• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01450 · APJ Peter D Shapiro · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 were not shown unpatentable because Dziong and Sathyanath do not teach the claimed sharing definition for existing connections with allocated bandwidth.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “First, the claims use present-tense language, “one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection.”3 Ex. 1001, claim 1 (emphasis added). The exclusive use of the present tense have indicates “other connections” must have current possession of the bandwidth. For these other connections to share bandwidth with a newly established connection, they must already exist and have bandwidth ready for immediate use, rather than merely holding a dormant “reservation” pending a network failure. See PO Supp. Br. 1. The Federal Circuit addressed a similar situation where the Court found the present-tense limitation “is connected to the computer network” means a device was required to be connected at the” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “combination, do not teach or suggest limitations 1.2 and 1.3 requiring: providing a sharing definition specifying one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection, such that a total bandwidth allocated jointly to the new connection and to the other connections in any given segment is equal to a maximum of the requested bandwidth and of the bandwidths of the other connections in the given segment Ex. 1001, limitations 1.2, 1.3 (emphasis added); see PO Resp. 17–22; Sur-reply 4–5, 12–14. As discussed above in Section II.C.2, we interpret “other connections” to mean “existing connections in the network that already have bandwidth allocated to them.” Because the information shared in Dziong and Sathyanath, described below, relates to reserved protection paths, rather than existing connections that have bandwidth that can currently transmit network traffic, the references do not teach or suggest the “other connections” part of the sharing definition in limitations 1.2 and 1.3. Dziong describes advertising, across the network, the amount of bandwidth reserved for recovery on each link that would be activated when a protected link fails. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60; Pet. 36. Once activated, network traffic from a “primary path” failure is rerouted to these recovery paths. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7–9, 70, 83. Petitioner points to this advertising of the reserved bandwidth information as teaching the claimed “sharing definition.” Pet. 33–36 (arguing that the “protection paths [in Dziong] have bandwidth reservations” and “share an overall protection bandwidth reservation”); Reply 21–23. However, since the advertised information only contains information about the recovery paths “that would be activated” upon a primary path failure, such paths are not existing connections that already have bandwidth allocated to them, and therefore do not teach the claimed “other connections” that are part of the sharing definition. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60.” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,596,088 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,596,088
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00503 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the failure to show the claimed request and routing steps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’279 patent in January 2001 “would have had a working knowledge of the network communication technologies that are pertinent to the ’279 patent, including network flow allocation in a ring topology.” Pet. 12. More specifically, Petitioner argues, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a master’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience relating to network communications and resource allocations,” where “[a]dditional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner represents that it “does not dispute Petitioner’s definition” for the purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 5. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’279 patent, and, therefore, we likewise adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Neither party contends that any formal claim construction is necessary. See Pet. 12 (“Petitioner submits that, for the purposes of this proceeding and the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.”); PO Resp. 4 (“Here, at this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner will apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the ’279 Patent’s claim terms.”). Patent Owner notes, however, that Petitioner had asserted specific constructions in the Cisco litigation for the term “predetermined,” as recited in claims 1, 10, 14–16, and 18, and for the term “quantum.” PO Resp. 4. Specifically, according to Patent Owner, Petitioner proposed that “predetermined” be construed as “determined before the data flow request” and that “quantum” be construed as “an amount of a requested resource by which to increase or decrease.” Id. (citing Ex. 2007). Patent Owner contends asserted prior art combinations disclose or render obvious the challenged claims under these constructions. Id. Because our conclusion that Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable does not turn on the construction of either “predetermined” or “quantum,” there is no need for us to construe those terms. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We again are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. As an initial matter, we find no argument with respect to “best effort data traffic” or dropped packets in the Petition. See Tr. 12:10–21 (conceding that “the phrase ‘best effort’ was not in the Petition” but arguing that it was raised in response to the Patent Owner Response). Moreover, we are unable to identify any argument in the Patent Owner Response to which this line of argument is properly responsive, and Petitioner does not identify any such line of argument. Instead, Petitioner’s argument appears to advance belatedly a new theory. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 73–74, available at” slip op. at 43

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “We credit the supporting testimony of Dr. Olivier on the points discussed above, as it is explained sufficiently and consistent with the testimony simply mirrors the Petition and does not explain sufficiently why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kovvali in the manner Petitioner asserts. See Pet. 35; Reply 17–18; Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 7,035,279 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,035,279
• Hanshow America Inc. / Hanshow Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ses-Imagotag Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00208 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Wu and the asserted combinations did not teach or suggest the claimed acquisition and transmission of a sequence of shelf label identifiers.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “identifying information and the label location information[,]’ by extrapolating from the ESL that is already installed as required by steps S104 and S106.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003, 4:26-28; Ex. 1009 ¶ 81) (third and fourth alterations in original). There is no explanation or reasoning provided in the Petition to support this assertion. See id. We can find no support for this assertion that the method described in Wu requires this undisclosed step or that it could not otherwise possibly work14 to create the relationship between the label identifying information and the label location information of the added shelf label by extrapolation from the ESL that is already installed. The only evidence cited in support of this assertion is a short passage in Wu (Ex. 1003, 4:26–28) and paragraph 81 of the Declaration of Dr. Tentzeris (Ex. 1009). This short passage in Wu provides that, “[i]n step S106, the deploying device 130 or the controlling device 120 creates the relationship between the label identifying information and the label location information.” Ex. 1003, 4:26–28. This passage does not support Petitioner’s assertion. The cited paragraph in the Declaration of Dr. Tentzeris provides: 81. In my opinion, a POSITA would understand that, without acquiring this second identifier in the sequence (which 14 Prior art patents enjoy a presumption of enablement. Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 861 Fed. Appx. 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Wu is presumed to enable what it discloses. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“a presumption arises that both the claimed and unclaimed disclosures in a prior art patent are enabled”). However, even without applying this presumption, Wu provides a disclosure that establishes how to create the relationship between the label identifying information and the label location information of the added shelf label by extrapolation or interpolation without the reading device acquiring the label identifying information of the adjacent shelf label which is already installed. See Ex. 1003, 3:59–4:28. is explicitly shown in FIG. 3B of Wu), the reading device could not possibly “create[] the relationship between the label identifying information and the label location information[,]” by extrapolating from the ESL that is already installed as required by steps S104 and S106. Ex. 1003, [4:26-28]. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81. Dr. Tentzeris does not support his opinion with any explanation, reasoning, facts or data, here or elsewhere. This unsupported, conclusory testimony is entitled to little or no weight. See cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings Inc., 986 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We do not accord weight to conclusory expert testimony.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). There is no evidence that supports Petitioner’s assertion that a skilled artisan would understand from Wu that the reading device acquires the label identifying information of a second shelf label that is already installed and adjacent to the added shelf label.” slip op. at 27

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art relating to the subject matter of the ’709 Patent as of the Critical Date (“POSITA”) would have had at least a Master of Science Degree in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, or an equivalent field (or a similar technical Master’s degree, or higher degree). Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 31). Petitioner further contends, in the alternative, that “a POSITA would have had a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher degree)” in one of the fields noted above, with “two or more cannot demonstrate unpatentability of any claim of the ’709 Patent because Petitioners fail to identify a ‘reading device’ that acquires and transmits the ‘sequence of label identifiers’ recited by the claims.”). Our decision is based on our determination that Petitioner has failed to establish that the cited art teaches or suggests acquiring and transmitting a sequence of label identifiers as recited in the independent claims of the ’709 patent. years of work experience” in one of those fields. Id. According to Petitioner, “[a]dditional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner, as it is not disputed by the Patent Owner and is consistent with the ’709 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “necessary to resolve the controversy involved in this IPR, and the terms of the ’709 Patent should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 4. In the claim construction section of its Response, Patent Owner discusses the claim terms “location(s)” and “planogram.” See PO Resp. 16– 29. As discussed in our analysis below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that the prior art teaches or suggests certain limitations of the claims that do not include either the term “location(s)” or “planogram.” Accordingly, no need exists to expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Our decision relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the limitations on which our decision is based and no need exists to expressly construe any claim term to make our decision.8” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the entire record of this proceeding, we find that Wu does not teach or suggest: (1) “acquiring, by a reading device, a sequence of label identifiers . . . comprising a label identifier of an adjacent shelf label which is adjacent to the added shelf label” as recited in independent claim 1: (2) “transmitting, by the reading device, the sequence of label identifiers to the computer system” as recited in independent claim 1: (3) “acquiring, by a reading device, a sequence of label identifiers . . . comprising a label identifier of an adjacent shelf label which is adjacent to the added shelf label” as recited in independent claim 10; (4) “transmitting, by the reading device, the sequence of label identifiers to the computer system” as recited in independent claim 10: (5) “the computer system being configured to receive, from the reading” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 11,010,709 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,010,709
• Whatfix Inc. v. Walkme Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00065 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable under the Symons and Williams, Allen, or Krishnan and Radhakrishnan obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner proposes that a “person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) in the field of the ’317 patent would have [had a] bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science and two years of experience working on NLP [natural language processing] or automation processes” or “[a]lternatively . . . would have [had] five to six years of experience working on NLP or automation processes.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–45). We adopted Petitioner’s proposal for purposes of the Decision on Institution, explaining that it appeared to be consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’317 patent. Dec. 12. is inconsistent with the asserted Symons prior art and with factors (4)–(6) set forth in Daiichi Sankyo. PO Resp. 20–21 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 36–45). According to Patent Owner, the technology of the ’317 patent was “evolving rapidly” and the level of sophistication in the technology was “relatively low” in November 2017. Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1004, 1–2; Ex. 1009, 2; Ex. 2002 ¶ 42; Ex. 2003 (transcript of June 26, 2024, deposition of Dr. Beigi), 141:2–9, 191:18–197:5; Ex. 2007; Ex. 2008). Further, Patent Owner contends, “[a]ctive work[ers] in the field, like Symons,[8] had less experience than [Dr. Beigi] proposed.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 2002; Ex. 2003, 112:12–24). Accordingly, Patent Owner argues, “[t]he evidence of record demonstrates a more appropriate level of skill would [be] a worker who had some education, formal or informal, in computer science and 1–2 years’ work experience with chatbots using NLP and/or automation processes.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44; Ex. 2002 ¶ 44; Pet. 5–6). “Under Patent Owner’s more appropriate analysis,” Patent Owner contends, “Dr. Beigi’s interpretation of what a POSITA would understand are overstated,” as “[h]e expects a POSITA to have ‘more experience’ (like himself) and apply a more ‘technically correct’ (in his view) understanding of the prior art than less skilled authors and artisans would have understood.” Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 141:2–9, 191:18–197:5). Nonetheless, Patent Owner argues, “[s]hould the Board continue to apply Petitioner’s” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). construction” “[f]or purposes of this Petition.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner similarly represents that “[t]he parties agree that the claim terms used in the ’317 Patent claims have their ‘ordinary and custom[ary] meanings of terms’ as would be understood by a POSITA as of November 5, 2017.” PO Resp. 24. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 35–37). Further, Petitioner asserts, “the Petition relies on Williams, not Symons, for its teachings of a ‘web-based’ target system.” Id. (citing Pet. 40). Petitioner does not, however, address Patent Owner’s main point, i.e., that the Petition relies on Symons’s illustration of its RPA bot purportedly filling in a text input field in the GUI of the Cronos Email Signature Generator for limitation 1[g] but relies on Symons’s illustration of its RPA bot interacting with a widget in Internet Explorer for limitation 1[h], despite the recitation in limitation 1[h] of “interacting with a widget in the GUI.” See, e.g., PO Resp. 38. Dr. Beigi acknowledges that, “[a]ccording to the ’317 patent, a widget is a GUI element,” and he concludes, with reference to Petitioner’s annotated version of the screenshot from page 13 of Exhibit 1006 reproduced above, that “Symon[s]’s GUI button is a widget in a GUI.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 100 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1001, 10:19–21). But neither the Petition, nor the Reply, nor Dr. Beigi’s testimony persuasively explains how a dialog box in Internet Explorer teaches or suggests a widget in the Cronos GUI. The Reply’s contention that “the Petition relies on Williams . . . for its teachings of a ‘web-based’ target system” is unavailing, because the issue is not whether either the Cronos program or Internet Explorer is “web-based”12 but whether Petitioner has identified a teaching or suggestion of an implementation of an automation process that fills in a text input field in a GUI of a web-based target system and interacts with a widget in the same GUI. 12 In this regard, we credit Mr. Zatkovich’s statement that Internet Explorer is local to and resident on the user’s computer. Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 161–162; cf. Ex. 2003, 219:24–220:5 (Dr. Beigi testifying that he is “not sure where this Windows software is running”).” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s reasoning fails to explain “how the combination of the two references was supposed to work.” See Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017). More specifically, Petitioner fails to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to perform Krishnan’s automation process (i.e., fulfilling customer requests) by implementing an “automation process by interacting with a Graphical User Interface (GUI)” and “simulating user input to the GUI,” as purportedly taught by Radhakrishnan. Petitioner’s arguments are focused toward using Radhakrishnan’s RPA bot to perform Krishnan’s customer service requests (i.e., automation process) but fail to explain how Radhakrishnan’s RPA bot’s mirroring of the user’s operations (i.e., the simulation on the displayed user interface) as applied in Krishnan would work or provide sufficient reasoning to do so. See Personal Web, 848 F.3d at 993–994 (“[I]t does not imply a motivation to pick out . . . two references and combine them to arrive at the claimed invention”); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[M]ere identification in the prior art of each element is insufficient to defeat the patentability of the combined subject matter as a whole”).” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 11,558,317 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,558,317
• Whatfix Inc. v. Walkme Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01379 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–6, 9–16, and 18–21 not shown unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds, because Petitioner failed to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Determining whether an invention would have been obvious under” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “the claims challenged in the inter partes review are unpatentable. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). An obviousness determination based on a combination of references requires finding “both ‘that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a finding of a motivation to combine “must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,258,732 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,258,732
• Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. NEC CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01239 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 14–18, 20–23, and 25–29 were not determined unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds failed to establish the claimed code-rate determination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner, supported by the testimony of Dr. Reader, argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, a related field, and 2–3 years’ experience researching, designing, or developing content delivery systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner further argues “[o]ne having less education but more practical experience, or more education and less experience, might also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition or offer an alternative level or skill in the art. PO Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 14; Ex. 2012). Instead, “[f]or the purposes of this PO Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of POSITA.” Id. Thus, on this record, the parties agree upon the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, and this level is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’101 patent and the prior art references that disclose content delivery systems. For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “the gap between the playback deadline and the target schedule, (td(n) − tT(n)), is the target buffer duration, i.e., ‘the desired client buffer duration (in client time).’” Id. at 22–23 (quoting Chou ¶ 74). Petitioner also argues that “in efforts to match upper bound tb(n) to target schedule tT(n), Chou takes into consideration the time duration between target schedule tT(n) and the playback deadline td(n).” Thus, it appears Petitioner assembles three separate and distinct time intervals from Chou’s timing diagrams and equations to construct one contiguous time interval equivalent to claim 1’s remaining time. However, Chou does not recognize the time interval that Petitioner posits, and Petitioner has not persuasively shown that this combined time interval exists as a teaching in the prior art and is used as part of any step or decision involved in determining the code rate. As admitted by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Reader, Petitioner’s analysis “used the claims as a road map to find limitations in the prior art.” Ex. 2015, 76:4–9 (Reader Deposition Transcript). See also Tr. 28:20–31:2 (Petitioner’s response to whether identification of and integration of separate time ranges described by Chou is hindsight reconstruction, Petitioner argues Chou’s device operates such that code rate is based on remaining time). Under the circumstances, this is improper because Petitioner and Dr. Reader do not justify this combination of separately identified time ranges except based solely on hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. However, even if that were not the case, we are not persuaded that Chou or the other asserted prior art references suggest using the combined time interval td(n) − ta(n) as the basis for any decision related to determining the code rate.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “d) Analysis In our Institution Decision, although expressing some uncertainty with respect to certain of Patent Owner’s arguments on the preliminary record then before us, “we [were] not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions that [(1)] Wang teaches [1d]’s code rate” (Dec. 53 (citing Pet. 62–65) or (2) “a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Chou and Wang” (id. at 54 (citing Pet. 74)). Petitioner does not dispute those determinations in its Reply or otherwise. Furthermore, Petitioner does not address or otherwise dispute Patent Owner’s arguments challenging the asserted obviousness of claims 1, 4–6, 10–16, and 19–26 over the combined teachings of Chou and Wang. Thus, for at least the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to show that (1) one skilled in the art would have combined the teachings of Chou and Wang or (2) the combined teaching of Chou and Wang renders limitation 1(d) obvious. e) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of Chou and Wang.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 8,752,101 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,752,101
• Arista Networks, Inc. v. Corrigent CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00839 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the evidence did not establish the claimed LAG use between MPLS switches or explain how the references would be combined.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, apart from the phrase “at least” modifying the number of years of professional experience. See Dec. 17–18. As we previously explained, inclusion of such qualifiers renders the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 18. Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) and related cases. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that precedent, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 4; PO Resp. 3. Based on the parties’ arguments, we see no need to expressly construe any terms to resolve the dispute before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached

    “Pet. Reply 10–11. Despite Petitioner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated by knowledge of Rabie to combine the teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz at the time of the invention of the ’602 patent. First, the ’602 patent claims a priority date of May 6, 2005, which is not challenged by Petitioner (see Pet. 3), whereas Rabie was published more than two months later. Ex. 1021, code (65). Moreover, the question is not whether it may have been known at the time of the invention that a LAG could be used between switches, but rather whether the combined teachings of RFC 3209 and Raz would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a LAG between switches, as claimed, when neither RFC 3209 nor Raz teaches such usage or suggests the existence of a problem that such usage would solve. We are not persuaded that they would.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,118,602 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,118,602
• Netflix, Inc. v. Gotv Streaming, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 29, 2024 · IPR2023-00759 · APJ Richard M Lebovitz · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20, 31, and 34 were not proven unpatentable under either obviousness ground based on Hariki, Harris, and Dees.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “obviousness”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “1. Independent Claim 1 The first ground of unpatentability is based on Hariki and Harris. We” slip op. at 27

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Patent Owner did not provide evidence that Exs. 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012 were available before the invention was made (i.e., Aug. 1, 2007). As shown in the table above, these exhibits have dates identifying information that suggests publication after the effective filing date. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Exhibits 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012 should be excluded as not credible evidence of how one of ordinary skill would have understand the terms recited in the issued claims of the ’865 patent because Petitioner did not establish these definitions were available at the time the invention was made. Consequently, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012 is granted.” slip op. at 77

  Patent outcomesUS 8,103,865 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,103,865
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Almondnet, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2024 · IPR2022-01259 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 35–51 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not show that the claimed computers automatically authorize a distinct third-party second media property to allow ad display.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with Petitioner that the recited “system” of claim 35 does not necessarily exclude a “third-party second media property.” As Petitioner points out, claim 35 uses the open-ended transitional phrase “comprising,” such that the recited “system comprising one or more computers” may include components other than the recited “one or more computers.” See Pet. Reply 1 (citing CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “programmed to implement a method of directing electronic advertisements” more naturally modifies “one or more computers,” rather than “system.” Id. at 3. Nonetheless, it is clear from the plain language of claim 35, as well as from the prosecution history of the related ’745 patent, that the third-party second media property must be distinct from such “one or more computers.” Petitioner’s repeated use of the abbreviation “TPSMP” obscures the fact that claim 35 does not simply recite a “second media property” but instead specifically recites a “third-party second media property.” Ex. 1001, 16:18–19 (emphasis added). Highlighting the significance of the modifier “third-party,” as Patent Owner points out, is the fact that that modifier was added to “second media property” in the phrase “automatically electronically authorizing, with at least one of the computers, a third party second media property to allow display, to the electronic visitor when later visiting the second media property, of an advertisement” in an Examiner’s amendment during prosecution of the ’822 patent’s grandparent ’286 application to avoid certain prior art, and the prosecution record of the ’286 application reflects that this amendment was made to make it clear that the recited “authorizing is being done of an unrelated site.” Ex. 2005, 58; see PO Resp. 10–11. More particularly, as Patent Owner points out, the applicant stated in the cited examiner interview report that “the claim structure already made [it] clear” that “the authorizing is being done of an unrelated site . . . because the phrase ‘authorizing’ a site does not seem to cover a site deciding something on its own,” but that the amendment to specify a “third party second media property” made that requirement “explicit.” Ex. 2005, 58; see PO Resp. 7–8 (quoting the same).” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, minus the phrases “at least” modifying the education and “or more” modifying the number of years of experience. As we explained in our Institution Decision, although Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art, inclusion of such qualifiers render the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of education and experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. See Dec. 12. Thus, in summary, we find that one with ordinary skill in the art at the pertinent time period would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two years of experience with designing, programming, configuration, and/or analysis/research with Internet or similar network-related processes including, for example, user/entity profile management and/or web-based targeted content delivery, or a related field, where more education could supplement practical experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having considered the parties’ respective contentions in light of the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 35 is unpatentable over the combination of Perry, Wilson, and Bronson. In particular, we are not persuaded that the cited prior art teaches or suggests “a system comprising one or more computers programmed to implement a method . . . comprising: . . . automatically electronically authorizing a third-party second media property to allow display . . . of an advertisement correlated with the profile-attribute information received about the visitor.” Although Figure 1 of Perry depicts a “system” that includes computers programmed to implement a method of distributing advertisements to users over the Internet, we are not persuaded that any component in that system implements a method that includes “automatically electronically authorizing a third-party second media property” to display such advertisements. As Patent Owner points out, Petitioner identifies “Internet publisher computer systems 131 and 132” and “advertising service company computer system 140 comprising one or more CPUs 141” as the recited “one or more computers.” Pet. 7; PO Resp. 11. Although there is no dispute that Publisher Systems 131 and 132 and ASC 140 are computers, we find that neither satisfies the remaining limitations of claim 35, particularly because neither “automatically electronically authoriz[es] a third-party second media property” to display advertisements. As we explain in our claim construction discussion above, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the recited “system” necessarily must exclude the “third-party second media server.” See supra § III.C. Nonetheless, the third-party second media server still must be separate and distinct from the “one or more computers programmed to implement [the recited] method,” lest the modifier “third-party” be rendered meaningless.” slip op. at 54

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Further, Patent Owner did not present Mr. Sherwood as an expert on patent law or claim drafting, and we decline to give substantial weight to his testimony on this issue that is ultimately a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (ruling that the interpretation of patent claims is a matter of law to be determined exclusively by the courts). Still further, Petitioner’s counsel conceded that the formatting of the claim is not dispositive. Tr. 14:14–18.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,200,822 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,200,822
• Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00744 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–10, and 12–14 were not shown unpatentable because Halbert did not disclose the claimed ranks operating at the specified data rate.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not provide a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill, but Dr. Przybylski states that an individual with the level of experience identified by Petitioner “would have less knowledge and familiarity” than presumed by Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2003 ¶ 46. Dr. Przybylski, however, provides no further discussion explaining this apparent disagreement with Petitioner, nor does he set forth what level of knowledge and familiarity a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Based on the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed skill level is consistent with the level of ordinary skill evidenced by the ’314 patent and the asserted prior art, and we adopt that skill level with the exception of the phrases “at least,” which introduce vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We disagree with Petitioner’s interpretation. Taking Petitioner’s point that “‘specified data rate’ means only that the data rate is specified in some way” (Pet. Reply 4), we do not see how, once the rate is specified, claim 1’s later recitations of “the specified data rate” could refer to any other rate, as Petitioner’s arguments suggest. Petitioner argues that “it is clear that the ‘specified data rate’ that provides antecedent basis for later recitations of that term is merely the data rate specified for ‘communicat[ing] data’ between the ‘memory module’ and the external ‘memory controller of the computer (alteration by Petitioner). We agree with this statement, and later recitations of “the specified data rate,” therefore, refer to the data rate that is so specified. Petitioner provides no persuasive argument to support its position that later recitations of “the specified data rate” could be satisfied by data rates that are not the “specified data rate.”” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “PO Resp. 19; see also Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 68–72 (Dr. Przybylski’s testimony explaining this annotated figure). Halbert’s Figure 5 is a timing diagram for two consecutive read operations (Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 16, 37), and Patent Owner includes annotations to show each of ranks 140 and 142 outputting data onto their respective data busses at half the rate that data are output from data interface circuit 120 on the DQ data line. In particular, Halbert explains that each of ranks 140 and 142 is “capable of performing m-bit-wide data transfers.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 30. On a read command, rank 140 sends m-bit-wide data to bi-directional data register 126 on line RDQ0 at the same time that rank 142 sends m-bit-wide data to bi-directional data register 128 on line RDQ1, as shown in Figure 5 between T7n and T8n. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 31–32, 39. Halbert discloses that register 126 or from register 128 to output to buffer 122, which are then output on line DQ. Ex. 1005 ¶ 33. Halbert explains that “[d]ata is serialized from the data registers onto the memory data bus by reading 2m bits into the data registers during one memory device read cycle, and then driving these bits, m at a time, through MUX 124.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 33. As shown in Halbert’s Figure 5, over one clock cycle (T7n–T8n), each of ranks 140 and 142 outputs one piece of m-bit-wide data, and over one clock cycle (T8–T9), those two pieces of m-bit-wide data are output on line DQ to the system memory data bus. Halbert explains that the second read operation proceeds in the same fashion as the first and that “[t]he net result is that the memory data bus transfers 4m bits of data in two memory bus clock cycles (four mbit transfers), with only two data accesses performed at each memory device on the module.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 42. Thus, Halbert’s memory module outputs data to the system memory data bus at twice the rate that each of ranks 140 and 142 outputs data. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 68–73 (Dr. Przybylski’s credible testimony explaining Halbert’s data rates).” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 10,489,314 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,489,314

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.