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  • PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00399 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in instituting review of claims 1–19 despite the later disclaimer of claims 1–10.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “be treated as never having existed, and because claim 1 is the only claim on which Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing, we should overturn our decision instituting review. As noted above, when rehearing a decision on petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion, and an abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c); PPG Indus. Inc., 840 F.2d at 1567. But Patent Owner has not explained how we erred in any way in reaching our decision instituting review. Instead, Patent Owner’s argument is new and was not presented previously, and Patent Owner bases its rehearing argument on circumstances having changed since we issued our decision. Req. Reh’g 4 (stating statutory disclaimer was “filed following, and in view of, the Board’s guidance in the [decision on institution]”). For this reason, the Rehearing Request does not “identify [any] matters [Patent Owner] believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked,” nor does it “identify . . . the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). For this reason, we deny Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing. In addition, we note that statutory disclaimers are “considered as part” slip op. at 4

    • Adverse judgmentOther

      “proposition that “[c]laims disclaimed under § 253(a) are treated as though they never existed.” Prelim. Resp. 3 (citing Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d at 1383; Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1422). Neither Guinn nor Vectra Fitness involved a situation in which a determination about the patent, once made, was required to be unwound in light of a subsequent statutory disclaimer. Instead, Vectra Fitness related to a question of how to resolve post-disclaimer proceedings, and Guinn dealt with whether to apply a rule treating the disclaimer of all claims involved in an interference proceeding as a request for adverse judgment against the disclaiming party. Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d at 1381 (disclaimer filed Feb. 16, 1990; reissue application at issue filed May 9, 1991; reissue patent issued Mar. 29, 1994; infringement suit filed Dec. 4, 1996); Guinn, 96 F.3d at 1420–21. In fact, contrary to the result that Patent Owner urges here of reversing our institution of review, Guinn held that it was appropriate to resolve an interference even after all the involved claims had been disclaimed. 96 F.3d at 1422 (“We hold that the Board had the authority and the responsibility pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) to resolve the interference and render judgment against Guinn as a result of his disclaimer of claim 9 of the ’812 patent.”).” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,350,246
  • PTAB · Jan 4, 2023 · IPR2022-00182 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Rehearing

    Denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request; the Board found no abuse of discretion in instituting IPR of claims 1, 24, and 25 on the stated § 103 grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2022). In a rehearing request, the party challenging the decision “must specifically identify” (1) “all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) “the place where each matter was previously addressed” in an earlier submission. Id.; see Consolidated Trial Practice Guide at 90.3 “A rehearing request is not an opportunity for the requesting party to reargue its case or merely to express disagreement with the underlying decision.” MicroSurgical Tech., Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., PGR2021-00026, Paper 14 at 2 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2021). “Nor is it an opportunity for the moving party to present new arguments that were not in its original submissions.” Id.” slip op. at 3

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › CopyingObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not explain why issue preclusion permits the Board to hold the district court’s finding that Cisco “copied software functionality from the [infringed] patents” against Petitioner. See Prelim. Resp. 16, 54–56; Req. Reh’g 3, 14–15. Issue preclusion “is appropriate only if”: (1) “the issue is identical to one decided in the first action”; (2) “the issue was actually litigated in the first action”; (3) “resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action”; and (4) the party defending against preclusion “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” SynQor, Inc. v. Vicor Corp., 988 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Patent Owner does not address any of these requirements for issue preclusion. See Prelim. Resp. 16, 54–56; Req. Reh’g 3, 14–15.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “Regarding the policy’s whitelist processing, if the security device determines that a newly received packet with encrypted data is correlated to the hostname corresponding to the whitelisted destination domain, the security device filters the packet by forwarding it to the remote server with the whitelisted destination domain. See Ex. 1004, 7:52–59, 16:36–42; Ex. 1003 ¶ 90; see also Ex. 1004, 6:1–11. Filtering the newly received packet with encrypted data by forwarding it to the remote server with the whitelisted destination domain occurs “without having to decrypt the encrypted secure tunnel session traffic.” Ex. 1004, 5:24–27, 5:35–42, 7:1–9, 11:7–19; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94, 113. Further, filtering the newly received packet with encrypted data by forwarding it to the remote server with the whitelisted destination domain results from applying a packet-filtering rule (a whitelisted destination domain) to the packet. Hence, we disagree with Patent Owner that Buruganahalli’s security devices process whitelisted packets by “forward[ing] the entire encrypted stream without . . . filtering encrypted packets.” See Req. Reh’g 10. We also disagree with Patent Owner that “encrypted packets in whitelisted sessions” are (1) “forwarded without applying any packet-filtering rules” and (2) “allowed uninspected.” See id. at 11 n.1, 13. Regarding the policy’s blacklist processing, if the security device determines that a newly received packet with encrypted data is correlated to the hostname corresponding to the blacklisted destination domain, the security device either blocks the packet (as Patent Owner contends) or filters the packet by forwarding it to a decryption engine. See Ex. 1004, 7:60–67, 9:61–67, 14:33–36, 16:43–48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 90–91, 94, 97, 108, 118, 127, 137; Req. Reh’g 10–11, 13. Filtering the newly received packet with encrypted data by forwarding it to a decryption engine occurs “without having to decrypt the encrypted secure tunnel session traffic.” Ex. 1004, 5:24–27, 5:35–42, 7:1–9, 11:7–19; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94, 113, 135. Further, filtering the newly received packet with encrypted data by forwarding it to a decryption engine results from applying a packet-filtering rule (a blacklisted destination domain) to the packet and corresponds to limitation [1.g] and the similar limitations in claims 24 and 25. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 109, 134–135. The Institution Decision explained how Buruganahalli’s security devices may filter packets comprising unencrypted data and packets comprising encrypted data according to claims 1, 24, and 25 by applying a whitelist/blacklist policy to the packets. See, e.g., Inst. Dec. 57–60, 66–67, 69–71. As the Institution Decision explained and as discussed above, “for each session packets comprising unencrypted data and packets comprising encrypted data are correlated and filtered based on the hostname (destination domain) extracted from the handshake traffic, and then the correlated and filtered packets are processed separately from packets destined for other domains.” See Inst. Dec. 69–70; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 109, 120–121, 133–135; Ex. 1004, 7:39–67, 8:55–60, 11:47–51, 14:21–33, 14:50–55, 16:32–48. Buruganahalli discloses additional filtering after forwarding a newly received packet with encrypted data to a decryption engine, e.g., as occurs in Buruganahalli’s Figure 3B embodiment. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 6:17–22, 9:67–10:4, 12:4–64, Fig. 3B. But claims 1, 24, and 25 use the transitional term “comprising.” Ex. 1001, 25:14, 28:59, 29:29–30. Hence, the claims do not “exclude unrecited elements,” such as additional filtering after forwarding a newly received packet with encrypted data to a decryption engine. See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111.03).” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
  • PTAB · Jul 7, 2021 · IPR2020-01466 · APJ Melissa A Haapala · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place the denial of institution on claims 1–12 because petitioner showed no overlooked matter or abuse of discretion.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “On rehearing, the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified lies with Petitioner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “establish Hettstedt discloses the “reconfiguring each remote radio unit.” See Dec. 15. We disagree that we overlooked any arguments presented in the Petition with respect to this limitation. In its analysis of the “reconfiguring each remote radio unit” limitation in the Petition, Petitioner relied on Hettstedt’s disclosure that the CMU controls the frequency allocation of each carrier to the remote radio heads “by changing the MAC address of a specific carrier packet to correspond no longer to a first remote radio head, but instead be addressed to a different radio head in a high traffic area.” See Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1005, 5:10–11; 3:8–16; 4:35–39). Our Decision expressly addressed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence: After reviewing Petitioner’s analysis and supporting evidence, and Patent Owner’s response, we determine Petitioner fails to establish Hettstedt discloses “reconfiguring each remote radio unit” as we construe the claim (changing the configuration of each remote radio unit). Petitioner relies on Hettstedt’s disclosure that the CMU controls allocation of each carrier by changing the MAC addresses of carrier packets to disclose the recited “reconfiguring.” See Pet. 22. However, while changing the MAC addresses of carrier packets may result in an increase or decrease of the number of carriers assigned to a radio head by the CMU when routing traffic, it does not reconfigure (change) the configuration of the remote radio head itself. As we noted in our analysis of the claim construction of this term, the plain language of the claim requires that the remote radio head itself be reconfigured. Petitioner’s analysis does not address how Hettstedt discloses reconfiguring the remote radio unit itself.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “We are unpersuaded that we misconstrued the phrase “reconfiguring each remote radio unit by.” Petitioner’s proposed claim construction in the Rehearing Request does not give patentable weight to the claimed “reconfiguring each remote radio unit.” Although we agree with Petitioner that claim 1 requires limitations [b] and [c] (i.e., “determining a load percentage” and “increasing or decreasing the number of carriers”), we disagree with Petitioner that the term “by” before limitations [b] and [c] would require what comes before “by” to have no patentable weight. Rather, as stated in our Decision: we adopt the district court’s construction and construe “reconfiguring each remote radio unit” to be “changing the configuration of each remote unit.” We additionally note that the claim term requires that it is the remote radio unit itself that is changed because the “remote radio unit” is the direct object of the verb “reconfiguring.” This is consistent with the specification of the ’338 patent, which describes reconfiguring the RRUs themselves. Dec. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:1–13, 7:16–31, 8:8–21, 8:48–55, 11:28–39).” slip op. at 7

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “In its rehearing request, Petitioner now newly argues that we overlooked Hettstedt’s disclosure that remote radio heads are channel-selective in the uplink (i.e., column 5, lines 6–8 of Hettstedt). But Petitioner’s new analysis and explanation that Hettstedt’s teaches “reconfiguring each remote radio unit head” because its radio units are channel selective in the uplink was not presented in the Petition, and we could not have overlooked arguments or evidence not before us.2 See 37 C.F.R. 42.71(d). A petition must include “a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2). We are not persuaded of any error in our Decision that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that claim 1 is anticipated by Hettstedt. See Dec. 13–15. 2 We acknowledge Petitioner’s reliance on Hettstedt’s column 5, lines 6–8 on page 21 of the Petition; however, the Petition relied on this portion of Hettstedt for Element F of claim 1 (“configuring each remote radio unit to receive or transmit a respective subset of the plurality of carriers, each respective subset of the plurality of carriers including a number of carriers”), not for Element G of claim 1 (“reconfiguring each remote radio unit by . . .”). See Pet. 21. Petitioner’s Rehearing Request also points to reliance on Hettstedt’s column 5, lines 6–8 on page 10 of the Petition and in paragraphs of Dr. Acampora’s testimony (see Req. Reh’g 6–8 (citing Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–54)), however (i) page 10 of the Petition and paragraphs 46–52 of Dr. Acampora’s testimony are not addressing the “reconfiguring each remote radio unit” limitation, and (ii) while paragraphs 53–54 of Dr. Acampora’s testimony addresses the “reconfiguring each remote radio unit” these paragraphs do not reference Hettstedt’s column 5, lines 6–8. See Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–54.” slip op. at 4

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 8,682,338
  • PTAB · Jan 5, 2021 · IPR2020-00483 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place after finding no pertinent matter was overlooked or misapprehended.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “we do not hold the Petition to recite the exact wording of Advanced Bionics that– “the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims.” Nevertheless, we reviewed the challenges in the Petition and the prosecution history to assess whether Petitioner had demonstrated material error by the Office. We noted that challenged claim 29 (application claim 50) was allowed after it was amended to include 4 The Petition has been accorded a filing date of February 3, 2020. The decision in Advanced Bionics was issued on February 13, 2020 and designated precedential on March 24, 2020. command keys positioned on the handle. Dec. to Inst. 19; see also Pet. 15‒ 16 (discussing prosecution history and the Examiner’s identification of allowable subject matter). We also found persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that these same features are found in Rosenhan. Id. (referencing Pet. 31‒ 33). As a result, we determined that the Office’s failure to recognize Rosenhan discloses features that prompted the Examiner to allow the claims was an error material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Id. Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing does not dispute the substance of this analysis. Req. Reh’g. 2–5. Patent Owner’s argument that our approach “bootstraps” reasonable likelihood of success into the analysis of Office error is incorrect. Req. Reh’g. 5. Our analysis of the Office’s error focuses on the features that led the Examiner to allow the claim. Dec. to Inst. 19. That analysis is separate and distinct from our analysis of whether Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success by showing the reference teaches each of the elements of the claim to a person of ordinary skill. Id. at 23–25.” slip op. at 4

    • Other 314aDecided for petitioner

      “Here, as discussed below, the Decision to Institute weighed the factors argued in the Preliminary Response concerning discretionary denial of institution under Section 314(a). Section 314(a) states “the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the Director determines the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Although Section 314(a) does not require the Director to institute inter partes review in any particular case (see Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371 (2018)), the Decision to Institute concluded that the Petition in this case satisfied the requirements for institution under Section 314(a) and that the circumstances of this case do not support exercising discretion to deny Petitioner its ability under the statute to obtain inter partes review.” slip op. at 8

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,503,627
  • PTAB · Jun 10, 2020 · IPR2019-01431 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked matter or abuse of discretion in instituting review of claims 1–20.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,272,019
  • PTAB · Jun 9, 2020 · IPR2019-01416 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Rovi’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter and no abuse of discretion in instituting review of claims 1–16.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “On this record, Patent Owner neither persuades us that we overlooked or misapprehended any matter, nor sufficiently shows that instituting an inter partes review of claims 1–16 of the ’107 patent was an abuse of discretion. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

      “The Federal Circuit’s mandate has now issued. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 2018-2140, Dkt. No. 119 (Fed. Cir. April 6, 2020) (Ex. 3001). As to the contended insufficiency in the remedy set forth in Arthrex, Patent Owner’s position is contrary to that decision by our reviewing court. See Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337 (“This as-applied severance . . . cures the constitutional violation.”). Further, as set forth in the Decision, we determined that Arthrex did not warrant terminating or staying this case. Dec. 42. First, we set forth that “Arthrex indicates that there is ‘no constitutional infirmity’ in an institution decision.” Id. (citing Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1340). Second, we set forth that “the Board generally declines to stay proceedings pending an appeal to the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Askeladden LLC v. Purple Leaf, LLC, IPR2016-1720, Paper 22 at 2 (PTAB Sept. 11, 2017). Patent Owner’s disagreement with Arthrex and the sufficiency of its remedy does not meet Patent Owner’s burden here. In sum, Patent Owner’s arguments do not identify any matter” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,735,107
  • PTAB · May 29, 2020 · IPR2019-01413 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Rovi Guides’ rehearing request, leaving institution of inter partes review of claims 1–22 in place because the request showed no matters misapprehended or overlooked.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “institute an inter partes review, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

      “Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019), did not warrant terminating or staying this case. Dec. 26–27. Specifically, we explained that, according to Arthrex, “no constitutional infirmity [exists] in an institution decision.” Id. at 27 (quoting Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1340) (alteration in Decision). We also explained that we generally do not stay cases pending an appeal to the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court. Id.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,232,254
  • PTAB · May 26, 2020 · IPR2019-01209 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because the Petition lacked adequate evidence and reasoning to support the proposed obviousness combination.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). “An abuse of discretion is found if the decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact finding; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “As the Petition makes clear, the linchpin of Petitioner’s argument for modifying Brenner is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues due to signal loss in the optical waveguide of Brenner’s device. See Pet. 21 (“Thus, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have recognized that the security device of Brenner is prone to reliability issues due to signal loss in the optical waveguide.”); id. at 34 (“A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that . . . the security device will likely suffer from reliability issues associated with signal loss within the optical waveguide.”); id. at 35 (“[T]he optical transceivers of the sensor unit and the base unit may not be able to reliably communicate with one another due to optical signal loss within the optical waveguide.”); id. 6 The Petition and our Decision refer to this book by its title (“Communications Standard Dictionary”), but Petitioner now refers to it by the last name of its author (“Weik”). Compare Pet. 6, 19, with Req. Reh’g 2. For convenience and consistency with the Request for Rehearing, we refer to the book herein as “Weik.” Notably, Petitioner did not submit Weik as a prior art printed publication to be considered as part of an unpatentability ground, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018). See Pet. 5. Rather, the Petition cites Weik as support for its proposed claim construction and as support for an alleged “well-known fact” that an optical waveguide subjected to bending or winding is prone to signal loss. Id. at 6, 19. skill in the art] to improve the reliability of the security device of Brenner . . . .”); see also Dec. 14–15, 17–18 (citing Pet. 21, 35). Because we determined in our Decision that Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues in Brenner’s device, we concluded Petitioner did not provide adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Brenner as proposed. Dec. 16– 18.” slip op. at 4

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “As the Petition makes clear, the linchpin of Petitioner’s argument for modifying Brenner is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues due to signal loss in the optical waveguide of Brenner’s device. See Pet. 21 (“Thus, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have recognized that the security device of Brenner is prone to reliability issues due to signal loss in the optical waveguide.”); id. at 34 (“A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that . . . the security device will likely suffer from reliability issues associated with signal loss within the optical waveguide.”); id. at 35 (“[T]he optical transceivers of the sensor unit and the base unit may not be able to reliably communicate with one another due to optical signal loss within the optical waveguide.”); id. 6 The Petition and our Decision refer to this book by its title (“Communications Standard Dictionary”), but Petitioner now refers to it by the last name of its author (“Weik”). Compare Pet. 6, 19, with Req. Reh’g 2. For convenience and consistency with the Request for Rehearing, we refer to the book herein as “Weik.” Notably, Petitioner did not submit Weik as a prior art printed publication to be considered as part of an unpatentability ground, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018). See Pet. 5. Rather, the Petition cites Weik as support for its proposed claim construction and as support for an alleged “well-known fact” that an optical waveguide subjected to bending or winding is prone to signal loss. Id. at 6, 19. skill in the art] to improve the reliability of the security device of Brenner . . . .”); see also Dec. 14–15, 17–18 (citing Pet. 21, 35). Because we determined in our Decision that Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues in Brenner’s device, we concluded Petitioner did not provide adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Brenner as proposed. Dec. 16– 18.” slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “We are not persuaded that we overlooked evidence from Weik relied on in the Petition. Our Decision considered Weik’s description of a “microbend loss” that was quoted in the Petition: “the optical power loss caused by a microbend, i.e., a small bend, kink, or abrupt discontinuity in the direction of the optical axis of fibers, in the core-cladding interface surface, or both, usually caused by cabling, wrapping the fiber around drums and (citing Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1002, 576)). But Petitioner does not identify, nor do we see, any assertion in the Petition that Weik shows a microbend loss can cause a “total failure” of an optical signal to reach its destination. See Req. Reh’g 9; Pet. 19–20, 34–35. Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing also does not identify where the Petition addressed Weik’s statement that microbends can cause radiative loss. See Pet. 19–20, 34–35. Because these arguments were not presented in the first instance in the Petition, we could not have overlooked them in our Decision.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,062,253
  • PTAB · May 26, 2020 · IPR2019-01206 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because the Petition lacked sufficient evidence and reasoning to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). “An abuse of discretion is found if the decision: (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact finding; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “ordinary skill in the art] to improve the reliability of the security device of Brenner . . . .”); see also Dec. 14–15, 18 (citing Pet. 21, 36–37). Because we determined in our Decision that Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues in Brenner’s device, we concluded Petitioner did not provide adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Brenner as proposed. Dec. 16– 18.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “ordinary skill in the art] to improve the reliability of the security device of Brenner . . . .”); see also Dec. 14–15, 18 (citing Pet. 21, 36–37). Because we determined in our Decision that Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized reliability issues in Brenner’s device, we concluded Petitioner did not provide adequate reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Brenner as proposed. Dec. 16– 18.” slip op. at 5

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,818,274
  • PTAB · Mar 25, 2020 · IPR2019-00292 · APJ William M Fink · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, leaving in place its denial of authorization to seek a stay or termination based on Arthrex.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,937,394
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.