• Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 22, 2015 · IPR2014-00963 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS The burden of showing that the Decision should be modified is on Petitioner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Figure 6 is a detailed diagram of a TDM FIFO receiver. Ex. 1006, 10:34– 35. “The TDM slot counter 200 and enable DP-RAM 202 operate as for the TDM FIFO driver 180-1 shown in FIG. 5,2 to identify when the receiver 212 is to be active.” Id. at 10:36–39. When DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 3 (or Figure 5) enables driver 208 to permit DP RAM Data 204 to assert data at a particular slot, the corresponding DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 6 enables receiver 212 to remove data from the bus at the same time slot. Id. at 10:36–43. As with the DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 3, the DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 6 does not determine which slot is associated with which DSP. It simply allows data to pass through during an enabled time slot to FIFO Data 214, which clocks data into the DSP associated with the enabled time slot. Id. In the Decision, we found that “Petitioner and Dr. Stark do not explain persuasively how simply reprogramming DP RAM Enable 202 would provide a different mapping between the data stored in DP RAM Data 204 and the DSPs.” Dec. 27. Simply reprogramming the corresponding DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 6 to coincide with the mapping of DP RAM Enable 202 of Figure 3 does not address this deficiency. The Decision did not discuss Figure 6 explicitly. Nevertheless, because Petitioner’s proposed re-programming of its DP RAM Enable 202 mirrored that of Figure 3’s DP RAM Enable 202, we implicitly rejected Petitioner’s arguments regarding” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “frequency hopping. Req. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1023, 33:6–13, 34:3–14, 43:12– 44:1). Petitioner did not make this argument in the Reply. Indeed, Petitioner made the opposite argument—criticizing the same testimony for stating that the ’480 patent does not disclose implementing the optional frequency hopping portion of GSM. Reply 5–6. We find that Dr. Wells has testified consistently that the portion of the ’480 patent quoted above “actually means . . . that it can support GSM, and then it characterizes GSM as a frequency hopping standard. It doesn’t say that it supports frequency hopping.” Ex. 1023, 34:10–14; accord Ex. 2007 ¶ 78. We continue to credit Dr. Wells’s testimony.” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “LLC, 805 F.3d 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Req. 2, 13–15. Belden addressed the Board’s denial of a motion to exclude reply expert testimony as beyond the proper scope of a reply, as informed by our Office Patent Trial Practice Guide.3 805 F.3d at 1077–78. In upholding the Board’s denial, the Federal Circuit noted that “[e]vidence admitted in rebuttal to respond to the patent owner’s criticisms will commonly confirm the prima facie case. That does not make it necessary to the prima facie case.” Id. at 1079. Petitioner argues that it should have been permitted to present responsive evidence confirming the prima facie case it presented in the Petition. Req. 13–14. Petitioner’s second theory for combining the ’480 patent and GSM 05.02, however, is not designed to support or confirm the prima facie case it presented in the Petition. As explained above (taking into account Petitioner’s Figure 6 argument), and in the Decision (at 25), the prima facie case presented in the Petition was that a skilled artisan would have modified the ’480 patent simply by reprogramming the DP RAM Enable 202 mappings. Petitioner’s second Reply argument was that a skilled artisan would have modified different components of the ’480 patent “without any modification to the memory (DP RAM Enable) mapping 3 “While replies can help crystalize issues for decision, a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply. Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute claim, and new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). used.” Req. 14 (quoting Ex. 1022 (Stark Reply Decl.) ¶ 43).4 This is an attempt to argue an entirely new prima facie case. Thus, our refusal to consider Petitioner’s second reply argument was consistent with Belden and the Office Trial Practice Guide.” slip op. at 9

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,952,408
• Valeo North America, Inc. / Valeo S.A. et al. v. Magna Electronics, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 21, 2015 · IPR2014-01208 · APJ Phillip J Kauffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19, 21–23, 25, 26, 28, 32–35, 37, 40, and 44–46 are unpatentable; claim 24 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “§ 42.64(c). Patent Owner seeks to expunge (vice exclude) the Broggi Declaration (Ex. 1033) because it was not timely served in response to Patent Owner’s first set of objections. See id. at 12; Opp. Reply 1–2.; Ex. 1036, 2; Ex. 2015; 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2). As the moving party, Patent Owner bears the burden of proof. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). We address first Exhibit 1033 and then the remaining exhibits in reverse chronological order of their filing. 1. Broggi Declaration (Ex. 1033) As explained above, the Broggi Declaration is not supplemental evidence because the objection to which it was served in response was not proper. Because the Broggi Declaration is not evidence, supplemental evidence, or supplemental information, we expunge it.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “4. Summary Broggi is a printed article titled “Multi-Resolution Vehicle Detection using Artificial Vision.” The first page makes reference to the 2004 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium held at the University of Parma in Parma Italy on June 14–17, 2004, and includes a copyright date of 2004 that is consistent with this information. Broggi is not marked with any limitations regarding dissemination. Dr. Frahm, as a person who has chaired an IEEE conference and regularly attended IEEE conferences, states that it is his experience that IEEE papers, such as Broggi, that are presented are made publically available at that conference as is indicated on the face of the paper. Although he did not attend the Symposium, the Senior Director of Publishing Technologies for IEEE, Mr. Grenier, states that IEEE records indicate that Broggi was published and presented as part of the proceedings on the date of the Symposium. The Office Manager of the Internet Archive, Mr. Butler, provides records that indicate that Broggi was posted to a public website no later than October 12, 2004.” slip op. at 34

  • Skill levelDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Frahm, provided testimony regarding the level of skill in the art. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 43–48. Although the level of skill in the art is not discussed in the Petition, Dr. Frahm acknowledged that obviousness is viewed from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, and applied that standard to his evaluations. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. That is, Dr. Frahm’s evaluations of the grounds of unpatentability based on obviousness is based on the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention, and this analysis is cited and explained in the Petition. address the merits of the level of skill in the art provided. The significance of the level of ordinary skill in the art is the role it plays in an obviousness analysis. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.”); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.”). Patent Owner’s assertion fails to address how the level of skill in the art impacted the obviousness analysis.” slip op. at 35

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response argued that we should deny the Petition based on 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 2, 7–12. We considered this argument and declined to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. See Dec. 12–15. Patent Owner’s current argument adds nothing to 30 We presume the second citation, which is to “§ 315(d)” is a typographical error and “§ 325(d)” was intended. the Petition on that basis.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 7,991,522 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,991,522
• Arris Group, Inc. v. Cirrex Systems, LLC.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2015 · IPR2014-01191 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 59, 61, 74, 76, 78, and 87 are unpatentable under § 103 over Stone and Takashashi, with Shioda, Ohmi, or Garmon applied to dependent claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Even under the rule of broadest reasonable interpretation, claim terms generally also are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “[an] education and/or experience in the field of optics” and “in the sub-field of thin-film filters.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). According to Petitioner, such person would have, at a minimum, (1) more than three years of relevant work experience and hold a basic Bachelor’s degree, or (2) less than three years of relevant work experience, but hold a more advanced degree, such as a Masters or a Ph.D. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, or offer an alternative definition. See generally, PO Resp. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Tomlinson, see Pet. 15–20, who testified that he is “an expert in the field of optical assemblies and . . . [has] been an expert in this field since prior to 1965.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 11. Dr. Tomlinson testified that he is “familiar with the knowledge and capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art” by virtue of his “work as a research assistant, scientist, researcher, supervisor of Ph.D. level researchers and engineers, and project manager.” Id. ¶ 23; see also id. ¶¶ 13–18 (wherein Dr. Tomlinson discusses the specifics of his work). We find Dr. Tomlinson is qualified to give an opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art in the field of optics, and adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this proceeding. Cf. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702, a person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art, but rather “qualified in the pertinent art.”).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We credit Dr. Tomlinson’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art: “would not [have] use[d] a beveled end face for applications where reducing reflected power is not necessary because a beveled end face requires additional machining and, as illustrated by Stone’s Figure 6, makes connection to other fibers more problematic” and “would generally use a perpendicular end face as shown in Stone Figure 1 unless a particular application called for a beveled end face” (Ex. 1020 ¶ 23). We also credit Dr. Tomlinson’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by Takashashi’s description of the benefits provided by a higher packing density, e.g., a reduction in the effect of ambient moisture on filter performance, to substitute one known method of thin film deposition – i.e., the “electron-beam deposition” of Stone – for another know method of thin film deposition – i.e. the reactive-ion plasma process of Takashashi – because the substitution would have yielded a favorable and predictable result. Namely, the combination of Stone and Takashashi would have yielded a thin-film filter with a higher packing density which was less susceptible to volumetric distortion of the film due to ambient moisture, as taught by Takashashi. Ex. 1003 ¶ 100.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence, but are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the filter inefficiencies created by ambient moisture could be addressed adequately by merely beveling Stone’s filter/fiber end face, i.e., we are not persuaded that the ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to increase filter packing density in Stone’s optical assembly. As pointed out by Petitioner, Stone discloses that optical fibers having multilayer thin-films deposited directly on their end faces have advantageous properties, regardless of whether the filters are deposited on perpendicular fiber end faces or on beveled fiber end faces. See Reply 10 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:60– 67). We further agree with Petitioner that Stone’s teaching of a preference for using a beveled end face is limited to “certain situations in which power would be reflected back into the waveguide in a problematic way” (id. at 10–11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 3:57–65)). Patent Owner has not argued, however, nor do we find any language in the claims or specification of the ’970 patent that supports a narrow reading of claim 59 as limited to an optical fiber assembly that is capable of use in an application in which reflected light is problematic. We credit Dr. Tomlinson’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art: “would not [have] use[d] a beveled end face for applications where reducing reflected power is not necessary because a beveled end face requires additional machining and, as illustrated by Stone’s Figure 6, makes connection to other fibers more problematic” and “would generally use a perpendicular end face as shown in Stone Figure 1 unless a particular application called for a beveled end face” (Ex. 1020 ¶ 23). We also credit Dr. Tomlinson’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated by Takashashi’s description of the benefits provided by a higher packing density, e.g., a reduction in the effect of ambient moisture on filter performance, to substitute one known method of thin film deposition – i.e., the “electron-beam deposition” of Stone – for another know method of thin film deposition – i.e. the reactive-ion plasma process of Takashashi – because the substitution would have yielded a favorable and predictable result. Namely, the combination of Stone and Takashashi would have yielded a thin-film filter with a higher packing density which was less susceptible to volumetric distortion of the film due to ambient moisture, as taught by Takashashi.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 6,222,970 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,222,970
• Toyota Motor Corporation v. Cellport Systems, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · IPR2015-01422 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all claims: claims 1–11 lacked a sufficient showing of the claimed network protocol converter structure, and claims 12–21 were denied as a second, delayed petition.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “network communication means” claim limitation. Claims 2, 6, and 8–11 depend from claim 1 and, thus, incorporate this limitation by way of dependence. A petition for inter partes review “must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Because the “first standard network communication means” is a means-plus-function claim limitation, Petitioner is required to show that both the recited function of this claim limitation and the corresponding structure or an equivalent are present in the applied references. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] challenger who seeks to demonstrate that a means-plus-function limitation was present in the prior art must prove that the corresponding structure—or an equivalent—was present in the prior art.”). The Petition does not identify any structure in the applied references that is allegedly identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure of the “first standard network communication means” claim limitation, i.e., network protocol converter 26. Petitioner’s entire argument concerning the “first standard network communication means” of claims 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7, is reproduced below: Cao discloses a “first standard network communications means” (i.e., wireless Proxim radio link with base station) that uses Internet Protocol for “presenting information for transmission over the airlink in a first format that is acceptable to a first standardized network that includes the airlink” (i.e., TCP/IP format). See Ex. 1019 at 6; see also supra Section VIII.A.4. Pet. 40. Though Petitioner alleges that the “wireless Proxim radio link with base station” of Cao performs the recited function of the “first standard network communication means,” Petitioner does not compare the structure of the “wireless Proxim radio link with base station” of Cao to the structure of network protocol converter 26. Cited Section VIII.A.4 of the Petition similarly does not address the structure of the “wireless Proxim radio link with base station” of Cao. See Pet. 18–20. Thus, the Petition does not identify any structure in the applied references that is allegedly identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure of the “first standard network communication means” claim limitation. For the foregoing reasons, the Petition fails to show persuasively that the “first standard network communication means” claim limitation is found in the references that Petitioner relies upon with respect to claims 1–11. Thus, the information presented in the Petition is not sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claims 1–11 are unpatentable. 3.” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied

    “The 4½ month delay between Petitioner’s first and second Petitions is problematic for several reasons. First, the timing of this Petition makes consolidation impractical, and, thus, frustrates the interest of judicial economy. The oral hearing in IPR2015-00633 is set for April 14, 2016. IPR2015-00633, Paper 12. Thus, it would not be practical to institute a second inter partes review and consolidate that proceeding with IPR2015- 00633. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). Assuming that Petitioner has shown here a reasonable likelihood that claims 12–21 are unpatentable, two separate trials would be necessary, requiring the parties, as well as the Board, to expend significant additional resources. Second, even if we were to institute a second inter partes review involving claims 12–21, Petitioner might be unable to “maintain” the second inter partes review upon issuance of a final written decision in IPR2015-00633. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) provides that any final written decision in IPR2015-00633 on the patentability of claims 12–21 would preclude Petitioner from “maintain[ing] a proceeding before the Office . . . on any ground that the petition raised or reasonably could have raised during [the earlier] post-grant review.” Thus, instituting a second inter partes review may result in a significant waste of time and resources for the parties and for Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (“This part shall be construed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”). Third, the timing of the second Petition raises the potential for gamesmanship. Petitioner did not file this Petition until one month after Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response in IPR2015-00633. The timing of the second Petition gave Petitioner the opportunity to preview the arguments set forth in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response in IPR2015- 00633. Petitioner also has not provided an adequate explanation for the 4½ month delay between the filing of this Petition and the filing of its previous Petition. Though Petitioner alleges that it was not aware of Cao “at the time it filed Petition No. 2015-00633” (Pet. 2), Petitioner does not state when and under what circumstances, during the 4½ months that preceded the filing of the current Petition, it became aware of Cao. Cao is a technical paper that was published by a major research university in the United States, and, thus, it is not clear on this record why Petitioner was unable to locate Cao at an earlier date. See Ex. 1019, 1. We further note that Petitioner has not identified any meaningful distinctions between the arguments regarding claims 12–21 in this Petition and the arguments Petitioner set forth in its earlier Petition. For instance, Petitioner does not explain in what ways the grounds asserted against claims 12–21 in this proceeding are superior to the grounds against the same claims and on the basis of which we instituted trial in IPR2015-00633. In view of the foregoing, we exercise our discretion and decline to” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Despite the rebuttable presumption, we do not construe “controller means” as a means-plus-function claim limitation. The presumption is overcome because the claim language does not link the “controller means” to a specific recited function. See York Prod., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Without a ‘means’ sufficiently connected to a recited function, the presumption in use of the word ‘means’ does not operate.”). In addition, the presumption is overcome when the claim specifies detailed structure sufficient to perform any recited or implicit function, e.g., controlling. See TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Sufficient structure exists when the claim language specifies the exact structure that performs the functions in question without need to resort to other portions of the specification or extrinsic evidence for an adequate understanding of the structure.”); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Each of independent claims 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 recites that the “controller means” includes the “processing means” and the “first standard network communication means.” As discussed herein, the processing means and the first standard network communication means are means-plus-function claim limitations that are defined in terms of specific structures disclosed in the Specification. Moreover, the recited “controller” is also a structure that is sufficient to perform any recited or implicit function of the “controller means.” The rebuttable presumption also is overcome because the controller means claim limitation is associated with these structures. Thus, in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language, and consistent with the Specification (see Ex. 1001, 2:66–3:29, 6:11–37, 8:1–45), for purposes of this Decision, we construe “controller means” as “a controller.” 3.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “is a means-plus-function limitation is overcome because this limitation lacks an associated function. Prelim. Resp. 13. We agree. The grammatical structure of the claim and, in particular, the fact that the functional language cited by Petitioner appears immediately after the recitation of the “processing means” evidences an intent to associate this functional language with the “processing means” claim limitation. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we construe “processing means” as a means-plus-function claim limitation having a recited function of “controlling the sending and receiving of said information using said wireless device between said first remote station and the vehicle.” “Structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as ‘corresponding structure’ if the intrinsic evidence clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352. The Specification of the ’074 Patent indicates that the sending and receiving of vehicle information between the remote station and the vehicle is controlled by processor 90 in conjunction with real time operating system 94. See Ex. 1001, 8:1–23, 13:54–56. Data memory 106 is not linked clearly to the recited function because data memory 106 merely stores information, and does not control the sending and receiving of information. See id. 8:45–58, 9:31–45, 10:58–64, 13:8–10, 23–26. Thus, the structure in the Specification that corresponds to the “processing means” is “processor 90 in conjunction with real time operating system 94.”” slip op. at 11

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 5,732,074
• NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01316 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that VESA P&D and VESA Flat Panel were publicly accessible printed publications, so claims 6–10 could not rely on them.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately whether or how the VESA documents were made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Lister, 583 F.3d at 1311. Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that “VESA is a well-known standards setting organization that promulgates standards relating to video in electronics.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58); id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 75). As such, we determine that Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the VESA documents are printed publications under § 102(b). See Lister, 583 F.3d at 1317 (burden is on the proponent to show the purported reference was publicly available). Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that either VESA P&D or VESA Flat Panel may be relied upon as prior art with respect to claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent.” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,804,724
• Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2014-00736 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Corning’s rehearing request, leaving intact dismissal of the petitions because Corning Inc. and Corning Optical Communications LLC were unnamed real parties in interest.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner

    “proof on Petitioner.” Req. Reh’g. 9–10. As noted in our Decision, we placed the ultimate burden of proof, i.e., burden of persuasion, on Patent Owner, not Petitioner. Dec. 13–14 (stating that if “a patent owner raises the RPI issue after institution and after filing a response to the petition, and in the form of a motion . . . , the burden of proof is on the patent owner as the proponent of the motion”). As explained recently by the Federal Circuit, the “burden of persuasion ‘is the ultimate burden assigned to a party who must prove something to a specified degree of certainty,’ such as by a preponderance of the evidence.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s burden of persuasion, however, once it came forward with sufficient evidence indicating that Petitioner should have identified Corning Inc. and Corning NC as RPIs (as cited and discussed in Patent Owner’s Motion), a “shifting burden” came into play, i.e., a “burden of production” on Petitioner. Id. at 1379. To address that burden of production, Petitioner had an opportunity to “produc[e] additional evidence and present[] persuasive argument based on new evidence or evidence already of record” in its Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss. Id. (citations omitted). It was in this capacity, only after determining that Patent Owner had made a sufficient showing regarding RPI, that we stated that Petitioner did not point “to credible evidence indicating that if interests of Corning Inc. and Petitioner ever diverged, Mr. Hulme and Mr. Vynalek, who are employees of Corning Inc. (Ex. 2100, 12– 14), would act in a matter contrary to Corning Inc.’s interests.” Dec. 22; Req. Reh’g. 9. Thereafter, based on all evidence before us, we concluded that Patent Owner had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Corning NC and Corning Inc. should have been named as RPIs in these proceedings. Dec. 13–14, 16, 25. Thus, Petitioner does not persuade us that we impermissibly placed the burden of persuasion on Petitioner.” slip op. at 5

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 6,676,446
• Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2014-00921 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 23, 24, 60, and 61 are unpatentable as obvious over Robertson and Ungerboeck; claims 23 and 60 were not shown anticipated by Palicot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “It is clear from the record evidence before us that, in the context of the ’783 patent, a connection between two components is not one that is considered properly as “direct” if there is an interleaver between those components. We understand that an “interleaver” is a structure that provides extensive reordering of data. For instance, record evidence characterizes a particular interleaver as a “pseudorandom block scrambler” that reads out data “in a specified permuted order.” Ex. 1009, 29. Indeed, the ’783 patent itself characterizes an interleaver as a “pseudo-random block scrambler” that operates to output data “in a specified (fixed) random order.” Ex. 1001, 5:57–61. In that respect, it is further understood from the ’783 patent that there are extensive considerations that go into the design of interleavers and the effect that a given interleaver has on the configuration, order, and characteristics of data. See id. at 9:53–13:54. Thus, the operations of an interleaver appear to constitute complex data reordering schemes where the “pseudorandom” scrambling of data is, at least in some cases, the desired goal. As noted above, in the context of an inter partes review, the Board construes claim terms based on their broadest reasonable construction that is consistent with the underlying specification. Here, with that guidance in mind, we do not discern that Intellectual Ventures’s position that the claim terms in question should be construed narrowly to prohibit any intervening structure that performs any type of operation that may be regarded as manipulating data or changing the order of data in some aspect, regardless of the nature or extent of the data reordering. To that end, while the reordering operations provided by an interleaver are not encompassed by “directly” connecting elements, we are not satisfied that Intellectual Ventures has provided a suitable evidentiary basis for its position that any intervening data reordering, of any kind, is the benchmark for evaluating whether structures are directly connected to one another. It also is clear from the Specification of the ’783 patent, and as we observed in our Decision instituting trial (Inst. Dec. 12–13), that a direct connection does not prohibit some intervening structures, such as the intervening presence of a switch. In considering the totality of the record before us, we do not discern that there is cause to deviate from the construction we initially adopted for “directly coupled”/“signal directly from” as a part of the Decision to institute trial. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we maintain the understanding that components that are “directly” coupled to one another, or which receive signals “directly” from one another, excludes the presence of an interleaver between those components, but does not prohibit any and all intervening structures, such as a switch.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Thus, the declarants are largely in agreement as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, but for a slight difference of opinion as to the extent of education. While Mr. Lanning and Dr. Xiong take the view that a person of ordinary skill “would have at least a Bachelors or Masters level college degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Computer Engineering or equivalent training and experience,” Dr. Cimini opines that only a Bachelor’s degree would be insufficient. Dr. Cimini advanced that opinion on the theory that one with only a Bachelor’s degree would lack an appropriate “mathematical foundation.” On the record before us, it is not apparent that the possession of a Master’s degree as compared with possession of a Bachelor’s degree establishes a dividing line between a person who is of ordinary skill in the art, and a person who is not. Dr. Cimini does not explain persuasively why a person with a Bachelor’s degree in the noted areas, coupled for instance, with the noted “academic or industry experience” would lack the requisite “mathematical foundation.” To that end, we are cognizant of the level of ordinary skill to which all declarants have testified, but do not understand the record as establishing that a Master’s degree, to the exclusion of other equivalent experience, is a strict requirement of a skilled artisan in the pertinent field.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “contends that Robertson discloses all the features of claims 23 and 60 (Pet. 49–54) with the exception of those features directed to “multilevel modulation” (id. at 53). In that regard, Ericsson contends that Robertson is directed to “binary modulation” rather than “multilevel modulation,” but points to Ungerboeck as disclosing multilevel modulation. Id. Referencing the declaration testimony of Mr. Mark Lanning (Ex. 1003), Ericsson contends the following: As noted by Mr. Lanning, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine Robertson and Ungerboeck to replace the binary modulation in Roberton’s coding system with multilevel modulation taught by Ungerboeck because it would yield the predictable result–that more data bits correspond to a modulated symbol, thereby enhancing bandwidth efficiency. Id. at 53–54. To that end, we understand that Ericsson proposes, and Mr. Lanning testifies (Ex. 1003 ¶ 230), that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to substitute Ungerboeck’s multilevel 8-PSK modulator for Robertson’s binary modulator so as to enhance bandwidth efficiency.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “ordinary skill in the art, but for a slight difference of opinion as to the extent of education. While Mr. Lanning and Dr. Xiong take the view that a person of ordinary skill “would have at least a Bachelors or Masters level college degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Computer Engineering or equivalent training and experience,” Dr. Cimini opines that only a Bachelor’s degree would be insufficient. Dr. Cimini advanced that opinion on the theory that one with only a Bachelor’s degree would lack an appropriate “mathematical foundation.” On the record before us, it is not apparent that the possession of a Master’s degree as compared with possession of a Bachelor’s degree establishes a dividing line between a person who is of ordinary skill in the art, and a person who is not. Dr. Cimini does not explain persuasively why a person with a Bachelor’s degree in the noted areas, coupled for instance, with the noted “academic or industry experience” would lack the requisite “mathematical foundation.” To that end, we are cognizant of the level of ordinary skill to which all declarants have testified, but do not understand the record as establishing that a Master’s degree, to the exclusion of other equivalent experience, is a strict requirement of a skilled artisan in the pertinent field.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,023,783 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,023,783
• Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2014-00440 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Corning’s rehearing request, leaving in place dismissal of the petitions, termination of the reviews, and vacatur of the institution decisions for failure to identify all RPIs.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner

    “Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s burden of persuasion, however, once it came forward with sufficient evidence indicating that Petitioner should have identified Corning Inc. and Corning NC as RPIs (as cited and discussed in Patent Owner’s Motion), a “shifting burden” came into play, i.e., a “burden of production” on Petitioner. Id. at 1379. To address that burden of production, Petitioner had an opportunity to “produc[e] additional evidence and present[] persuasive argument based on new evidence or evidence already of record” in its Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss. Id. (citations omitted). It was in this capacity, only after determining that Patent Owner had made a sufficient showing regarding RPI, that we stated that Petitioner did not point “to credible evidence indicating that if interests of Corning Inc. and Petitioner ever diverged, Mr. Hulme and Mr. Vynalek, who are employees of Corning Inc. (Ex. 2100, 12– 14), would act in a matter contrary to Corning Inc.’s interests.” Dec. 22; Req. Reh’g. 9. Thereafter, based on all evidence before us, we concluded that Patent Owner had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Corning NC and Corning Inc. should have been named as RPIs in these proceedings. Dec. 13–14, 16, 25. Thus, Petitioner does not persuade us that we impermissibly placed the burden of persuasion on Petitioner.” slip op. at 5

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsDenied

    “sufficient “good cause” exists to waive our rules to allow correction of the RPIs identified in the Petitions without a loss of original filing dates. Dec. 24–25 (citing Reflectix, Inc. v. Promethean Insulation Tech. LLC, Case IPR2015-00039, slip op. at 13–18 (PTAB April 24, 2015) (Paper 18)). Petitioner’s incorrect determination of RPIs in its Petition, as argued in its Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss and its Request now, “did not arise out of some mistake of fact.” Reflectix, Case IPR2015-00039, slip. op at 14 (Paper 18). Rather, Petitioner asserted that it “designated itself as the only RPI in good faith at the time the Petitions were filed, based on the guidance in the [Trial Practice Guide] before the Board’s RPI decisions cited in the Decision even existed.” Req. Reh’g. 12, 14–15. In other words, Petitioner “misunderstood the law as it applies to the RPI determination.” Reflectix, Case IPR2015-00039, slip. op at 14 (Paper 18). We agree with our colleagues in Reflectix that the Trial Practice Guide provides notable guidance, “as it devotes over a page of the Federal Register to discussing RPI and privity, and cites to precedent including the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Sturgell.” Id. at 14–15 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,759 (citing 553 U.S. 880 (2008)). Furthermore, a number of relevant Board decisions concerning RPI had issued by March 2, 2015, when we authorized Patent Owner to file its Motion for Additional Discovery regarding whether Corning Inc. and Corning NC should have been listed as RPIs. Paper 31. Petitioner did not request authorization to correct its Petitions thereafter, but instead suggested the possibility of correction in its Opposition to Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss. Opp. 1, 22, 23, 25. Our determination that Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was timely did not undercut the significance of Petitioner’s actions here. Req. Reh’g. 14–15. We are not persuaded, given the facts of this case, that Petitioner’s failure to name all RPIs in its Petitions, and its failure to request authorization to correct its Petitions regarding RPIs during trial, constitute a type of “error” that warrants permitting correction at this stage, without altering filing dates of the Petitions, even assuming no evidence of bad faith by Petitioner exists. Req. Reh’g. 15, 14. In addition, regardless of whether Petitioner “erred” when preparing its Petitions, Petitioner continued to maintain strongly its position regarding RPIs, even after it had access to all facts and evidence before us when we issued our Decision, thereby indicating that its position was not an “error” on Petitioner’s part, but rather a strategic position. As stated in 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) (emphasis added), a petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if— . . . the petition identifies all real parties in interest.” In view of Petitioner’s actions here, we are not persuaded that we abused our discretion in determining the appropriate remedy here was to grant Patent Owner’s Motions to Dismiss, terminate the instant proceedings, and vacate our Decisions on Institution.” slip op. at 12

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 8,597,041
• NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01315 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Lai qualified as prior art, defeating both asserted grounds for claims 1, 3, and 26–29.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “Lai issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 10/236,794, which was filed on September 6, 2002 and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/328,284, filed on October 9, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “the Lai Provisional”). Ex. 1003, [21], [22], [60], 1:8–12. Because Lai’s filing date postdates the effective filing date of the ’602 patent, Lai must be entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date to qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Lai is entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date if the disclosure of the Lai Provisional supports the claimed subject matter of Lai in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.1 See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.”).” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther

    “In a conference call with the parties, the panel authorized Petitioner to submit a five-page, non-argumentative claim chart showing how the claims of a reference patent asserted by Petitioner are supported by a provisional application. Paper 9, 3. The panel also authorized Patent Owner to file a five-page response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Id. at 4. Petitioner filed a claim chart. Paper 8. Paper 8 included two pages of text in addition to the five-page claim chart. Because these two additional pages are not in compliance with our Order (see Paper 9), we have considered the claim chart only and none of the arguments presented in the additional two pages. Patent Owner subsequently filed a response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2

  § 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,819,602
• Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2014-01149 · APJ William A Capp · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 18–22 and 43–44, 46–49 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 25–26, 55–59, and 62–63 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “The complete exclusion of Dr. Cimini’s testimony is not warranted or necessary here. Intellectual Ventures argues that the instant dispute concerning Dr. Cimini’s testimony should not affect the admissibility of his opinion, but merely the weight the Board accords his opinion. Paper 49, 12. This is the path we choose to follow. By shielding Dr. Cimini from the Robertson CMS reference so that he did not address it in his declaration and was unprepared to testify about it at this deposition, Intellectual Ventures deprived itself of an opportunity to respond to Ericsson’s case. Accordingly, we DENY Ericsson’s motion to exclude 60–65, 79, 80, and 93 of Dr. Cimini’s declaration testimony (Ex. 2009), but discount the weight to be given such testimony in light of the foregoing discussion.” slip op. at 9

  • Adverse judgmentDenied

    “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, a party may obtain termination of a proceeding by requesting entry of adverse judgment. However, we do not interpret Ericsson’s request as a request for entry of adverse judgment. To the contrary, we view Ericsson’s motion as an effort to prevent entry of an adverse judgment under circumstances where Ericsson reserves the right to challenge the patentability of claims 55–59, in this or another forum. Finally, Ericsson relies on our extraordinary and discretionary powers under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a) as a basis for grant of the relief sought. In denying Ericsson’s previous motion to correct the petition, we considered whether it was an appropriate exercise of our extraordinary powers to allow Ericsson to correct its petition. Paper 31, 14–15. We concluded that it was not. Id. Many of the same considerations that informed our decision to deny Ericsson’s motion to correct its petition also militate against a grant of relief in the instant situation.” slip op. at 20

  • BurdenFwd mixedNot shown unpatentable

    “Ericsson concedes that the mistake in its Petition with respect to claims 55–59 is a “fatal flaw” and, consequently, it wants to remove those claims from the proceeding. Tr. 74:3–8, a copy/paste error that originated in Mr. Lanning’s Declaration resulted in a deficient analysis of independent claims 55 and its dependent claims 56–59 . . . [a]t this point in the trial, both Patent Owner and Petitioner agree that the Petition is defective with respect to claim 55–59. Paper 52, 5–6. In view of the foregoing, we find that Ericsson has failed to carry its burden of proof with respect to the unpatentability of independent claim 55 and claims 56–59 that depend therefrom.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision to Institute, we construed “systematic convolutional encoder” on a preliminary basis, as an encoder that may output both encoded data and also original data (or its equivalent). In the Decision to Institute, we criticized Ericsson’s proposed construction because it focused on what it means for a coding system to be systematic to the exclusion of how the adjective “convolutional” also modifies the word “encoder.” DI 8–9. Similarly, we criticized Intellectual Ventures’s proposed construction because it focused on what it means for a coding system to be “convolutional,” to the exclusion of what it means to be “systematic.” Id. at 9. In the Decision to Institute, we admonished the parties to give 18 Claim 18 claims a “systematic recursive convolutional encoder.” Ex. 1001, 25:49. 19 Claim 43 is a method claim that claims “systematic convolutional encoded output elements.” Ex. 1001, 29:57. 20 Claim 55 is a method claim that claims “systematic convolutional encoded intermediate output elements.” Ex. 1001, 30:61–62. 21 Claim 62 is a method claim that claims “systematic convolutional encoded output elements.” Ex. 1001, 31:60–61. attention to our points of criticism in their respective Patent Owner’s Response and Petitioner’s Reply. Id. We instituted a trial on less than all challenged claims. DI. In particular, we did not institute a trial on claim 6. DI 14. In its Patent Owner’s Response, Intellectual Ventures indicated that the Board need not construe this term to resolve the instituted grounds. PO Resp. 13. In its Petitioner’s Reply, Ericsson simply states that it agrees with the Board’s claim construction in the Decision to Institute. Reply 6. The parties’ respective positions, as developed in Intellectual Ventures’s Patent Owner’s Response and Ericsson’s Reply do not rely on competing constructions of this term. Accordingly, we do not modify the construction of this term as set forth in our Decision to Institute. 2. “coded output elements” - “encoded output elements” (Claims 18, 19,” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 6,023,783 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,023,783

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.