- PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends “the preamble of claim 1 is limiting based on Petitioner’s assertion in the District Court and based on the District Court’s order.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends “the District Court agreed with Patent Owner and ordered that the ‘control component’ term has its plain and ordinary meaning and is not subject to means-plus-function treatment.” Id. Patent Owner finally contends “there is no need for the Board to make claim construction determinations about Section 112, Paragraph 6 to decide institution.” Id. As to the preamble, we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. The parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed board ownTerm construed patent owner constructionMixed
“As to the “driving component” recitation, the parties agreed to a construction in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. Pet. 6. The parties agreed the “driving component” term is a means-plus-function term. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. The function is “drives the moveable component in each of two opposite directions.” Id. Corresponding structure includes “coils 420, 514, 626, 1202, 1204, 1302, 1304, 1412, 1414, 1510 (also shown in Figs. 16–17); electromagnets shown in Figs. 10–11; and equivalents thereof.” Id. As to “control component,” the District Court held that the term is not a means-plus-function term because the claim defines the term structurally by requiring a “microprocessor,” “control program,” and “switch.” Dist. Ct. Constr. 17–22. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with the District Court that means-plus-function treatment does not apply to the “control component” recitation because structure in claim 1 defines the component. Given the context provided by claim 1 as a whole, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the “control component” as identifying a specific structure (requiring a microprocessor, control program, and switch as claim 1 recites). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the means-plus-function inquiry depends on “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure”).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“With respect to other claim terms, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim based on the ordinary and customary meaning of these terms. Thus, no other claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,093,767 - Apple Inc. v. Aire Technology LimitedInstitutedPTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · IPR2022-01136 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds: claims 1–3, 8–11, and 15, including grounds the Board found unlikely to succeed.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“exercise our discretion to deny the Petition in favor of the parallel Apple litigation identified above taking place in the U.S District Court for the Western District of Texas (“the Texas court”). Prelim. Resp. 1–10. The Board has held that the advanced state of a parallel district court action is a factor that may weigh in favor of denying a petition under § 314(a). See NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential); Trial Practice Guide, 58 & n.2. We consider the following factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding”: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“Tobergte and O’Toole differ in two ways: (1) unlike Tobergte, O’Toole does not rely on magnetic coupling, and (2) unlike Tobergte, O’Toole deactivates its receiver, as well as its associated circuitry. Nevertheless, Tobergte discloses that its continuously operating receiver circuit “requires only a very small amount of electric energy” in much the same way that O’Toole’s continuously operating timer uses only a small amount of energy compared to the remainder of the integrated circuit. We further note that in both Tobergte and O’Toole, operation at normal power levels occurs after the receiver detects the presence of a valid data signal. We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill would have circuits would reduce power consumption. As discussed below, however, it is not clear why a person of ordinary skill would have reason to include O’Toole’s timer, which is active and therefore consumes power in the sleep mode, into Tobergte’s receiver, which, because it is passive, consumes very little power when not in the presence of a nearby data carrier. 3. Claim 8 Claim 8 depends from claim 1. Petitioner designates as claim limitation 8.1 the claim’ s sole recitation “wherein the switching apparatus has a time controller for cyclically switching the measuring device on and off.” Petitioner maps Tobergte’s receiver 36 to the claimed measuring device. Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:42–45, 4:11–14). Petitioner notes that Tobergte’s receiver circuit “is ‘continually kept in operation’ to monitor for voltage indicative of a nearby data carrier and activate the switch if such voltage is detected.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 4:4–11). Petitioner posits that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to connect O’Toole’s wakeup timer between Tobergte’s receiver device and Tobergte’s switch to its energy source to form a more intelligent switching apparatus that cyclically activates and deactivates Tobergte’s receiver at periodic intervals. Id. at 65– 66. Although we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill would have understood that cyclically operating circuitry in a wireless data communications device reduces its power consumption and preserves battery life, it is not clear why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to apply O’Toole’s techniques to cycle Tobergte’s receiver on and off. Tobergte’s continuously operating receiver consumes little power when not in presence of a data carrier. Ex. 1005, 4:4–11. O’Toole’s timing circuit remains active and consumes power during the sleep mode. Ex. 1008, modification against each other, to determine whether there would be a motivation to combine. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349, n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Petitioner has not explained why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to introduce additional complexity and power consumption to Tobergte by adding a power consuming sleep timer to periodically deactivate a receiver (the claimed measuring device) that itself consumes little power when not in the presence of a data carrier On the current record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a person of ordinary skill would have combined the teachings of Tobergte and O’Toole to arrive at the limitations recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,174,360
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.