- Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Emerachem Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2016 · IPR2014-01555 · APJ Fred E Mckelvey · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–2, 7–12, 14–17, 19, 21–24, and 31–42 are unpatentable based on the grounds sustained in the final written decision.
RulingsFinal written decision- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Unlike Corning, the inherency theory matured during cross- examination of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Crocker. Ultimately, in our view, Dr. Crocker agreed that no platinum migrated to the alkali metal layer—based on an analysis with a correct “0.018” number. The Reply evidence, consistent with Dr. Crocker’s testimony, agreed that a correct number is “0.018” and on that basis, Petitioner’s witness agreed with Dr. Crocker. Further, unlike Corning, a whole new theory of anticipation did not arise in the first instance with the Reply; rather, it was essentially developed during cross-examination of Patent Owner’s witness.” slip op. at 74
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“The fact that evidence is filed with a reply does not mean the evidence is per se inadmissible. The exhibits relate to the issue of whether there is a typographical error in Example 1 of Hoekstra, i.e., is “2.018” a typographical error which should be “0.018.” In presenting the Petition, Petitioner’s witness Dr. Farrauto explained why he felt Hoekstra’s Example 1 anticipates claim 1 of the ʼ558 patent. Dr. Crocker, Patent Owner’s witness, disagreed with Dr. Farrauto’s explanation.” slip op. at 73
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“While the matter of assigning the weight to be given to the testimony of the two witnesses in this case is a close call, based on the direct and crossexamination testimony with respect to Kinoshita and its Example 3, and to the extent that there is a conflict between Dr. Crocker’s testimony and that of Dr. Farrauto, we credit the testimony of Dr. Crocker over that of Dr. Farrauto. However, even if one were to find the testimony of Dr. Crocker and Dr. Farrauto evenly balanced, then a preponderance of the evidence on inherency does not emerge. Under those circumstances, the party with the burden of proof cannot be said to have proved its case. See Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1580 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (where a party is under a burden to establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence and where the evidence is so evenly balanced that no preponderance emerges, the party having the burden of persuasion necessarily loses). We are also concerned that Example 3 does not describe enough detail to indicate clearly whether there is enough potassium to cover the platinumimpregnated alumina. Ex. 2002 ¶ 32.” slip op. at 51
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We hold that “intimately and entirely coated” mean exactly what it says. In other words, it means the embodiment shown in Figs. 1a through 1c of the ʼ558 patent drawings and associated discussion in the written description portion of the specification. We appreciate why both parties would prefer a broader construction, i.e., “intimately and entirely coated” means (1) coated with a monolayer where catalytic action would occur through diffusion (our construction) as well as (2) direct contact with the combustion gas without diffusion. Petitioner would favor a broader construction because Takeshima anticipates a direct contact embodiment. Patent Owner would favor a broader construction because more “material” might infringe claim 1. Takeshima Figs. 5(A) and 5(B) describe an embodiment where the exhaust gas directly contacts the catalyst. A direct contact embodiment does not fall within the scope of claim 1 of the ʼ558 patent. Accordingly, Takeshima does not describe the “intimately and entirely coated” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 5,451,558 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,451,558 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Emerachem Holdings, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 22, 2016 · IPR2014-01557 · APJ Fred E Mckelvey · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, and 39 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 41, 45, 46, and 49 were not shown unpatentable because the combinations did not disclose an indicator reporting the …
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Farrauto noted that MECA describes testing using a 90 mm Pallflex filter. Ex. 2009, page 29:4–page 30:20. His uncontradicted cross-examination supports a finding that one skilled in the art (1) knows the nature of the Pallflex filter and (2) would have been able to use the Pallflex filter in the diesel engine Otake environment. Opposing Dr. Farrauto’s testimony, all we have is an argument by counsel for Patent Owner. Paper 21, pages 8–9. As MECA shows, use of a DPF-A filter with a catalyst coated directly on the filter” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. Claim 1 Claim 1 is not as narrow as Patent Owner would have us believe. It covers reducing “particulate matter” (i.e., “small particles of solid or liquid suspended in a gas”). These are precisely the “particulate matters” described by MECA. See Ex. 1008A, Figure 6, renumbered page 15—discussed in more detail above.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Farrauto noted that MECA describes testing using a 90 mm Pallflex filter. Ex. 2009, page 29:4–page 30:20. His uncontradicted cross-examination supports a finding that one skilled in the art (1) knows the nature of the Pallflex filter and (2) would have been able to use the Pallflex filter in the diesel engine Otake environment. Opposing Dr. Farrauto’s testimony, all we have is an argument by counsel for Patent Owner. Paper 21, pages 8–9. As MECA shows, use of a DPF-A filter with a catalyst coated directly on the filter reduced particulate matter to very low levels. Ex. 1008A, renumbered page 15, Figure 6. Patent Owner is using a known filter for its intended purpose to obtain an expected result—reduction in particular matter.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“3. Conclusion We hold that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner has not argued the separate patentability of dependent claims 5, 9, and 39. Accordingly, those claims fall with claim 1. We hold that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 41 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,951,346 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,951,346 - Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. v. Emerachem Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2015 · IPR2014-01554 · APJ Fred E Mckelvey · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 11 are unpatentable because Joy, Tauster, and Rieck each anticipate them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“On the record before us, we find that Dr. Farrauto is qualified to testify on the subject matter involved and to offer scientific opinions concerning that subject matter. Ex. 1007A ¶ 1–6. His testimony is consistent with the disclosures of the three references upon which his scientific opinions are based.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“C. Anticipation To establish anticipation, a party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a prior art reference expressly or inherently describes each claim limitation arranged as in the claim said to be anticipated. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008 ).” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 6,037,307 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,037,307 - Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00411 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 and 30–58 of the ’813 patent and claims 1–7 and 9–20 of the ’496 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the listed prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“construction of “leak” deviates from the ordinary meaning of the term. PO Resp. 31–33. LSI relies on extrinsic evidence to supports its contention that the ordinary meaning of “leak” as recited in the ’813 and ’496 patents is limited to unintended or fugitive emissions. PO Resp. 33. LSI’s contention fails to recognize and distinguish the express teaching that chemicals of interest from flares, exhausts, vents or blow off valves are expressly described as uses of the claimed invention. Ex. 1001, 12:17–25. Indeed, one portion of the specification that LSI relies on to distinguish known versus unknown emissions, indicates that the invention is used to survey known emissions of gas from vents. Ex. 1001, 20:28–31; see PO Resp. 34.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by LSI’s arguments. The case LSI relies on, Virginia Innovation, is neither binding authority nor persuasive authority. The facts in Virginia Innovation can be distinguished from the facts of the present case, as the prior art in question in Virginia Innovation was not sufficiently shown to be generally on sale to the interested public, and was instead “restricted” to members of a publishing organization, which required membership dues for access. See 983 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. Indeed, the district court in Virginia Innovation noted that there was no evidence that the document was available for sale to the general public outside of the publishing organization members. Id. In the present case, no membership fee or organization membership is required for access to the Merlin User’s Guide, which testimony shows was available and sold to the interested public as early as late 2000. See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–19; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 12–14; Ex. 1016 ¶ 12. Based on the complete record, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that distribution of the Merlin User’s Guide with the sale of the Merlin MID camera shows sufficient public accessibility and distribution. The cost to obtain the camera does not negate the evidence that the camera and accompanying user’s guide was available to the interested public. The testimony evidence shows that the Merlin User’s Guide was available for sale and distribution to the interested as early as 2000. Thus, FLIR has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Merlin User’s Guide was a publicly available printed publication.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“relevant experience with passive IR (infrared) systems in addition to the requisite engineering or physics education. Paper 2, 10–11 (IPR ’065); Reply 19–20. LSI contends that in addition to the requisite physics or optical science/engineering education a person of ordinary skill the art would have experience developing IR camera systems generally. PO Resp. 22. LSI’s contention is that FLIR’s definition of a person of ordinary skill is too narrowly focused on passive IR systems and is evidence of hindsight bias. PO Resp. 23. LSI’s arguments are contradictory and confusing; asserting not only that FLIR’s person of ordinary skill in art is overly narrow and defined as a “specialist in the [’813 and ’496 patents’] specific solution to the problem being solved,” but also that FLIR’s artisan “would not [] have been familiar with the technical problem being addressed by the invention.” PO Resp. 22 (emphasis omitted). Regardless, FLIR argues that the invention would have been obvious under either FLIR’s or LSI’s proposed person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 20. Based on the full record, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is evidenced by the prior art references and the type of problems and solutions described in the ’813 and ’496 patents (Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:34), and includes experience in imaging of chemical gases using IR camera systems generally in addition to the requisite engineering, physics or optical science education. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Moreover, and apart from any differences of opinion between FLIR and LSI on the precise background and knowledge of one skilled in the art, the prior art itself is highly indicative of the level of skill. See id. (“the level of ordinary skill in the art . . . was best determined by appeal to the references of record”). In any event, we do not find that a person of ordinary skill’s understanding of the teachings of the prior art would differ if an ordinarily skilled artisan possessed knowledge of both active and passive IR systems rather than knowledge of passive IR systems alone. See PO Resp. 22–24.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based on the full record, we find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that FLIR has provided articulated reasons with rational underpinnings for the proposed combinations of prior art. FLIR’s evidence shows that combinations of the Merlin Brochure with Strachan or the Merlin User’s Guide with Kulp is the combination of known elements that yield predictable results. See Paper 2, 17–18 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 55), 20–21 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 60) (IPR ’065); Paper 2, 37–38 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81) (IPR ’411). In addition, we find by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art demonstrates that it would have been an obvious design choice to one skilled in the art to replace the filters disclosed in Strachan and Kulp to target hydrocarbon gases of interest using the camera disclosed in the Merlin Brochure and Merlin User’s Guide. Paper 2, 38–39 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 81– 82) (IPR ’411). Accordingly, we do not agree with LSI that FLIR’s expert testimony is conclusory. PO Resp. 23, 61, 67–68.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 8,426,813 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,426,813 - Allscripts Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Mymedicalrecords, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2015 · CBM2015-00022 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 8–12 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject matter; the Board did not reach the anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“Second, we consider the challenged claims as an ordered combination. Id. at 2359. On this record, when viewed as a whole, the challenged claims 8–12 simply recite the concept of user management performed by a generic computer. The challenged claims, for example, do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they improve another technology or technical field. Petitioner additionally relies on the Declaration of Dr. Bysinger (Pet. 20–28), who testifies that the recited elements including “server,” “storing files . . . in a computer readable storage medium,” and “user interface on a computing device” were well-known conventional concepts in 2005. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32. Dr. Bysinger additionally states “the abstract idea of privately accessing and managing patient medical records . . . [has] existed since at least the promulgation of HIPAA.” Id. ¶ 33. We credit Dr. Bysinger’s statements because they are consistent with the challenged claims. Challenged dependent claims 9–12 add nothing that alters the above analysis under § 101. Claims 9, 10, 11, and 12 recite additional limitations, such as wherein the access information comprises a password, receiving files from a second provider, wherein the files comprise image format files including wills and powers of attorney, respectively. Based on the present record, these comprise either generic limitations, such as using a password for access or sending a file in a known image format, or they relate to organizing human activities, such as user management of legal and financial documents, in addition to health records. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8–12 of the ’466 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because they are directed to non-statutory subject matter.” slip op. at 11
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Petitioner asserts that claims 8–12 of the ’466 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because they are directed to the abstract concept of allowing individuals to manage and access their health records and other medical or legal files privately. Pet. 19. We agree with Petitioner that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea: privately managing files by the user. The preamble and all claim limitations of the challenged claims support this view of the claims, and the ’466 Patent consistently describes the invention as allowing an individual to control access to their medical records. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:21–23. Management or control by the user or patient rather than by the health care provider is a method of organizing a human activity. On this record, the concept is an abstract idea, just like the basic hedging concept at issue in Bilski and the abstract idea of intermediated settlement in Alice.3” slip op. at 8
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“We conclude that receiving and sending data is a routine and conventional computer function. As explained in Alice, “use of a computer to obtain data . . . and issue automated instructions . . . are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional actitiv[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2359; see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). Restricting access by password also is routine and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712–13, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that representative claim 1 is patent ineligible although it recites “a fourth step of restricting general public access.”). Similarly, providing a user interface is an insignificant activity. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (determining that claim 1 is patent ineligible although it recites a “claim folder,” which “manages claim information . . . by providing a structured and easy to use interface.”). Claim 8 includes additional recitations relating to how data is stored and managed on the server. We determine that these limitations recite generic functions performed by a generic server and computing device. Storing files is a basic computer function. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (“Using a computer to create and maintain ‘shadow’ accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer.”). Additionally, regarding the recitation in challenged claim 8 of “wherein the files are maintained on the server independently from any files maintained by the health care provider” (Ex. 1001, 17:18–19 (emphasis added)), we note the representative claim in Alice had a similar recitation. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352. In particular, in Alice, the representative claim included the following:” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner additionally relies on the Declaration of Dr. Bysinger (Pet. 20–28), who testifies that the recited elements including “server,” “storing files . . . in a computer readable storage medium,” and “user interface on a computing device” were well-known conventional concepts in 2005. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 30–32. Dr. Bysinger additionally states “the abstract idea of privately accessing and managing patient medical records . . . [has] existed since at least the promulgation of HIPAA.” Id. ¶ 33. We credit Dr. Bysinger’s statements because they are consistent with the challenged claims.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 8,301,466 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · BilskiPatents in suitUS 8,301,466 - Corning Incorporated v. DSM IP Assets B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 9, 2014 · IPR2013-00048 · APJ Scott E Kamholz · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 5, 13, 17, 29, 33, 37, 45, and 49 are unpatentable; the remaining challenged claims are not shown unpatentable, principally because key material-property limitations were not proved.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“The evidence supports a conclusion that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “moisture” is liquid water—that is, a condition of 100% relative humidity. The written description uses the term “moisture” in a context that suggests liquid water. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 28:65-67 (applying a “wax/water slurry” to surface of sample film in order “to retain moisture”); 35:17-18 (applying heat to remove “moisture” from samples, suggesting removal of liquid water). Moreover, where the written description discusses water in vapor form, the inventors use the word “humidity” or “atmospheric moisture,” but not “moisture” alone. See, e.g., id. at 21:47 (referring to “atmospheric moisture”); 28:48, 60, 65 (referring to “humidity”). The ’189 patent further discloses that a “ribbon assembly can be buried under ground or water for long distance connections, such as between cities,” which is consistent with the proposition that an optical fiber coating must endure long periods of immersion in liquid water without delaminating. Ex. 1001, 67:43-45. In light of the context in which the term “moisture” appears in the specification, we conclude that the inventors used that term in its ordinary sense to refer to liquid water. The ’189 patent, thus, is directed to a coating composition that, after radiation cure, has sufficient adhesion to glass to prevent delamination in the presence of liquid water. We decline to resolve what temperature, or length of time of exposure to liquid water the coating must endure, without delaminating, in order to satisfy the claimed adhesion property. Resolving those conditions is not necessary to our analysis, which focuses on whether Corning’s wet adhesion test, conducted under conditions of 95% relative humidity, is probative of the extent to which a cured coating delaminates from glass when exposed to liquid water.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Corning that the ’189 patent defines the term “stripping temperature” as “about 90°C to about 120°C.” Rather, the patent indicates that stripping temperature is “typically” within this range. Ex. 1001, 13:32-34; accord id. at 14:21-25 (“[F]or most coating compositions the design ribbon stripping temperatures are usually about 90° C. to about 120° C., but may be different depending on the specific design parameters for the particular coating composition.”). This disclosure is too imprecise to serve as a definition. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. The ’189 patent does refer repeatedly, however, to 90°C as an exemplary stripping temperature. E.g., Ex. 1001, 31:14-15, 31:41-42, 50:55. The ’189 patent also identifies 100°C as an exemplary stripping temperature, particularly in the context of measuring change in length. Id. at 14:46-47, 18:44-45. Whatever other temperatures this term encompasses, it certainly encompasses at least the ones specifically identified. See Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.”). The limitation requires no further construction.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“plots is whether they exhibit a linear region of negative slope. Corning argues that they do, and the description in Exhibit 2015 that a region of the Shustack Example I plot showing a “linear relationship” was used to calculate slope bears out this argument. See Ex. 2015, 1. DSM, in contrast, argues that Corning’s plots lack “a substantially smooth linear region” but offers little evidence to support this assertion beyond Dr. Taylor’s statements that the plots “have no linear region from which to measure a slope” and that they lack any “substantial linear region.” See Resp. 31; Ex. 2032 ¶ 86. Dr. Taylor gives no credible explanation for the basis on which he reaches these conclusions. Even if Dr. Taylor provided some underlying facts or data for this conclusion, Dr. Taylor’s statements do not support DSM’s argument that there is no substantially smooth linear region. As between the conflicting evidence on this point, we credit Corning’s evidence, particularly from Exhibit 2015, in which Corning’s Mr. Gleason identifies the region of linear relationship as extending between displacements of 2.76 mm and 7 mm. DSM does not explain why this determination is invalid. We agree with Corning that the plots for Shustack Example I show a linear region of negative slope from 2.76 mm to 7 mm. To be sure, the signal is noisy, and the plots are jagged, but that does not mean that a linear relationship is not discernible in that region.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundNot shown unpatentable
“For these reasons, we credit Corning’s testing evidence over DSM’s. We are persuaded that Corning has shown that Shustack Example I and Szum ’928 Example 5B each inherently possess a fiber pull-out friction within the scope of every challenged claim. 2. “Sufficient Adhesion” As discussed above in section II.A.1, each of claims 1-4 and 9-12” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 6,298,189 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,298,189 - Corning Incorporated v. DSM IP Assets B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 1, 2014 · IPR2013-00053 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 35, 39, 44, and 53-57 are unpatentable as anticipated by Murphy; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Corning’s proposed claim construction of “absorption maximum” as unreasonably broad in light of the Specification. Dec. 6. Based on the language in the Specification, the Board explained that [A]n absorption maximum does not include a “wavelength with the highest absorbance on either side of [the identified valley within the range of 240 and 360 nm]” unless that wavelength is also “a point on the curve wherein the tangent to the curve is parallel with the horizontal axis.” Id. After the institution of the trial, the parties did not further brief this issue. The Board hereby adopts its previous construction.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedNot shown unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“factual findings. Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To establish an actual reduction to practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) an embodiment of the invention was constructed that meets all the limitations of the claim-at-issue; and (2) the inventor appreciated that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 9. According to Corning, examples 8- 13 and a-d of Murphy meet all the limitations recited in claims 35, 39, 44, and 53-57, and thus, anticipate these claims. Id. at 40-46. DSM did not dispute that Murphy meets all the limitations recited in the challenged claims. Nor did it dispute that the effective filing date of Murphy is December 23, 1999. PO Resp. 41. Instead, it contended that Murphy could not qualify as § 102(e) prior art, because the inventors of the ’543 patent made the claimed invention through an actual reduction to practice before December 23, 1999. Id. at 41-55. As evidence, DSM submitted a “Rule 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 Declaration of Timothy E. Bishop,” one of the co-inventors of the ’543 patent. Ex. 2041. DSM also attached Exhibits A, B, and C to the Bishop Declaration as proof to antedate Murphy.4” slip op. at 5
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We find Corning’s arguments unconvincing. Nevertheless, we deny DSM’s Motion to Exclude. Similar to a district court in a bench trial, the Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal with administrative expertise, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to evidence presented. See, e.g., Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941) (“One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received . . . .”). Thus, in this inter partes review, the better course is to have a complete record of the evidence to facilitate public access as well as appellate review. See id. (“If the record on review contains not only all evidence which was clearly admissible, but also all evidence of doubtful admissibility, the court which is called upon to review the case can usually make an end of it, whereas if evidence was excluded which that court regards as having been admissible, a new trial or rehearing cannot be avoided.”).” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 7,276,543 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,276,543 - Corning Incorporated v. DSM IP Assets B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 1, 2014 · IPR2013-00052 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11-23 and 26-31 are unpatentable; Corning did not prove claims 24, 25, and 32-34 unpatentable because its obviousness showing was insufficient and its renewed %RAU data was improper reply evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We find Professor Sogah’s explanation more persuasive. First, after Corning submitted Professor’s Sogah’s declaration rebutting Professor Bowman’s opinion, DSM cross-examined Professor Sogah for two days. See Exs. 2060, 2061. In its Motion for Observations on Cross-Examination of Corning Reply Declarants, DSM called to our attention several deposition testimony excerpts from other Corning experts. See Paper 70. Had DSM found any support for its allegation that Corning improperly prepared the oligomer samples, it could have pointed it out to us. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide (“Trial Practice Guide”), 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767-68 (Aug. 14, 2012). It did not do so. In fact, DSM did not call to our attention any testimony from Professor Sogah. More importantly, DSM’s scientists do not appear to have given much weight to the low-molecular-weight region of the GPC spectrum. See Ex. 1039, 144:6–147:22. Indeed, when a DSM’s scientist presented the oligomer test data to Professor Bowman, she did not include data of the lowmolecular-weight region. See id. at 146:12-15 (“So the one that I’m sure had been done before it was the di -- the diisocyanate diacrylate. They had run that before. She thought she knew where it should show up, but couldn’t pull out that data.”); id. at 146:20-25 (“And I think the same thing was true of the lauryl acrylate as was true of the diisocyanate diacrylate. She knew from her experience where it would show up, but I again indicated I needed more than her experience, that I wanted see that run as a sample itself . . . .”). This testimony confirms Professor Sogah’s position, i.e., when analyzing a GPC chromatogram to assess oligomer formation, a skilled polymer chemist would focus on the oligomer peaks in the high-molecular-weight region, and not the peaks of the starting materials or tracer in the low-molecular-weight region. Ex. 1071 ¶¶ 56-57. We find that Corning has established that it properly prepared the oligomer it used for testing. DSM has not presented enough evidence to lead us to doubt the quality of Corning’s oligomer preparation. Based on the record developed at trial, we find a preponderance of evidence supporting unpatentability of claims 11-23 and 26-31. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Specifically, we are persuaded by the data and testimony Corning presented in support of its position that Examples 4 and 5B of Szum ’041 inherently anticipate claims 11-14, 16-21, 26, 27, 29, and 30. See Pet. 18-26; Ex. 1013” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureUnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that Corning has established that it properly prepared the oligomer it used for testing. DSM has not presented enough evidence to lead us to doubt the quality of Corning’s oligomer preparation. Based on the record developed at trial, we find a preponderance of evidence supporting unpatentability of claims 11-23 and 26-31. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Specifically, we are persuaded by the data and testimony Corning presented in support of its position that Examples 4 and 5B of Szum ’041 inherently anticipate claims 11-14, 16-21, 26, 27, 29, and 30. See Pet. 18-26; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 106-29, 135; Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 35-39. Also, Corning presented persuasive data and testimony supporting its position that Example C of Snowwhite inherently anticipates claims 11-22 and 26-30. See Pet. 48-54; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 209-28, 231; Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 35-39. Further, Corning presented data and testimony sufficient to support its position that the combination of Snowwhite, Fouassier, and Levy renders claim 23 obvious, and that the combination of Snowwhite and Zahora (or the combination of Szum ’041, Snowwhite, and Zahora) renders claim 31 obvious. See Pet. 30-31, 55-58; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 233-46.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We decline to consider Corning’s “renewed” %RAU data because they are improper reply evidence and because considering the data at this late stage would not serve the interest of justice. “A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). When DSM challenged the soundness of Corning’s methodology, a proper reply could have included, for example, Corning’s rebuttal to contradict DSM’s allegation and any supporting evidence to confirm the veracity of Corning’s original %RAU data. These options were not available to Corning because it, in fact, discovered errors in that testing. Reply 7-8. Instead, Corning provided new evidence of %RAU data of an entirely new batch of samples tested under a new protocol, including using a new light meter. Id. at 8-10. Such evidence, and Corning’s argument relying on such evidence, exceeded the proper scope of a reply. Corning insisted that its new reply evidence, or at least the portion using the new ILT1400/XRL140B meter, was in response to Professor Bowman’s criticism of Corning’s test procedure. See Tr. 6:12-24. We disagree. “Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute claim, and new evidence that could have been presented in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767. Corning’s reply evidence falls squarely into this category. Corning conceded that it could not rely on the original %RAU data in the Petition to support its position that Szum ’041 inherently anticipates claims 32-34. See Tr. 5:14-21. Thus, Corning’s “renewed” %RAU data in the Reply becomes necessary to make its case for unpatentability of claims 32-34.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art. Although common sense directs one to look with care at a patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Here, Corning argued that “it was well known to include multiple photoinitiators in radiation-curable compositions, for instance, to improve cure speed and optimize performance properties.” Pet. 28. Having initially found this reasoning persuasive, we instituted this review. After institution, DSM, however, came forward with evidence showing other considerations at play. See PO Resp. 26-30. Indeed, Professor Bowman explained why one skilled in the art would not have had a reason to use five photoinitiators and in the amount as claims 24 and 25 require. See, e.g., Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 46-48. He refers to express teachings in Ciba to support his opinion. For example, “a frequent cause of insufficient through-cure is too much photoinitiator in the composition, and as Ciba expressly teaches, this problem can often be rectified by using lower levels of photoinitiators.” Id. ¶ 47; see also id. ¶ 48 (pointing to the cost concerns expressed in Ciba). We find Professor Bowman’s opinion credible, especially given that both the opinion and the evidence referred to therein stand unrebutted by Corning. A second independent basis supports our conclusion that Corning has” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,276,543 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,276,543
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.