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  • Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
  • PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of the asserted references, including Shin and Aoyama and Shimomura and Iwase.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther

      “1 SoundClear also filed a Contingent Motion to Amend that proposed to replace originally challenged claim 5 of the ’675 patent with proposed substitute claim 8. Paper 21. We, however, granted SoundClear’s request to withdraw its Contingent Motion to Amend and, as a result, the Contingent Motion to Amend will no longer be considered in this proceeding. Paper 30.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

      “combination because (1) configuring Shin’s processor 120 accordingly “would have been trivial, involving straightforward changes to enhance the processor’s approach to simplifying and abbreviating its output”; and (2) this approach was well-known as evidenced by Ha’s disclosure of replacing “team meeting” and “date” with “schedules” based on the user’s environment.6 Id. at 27–28 (first quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 97, then quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 98) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011, Fig. 7).” slip op. at 33

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “4. Dr. Stern’s Testimony is Reliable In its Patent Owner Response, SoundClear contends that “Dr. Stern’s” slip op. at 125

    Patent outcomesUS 11,244,675 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,244,675
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixed
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 11,966,920
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 102, § 103, or § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish its limitations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “1. Legal Standards “Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed

      “2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1368). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); accord In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “conclusory statements” amount to an “insufficient articulation[] of motivation to combine”; “instead, the finding must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 36

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionMixed

      “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

      “because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108

    Patent outcomesUS 11,972,423 mixed
    § 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,972,423
  • PTAB · Jul 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–29 are unpatentable under each asserted obviousness ground, including Chang and Fang, because Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Additionally, we note that Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Ryan Bauer, who provided a detailed, 169-page expert report providing, on behalf of Petitioner, his opinions about the issues in this proceeding. See Exhibit 1003. Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence in this proceeding remains unrebutted.” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. Based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the Examiner construed the term “self- contained, in-bra wearable device” to mean “complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290).14 According to Petitioner, “[Patent Owner] did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner contends that all other terms “should receive their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “(3) 1[a][1] a diaphragm configured to prevent milk from reaching an air pump by forming a seal around its outer edge; Petitioner relies on Fang for the disclosure of a diaphragm, as stated in this clause. Pet. 25–26. Petitioner asserts the proposed combination of elements suggest a breast pump device that would have used a diaphragm pump including first and second diaphragm housing components and an elastic diaphragm, “in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 25. As also asserted by Petitioner, Fang discloses that flexible diaphragm 7 (i.e., a membrane) is configured to prevent milk from reaching the pump. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 19 (“The elastic diaphragm 7 is used to prevent milk from flowing into the air pump main unit 8.”). Mr. Bauer testifies: The flexible diaphragm [diaphragm 7 in Fang] forms a watertight and airtight seal around its outer edge. In doing so, the diaphragm prevents the passage of milk from reaching the air pump and facilitates generation of negative pressure during operation. Fang also explains that the elastic diaphragm 7 deforms away from the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber, which then creates negative air pressure in the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber.” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 11,813,381 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,813,381
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenOther

      “Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,069,337
  • PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00169 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 50–54 are unpatentable as obvious over KR996 and JP705; claims 55–63, 68, 69, and 80–85 were not shown unpatentable over KR996, JP705, Bares, and Beltrami.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “(“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”).” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness analysis includes consideration and weighing of Patent Owner’s objective indicia of non-obviousness.” slip op. at 57

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “e) Conclusion as to the Independent Claim 50 For the reasons discussed above, the evidence presented by Petitioner” slip op. at 67

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

      “For these reasons, we are persuaded by Petitioner to exclude, as” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 9,321,386 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,321,386
  • PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00170 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable over KR996 and the KR996/Bares combination; Petitioner did not prove claims 19–36 unpatentable over KR996, Bares, and Beltrami.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “(10) Conclusion as to Objective Indicia We have considered, as a whole, all of Patent Owner’s arguments and admissible evidence concerning secondary considerations. If we were to presume nexus, we give some weight to Patent Owner’s admissible evidence of industry praise and skepticism at the time of invention. d. Conclusion as to Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above (§§ II.F.2.a–b), the evidence” slip op. at 62

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

      “probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one skilled in the art, secondary considerations (objective evidence of non-obviousness) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Our obviousness” slip op. at 52

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “lexicographical, we agree with the parties that “mainframe” is not limited to a single weldment. Pet. Init. CC Br. 1; PO Init. CC Br. 1–2. Instead, a single-weldment “mainframe” is merely one disclosed embodiment. See Pet. Init. CC Br. 3 (stating that “by including the term ‘generally’ in a statement, the feature (i.e., single weldment) is expressly identified as merely included in some, but not all embodiments”); PO Init. CC Br. 3 (“This language is merely exemplary, using reference numerals to refer to the embodiment’s features and qualifying ‘single weldment’ as referring ‘generally’ to specific embodiments.”). The Iowa District Court reached the same conclusion. See Ex. 1020 at 4 (holding that “‘mainframe’ will be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require a single weldment” (emphasis added)), cited at Pet. Init. CC Br. 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”). Turning to the prosecution history, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner has highlighted any specific statements that impact the scope of the term “mainframe.” And from our independent review, we do not discern any such statements. For these reasons, the intrinsic evidence as a whole supports construing “mainframe” as a primary supporting structure.” slip op. at 33

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “2. Analysis “The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20. a. Exhibits 1005, 1006, and 1014 Exhibit 1005 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996. Exhibit 1006 is an English language translation of Japanese document JP2004-17705A. Exhibit 1014 is an English language translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1023528. A Certification of Translation signed by Takashi Maeshiro of HC Language Solutions, Inc., accompanies each of Exhibits 1005, 1006, and 1014. Ex. 1005 at 28; Ex. 1006 at 16; Ex. 1014 at 16. Each Certification of Translation is worded substantially the same except for the references to the document at issue and the source language being either Korean or Japanese. Exhibit 1005’s Certification of Translation, for example, states: I, Takashi Maeshiro, on behalf of HC Language Solutions, Inc., do solemnly and sincerely declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the attached text represents a translation of Korean Patent No. 10-1041996, that the translation was performed by HC Language Solutions, Inc., and that the translation represents a true, correct, and faithful translation from Korean to English in a form that reflects the intention and meaning of the original text. I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Ex. 1005 at 28 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the Certifications of Translation do not” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 9,975,750 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 9,975,750
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
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