- Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of the asserted references, including Shin and Aoyama and Shimomura and Iwase.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther
“1 SoundClear also filed a Contingent Motion to Amend that proposed to replace originally challenged claim 5 of the ’675 patent with proposed substitute claim 8. Paper 21. We, however, granted SoundClear’s request to withdraw its Contingent Motion to Amend and, as a result, the Contingent Motion to Amend will no longer be considered in this proceeding. Paper 30.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“combination because (1) configuring Shin’s processor 120 accordingly “would have been trivial, involving straightforward changes to enhance the processor’s approach to simplifying and abbreviating its output”; and (2) this approach was well-known as evidenced by Ha’s disclosure of replacing “team meeting” and “date” with “schedules” based on the user’s environment.6 Id. at 27–28 (first quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 97, then quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 98) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011, Fig. 7).” slip op. at 33
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“4. Dr. Stern’s Testimony is Reliable In its Patent Owner Response, SoundClear contends that “Dr. Stern’s” slip op. at 125
Patent outcomesUS 11,244,675 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,244,675 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com Services LLC et al. v. Soundclear Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,069,337 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed
“construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,602,448 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6–10, 14–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable; claims 4–5, 11–13, and 19–21 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’690 patent does not limit the term “probe” to channel assessment. Pet. Reply 2–4. Reviewing the intrinsic evidence, the “Technical Field” of the ’690 patent states that “some embodiments relate to channel assessment probes,” implying others do not. Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. The ’690 patent further states that “receiver determined probes may be used in a variety of applications” including to “discover hidden nodes” and “off-site network diagnosis.” Id. at 2:20–27. In addition, the ’690 patent states that probes may be used for “network maintenance procedures,” to “replicate a potential problem, reach or discover a distant or previously undetected node on the network, or assist with network admissions procedures.” Id. at 4:25–38. Turning to the claims of the ’690 patent, the evidence of record does not establish that the independent claims recite anything unique or specific to channel assessment (although their scope covers that purpose). Furthermore, dependent claim 7 of the ’690 patent recites that the “probe” is used to diagnose a network problem, and dependent claim 13 recites that the “probe” is used to identify a hidden node. Restricting the independent claims to probes used solely for channel assessment would be contradictory to these dependent claims. Littlefuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (construction of term in independent claims should not render dependent claims superfluous or lacking scope).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that a “physical layer probe” is “a probe that relates to the physical layer.” The term does not appear per se in the specification of the ’960 patent, nor in the prosecution history, but only in claims 9, 17, and 19. However, the term “physical layer” is well-known and is the first layer in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network model. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 35–40, 69; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 49–50. The physical layer is used to transmit digital bits over a network, and defines the timing, mechanical, and physical network characteristics required for transmitting the data bits. Hence, a “physical layer probe” is a probe that relates to the physical layer. We need not, and do not, construe the term further to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Realtime, Vivid Techs., supra. Having decided proper constructions for the disputed terms, we proceed in our analysis to consider the parties’ arguments concerning the challenge grounds. In the following sections, we apply the plain meaning of the claim terms, and as necessary, specify what the plain meanings are.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: A POSITA8 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level because it is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’690 patent and the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (citing factors to consider when determining level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 25
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Hence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by preponderant evidence that the Ranging Request (“probe request”) message includes CID and SS MAC address and other parameters (“first plurality of parameters”) which at least specify the CID (“content payload of the probe”) and the SS MAC address (“second node”) of the Ranging Response.12 We thus proceed to consider Petitioner’s contentions for the remaining limitations of claim 1, which are undisputed, and determine that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE-802.16.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,284,690 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - PLR Worldwide Sales Ltd. v. Flip Phone Games, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00209 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 and 13–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Ho and Aoki; claims 12 and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Jiau and Aoki or Jiau and Kim.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues for a slightly different level of ordinary skill in the art: “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with one to two years of experience developing or programming video games or video game systems, or similar types of computer systems.” PO Resp. 2 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). Patent Owner further argues that the person having ordinary skill in the art “may have additional education that might substitute for some of the experience, and additional experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 29). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner’s proposal does not require experience in programming video games. Id. at 3. However, Patent Owner states, “[t]his difference does not materially affect the analysis presented below.” Id. We see very little difference between the parties’ respective proposals. We adopt Patent Owner’s marginally more specific proposal. Additionally, because we would reach the same conclusions under Petitioner’s proposal, we agree with Patent Owner that this does not affect our analysis.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of “downloading” excludes “real-time fetching of data by a client from a server system.” PO Resp. 34; see also PO Sur-reply 16–17; Tr. 32:22–34:7. Because we need not expressly construe any claim terms, we do not construe any terms of the ’662 patent. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“date of the ’662 patent, Ho is not a “printed publication” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). PO Resp. 30–33; PO Sur-reply 15–16. The Federal Circuit has rejected this argument, holding that: a published patent application is, by its literal terms, a “printed publication.” So, when § 311(b) permits IPR challenges based upon “prior art . . . printed publications,” it includes within its literal scope challenges based upon a published patent application. And, by virtue of § 102(e)(1), a published patent application—this specific type of “printed publication”—is deemed prior art as of its filing date. Therefore, the plain language of §§ 311(b) and 102(e)(1) permits IPR challenges based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Thus, Petitioner asserts permissible grounds of unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) by arguing that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) on the basis of Ho, which is a prior art printed publication, and either Aoki or Kim.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“A person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Aoki’s teaching of using user-identification information as part of the request for an advertisement with Ho’s system, which also teaches a client device sending information to a server to request hot spot information, such as advertisements. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–107, 111, 114, 117. Because both Ho and Aoki are directed to improvements in game design and monetization from using advertisements (id. ¶ 106; Ex. 1004, 1:26–28; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8), a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked at both Ho and Aoki and combined the relevant features with a reasonable expectation of success (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 106, 117). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that using Aoki’s teaching of sending user-identification information with Ho, which includes sending information with a request for information relating to interactive information elements (hot spots), allows for targeted advertisements, which was a known advantage in advertising. Id. ¶ 117; Ex. 10089 ¶¶ 54–55 (describing advantages of targeted advertising).” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,427,662 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,427,662 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Sta Group LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01292 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 17–21 are unpatentable over Ohel; claims 5 and 11–16 were not shown unpatentable over Ohel or Nigawara.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Williams, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar field, and would have had approximately two years industry experience in networking or communication systems.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–58). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. PO Resp. 9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. On the complete record, we adopt this level of skill.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We have considered the parties’ citations to the specification and find examples that support Petitioner’s view that the term “entity” is broad enough to encompass dispatchers and individual users. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:52–4:5, 7:18–20, Fig. 1). However, we find no disclosure that redefines “entity” or excludes dispatchers and individual users from the category of “entity.” Patent Owner’s best examples (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:15–21, 3:59–62) are no more than non-limiting examples. On the complete record, we conclude that “entity” is broad enough to include dispatchers and individual users.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot reached
“have used a queue with Ohel’s system. This is insufficient because it does not provide evidence of a reason why a skilled artisan would have implemented Ohel’s system with a queue. See Auris Health, Inc. v. Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., 32 F.4th 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The motivation-to-combine inquiry asks whether a skilled artisan ‘not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations . . . of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.’” (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk- Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted))).” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 7,324,802 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,324,802 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00924 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Zhao; claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd mixedMixed
“Decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to the patentability of claims 1–16 of the ’980 patent. We determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable, and Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyOther
“being present in another image or comparing that probability to a detection threshold.”). Dr. Saber was consistent with this testimony on cross-examination. Ex. 1051, 167–251. When I weigh the evidence, I find it to be one-sided, with all of the expert testimony weighing against Petitioner or avoiding the issue altogether. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Zhao teaches claim limitation 1e. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct about how Zhao’s RCR algorithm works, all that shows is that the detection of object presence in a previous image can be used to disambiguate segments (e.g., limbs) of an already detected object (e.g., a person), not that it can be used to detect the object in the image in the first place, as required by the claim language. For this additional reason, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden.” slip op. at 84
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of “obviousness” are primarily assertions of how a POSITA would have understood Zhao’s disclosures. For example, with regard to claim 1, Petitioner repeatedly asserts how “a POSITA would have understood Zhao” (Pet. 13, 18, 21, 27) and for each limitation contends that Zhao “disclosed or at least rendered obvious” (or a variation thereof) the limitation (id. at 13– 15, 17–18, 21, 23, 25–27). We will, accordingly, address these “obviousness” contentions when addressing the respective limitations.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,436,980 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,436,980 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 1, 2024 · IPR2022-00279 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 were not shown unpatentable over either Kovatch and Burrows or Wise and Burrows because the combinations did not teach the claimed polling and rank-decrease limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Mr. Lipoff, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience with voice interfaces and information processing,” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for less experience, and vice versa.” 5 The complete record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. same proposal. PO Resp. 1. On the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art and adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“From this description in Burrows, it is clear that index 70 has no sense of ranking, and that Burrows’ system overall has no sense of ranking prior to a query; thus, adding or deleting a webpage from the index does not change a ranking that does not yet exist. It is also clear that, if a page is flagged as deleted, it will be ignored by the query module when the query module queries the index and ranks the identified qualified pages. Id. at 15:12–16, 15:21–22. The webpage’s rank is not decreased, as the webpage is never ranked in the first place. As Mr. Occhiogrosso testifies: web page. A “polled web site” page cannot be ranked in the Burrows system because the Burrows ranking is performed only after a user query is performed. Only at that time can the Burrows system provide a ranked list (of qualified webpages) for presentation to the user. As Burrows discloses, the Automated Web Browser is robotic in nature and not associated with the queries of users. Ex. 2009 ¶ 181. Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony on this point is consistent with Burrows’ description, credible, and entitled to substantial weight. We have considered Mr. Lipoff’s testimony that a skilled artisan “would have understood that combining Burrows’s polling mechanism receiving no response into Kovatch would decrease the entries’ ranking or placement in Kovatch’s destination tree in order to further limit the pages that may not be of interest to the user.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:38–46). That testimony, however, is conclusory and lacks persuasive reasoning. Moreover, the passage in Burrows to which it cites (Ex. 1006, 1:38–46) does not teach or suggest decreasing the ranking of webpages. Thus, Mr. Lipoff’s testimony on this point lacks credibility and is entitled to little weight. Upon consideration of the complete record, we are not persuaded that Kovatch and Burrows teach claim limitations 1H and 2H.” slip op. at 22
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“In the Reply, Petitioner argues that “the type of database record that Burrows polls and ranks makes no difference for this teaching; processing costs and cycles, equating to processing time, are a potential issue any time computer processing occurs.” Reply 20 (citing Ex. 1061 ¶ 24). Mr. Lipoff repeats this statement in his testimony without identifying the basis for it, rendering that testimony of little value. Ex. 1061 ¶ 24. In any case, it appears that Petitioner and Mr. Lippoff are arguing that a general notion of processing cost any time computer processing occurs would lead a skilled artisan to decrease a webpage’s rank based on response time. This is a new argument, not presented in the Petition, and is therefore forfeited and will not be considered. In any case, Petitioner has not supported this new argument with persuasive evidence.” slip op. at 31
- BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable
“In sum, for several reasons, Petitioner has not shown that Kovatch and Burrows teach claim limitations 1H–1J and 2H–2J and, therefore, Petitioner has not shown that Kovatch and Burrows teach each limitation of claims 1 and 2. 4. Conclusion of Nonobviousness As explained above, Petitioner has failed to show that the combination of Kovatch and Burrows teaches each limitation of claims 1 and 2. Upon consideration of all the evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 2 would have been obvious over Kovatch and Burrows.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 6,721,705 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,721,705 - Apple Inc. / Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2023-00577 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over either Robertson, Gralla, and Gettman or Sauve and Tsuda; claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“1. “3D space” and “two-dimensional (2D) space” As we stated in the Institution Decision, at page 20, the parties agree” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. Remaining claim terms Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“predictably improved Sauve’s quick pick interface, and would have promoted space efficiency and conveyed order more clearly. Id. at 59–60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 159). Petitioner further argues that the combination would have exploited spatial memory and more efficient use of screen space and, thus, would have been a differentiator among competing web browsers. Id. at 60–61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 160–162). Petitioner argues that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination because GUIs, web browsers, and simulated 3D environments were all well-known technologies that had been demonstrated successfully in the real world. Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 163). Dr. Fuchs’ testimony has rational underpinning, is logical and well-reasoned, and, accordingly, we give it substantial weight.” slip op. at 64
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“reference teaches away “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. We have considered the portions of Sauve and Tsuda cited by Patent Owner and Dr. Schaefer, and find nothing that would discourage or lead in a direction divergent from the path taken by the inventor. Other than repeating Patent Owner’s argument that Sauve and Tsuda provide drastically different solutions for moving from one active window to another, Dr. Schaefer does not explain why he concludes that the solutions teach away from one another or point to evidence to support that conclusion. Ex. 2014 ¶¶ 225–227.” slip op. at 65
Patent outcomesUS 8,881,048 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,881,048
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.