• Microsoft Corporation v. Daedalus Blue, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 27, 2022 · IPR2021-00830 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Keagy, Miller, and the knowledge of an ordinary skilled artisan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “‘Autonomic’ refers to an ability for a cloud computing environment to manage its own operations with little or no governance by hand from any user or system administer. ‘Autonomic scaling’ therefore refers to an ability of a cloud computing environment to manage its own scaling operations with little or no governance by hand from any user or system administer. This paper describes autonomic scaling in the sense of adding and removing instances of virtual machines and their data processing applications as data processing workload increases and decreases with a cloud computing environment. Ex. 1001, 2:35–45.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “iii. Other terms After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented by the parties, we determine that it is not necessary to our decision to construe any other claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that an ordinary skilled artisan “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related discipline and three years of experience in the relevant technical field— cloud computing, computer networks and systems—or the equivalent.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). Petitioner further states that “[a] POSITA also would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about the structure 4 The parties have not introduced any evidence concerning secondary considerations. levels of education may substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 8. We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ’612 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “For the following reasons, we determine that Petitioner persuasively shows that an ordinary skilled artisan would have combined Keagy and Miller in the manner proposed, and Patent Owner’s contentions are unavailing. We look to Dr. White’s testimony in connection with analyzing Patent Owner’s contentions. With respect to deploying additional instances of a VM, Dr. White points to page 37 of the Petition where Petitioner argues that “Keagy contains a similar disclosure [to Miller]” of up-scaling VM resources. Ex. 2011 ¶ 105. Dr. White, however, specifically states his disagreement that Keagy discloses deploying an additional instance of a VM. Id. ¶ 106. Patent Owner also disputes that Keagy discloses deploying that Miller discloses deploying an additional instance of a VM. Id. at 28. As explained below in connection with limitation 1.C, Patent Owner’s argument that Miller does not disclose deploying an additional instance of VM is based on its claim construction that “deploying” requires “creating a new instance of a VM” that we did not adopt for the reasons stated in Section II.C. Id. Dr. White’s quibbles with Miller in this regard are also based on the same claim construction that we do not adopt. Ex. 2011 ¶ 107 (“Miller does not create any new instances of a VM”). As further explained in our analysis of limitation 1.C, assuming Patent Owner is correct concerning Keagy’s lack of disclosure of adding additional instances of a VM, Miller discloses deploying additional instances of a VM under the proper claim construction. Consequently, modifying Keagy with Miller’s disclosure of deploying additional instances of a VM does not entail adding a feature to Keagy that it already possesses. Pet. 69; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 204–206. Dr. White’s testimony with respect to removing entire instances of a VM takes a similar tack. Dr. White points to page 70 of the Petition that “Keagy already discloses the termination and deletion of entire VMs.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 108 (citing Pet. 70). Dr. White specifically states his disagreement that Keagy has such a disclosure. Id. Petitioner relies on Dr. Jakobsson’s testimony at paragraphs 203 and 208. Pet. 70. In paragraph 208, Dr. Jakobsson directs us to his testimony in connection with, inter alia, limitation 1.D. In connection with limitation 1.D, Dr. Jakobsson testifies that “Keagy teaches the termination and deletion of entire VMs outside of the autonomic scaling context.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 128. Consequently, modifying Keagy with Miller to terminate entire VM instances in the context of to Keagy that it already possesses.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,572,612 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,572,612
• Microsoft Corporation v. Daedalus Blue, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 21, 2022 · IPR2021-00831 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–25 were shown unpatentable: claims 15–21 and 23–25 as obvious over Gelb and Tivoli, and claim 22 as obvious over Gelb, Tivoli, and Callaghan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We begin with the language of the independent challenged claims. Claim 15 recites “[a] method for handling files within a policy-based data management system, the method comprising.” Ex. 1001, 16:21–22. Claim 23 recites “[a] storage device storing computer code executable by a processor to carry out a method comprising.” Id. at 16:61–62. The remaining limitations of the independent claims are the same and directed to (1) providing a policy set with at least one service class rule; (2) receiving one or more attributes of a file from one of a plurality of clients, the clients comprising at least two different computing platforms; (3) applying the service class rule to the file to assign a service class to the file; and (4) conducting operations on the file in a manner according to the service class. Id. at 16:23–31, 16:63–17:4. The involved claims do not recite a “distributed storage system,” a “storage area network system,” or a “networked, distributed system [environment].” Thus, even if Patent Owner were correct that an invention that involves a networked, distributed system environment dictates that the plurality of clients also be in the networked environment, the claims themselves don’t require a networked, distributed system environment. Indeed, the preamble of claim 23 recites “a storage device,” and the preamble of claim 15 recites a “data management system,” terms that are much broader than those the Patent Owner uses to describe “the invention.” PO Resp. 8–10. Although Patent Owner never explains what “clients in a networked environment” means, Dr. White testifies that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ‘plurality of clients’ to refer to clients in a networked distributed systems environment, such that each challenged claim requires a networked environment where clients communicate through a network.” Ex. 2024 ¶ 50. But, again, there is nothing in the claims that recites a “networked distributed systems environment,” a “networked environment,” or “clients communicating through a network.” The method claims are directed to performing certain steps to a file from one of a plurality of clients. No networking or clients communicating through a network is claimed or even shown to be relevant to what is claimed. Indeed, in urging us to narrowly construe the term “plurality of clients,” Patent Owner does not discuss the claim language at all. PO Resp. 8–10. But, the name of the game is the claim. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Here, Patent Owner fails to direct us to anything in the claim language itself that would support Patent Owner’s construction of “plurality of clients,” and we find nothing that supports the argument.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “two different computing platforms.” Patent Owner contends that the limitation “computing platforms” should be construed to mean “operating systems.” PO Resp. 10–12. Petitioner disagrees and argues that “computing platforms” should be construed to mean “the combination of computer hardware and an operating system.” Pet. Reply 4–6. We understand that resolution of this issue is relevant only to Petitioner’s challenge based on Devarakonda. PO Resp. 2–3, 38–39 (arguing that Gelb alone fails to teach a plurality of clients but not addressing Gelb in combination with Tivoli), 55– 59 (arguing that Devarakonda fails to disclose clients that comprise at least two different operating systems); Pet. Reply 15–16; Tr. 5:16–22, 7:24–8:3, 25:22–26:23. For reasons explained below, we need not decide Petitioner’s challenge based on Devarakonda. Accordingly, for purposes of our Decision, we need not construe “computing platforms.” Other Terms We need not otherwise construe any other terms in the claims. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 15–21 and 23–25 over Gelb and Tivoli” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner, relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Christopher Jules White, argues that a POSITA would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, along with two years of experience in the design, operation, or control of networked data management systems, and/or distributed systems.” PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2024 ¶ 47). Patent Owner further argues that “Dr. White’s opinions and the arguments in this paper apply under either proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 2024 ¶ 49). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill except that we delete the phrase “at least” to avoid ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. Patent Owner’s proposed level overlaps substantially with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of qualifications, the outcome would remain the same.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “construction for “plurality of clients” to mean “clients in a networked environment.” Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner that the claims reflect that the ’132 patent’s field of endeavor is distributed storage systems. During oral argument, Patent Owner represented that its “analogous art argument depends on the construction of clients in a networked environment . . . for the first prong.” Tr. 39:20–40:11; see also Sur-Reply 7–8 (“[t]he lack of clients in a networked environment takes Gelb’s single-machine mainframe out of the ’132 Patent’s field of endeavor of distributed storage systems, which involves networked computers”). Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to show that Gelb is not relevant to the obviousness analysis and agree with Petitioner that “Gelb’s teachings align closely to the subject matter of the ’132 Patent and therefore are analogous.” Pet. Reply 6.9” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,671,132 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,671,132
• Momentum Dynamics Corporation v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2022 · IPR2021-01127 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable because Kanno anticipates them and renders them obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not address the level of skill in the art. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’635 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill, except that we delete the phrase “at least” to avoid including an expert in the definition of the level of skill.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 1 is expansive, requiring only that the partially cancelled first magnetic field is “outside a spatial region through which power is transferred from the first source magnetic resonator to the device magnetic resonator.” The claim does not refer to a specific type of radiation, let alone far field radiation. The claim drafter deliberately chose the broader term “first magnetic field” rather than specifying “far field radiation.” We find nothing in the claim that points to a more restrictive interpretation of “first magnetic field.” The specification does not limit the partially canceled first magnetic field to far field radiation either, as it expressly contemplates that “the fields that need to be minimized or reduced can be either the far-field, or the near field (if the wavelength is much larger than the distance between the wireless power transfer system to the point of interest).” Ex. 1001, 51:33–37 (emphasis added). The specification could not be any plainer than this— referring explicitly to reducing the far field “or the near field.” Id.5” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s arguments rely on a claim construction that we have not adopted. And Kanno discloses at least near-field cancellation by disclosing, for example, that angles “within the range of 90 to 180 degrees . . . minimized leakage of electromagnetic waves into the surrounding space effectively.” Ex. 1005, 28:36–41; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, 28:18–42), 107 (similar), 111 (similar). Patent Owner does not dispute that Kanno teaches near-field cancellation. See, e.g., PO Resp. 9 (“reducing ‘near field strength’ as described in Kanno”). Thus, under the correct construction of this limitation as encompassing near-field radiation, far-field radiation, or both, we agree that Kanno teaches it. Not only that, but Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s Reply argument that Kanno also discloses the same far-field cancellation as the ’635 patent, as Patent Owner neither filed a sur-reply nor addressed Petitioner’s Reply argument at the oral hearing. See Tr. 14:20–21 (resting on the briefs). And we agree with Petitioner’s argument, as supported by the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Arnold, that even under Patent Owner’s incorrect construction, Kanno teaches this limitation. Reply 6–7 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–15). Dr. Arnold asserts that “[a] reduction in the strength of the electromagnetic near field generally corresponds with a reduction in the strength of the electromagnetic far field.” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 114. Dr. Arnold explains in detail how these near and far fields relate to one another as follows: The term “near field” is a technical term that refers to the electromagnetic near field of an antenna, as opposed to the radiative “far field”. The near field for an electromagnetically short antenna is defined as a region within one electromagnetic wavelength of the antenna. The electrical frequency used in the real-world implementation of the power generator is 3 MHz. Id. 27:44-48. A frequency of 3 MHz corresponds to an electromagnetic wavelength of 100 meters. Here, the measurement distance of 5 meters is well within the near field range of 100 meters, and constitutes a near field measurement. A reduction in the strength of the electromagnetic near field generally corresponds with a reduction in the strength of the electromagnetic far field Id. ¶ 114. In other words, if a field closer to an antenna is reduced, then the field farther from the antenna will be reduced too. This fact is unremarkable, as Dr. Arnold explains, “[t]he principles behind magnetic resonators to wirelessly transfer power have been known for over a century.” Id. ¶ 24.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Even in light of Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we agree with Petitioner. We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Kanno’s Example 1 with its fundamental arrangement because the specific details in Example 1 and test data would have indicated to the skilled artisan the desirability of combining these portions of Kanno. As Dr. Arnold persuasively testifies, “a POSA would have been motivated to look to Example 1 because it provides those specific implementation details for circuit component types and values, as well as test data showing that the power generator achieves high power transfer efficiency while minimizing electromagnetic field leakage.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 150. He further testifies, “given that Kanno describes ‘Example 1’ as a real-world implementation, a POSA would have had a reasonable expectation of success that the power generator using those implementation details would work.” Id. We agree and credit this unrebutted testimony in support of Petitioner’s motivation to combine separate portions of Kanno.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 9,306,635 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,306,635
• Apple Inc. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 21, 2022 · IPR2022-00457 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–9, 11–19, 21, 23, 25, and 27, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “Office during the prosecution of the ’440 patent in an IDS on November 24, 2014” and “the Examiner initialed Lahetkangas as being considered.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Pet. 17; Ex. 1002, 69; Ex. 1011), 33. We agree that Lahetkangas was previously presented to the Office during prosecution of the ’440 patent. Ex. 1001, code (56); Ex. 1002, 69; see also Pet. 17 (Petitioner acknowledging that Lahetkangas was cited in an IDS). Accordingly, we determine that part one of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied. 3. Part Two of the Advanced Bionics Framework Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has failed to show material error by the Examiner during prosecution. Prelim. Resp. 51. We disagree. As Petitioner points out, although the Examiner considered Lahetkangas in an IDS, Lahetkangas was not discussed in any Office Action or Response. Pet. 17–18. We find that Lahetkangas was not extensively evaluated during examination and was not the basis for a rejection. Petitioner has presented a sufficient showing that the Examiner overlooked disclosures in Lahetkangas that render obvious the challenged claims. See infra. We, therefore, agree with Petitioner that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Pet. 18–19.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “an assessment as to the level of ordinary skill in the art and the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill at the time of the ’440 patent. See Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Dr. Kakaes states that a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would be someone who had a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Applied Mathematics, Computer Science, Physics or equivalent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Citing Dr. Kakaes, Petitioner further states that the POSITA would have also had “three to five years of experience working with wireless digital communication systems” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not propose an alternative assessment. See generally Prelim. Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). E. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–7, 9, 11–17, 19, 21, 23, 25, and 27” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “Claim 18 depends from claim 11 and includes a similar limitation. Petitioner provides reasons for employing Wang’s “extended or aggressive MCS table (i.e., a second MCS table).” Pet. 65–70. We have reviewed Petitioner’s showing for dependent claims 8 and 18 and find such showing sufficiently persuasive at this stage of the proceeding. Id. Patent Owner does not contest claims 8 and 18 separately. Prelim. Resp. 63–64. We conclude that, based on the totality of the arguments and evidence currently in the record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown, for purposes of institution, that Lahetkangas and Wang with or without LTE TS 36.213 teach or suggest the limitations of claims 8 and 18, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the references in the manner Petitioner proposes. Accordingly, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that challenged claims 8 and 18 would have been obvious over Lahetkangas and Wang with or without LTE TS 36.213.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,509,440
• Apple Inc. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonInstituted
  PTAB · Sep 7, 2022 · IPR2022-00337 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–40 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the §103 challenges, including obviousness over Bao and Feuersanger.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–40 in the ’655 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “As also explained in our patentability analysis below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving the challenged claims unpatentable as obvious over Kwon. See Pet. 48–83; infra §§ IV.F.2–IV.F.4. In doing so, Petitioner demonstrates that the Examiner erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims when (1) rejecting the claims only due to obviousness-type double patenting and (2) failing to appreciate that Kwon ’790/Kwon teaches the claimed subject matter. See Ex. 1002, 134–41 (rejecting the claims only due to obviousnesstype double patenting and citing Kwon ’790 without explanation), 192–99 (allowing the claims after terminal disclaimer filed); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 304–520; infra §§ IV.F.2–IV.F.4. Because Petitioner persuasively shows on this record that Kwon teaches the claimed subject matter, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution.” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The descriptions of an ordinarily skilled artisan articulated by Petitioner and Patent Owner differ mainly in the educational level, i.e., “at least a Bachelor’s degree” according to Petitioner and “a Bachelor’s degree” according to Patent Owner. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 8; see Ex. 1003 ¶ 20; Ex. 2001 ¶ 17. Based on the current record and for purposes of institution, we accept Patent Owner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’655 patent and the asserted prior art. If the prior art renders the claimed subject matter obvious to a person with less experience and less knowledge, then the prior art renders the claimed subject matter obvious to a person with more experience and more knowledge. See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner “agrees with Petitioner that no claim terms require an express construction for the purposes of this proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Pet. 6). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,454,655
• Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 11, 2022 · IPR2021-00470 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 and 16–19 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103, principally over Bohbot and Gundlach, with additional grounds for claims 4, 8, 9, 17, and 18.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “According to Petitioner, “no express constructions are required to institute review and find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner argues that it “has assigned the claim terms their plain and ordinary meanings as a POSITA would have understood them in the context of the ‘020 patent, unless otherwise noted herein.” PO Resp. 8. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “discloses that this is “due to [its] size.” Ex. 1004, 2:9–13 (emphasis added). More relevant to Petitioner’s proposed combination of Bohbot and Gundlach are Patent Owner’s arguments concerning the ease or lack of ease of detachment of the headset from a primary module having a recess as taught by Gundlach. We determine that a POSITA would have balanced concerns about the combination lacking ease of detachment against the need for effectively securing the headset to the primary module. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”); see also Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349, n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit . . . should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). Additionally, an obviousness determination does not turn on whether the proposed combination is the preferred or most desirable combination. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004); PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, even if Bohbot teaches a “suitable mechanism” of securing its headset via magnetic coupling as Patent Owner argues (see PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 95)), we determine that Bohbot would not have dissuaded a POSITA from more effectively securing its headset using the recess cited in Gundlach. See Pet. Reply 11 (“Gundlach provides a suitable option for semi-enclosed protection in the form of a contoured recess, and Bohbot does not teach away from the use of a contoured recess.”) (citing Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ex. 1089 ¶ 28). Responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments, Dr. Cooperstock testifies that “Bohbot nowhere describes its headset as being easy and quick to detach ‘with one hand,’ and thereby being ‘readily available for use.’” Ex. 1089 ¶ 26. As Petitioner points out, “Bohbot’s magnetic attachments ‘make attachment and detachment easy’ but also ‘are powerful enough to make an effective attachment possible, thus avoiding a detachment that is so easy it could easily be removed by a person with malicious intentions, or an untimely detachment that would lead to loss of the headset.’” Pet. Reply 10 (quoting Ex. 1004, 3:26–4:5) (citing PO Resp. 14). We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention and Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony that “[t]he miniature communication device (with attached headset) is likely to be hit by other objects, dropped, etc., making the semi-enclosed protection provided by [Gundlach’s] contoured recess further advantageous and complementary to Bohbot’s stated goal.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:3–5); see Pet. Reply 11 (citing Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson Labs., Inc., 874 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting PAR Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1197–98)) (“obviousness ‘does not require that the motivation be the best option, only that it be a suitable option from which the prior art did not teach away’”).” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Further, even if Bohbot teaches a “suitable mechanism” of securing its headset via magnetic coupling as Patent Owner argues (see PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 95)), we determine that Bohbot would not have dissuaded a POSITA from more effectively securing its headset using the recess cited in Gundlach. See Pet. Reply 11 (“Gundlach provides a suitable option for semi-enclosed protection in the form of a contoured recess, and Bohbot does not teach away from the use of a contoured recess.”) (citing Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ex. 1089 ¶ 28). Responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments, Dr. Cooperstock testifies that “Bohbot nowhere describes its headset as being easy and quick to detach ‘with one hand,’ and thereby being ‘readily available for use.’” Ex. 1089 ¶ 26. As Petitioner points out, “Bohbot’s magnetic attachments ‘make attachment and detachment easy’ but also ‘are powerful enough to make an effective attachment possible, thus avoiding a detachment that is so easy it could easily be removed by a person with malicious intentions, or an untimely detachment that would lead to loss of the headset.’” Pet. Reply 10 (quoting Ex. 1004, 3:26–4:5) (citing PO Resp. 14). We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention and Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony that “[t]he miniature communication device (with attached headset) is likely to be hit by other objects, dropped, etc., making the semi-enclosed protection provided by [Gundlach’s] contoured recess further advantageous and complementary to Bohbot’s stated goal.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:3–5); see Pet. Reply 11 (citing Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson Labs., Inc., 874 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting PAR Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1197–98)) (“obviousness ‘does not require that the motivation be the best option, only that it be a suitable option from which the prior art did not teach away’”). For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner’s arguments do not undermine Petitioner’s showing. We determine that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Bohbot and Gundlach is persuasive for the reasons set forth above and is supported by sufficient rational underpinning in the record evidence and we adopt it as our own.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,259,020 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,259,020
• Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 9, 2022 · IPR2021-00473 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–13 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the Gundlach and Lee combinations with the additional references identified in the grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In the Institution Decision, we considered the subject matter of the ’320 patent, the background technical field, and the prior art, and we agreed with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications. Dec. 9. Here, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill, except that we delete the phrase “at least” to avoid ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. Accordingly, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and one year of experience in consumer electronics product design, and could have obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means. We note that even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of qualifications, the outcome of this Decision would remain the same.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “According to Petitioner, “no express constructions are required to institute review and find the Challenged Claims unpatentable” in the proceeding. Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly states that the ordinary meaning of the terms should be used. PO Resp. 6. In the Institution Decision, we determined that it was not necessary to provide express interpretations of any claim terms. Dec. 10–11. On the full record, we likewise determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not find that Patent Owner’s arguments undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. Petitioner proposes modifying Gundlach’s conductive charging components with Lee’s inductive charging components, and the relevant aspect at issue is charging of a wireless headset. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36, 42. We agree with Petitioner that Lee, as well as Gundlach, include embodiments for storing and charging wireless headsets. Ex. 1003 ¶ 36 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 80; Ex. 1006, 6:39–46). We also agree that Lee itself discloses the motivation to modify Gundlach’s conductive charging—Lee identifies that in previously-known wired methods of recharging batteries in wireless headsets there were disadvantages of increased size and risk of failure, and Lee’s improvements presented opportunities to correct those problems. Pet. Reply 1–2 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:14–2:2, 3:15–6:4). We discuss Patent Owner’s arguments related to alleged size and failure issues below, but we agree with Petitioner that Lee describes a low power electronic device that utilizes inductive charging as an alternative to conductive charging like that utilized in Gundlach. Id. Lee also provides reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified Gundlach to include Lee’s inductive charging.14 Id.; Pet. 14–15. We agree with 14 Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s assertion of a motivation based on Lee’s teachings is a new theory (PO Sur-Reply 8), we do not agree. The Petition discusses Lee’s teachings as offering advantages to Gundlach (Pet. 14–15), with Dr. Cooperstock testifying that Lee discloses its enhanced “reliability,” in view of the known failure-prone nature of electric contacts, and that “a POSITA would have appreciated that the benefits of inductive charging disclosed by Lee also would apply to Gundlach’s embodiments.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 42 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:62–2:2, 3:17–20). Additionally, even though we do not find that Petitioner raises a new issue in Reply, Patent Owner argues for the first time in Sur-Reply that Lee’s teachings are limited, that is, they “might arguably suggest, if anything, some advantage [of inductive charging], if any, over a USB cord.” PO Sur- Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:62–2:2). We do not find this argument persuasive because Gundlach is not limited to charging of the headset battery from the case battery. Gundlach discloses that the case may contain a reserve power supply, such as a reserve battery. Ex. 1005 ¶ 80. If a battery is not used, power could be sent to the headset battery via the power supply adapter in the case. Id. In this case, Gundlach’s charging of the Petitioner that, accordingly, Lee provides motivation to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Gundlach. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”).” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “directed to the use of inductive charging in portable low power consumer electronic products and, more particularly, to Dr. Toliyat’s testimony that at the time of the invention he was not aware of any hand-held, consumer portable earpiece charging systems that did not use conductive charging to charge an earpiece from a portable, battery powered case. PO Resp. 15; Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 96, 99. Patent Owner’s arguments are narrowly directed to “consumer portable earpiece charging systems,” absent explanation why the issue of whether the product is a consumer product is specifically relevant to the consideration of the use of a modification with inductive charging. Patent Owner also attempts to differentiate charging from a portable batterypowered device, but, as explained supra note 14, Gundlach is not limited to charging from a portable, battery powered case. Moreover, because Dr. Toliyat testified during cross-examination that he could not recall doing any work on or researching earbuds or headsets, we afford little weight to his testimony on this issue. Ex. 1088, 19:19–21. Instead we credit Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony that inductive charging was an industry-recognized wireless headset would not be “from a portable battery powered device to portable battery powered device,” and instead would be similar to Lee’s charging by USB connection. alternative to conductive charging in the context of low-power portable devices because it is supported by the evidence of record. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. For instance, the Wireless Power Consortium, a multi-national group of electronics companies formed in 2008, was promoting commercial adoption of inductive charging by standardizing specifications for inductive transmitters and receivers. Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 203215). Exhibit 2032 describes that the Wireless Power Consortium (WPC), comprised of “a group of Asian, European, and American companies in diverse industries, including electronics manufacturers” has defined “the type of inductive coupling (coil configuration) and the communications protocol to be used for low-power wireless devices.” Ex. 2032, 1 (emphasis added). The evidence of record also provides additional support that there were products commercially available in the market that inductively charged portable devices, so inductive charging was an available option. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–41; Ex. 1020; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1022. Dr. Cooperstock testifies that the Powermat and Touchstone inductive chargers were available at the time of invention, and that in a design process a person of skill who is “developing a portable device and associated charger—here, the wireless headset and charging case provided by Gundlach—would have contemplated an inductive charging solution like Lee’s.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Accordingly, the evidence of record supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that inductive charging was a known alternative to conductive charging.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,589,320 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,589,320
• Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 26, 2022 · IPR2021-00472 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–13 are unpatentable under §103 as obvious over the listed combinations of Gundlach, Lee, and the additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Jeremy Cooperstock, who testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing electronical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with electronic devices” and that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Hamid Toliyat, who applies a similar definition and testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have been someone having either a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or mechanical engineering with some level of post-baccalaureate electronic device or system design experience, or someone with an equivalent level of experience and training through other means.” PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶ 31). Dr. Toliyat further testifies that “Dr. Cooperstock’s definition of a POSITA10 is somewhat different than mine; however, my opinions in this declaration would be the same regardless of whether or not my description or Dr. Cooperstock’s description of a POSITA is used.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 33. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for purposes of this Decision, except that we delete the phrase “at least” to avoid ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. Patent Owner’s proposed level overlaps substantially with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of qualifications, the outcome would remain the same.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, and 11 over Gundlach and Lee” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artNon analogous artDecided for petitioner

    “the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Prior art is analogous if it is from the same field of endeavor or if it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem the inventor is trying to solve.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fec. Cir. 2015). A reference is analogous art if either of these two tests is met. Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Federal Circuit has indicated that the scope of analogous art is to be construed broadly. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 . . . (2007), directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly . . . .”). In determining the field of endeavor, we look to the ’077 patent’s written description and claims, including the structure and function of the invention. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326. And, we agree with Petitioner that in defining the field of invention, and in determining the relevance of Brown to the obviousness inquiry, here a broad approach should be taken. Pet. Reply 15. Indeed, the Supreme Court provided guidance in determining the applicability of a reference’s teachings in an obviousness inquiry. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Court explained that if a feature has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that it would improve a similar device in that field or another, implementing that feature on the similar device is likely obvious. 550 U.S. at 417. Here, we agree with Petitioner that the appropriate scope of the field of endeavor of the claimed invention is directed to switching devices and electronic devices. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:8–16, 17:63–65, 21:39–40); PO Resp. 59–60 (“[t]he field of endeavor of the ’077 patent is, broadly, speaking, magnetic switching devices that activate deactivate or hibernate an electronic device”). We further agree with Petitioner that “Brown’s headset falls into the general descriptive category of ‘electronic device.’” Pet. Reply 15. Patent Owner fails to show sufficiently that Brown is not within the same field of endeavor as the ’077 patent. PO Resp. 59. Although Brown may describe optical user interfaces for headsets, its teachings are relevant to the broad field of endeavor which includes electronic devices such as headsets. Because we find that Brown is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention and provides relevant teachings to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we need not consider Patent Owner’s arguments regarding whether Brown is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventors are involved.” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 10,562,077 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,562,077
• Apple Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 26, 2022 · IPR2021-00471 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12, 14–17, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Jeremy Cooperstock, who testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in an academic area emphasizing electronical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with electronic devices” and that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Hamid Toliyat, who applies a similar definition and testifies that a person having 8 Patent Owner does not present any objective evidence of nonobviousness as to the challenged claims. ordinary skill in the art “would have been someone having either a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or mechanical engineering with some level of post-baccalaureate electronic device or system design experience, or someone with an equivalent level of experience and training through other means.” PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶ 31). Dr. Toliyat further testifies that “Dr. Cooperstock’s definition of a POSITA9 is somewhat different than mine; however, my opinions in this declaration would be the same regardless of whether or not my description or Dr. Cooperstock’s description of a POSITA is used.” Ex. 2022 ¶ 33. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for purposes of this Decision, except that we delete the phrase “at least” to avoid ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. Patent Owner’s proposed level overlaps substantially with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level of qualifications, the outcome would remain the same.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “concerning its conductive charging” and that “conductive charging of a consumer device such as a headset would be a relatively simple and straightforward process for a POSITA” such that there would be no need to look beyond Gundlach’s teachings. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2022 ¶ 8810), id. at 1–2. Dr. Toliyat, who testifies the same, does not support his conclusions with a sufficient factual basis. Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 88–89. For example, Dr. Toliyat does not explain how Gundlach provides ample disclosure concerning its conductive charging and we find that Gundlach does not. Rather, Gundlach describes that the case may contain “charging circuitry,” but does not describe what the circuitry contains. Ex. 1005 ¶ 80. Dr. Cooperstock’s testimony is entitled to substantial weight that “[w]hile robust on structural aspects of the wireless headset and storage solutions, Gundlach provides significantly less guidance and implementation details on the subject of charging” because his testimony is supported by Gundlach itself. Ex. 1003 ¶ 35 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 69, 73, 79, 80). Moreover, Dr. Toliyat does not provide sufficient evidence to support his conclusion that, at the time of the invention, conductive charging for a wireless headset would have been simple and straightforward. Ex. 2022 ¶ 88. Thus, his testimony does not undermine Dr. Cooperstock’s sufficient explanation that a “POSITA considering Gundlach, and noting its limited disclosure on charging, would have seen a need for elaboration and description of design options to implement the charging functionality,” which would have led the POSITA to Lee, also directed to wireless headsets.” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “case, or card. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 55). Petitioner further contends, and we find, that although Gundlach generally describes that the case may contain charging circuitry and electrical contacts, Gundlach does not expressly describe the manner in which the headset’s charging circuitry responds when placed in the cradle for charging. Id.; Ex. 1005 ¶ 56. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that “[a] POSITA considering Gundlach, and noting its limited disclosure on charging, would have seen a need for elaboration and description of design options.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “seeking a supplement to Gundlach, . . . would have encountered Lee’s disclosure on charging in the familiar context of wireless headsets.” Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to exchange Gundlach’s conductive charging components with Lee’s more thoroughly explained inductive charging components. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37). We also agree with Petitioner’s contentions that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that inductive charging is a suitable alternative to conductive charging and would have appreciated benefits of inductive charging, such as enhanced reliability. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40– 43; Exs. 1020–1022; Ex. 1006, 1:62–2:2). Petitioner further contends, and we agree, that employing Lee’s inductive charging solution in Gundlach’s device would result in a more compact form factor and interoperability absent the added bulk of a standardized connection. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 56–57, 66; Ex. 1006, 2:62–66, 4:55–57, Figs. 12, 16, 18, 19; Ex. 1029).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “case, or card. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 55). Petitioner further contends, and we find, that although Gundlach generally describes that the case may contain charging circuitry and electrical contacts, Gundlach does not expressly describe the manner in which the headset’s charging circuitry responds when placed in the cradle for charging. Id.; Ex. 1005 ¶ 56. Petitioner argues, and we agree, that “[a] POSITA considering Gundlach, and noting its limited disclosure on charging, would have seen a need for elaboration and description of design options.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “seeking a supplement to Gundlach, . . . would have encountered Lee’s disclosure on charging in the familiar context of wireless headsets.” Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to exchange Gundlach’s conductive charging components with Lee’s more thoroughly explained inductive charging components. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 37). We also agree with Petitioner’s contentions that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that inductive charging is a suitable alternative to conductive charging and would have appreciated benefits of inductive charging, such as enhanced reliability. Id. at 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40– 43; Exs. 1020–1022; Ex. 1006, 1:62–2:2). Petitioner further contends, and we agree, that employing Lee’s inductive charging solution in Gundlach’s device would result in a more compact form factor and interoperability absent the added bulk of a standardized connection. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–45; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 56–57, 66; Ex. 1006, 2:62–66, 4:55–57, Figs. 12, 16, 18, 19; Ex. 1029).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,259,021 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,259,021
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Gui Global Products, Ltd., D/B/A GweeAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2022 · IPR2021-00335 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–15, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claim 10 over Kim and Koh; claims 16–17 over Kim and Lee; and claim 18 over Kim and Jiang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Sayfe Kiaei, who testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and one year of experience in consumer electronics product design” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21–22). Patent Owner relies on the declaration testimony of Dr. Mark Horenstein, who applies a similar definition and testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would be someone with either a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or mechanical engineering with some level of post-baccalaureate electronic device or system design experience, or someone with an equivalent level of experience and training through other means.” PO Resp. 6 n.2 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 25). Dr. Horenstein further testifies that “Dr. Kiaei’s definition of a POSITA7 is somewhat different than mine, nevertheless my opinions in This Declaration would be the same regardless” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the [claims] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the [claims] in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such [claims] as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “coupling member 510 on ‘at least one side’ of the second body with Petitioner’s unsupported suggestion of coupling the sub-device to either side of the second body.” PO Reply 5. We disagree that Petitioner’s position represents a conflation of the disclosure. Kim’s description that the coupling member for fixing the sub-device “is provided on at least one side of the second body” means precisely what Petitioner contends—that the sub-device may be coupled to either side of the second body. Patent Owner and Dr. Horenstein read Kim too narrowly or imprecisely.8 Indeed, Dr. Horenstein concludes that from the disputed Kim passage, the sub-device can only be coupled to the top of the second body in a closed position. Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42–44. Dr. Horenstein, however, fails to explain sufficiently why that is so and we find his testimony lacking and inconsistent with what Kim describes. Thus, we do not give his testimony substantial weight. Dr. Kiaei’s testimony on the matter, however, is deserving of 8 During the hearing, counsel for Patent Owner confirmed that it is Patent Owner’s position that Kim does not even contemplate coupling the sub-device to the first body, even though Kim explicitly describes as much. Tr. 42:23–43:14; Ex. 1010 ¶ 260. substantial weight, because his testimony is consistent with what Kim describes. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 81–85.” slip op. at 22

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “immediately above are new and too late. PO Reply 8–9. We disagree. Petitioners are not prohibited from relying on new evidence and arguments in a reply, if the evidence and arguments are responsive to arguments made in a patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. 42.23(b); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“Consolidated Practice Guide”)10 at 73. Here, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence (e.g., Ex. 1031) in connection with the Petitioner Reply are responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments. In particular, Petitioner could not have anticipated that Patent Owner would argue for such a narrow view of Petitioner’s Figure A representation. As explained above, the Petition does not limit the hinge in the Figure A representation in any way. Pet. 23–26. Rather, the Figure A representation is based on what is described in Kim, which also does not limit the hinge in any way. Id.; Ex. 1010 ¶ 256 (broadly describing that “[t]he second body may be configured to be connected by a hinge 100d to one side of the first body to be open or closed”), ¶ 260 (describing coupling a third body to one of the first and second bodies in a state that the first and second bodies are coupled). Thus, we determine that Petitioner’s argument that “[t]here is nothing in Kim that would suggest to a POSITA, much less require, that the folding watch-type embodiment of Figure A must have a hinge exactly as depicted in Figure 15A” and that “a POSITA would have been able to use routine design skills to select the appropriate hinge, as Dr. Horenstein admits” is permissively responsive to Patent Owner’s arguments, which are based on a myopic view of the Petition and Kim. Patent Owner did not 10 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. request to submit new testimony in support of its Sur-reply to rebut Dr. Horenstein’s testimony. For all of the above reasons, we determine that Patent Owner has not been prejudiced or denied due process, and that we may consider the reply arguments and Dr. Horenstein’s testimony in support of the arguments, which we find persuasive.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,259,020 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,259,020

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