- PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01078 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–22, and 24–30, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1011, 5:18–21. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’371 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “a person having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronic gaming technology.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–26). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (“Evolution does not set forth an alternative level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’371 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “a first selected position . . . to have an increased payout . . . greater than a first non-selected payout.” See Pet. 25–27, 30, 35, 36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35–36 (“had the first selected position not been randomly selected, the player would only be eligible for the basic payout”). Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,756,371 - PTAB · May 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00001 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are obvious over Hazelzet and Buchmann and over Hazelzet, Buchmann, and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“an inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses a two-part framework when determining whether to exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). An obviousness determination based on a combination of references requires finding “both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation.’” “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combination of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combination of prior art. B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 25
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner
“It is well established that collateral estoppel applies to IPR proceedings.” Google LLC v. Hammond Dev. Int’l, 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Collateral estoppel, i.e., issue preclusion, applies when “(1) a prior action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in that prior action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and (4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped party.” VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 909 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 702 F.3d 640, 644 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). This preclusive effect also applies to “related claims that present identical issues of patentability.” MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Google, 54 F.4th at 1381 (“[C]ollateral estoppel may apply even if the patent claims use slightly different language to describe substantially the same invention.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Our precedent does not limit collateral estoppel to patent claims that are identical.”). slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, or a related field, and several years of additional experience working with computer memory systems. She would have been familiar with computer memory systems and basic CPU architecture documented in the literature, including standards, and generally available in commercial systems, including how computer components access a computer’s memory, the role of a memory controller, the basic operation of memory modules and devices, and the techniques used to couple memory devices to the other components of the computer system. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 55; Ex. 1102, 11–12; Ex. 1103, 11–12; Ex. 1034, 8–9). Patent Owner “applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,386,024 - SAP America, Inc. v. Isix IP LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00615 · APJ Elizabeth J Reagan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–10, 19, and 23–25 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claims 1 and 8 over Brann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all of the challenged claims of the ’178 patent based on all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“stipulation (Prelim. Sur-Reply 2–3), which we need not address in view of the conditional nature of the stipulation offered by Petitioner. As noted above, in accordance with the Guidance Memo, we will not discretionarily deny if there is an effective Sotera stipulation. However, here, Petitioner’s stipulation states, “if the Board . . . determines that discretionary denial is warranted, then Petitioner stipulates . . . .” Prelim. Reply 7 (emphasis added). Petitioner therefore conditions its stipulation on the Board first determining, based on a consideration of the Fintiv factors, to exercise its discretion to deny institution. Due to the conditional nature of this stipulation, Petitioner is not “stipulat[ing] not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition,” as required by the Guidance Memo. As discussed in NXP, the policy of favoring institution when a Sotera stipulation is provided by Petitioner “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board.” IPR2021-01556, Paper 13 at 4. Although in NXP, the petitioner offered a stipulation after the decision denying institution issued, it is a distinction without a difference because here the stipulation is only being offered after the Board first reviews the Fintiv factors and determines that it would be appropriate to exercise its discretion to deny the Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner’s conditional stipulation would “[p]ermit[] a petitioner to wait and see if the Board denies institution under Fintiv, and then offer such a stipulation . . . [which] frustrates [the] goals [of a Sotera stipulation] and would open the door to gamesmanship.” Id. at Paper 13 at 4. Accordingly, we do not consider Petitioner’s representation to be an effective stipulation under the Guidance Memo. We therefore must consider the Fintiv factors.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“art “in the field of the ’178 patent, as of its earliest possible priority date of October 21, 1999, would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field, or with integration systems,” but that a “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17– 20). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the ’178 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. This proposal is also supported by the Houh Declaration. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 19. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.7” slip op. at 11
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt these constructions applied by Petitioner and Patent Owner. See Ex. 1007. 8 ISIX IP LLC v. International Business Machines Corp., Case No. 6:22-cv- 201-ADA-DTG, “Claim Construction Order,” Doc. 37, filed 01/04/23. 9 Petitioner states that it “accepts Patent Owner’s constructions for purposes of this proceeding only to simplify issues” and that Petitioner “reserves the right to propose alternative constructions in the corresponding District Court case.” Pet. 14, fn. 2.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,308,178 - PTAB · Aug 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00509 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 and 6–19, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted §103 obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’842 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–4 and 6–19 of the ’842 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner for the purposes of this Decision because it is consistent with the ’842 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“in the prior art that would have led a POSITA to modify the teachings of the Lorex Guide to incorporate the teachings of Kim, Petitioner argues, with Dr. Bim providing supporting testimony, that “both [the] Lorex Guide and Kim are directed to connecting network endpoint devices (e.g., peer devices) including smart phones and cameras” and “a POSITA would have been sufficiently skilled to implement such a combination given the predictable electrical/network components and the relatively advanced state of the art at the time.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 70). Thus, according to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the Lorex Guide-Kim combination.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 70–71). At this stage of the proceeding, we credit Dr. Bim’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine the teachings of the Lorex Guide and Kim. Thus, on the preliminary record before us and in the absence of any counterargument from Patent Owner, we are persuaded for purposes of this Decision that Petitioner makes a sufficient showing that a skilled artisan would have had reasons, with rational underpinning, to combine the teachings of the Lorex Guide and Kim, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Oxylabs LT Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00126 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
IPR instituted on all challenged claims and grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aDenied
“We decline to exercise discretion to deny institution of inter partes review on the basis of the later-filed reissue application and Patent Owner’s proffered stipulation. At this point in time, the progress and ultimate outcome of the reissue application is mere speculation as the reissue application is in the early stages of examination and will have to proceed through examination in much the same way as a patent application under original examination. See 35 U.S.C. § 251(c); 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a); MPEP § 1440. Furthermore, the parties may seek to address any concerns they may have regarding efficiency and duplication of efforts by moving to suspend prosecution in the reissue application. See MPEP §§ 1442.01–1442.02.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“3. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Same or Substantially the Same Prior Art or Arguments Previously Presented to the Office In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use [a] two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”); see also Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (listing factors to consider in evaluating the applicability of § 325(d)) (“Becton, Dickinson”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“For the purpose of institution, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “server operating system.” We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that a server operating system is limited to running on server hardware because it is attorney argument and is not supported sufficiently by the evidence of record. See Ex. 1001, 6:33–37; Ex. 2011; Ex. 2012; Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (unsworn attorney argument is not evidence). At this stage of the proceeding, we agree that a server operating system is role-based. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s construction for “server operating system” as an operating system capable of operating in the role of a server.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,616,826 - Xu Peicheng (Hong Kong) Optoelectronic Technology Co., Limited v. Semisilicon Technology Corp.InstitutedPTAB · May 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00156 · APJ Elizabeth J Reagan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 and 8 under all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would prevail on at least claim 1 over Kuang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is statutorily authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). We determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’546 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 of the ’546 patent.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“denied because of the Petition’s improper reliance on the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art (i.e., contentions (1), (2), and (3) above), we have considered these arguments. However, we preliminarily determine, as discussed below, that certain of the cited prior art teaches all limitations of at least some of the claims. Therefore, reliance on the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art is not required to supply any missing claim limitation(s) in at least one of the grounds. Accordingly, we need not expressly address these contentions of Patent Owner at this stage for purposes of our decision to institute trial. However, we invite the parties to provide further briefing on these issues during the course of the trial. With regard to Patent Owner’s contention that the Petition should be denied because the Schubert Declaration entirely repeats the Petition, and the Petition and Schubert Declaration include only conclusory statements of obviousness (contention (4) above), see Prelim. Resp. 20–24, we note that “[v]erbatim duplication between a brief and a declaration does not require giving the declarant’s testimony ‘little or no weight’ under Xerox,” provided that the testimony itself is sufficiently supported. Netflix, Inc. v. GoTV Streaming, LLC, IPR2023-00757, Paper 11 at 67 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2023) (emphasis added) (discussing Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022- 00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022)) (precedential); Hum Indus. Tech., Inc. v. Amsted Rail Co., IPR2023-00540, Paper 10 at 37 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2023) (“If declaration testimony is supported sufficiently and, in turn, supports contentions in the Petition, we do not give it little to no weight simply because it is repeated in the Petition”). Here, we agree with Patent Owner that Dr. Schubert’s testimony closely mirrors the language in the Petition. Nevertheless, on the record before us, we find that the support, including, for example, prior art citations and/or technical reasoning, provided in the declaration and repeated in the Petition is sufficient for demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge to at least one of the claims under at least one of the grounds. While expert testimony that mirrors the language of the petition, without more, may provide little help to the Board, we have evaluated the Schubert Declaration to determine the amount of weight attributable to the testimony therein at this stage of the proceeding, based on the support provided for the testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the Schubert Declaration, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and 6 years of practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or “[a]lternatively . . . would have had a master’s degree and four years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See generally Prelim. Resp.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction at this stage of the proceeding, with the exception of the term “synchronous signals” in limitation 1[D], which requires interpretation to the extent necessary to assess the merits of the parties’ assertions. The Specification does not expressly define “synchronous signals.” See generally Ex. 1001. Petitioner proposes a definition of “synchronous signals” based on how “a POSITA would have understood the term,” as: “signals that are sent to the slave nodes to control their corresponding LED strings at the same time.” Pet. 16–17. Patent Owner argues that there is no support for Petitioner’s definition of “synchronous signals,” but Patent Owner does not propose an express construction of the term. See Prelim. Resp. 21–23, 25–26. In the discussion on the merits below, we discuss the interpretation of the term “synchronous signals.” See infra Sec. III.D.2.a.v. As noted below, we invite the parties to present briefing on the interpretation of this term during trial.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,884,546 - PTAB · Apr 2, 2024 · IPR2023-01469 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–22 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail, including over Ho.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and three years of experience in the design and analysis of wireless communication systems or equivalent work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 10021 ¶¶ 53–56). According to the Petition, “[a]dditional education might compensate for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would be a person with a bachelor’s degree in a technical field such as electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or physics, and/or 2–3 years of relevant practical experience in wireless communication, data” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“B. Claim Construction The Board is required to construe only those terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner offers two alternative constructions for “default frequency band”: (1) “a preferred frequency band” and (2) “a preset frequency band used automatically in the absence of a choice made by the user.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1017, Attachment A, 4). Patent Owner asserts that the Administrative Law Judge in the parallel ITC action construed “default frequency band” to mean “a first selected frequency band.” Prelim. Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1003, 32). In this decision, we do not see a need to construe this term to resolve any issues because Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge under any of the offered constructions. See infra § II.D.2.b.i.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“b. The Second Part The second part of the framework asks whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Id. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8–9 n.9. Patent Owner argues that Ho was expressly used by the Examiner to reject the claims, which shows that the Examiner considered and evaluated Ho. Prelim. Resp. 22. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner did not identify any errors in the Examiner’s evaluation of Ho, Gatewood, or Farid, and Petitioner’s arguments about reconsideration of the prior art are unsupported and conclusory. Id. at 22–23. We disagree. Petitioner shows that the Examiner overlooked specific teachings of the relevant prior art: Ho’s RSSI threshold. See Pet. 55 (quoting Ex. 1009, 14:38–41). Although Ho was the basis for a rejection, the Examiner cited Ho” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“iii. Analysis We disagree, at this stage, that Petitioner needs to show that every possible combination of personalities of Ho’s hybrid device meets the claim limitation. Rather, “a prior art reference may anticipate or render obvious an apparatus claim—depending on the claim language—if the reference discloses an apparatus that is reasonably capable of operating so as to meet the claim limitations, even if it does not meet the claim limitations in all modes of operation.” ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., 903 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the Petition sufficiently sets forth a particular mode of operation that is the basis for its challenge: hybrid device 120 is a 1002 ¶ 143). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown at this stage that this configuration meets the claim limitations. See infra § II.D.2.b. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments on this record. See Prelim. Resp. 39–40.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,681,698 - PTAB · Mar 6, 2024 · IPR2023-01403 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has met that standard.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, and three years of experience in the design and analysis of wireless communication systems or equivalent work experience.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10022 ¶¶ 50–53). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education might compensate for a deficiency in experience, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response to the Petition. For this decision, we apply the level of skill proposed by Petitioner. If Patent Owner proposes a different skill level in its response, the parties are encouraged to discuss how those differences affect the Board’s assessment of Petitioner’s obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“B. Claim Construction The Board is required to construe “‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“As for Ground I only, we preliminarily determine that Liu’s disclosures are insufficient to support Petitioner’s argument about the details of Liu’s database, even in view of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art as reflected in cited evidence. Id. Specifically, apart from Liu’s statement about “one or more databases,” Petitioner has not identified any teachings from Liu that describe the database’s organization. See id. at 18–20. So one of ordinary skill in the art would have had to modify Liu to arrive at tables with rows representing STAs and columns containing the related information described in the Petition. See id. The Petition, however, provides insufficient reasoning and supporting evidence why one of ordinary skill in the art would have done so. See id. at 19. Although Petitioner cites Bharghavan and other references discussing databases generally, Petitioner does not propose modifying Liu with any specific features from those” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,468,025 - PTAB · Jan 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01128 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 5–28 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, the Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, and for the reasons 1 Petitioner identifies itself, Meta Platforms, Inc., as the real party-in-interest. Pet. 97. 2 Patent Owner identifies itself, Jawbone Innovations, LLC, as the real partyin-interest. Paper 7, 2. explained below, we determine Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, and 5–28 in the ’611 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“seeking joinder as a party in the Amazon IPR and consolidation with the Amazon IPR. Paper 2, 1. In August 2023, the Board terminated the Amazon IPR in view of representations by Amazon and Patent Owner that they had settled their dispute in the Amazon IPR and related district court litigation. IPR2023-00286, Paper 16, 2. Subsequently, in September 2023, Petitioner filed an Unopposed Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Joinder, stating that “in view of the Board’s Termination Order in the Amazon IPR, Petitioner should be permitted to withdraw its Joinder Motion.” Paper 9, 2. Based on the foregoing, we grant Petitioner’s Unopposed Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Joinder, as the underlying Motion for Joinder is moot in view of the Amazon IPR termination.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill in the art are similar, except that Patent Owner proposes slightly more experience, i.e., “approximately three years of industry or academic experience” versus “at least two years of relevant experience.” Prelim. Resp. 13; Pet. 6–7. Based on the current record and for purposes of analysis, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan, with the exception of the qualifier “at least” with respect to experience which renders the level of ordinary skill in the art ambiguous and may encompass levels beyond ordinary, as it is consistent with the ’611 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“that filter,” based on the ’611 patent Specification’s disclosure that β(z) “describes the relationship between O and calibrated O for speech.” Prelim. Resp. 11; Prelim. Sur-Reply 1; Ex. 1001, 5:31–32. We agree with Patent Owner that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. However, “[t]o act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ other than its plain and ordinary meaning.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Moreover, “the specification may reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope,” and it is the inventor’s disavowal that is dispositive of the claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316; see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“To disavow claim scope, the specification must contain ‘expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.’”)). Furthermore, it is impermissible to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Our view, at this juncture, is that the Specification does not indicate that there is an intended “special definition” for the term “filter that describes a relationship for speech between the first physical microphone and the second physical microphone.” Moreover, the Specification does not contain an express any disavowal of the scope of the claim term to limit the scope of the term to Patent Owner’s relied-upon citation to the disclosure relating to β(z). See Ex. 1001, 5:31–32. Accordingly, on this record, in the absence of a special definition of the term, we decline to import limitations into the claim term and read in the β(z) embodiment only into the term.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,326,611 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-01065 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims would be unpatentable under the stated §103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2022) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the ’080 patent and all of the asserted challenges to patentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Petitioner moves for joinder to and consolidation with related IPR proceeding IPR2023-00284 under 35 U.S.C. § 315 and 36 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Paper 3 (Motion for Joinder). IPR proceeding IPR2023-00284 has been terminated due to settlement. See IPR2023-00284, Paper 16. Thus, there is no proceeding with which to join the present case. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for joinder and consolidation is denied.” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Additionally, we credit Dr. Vipperman’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the critical time would have understood that this disclosure in Ikeda teaches a linear filter. See id. ¶ 132 (citing Ex. 1020, 16– 17, Fig. 2.2; Ex. 1028, 366–367). Dr. Vipperman citation to Ex. 1028 is particularly instructive because the reference explains that a tapped delay line structure, such as that used in Ikeda, is a type of a linear filter. See Ex. 1028, 367. Thus, we are persuaded that Ikeda teaches a linear filter, which results in linear proportionality. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, based on Ikeda itself and the supporting testimony of Dr. Vipperman, we are satisfied Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Ikeda teaches “by a varying linear transfer function between the plurality of combinations of signals, wherein the denoised output signals include less acoustic noise than acoustic signals received at the first and second physical microphones.”” slip op. at 37
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 26). For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’080 Patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,779,080
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.