• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,966,347
• Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,203
• Innolux Corporation v. Phenix Longhorn LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00044 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the Petition violated Rule 42.104(b)(3) and did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 5, and 6 were unpatentable as obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have had at least a bachelor of science degree in physics, electrical engineering, or the equivalent thereof and three (3) years of experience in circuit design or display technologies.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). According to Petitioner “[s]uch a POSA would have had knowledge of integrated circuits, gamma correction, and storage of gamma correction voltage values within memory, and would have understood how to search available literature for relevant publications.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition for the purposes of the Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the current record, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. This assessment is consistent with the ’788 Patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not identified corresponding structure for performing the recited functions of “optimizing . . . gamma reference voltage levels using means for executing a predetermined algorithm according to a predetermined criteria and data sensed by . . . at least one sensor, wherein said means for executing said predetermined algorithm is separate from [a] display to achieve [a] desired gamma curve” as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Because Petitioner has not provided constructions, either rebutting the presumption that “means for executing” is a means-plus-function term, or identifying corresponding structure if it is a means-plus-function term, Petitioner has violated Rule 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “and 5 recites “means for executing.” Ex. 1001, 7:36–40, 8:35–37. The use of the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments (Prelim. Resp. 36–39), the Petition does not address the presumption and, more specifically, the Petition does not provide any argument or evidence as to why the presumption is rebutted. Furthermore, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s newly presented argument that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of ‘means for executing a predetermined algorithm . . . ’ connotes a general-purpose processor, which is understood as structure sufficient to perform the function” (Pet. Reply 5), such argument is not persuasive as it is not supported by evidence earlier presented in the Petition or otherwise. Furthermore, even if the plain and ordinary meaning of means for executing a predetermined algorithm were a general-purpose processor, for a computer implemented means-plus-function term the corresponding structure must be the specific algorithm implemented by the processor as argued by Petitioner. Pet. Reply 6.” slip op. at 16

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,557,788
• Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01389 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–4 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability under any asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’000 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We construe a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party proposes construing any claim term. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 36. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “3 The parties do not dispute that a skilled artisan “would have had a B.S. degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent experience relating to computing, as well as two to three additional years of academic or industry experience related to web application development and data visualization services.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85); Prelim. Resp. 35– 36. 4 The record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “connotes interactivity, and does not explain why a “Data Animation Effect” would be interactive.6 These aspects of Figure 53 do not appear to show interactivity. Thus, the issue is whether selecting a choice other than “Hide” for “Scroll buttons” in box 710 of Figure 53 adds to chart 840, once published, a feature that allows a user to interact with that chart via scrolling, or whether “Scroll buttons” refers to some other feature of the configuration process (such as the scroll buttons shown in Figure 53 for scrolling through the various charts in the layout). Both experts provide conclusory testimony stating how they view Figure 53. Ex. 1003 ¶ 181 (“For example, Figure 53 of Rostoker shows the ‘Configure Chart View’ toolbar, which includes multiple ‘interactive’ features, such as making the chart ‘Selectable’ (suggesting interactivity using an input device such as a mouse), including ‘Scroll buttons’ to scroll the chart, and adding ‘Data Animation[s].’”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 141 (“Schmandt relies on the ‘Configure Chart View’ toolbar of FIG. 53 of Rostoker, but he is confusing the configuration step 330 of Rostoker with the end result.”). Petitioner invites us to speculate as to the behavior of features that are depicted in Figure 53 but otherwise are not described in any meaningful detail by Rostoker. We conclude that this is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,520,000
• Tableau Software, LLC v. Icharts LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-01388 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–18 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we do not institute an inter partes review of the ’595 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We construe a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. At most, Jou teaches that it was known to interact with charts in a Windows environment or a browser window. Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. But Rostoker already teaches that a user could interact with a chart, via a graphical user interface in a web browser, while configuring the chart. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 67–75. Petitioner does not explain persuasively why a skilled artisan, per the teachings of Jou, would have made Rostoker’s published charts interactive. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that a skilled artisan “would have been motivated to incorporate Jou’s additional ‘interactive’ features into Rostoker’s system to enable users to better visualize and explore business data,” is not supported by his citations to Jou, at least as to whether a skilled artisan would have modified Rostoker’s published charts. Ex. 1003 ¶ 259 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 8, 9). Petitioner’s argument that Flash and Java could enable interactive features, at most, show that a skilled artisan could have implemented interactive features with Rostoker’s a reason why a skilled artisan would have made these modifications. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))). Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is likely to show that a skilled artisan would have incorporated Jou’s interactive features into Rostoker to make Rostoker’s published charts interactive.” slip op. at 35

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “client is required for display and usage of an existing QlikView document (.qvw file). While the QlikView Server is responsible for opening, hosting, and calculating the document, the clients are required for user interaction and presenting the document and its objects.” Ex. 1009, 123. Petitioner points to no persuasive evidence that a Java or AJAX object or client executing at a web browser is a website separate from the server that serves the object or client. Mr. Schmandt makes conclusory statements to that effect, but does not state the basis for his testimony. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 338–339. Thus, Mr. Schmandt’s testimony on this point is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Dr. Jones does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Thus, the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and support, and is entitled to little weight.”).” slip op. at 44

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,712,595
• Jiangsu Favored Nanotechnology Co., Ltd. v. P2i Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Cohen and Legein or Francesch and Legein; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’087 patent in June 20154 “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29); PO Resp. 13 (Patent Owner stating that it “does not dispute this characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also PO Sur-reply 1–2 (noting both parties’ agreement on the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the fully developed trial record, we determine that no claims need an express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Because of Patent Owner’s shifting definitions of the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan, it is unclear on the complete record what precise definition Patent Owner and Dr. Senkevitch are applying when arguing the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 40, 52–55, 60, 68, 74, 76, 77, 80–86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 100, 102–105, 108, 110, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 122, 124, 127–134. We, therefore, give Dr. Senkevitch’s testimony regarding the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art minimal weight, which leaves us with Patent Owner’s insufficiently supported arguments regarding the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13. Moreover, as Petitioner correctly points out, the ʼ087 patent expressly teaches that the precise conditions for forming a protective polymeric coating “will vary depending upon factors such as, without limitation, the nature of the monomer compound, the crosslinking agent, the substrate, as well as the desired properties of the coating” and that such “conditions can be determined using routine methods.” Ex. 1001 15:1–15:5 (emphasis added); Pet. Reply 17. Where the patent itself leaves to the judgment of an ordinarily skilled artisan the assessment of these factors to ascertain suitable conditions for forming the protective coating, we find persuasive Petitioner’s view that it would have been well within the level of ordinary skill to ascertain such suitable conditions.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Although the claims of the ʼ087 patent recite obtaining the protective cross-linked polymeric coating “by exposing the device or component to a plasma,” the field of endeavor analysis in an analogous art inquiry does not exclusively turn on the claims at issue, but rather takes account of the entirety of a patent’s disclosure. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the PTO must show adequate support for its findings on the scope of the field of endeavor in the application’s written description and claims” (emphasis added)); In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument that the field of endeavor was limited to a claimed “Internet terminal” when “the specification describes various communication media, including facsimile machines and email, as related to the invention.”). This is significant here because the ʼ087 patent discloses that “[t]he … invention relates to protective coatings” and specifically “relates to protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof, and methods of forming such coatings.” Ex. 1001, 1:14–17. Based on this disclosure, we find that the ʼ087 patent’s field of endeavor relates to “protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof” broadly, not just those formed on such devices or components via a plasma polymerization process as asserted by Patent Owner. Id. Although Cohen does not explicitly disclose that its crosslinked polymers constitute a “protective coating,” Cohen does disclose that its “copolymerizable mixture can be cast into films” (Ex. 1004, 2:61–62), that the polymerization can “effected in situ,” and that the polymers may be used in “numerous” electrical applications (id. at 5:17–25). Tr. 8:9–10:2, 27:2– 21; see Pet. Reply 5 (explaining how “Cohen described insulating polymers that could be applied as films and be used to protect substrates including cables and electrical coils.” (citing Ex. 1004, 2:60–63, 5:13–25)). These disclosures suggest strongly that Cohen’s crosslinked polymers––if cast into a film or formed in situ on an electrical device or component––would serve as a protective coating on that electrical device or component, even though Cohen does not expressly refer to its crosslinked polymers ipsis verbis as a “protective coating.” Thus, we find that Cohen is within the field of endeavor of the ʼ087 patent.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,041,087 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
• Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co. Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco N.V.Instituted
  PTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01439 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–11 and 13–21 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Uchida and Grimshaw.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition and the evidence of record, and in the absence of any argument or evidence to the contrary, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’951 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 and 13–21 of the ’951 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “We do not agree that the references relied upon in the Petition are cumulative of the Banerjee and Epstein references previously considered by the Office. For example, during reexamination Patent Owner represented to the Office that neither Banerjee nor Epstein discloses or suggests “an actuator on the peripheral device, wherein said actuator is arranged in a way to enable the user to carry out a user action by actuating the actuator to trigger the processing device to transfer said user selected arbitrary media content to said wireless transmitter through said port to transmit said user selected arbitrary media content to the display node via the communications network” . . . . [T]he skilled person would have appreciated that Banerjee is directed to the plug-and-play device having code that is automatically executed when the plug-and-play device is connected to the remote computer and the remote computer sending a request to share the screen by the master computer, whereas Epstein is directed to a puck that sends an intention to the switching device or wirelessly through the laptop. Ex. 2001, 124–125 (emphasis added). Here, however, Petitioner relies primarily on the structures and operations disclosed by Ono, Ichieda, and Uchida to demonstrate it would have been known to include an actuator on a wireless peripheral device to trigger the transfer of a user selected arbitrary media content. See Pet. 31–33, 57–59, 77. Importantly, unlike Epstein or Banerjee, each of those references discloses display systems that include wireless peripheral devices that have actuators that are at least related to facilitating the transfer of image data from a personal computer to a projector for display. See id. As such, we find that Ono, Ichieda, and Uchida present information that is neither substantively similar nor cumulative of that disclosed or suggested by Banerjee and Epstein. Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Master’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with . . . five years of work experience in computer science and embedded systems, or Master’s Degree in Computer Science with . . . five years of work experience in electrical and computer engineering and embedded systems. Additional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, as it is consistent with the ’951 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenInstituted

    “Patent Owner’s assertion fails to undermine Petitioner’s contention because it does not actually address Petitioner’s point, which is that a skilled artisan would recognize, when a user slides switch 140 back to the ‘OFF’ position to allow image transfer to resume, that action would trigger image data transmission of user selected arbitrary media content from wireless through the wireless communications network for display. Instead, Patent Owner’s argument only addresses when a user slides switch 140 to the “ON” position to stop image transmission. On this record, we determine that Petitioner’s evidence and analysis shows sufficiently that Uchida and Grimshaw disclose this last claim element of claim 1. 4. Conclusion After considering Petitioner’s evidence and argument, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 1 based on the combination of Uchida and Grimshaw (Ground 2). We also note that both parties rely on substantially the same evidence and arguments to address independent claims 9, 16, and 21. See Pet. 49–59 (claim 9), 64–66 (claim 16), 67 (claim 21); Prelim. Resp. 34–47 (claims 9, 16, 21). Therefore, our determination for claim 1 applies equally to claims 9, 16, and 21.” slip op. at 16

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,422,951
• Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Sta Group LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01292 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–21 are unpatentable over Ohel; claims 5 and 11–16 were not shown unpatentable over Ohel or Nigawara.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Williams, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and would have had approximately two years industry experience in networking or communication systems.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–58). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. PO Resp. 9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We have considered the parties’ citations to the specification and find examples that support Petitioner’s view that the term “entity” is broad enough to encompass dispatchers and individual users. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:52–4:5, 7:18–20, Fig. 1). However, we find no disclosure that redefines “entity” or excludes dispatchers and individual users from the category of “entity.” Patent Owner’s best examples (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:15–21, 3:59–62) are no more than non-limiting examples. On the complete record, we conclude that “entity” is broad enough to include dispatchers and individual users.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached

    “have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 7,324,802 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,324,802
• Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3

  Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Apple Inc. v. Proxsense LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Feb 26, 2025 · IPR2024-01486 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–17 because Apple did not justify a second petition, and denied its motion to join IPR2024-00775.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “challenges a subset of the claims of the ’730 patent based on the prior art references Ludtke and Kon, while the instant Petition challenges all 17 claims of the ’730 patent based on the prior art references Burger and Robinson. Id. at 2–3. According to Petitioner, these are “significantly different invalidity grounds.” Id. at 3. However, Petitioner does not explain why challenging the same patent with different invalidity grounds, without more, justifies instituting both petitions.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the ’730 patent. We also deny Petitioner’s Joinder Motion.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “IPR2024-00775. Joinder Mot. 1. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).” slip op. at 8

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 8,352,730

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.