 patent’s priority date.” Reply 9. If that were the case, then Petitioner should have made its argument in the Petition. Section 312(a) of Title 35 is titled “Requirements of Petition,” and it specifies that a petition must identify, among other things, “the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim, including . . . (B) affidavits or declarations of supporting evidence and opinions, if the petitioner relies on expert opinions.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon; and . . . the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge.”). Thus, “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Board’s Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 73 (Nov. 21, 2019).7 Dr. Smedley’s testimony in his second declaration, that “Badros discloses Patent Owner’s ‘viewability test’” (Ex. 1027 ¶11), is clearly evidence to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. The same is true of Dr. Madansky’s testimony that she agrees with Dr. Smedley in this regard. Ex. 1026 ¶4.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,443,329 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,443,329 - Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. / Celltrion, Inc. et al. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00298 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after it disclaimed every challenged claim, terminating the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. / Celltrion, Inc. et al. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00260 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
Adverse judgment was entered against Patent Owner as to claims 1–30 after it disclaimed all challenged claims, and the proceeding was terminated.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005. We grant Patent Owner’s request. Several exhibits filed in this proceeding were done so under seal as” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. / Celltrion, Inc. et al. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00884 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after their disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005. We grant Patent Owner’s request. Several exhibits filed in this proceeding were done so under seal as” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.