• Jiangsu Favored Nanotechnology Co., Ltd. v. P2i Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Cohen and Legein or Francesch and Legein; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’087 patent in June 20154 “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29); PO Resp. 13 (Patent Owner stating that it “does not dispute this characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also PO Sur-reply 1–2 (noting both parties’ agreement on the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the fully developed trial record, we determine that no claims need an express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Because of Patent Owner’s shifting definitions of the education and experience level of the ordinarily skilled artisan, it is unclear on the complete record what precise definition Patent Owner and Dr. Senkevitch are applying when arguing the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 40, 52–55, 60, 68, 74, 76, 77, 80–86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 100, 102–105, 108, 110, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 122, 124, 127–134. We, therefore, give Dr. Senkevitch’s testimony regarding the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art minimal weight, which leaves us with Patent Owner’s insufficiently supported arguments regarding the skilled artisan’s capabilities. PO Resp. 13, 22–27, 31–32, 34–40; PO Sur-reply 1–6, 11–13. Moreover, as Petitioner correctly points out, the ʼ087 patent expressly teaches that the precise conditions for forming a protective polymeric coating “will vary depending upon factors such as, without limitation, the nature of the monomer compound, the crosslinking agent, the substrate, as well as the desired properties of the coating” and that such “conditions can be determined using routine methods.” Ex. 1001 15:1–15:5 (emphasis added); Pet. Reply 17. Where the patent itself leaves to the judgment of an ordinarily skilled artisan the assessment of these factors to ascertain suitable conditions for forming the protective coating, we find persuasive Petitioner’s view that it would have been well within the level of ordinary skill to ascertain such suitable conditions.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. Although the claims of the ʼ087 patent recite obtaining the protective cross-linked polymeric coating “by exposing the device or component to a plasma,” the field of endeavor analysis in an analogous art inquiry does not exclusively turn on the claims at issue, but rather takes account of the entirety of a patent’s disclosure. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the PTO must show adequate support for its findings on the scope of the field of endeavor in the application’s written description and claims” (emphasis added)); In re Mettke, 570 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an argument that the field of endeavor was limited to a claimed “Internet terminal” when “the specification describes various communication media, including facsimile machines and email, as related to the invention.”). This is significant here because the ʼ087 patent discloses that “[t]he … invention relates to protective coatings” and specifically “relates to protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof, and methods of forming such coatings.” Ex. 1001, 1:14–17. Based on this disclosure, we find that the ʼ087 patent’s field of endeavor relates to “protective coatings for electronic or electrical devices and components thereof” broadly, not just those formed on such devices or components via a plasma polymerization process as asserted by Patent Owner. Id. Although Cohen does not explicitly disclose that its crosslinked polymers constitute a “protective coating,” Cohen does disclose that its “copolymerizable mixture can be cast into films” (Ex. 1004, 2:61–62), that the polymerization can “effected in situ,” and that the polymers may be used in “numerous” electrical applications (id. at 5:17–25). Tr. 8:9–10:2, 27:2– 21; see Pet. Reply 5 (explaining how “Cohen described insulating polymers that could be applied as films and be used to protect substrates including cables and electrical coils.” (citing Ex. 1004, 2:60–63, 5:13–25)). These disclosures suggest strongly that Cohen’s crosslinked polymers––if cast into a film or formed in situ on an electrical device or component––would serve as a protective coating on that electrical device or component, even though Cohen does not expressly refer to its crosslinked polymers ipsis verbis as a “protective coating.” Thus, we find that Cohen is within the field of endeavor of the ʼ087 patent.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,041,087 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
• Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd. / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2025 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Yoshida and Saxler; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “In light of the record before us, we determine that we do not need to reach a specific finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we declined to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of the “side surfaces” limitation and determined that it was not necessary to further construe this term because “[t]he parties do not dispute that the language ‘side surfaces extending horizontally’ encompasses a gate material with sloped side surfaces as depicted in Figure 5 of the ’335 patent.” Inst. Dec. 11–16 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We invited the parties to address this limitation further during the course of this trial, but neither party provided additional evidence or argument regarding the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 16; see generally PO Resp.; Reply; Sur-reply. Accordingly, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision that we do not need to construe the “side surfaces” limitation. Inst. Dec. 15– 16.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “This evidence, particularly the language in the ’335 patent itself, undermines Patent Owner’s argument that “[t]he process for forming gate ledges using separate masks instead of the self-aligned process disclosed in the ’335 patent cannot produce ledges that are ‘substantially symmetric.’” PO Resp. 39 (emphasis added); see also PO Resp. 42–43 (arguing that a gate structure with ledges having substantially equal widths is “not achievable” without using a single photo-mask process). We have considered the evidence presented by Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert in support of Patent Owner’s arguments. PO Resp. 38–43; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 49–51. We, however, are unable to discern sufficient evidence supporting a conclusion that using separate masks cannot produce ledges that are substantially symmetric, particularly when the ’335 patent suggests otherwise. See Ex. 1001, 4:60– 63 (referring only to the “possibility of misalignment”). Even if, as Patent Owner and Dr. Schubert contend, misalignment “naturally” occurs when using a two-mask process, that does not foreclose the possibility that the” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “It is well settled that “[a] reference does not teach away . . . if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, “teaching that a composition may be optimal or standard does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,312,335 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,312,335
• Innoscience (Zhuhai) Technology Company, Ltd / Innoscience America, Inc. v. Efficient Power Conversion CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01381 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Uemoto and Smith; the motion to amend is granted, and proposed substitute claims 13 and 14 are not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In order to determine whether an invention would have been obvious at the time the application was filed, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science, or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner contends “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. at 6. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, physics, material science, or a closely related field, and three years of professional work experience in the epitaxial growth, design, and fabrication of semiconductor electronic devices, including those of GaN.” PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 82). Upon review of the evidence of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). We note, however, that the conclusions reached in this Decision would be the same under either proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See Ex. 2009 ¶ 83 (Dr. Schubert testifying that his opinions would be the same under either proposed definition); Ex. 1033 ¶ 9 (Dr. Shealy testifying that the differences in proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan “would not change the outcome of the invalidity analysis in any material manner”); PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “compensated GaN layer above the barrier layer, and a gate contact above the compensated GaN layer.” Ex. 1001, 5:12–18. Petitioner contends the term “compensated” indicates that the step of compensating the GaN layer has already occurred, such that the term “compensated GaN layer” should be construed as a “‘[d]oped GaN layer formed with a step to passivate its impurities’ which is a ‘product-by-process’ limitation.”5 Pet. 12–14. And, because compensation with hydrogen was the “critical step” distinguishing the claims from the prior art, and because hydrogenation in as-grown III-nitride materials had been well known for over a decade by 2009, Petitioner contends “compensated” “cannot be interpreted as mere hydrogen presence in as-grown material, a well-known property of doped GaN.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends “compensated GaN material” should be construed as “a semiconductor GaN gate material in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) cancels the electrical effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 92) (emphasis added). Patent Owner contends this construction is consistent with the IEEE dictionary, which defines “compensated semiconductor” as 5 Given that product-by-process steps in a device claim are not entitled to patentable weight, Petitioner contends “the prior art only need show a material with passivated impurities to show unpatentability, not the step to achieve it.” Pet. 15–16. “[a] semiconductor in which one type of impurity or imperfection (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity or imperfection (for example, acceptor).” PO Resp. 14 (quoting Ex. 2004). Patent Owner contends its construction is also consistent with the written description of the ’294 patent, which explains that a compensated GaN material is part of the gate and includes a p-type impurity that imparts an electrical effect (i.e., conductivity), as well as a second impurity, e.g., hydrogen, that partially cancels the electrical effect of the p-type impurity, rendering the layer semi-insulating. Id. at 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:10–13, 3:43–45). On this record, we construe “compensated GaN layer” as “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity (for example, donor) partially cancels the electric effects of the other type of impurity (for example, acceptor).” This is consistent with the disclosures of the ’294 patent, the IEEE dictionary definition, and the construction ultimately adopted by the ITC. Ex. 2004, 3; Ex. 1049, 16–17 (ITC construing “compensated GaN layer” to mean “a GaN layer in which one type of impurity partially cancels the electrical effects of another type of impurity”); Ex. 1001, 3:43–45 (explaining that the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is formed through the “passivation of a p-type impurity using hydrogen”). For the reasons set forth below, however, we decline to construe “compensated GaN layer” as a product-by-process claim term (as asserted by Petitioner), or to limit the compensated GaN layer to a gate material (as asserted by Patent Owner).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “There are two exceptions to the general rule that we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term: (1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or (2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. The standards for lexicography and disclaimer, however, are “exacting.” Id. at 1366. There is no argument that the patentees acted as their own lexicographer to redefine the term “compensated GaN layer.” With respect to disavowal, a “patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). As noted by Patent Owner, the title of the ’294 patent is, in part, “Compensated Gate MISFET” and much of the discussion of the ’294 patent is of a compensated GaN layer that is directly below the gate contact and above a barrier layer and operates in conjunction with the gate contact to control the on/off state of the transistor. PO Resp. 12–14. We are presented with insufficient argument or evidence to conclude, however, that these disclosures rise to the level of a disclaimer. For example, although the title of the ’294 patent is directed to a “Compensated Gate MISFET,” claim 1 is more broadly directed to “[a] column III Nitride transistor.” Ex. 1001, 5:12, code (54). Nor are we directed to an expression or statement of manifest exclusion in the ’294 patent that would serve to disclaim any “compensated GaN layer” that is not directly below the gate and/or that does not function in concert with the gate electrode to control the on/off state of the transistor. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. With respect to the stated goals of the invention, as noted by Patent Owner, one of the primary purposes of the compensated GaN layer of the ’294 patent is to reduce gate leakage and gate capacitance. Ex. 1001, 2:13– 19, 3:18–21 (“[U]sing a compensated semiconductor layer 38 leads to low gate leakage during device operation.”). We cannot use the goals of the invention, however, to rewrite the claims or insert terms that are not present. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. Moreover, the prior art of record indicates that a compensated GaN layer that is below the gate contact and above a barrier layer, but not part of the active gate structure, may also “decrease the leakage current between the gate and the drain.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 44 (“Even when a positive bias of 5 V or higher is applied to the gate electrode, no significant gate-leakage current is observed.”), 61. As such, evidence of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that one of the primary goals disclosed in the ’294 patent is achieved regardless of whether the compensated GaN layer is part of the gate, or simply in close vicinity to the gate. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the written description of the ’294 patent indicates that the “compensated GaN layer” must be part of the gate structure.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “To be probative, Patent Owner must prove there is a nexus between the presented evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A rebuttable presumption of nexus applies when the “patentee shows that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product and that the product ‘is the invention disclosed and claimed.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392). “That is, presuming nexus is appropriate ‘when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). If the praise is not limited to the features of the claimed invention, the patent owner may still prove nexus “by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. at 1373–74 (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Patent Owner contends that the compensated gate of the ’294 patent “was a breakthrough invention and resulted in the first commercially viable enhancement-mode GaN transistor.” PO Resp. 60 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 192– 193, 197; Ex. 2021). Patent Owner further contends that this achievement required the counter-intuitive use of a compensated gate material in the gate structure, and represented “a technological leap that laid the foundation for viable enhancement-mode GaN transistors.” Id. at 61–62. For this achievement, Patent Owner contends the inventor, Dr. Alex Lidow, received the 2015 SEMI Award. Id. at 60 (citing Ex. 2021). Upon review of Patent Owner’s evidence and the parties’ arguments, we find that Patent Owner’s objective indicia evidence is entitled to little, if any, weight. The evidence of praise relied upon by Patent Owner is not clearly linked to the claimed invention or any particular product having each of the claimed features of the ’294 patent. Ex. 2021. For example, the 2015 SEMI award was provided to Dr. Lidow “for commercialization of GaN power devices.” Id. An article explaining the award indicates that “high cost” previously “limited [the] commercial success” of GaN technologies, but Dr. Lidow was able to overcome these issues, “from resolving packaging limitations to establishing a low-cost supply chain,” “through persistence.” Id. This praise is not demonstrably linked to the claimed invention or any particular device, and does not mention the use of a compensated gate, or any other relevant feature recited in the claims. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is entitled to little, if any, weight.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,350,294 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,350,294
• Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 10–13 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Holmberg, Battey, Blankenship, and Cowen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least 1 year of experience related to communication networks or the equivalent.” Pet. 7. Petitioner further contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Dr. Eldering agrees that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and at least one year of experience related to communication networks or the equivalent.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 24. According to Dr. Eldering, “[a] person with less relevant practical experience but with additional experience would also qualify.” Id. Patent Owner contends that” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Although Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s construction, it contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute because Petitioner’s proposed grounds 1-5 are all insufficient under either construction.” PO Resp. 19. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For example, we discuss below in Section III.G why we do not reach the claim construction issue presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Holmberg expressly contemplates using its wall box within multi-dwelling units, notes that multi-dwelling wall boxes in the prior art were “typically provided” on every floor, and discloses that the multi-dwelling wall boxes would contain optical couplings for each resident on a given floor. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7, 34; Pet. Reply 8–10. In view of these disclosures, we credit the testimony of Dr. Kiaei that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use Holmberg’s wall box in multi-dwelling units and would have seen a need to access the area behind spice tray 230 to connect and disconnect subscribers. Ex. 1003 ¶ 92; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 7–8. Moreover, even if Holmberg were limited to mid-span locations and distributing drop cables, as opposed to distribution cables for individual subscribers, as asserted by Patent Owner, Patent Owner does not dispute that a technician would still need periodic access to the area behind splice tray 230 in these mid-span devices. Tr. 38:3–39:1 (counsel agreeing that one would need to access the area behind splice tray 230 in Holmberg, albeit in “rare occasions”); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 90–92; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 7–8. Thus, whether used in the manner contemplated by Petitioner or Patent Owner, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that access to the space behind splice tray 230 in Holmberg would be necessary. With access behind splice tray 230 required, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have seen a benefit to replacing Holmberg’s fasteners or screws with a hinged connection, such as that disclosed in Battey, to allow easier access to the area behind the splice tray. Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 39 (disclosing that a rotatable splice tray or shelf would “provide[] full and convenient access to the splice tray”)). First, Petitioner and Dr. Kiaei persuasively demonstrate that once the fibers of Holmberg are routed from behind splice tray 230 and the distribution cables spooled on this tray, a technician could not reasonably access fiber optic cables stored behind splice tray 230 without releasing or opening splice tray 230. Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1023, 60:20–61:15); Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 31–32. Second, Petitioner persuasively demonstrates that without a hinged connection, the technician would have to either hold the splice tray of Holmberg with one hand while performing the necessary routing and splicing steps, two screws would need to remain in place (essentially replicating a hinge), or the tray would have to be left to dangle, supported only by the routed and spliced fibers. Pet. Reply 19–20.” slip op. at 22

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “Allegedly New Arguments on Reply Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the benefits of a hinged connection when performing the splicing and routing steps should be dismissed or ignored because they were improperly raised for the first time on reply. Sur-reply 19–20. We disagree. The Petition asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add a hinged connection, such as that disclosed in Battey, in Holmberg and would have seen a benefit to so doing. Pet. 40–44. Petitioner did not change its proposed combination or its stated rationale in its Reply. Rather, in response to Patent Owner’s counter-arguments, Petitioner expands upon the benefits of its proposed combination, i.e., the substitution of a hinged connection in place of fasteners. Pet. Reply 15–21. This is permissible, as a reply may properly expand on or extend previously raised arguments relating to the motivation to make the proposed changes to the prior art. See Rembrandt Diagnostics, LP v. Alere, Inc., 76 F.4th 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (explaining that the reply arguments properly relied on the same legal ground, the same prior art references, and same legal argument—the motivation to make the proposed changes to the prior art reference).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 9,008,483 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,008,483
• Opticis Co., Ltd. v. Inneos LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2023-01256 · APJ Terry J Owens · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Kurita and Lemoff, with the Board declining to reach the remaining grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We accept the level of ordinary skill in the art stated by Petitioner and agreed with by Patent Owner with the exception of the open-ended language appears consistent with the ’416 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “describe elements that are not affirmatively recited in the claims, and in view of the “bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention,” we conclude that none of the unrecited limitations identified by Patent Owner are required by the claims. See Thorner v. Sony Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that the standard for disavowal is “exacting,” and the use of “the present invention” is not necessarily sufficient to meet this standard).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “art would not have modified Kurita in view of Lemoff because Lemoff positions the signal emitters near the fiber to emulate WDM without the need for an external optical multiplexer or a similar device and discourages using optical wavelength multiplexers for short distances because the complexity of the design is often cost prohibitive (PO Resp. 47–48), Lemoff does not appear to limit the usefulness of the fiber connector to any particular optical signal transmission distance. Petitioner relies upon Lemoff for a suggestion to combine Lemoff’s fiber connector configuration teachings with Kurita’s multiplexer teachings to enable fibers to be plugged Fig. 2) (Pet 29, 31; Reply 17–18). Regarding Patent Owner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Lemoff’s receptacle and ferrule with discrete components in Kurita because the fiber would need to be manually fixed and aligned with or without a ferrule and, therefore, would serve no purpose (PO Resp. 48), Lemoff’s fiber connector appears to fix and align the fiber adequately for wavelength division multiplexing without manual fixation or alignment being required (Ex. 1006, 5:65–6:2, Fig. 2; Reply 18). The challenged claims do not require any greater degree of fixing and alignment than that provided by Lemoff’s fiber connector. Regarding Patent Owner argument that Lemoff’s device is not physically combinable with Kurita’s WDM multiplexer due to Lemoff’s device’s small size (PO Resp. 47–48; Reply 17–18), “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.... Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art” (In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “stopped single optical fiber because fixing it in place does not passively align it with the optical components (PO Resp. at 35–37) is not persuasive because fixing Kurita’s fiber (40) in place in accord with Lemoff’s teaching regarding the ferrule (255) inserted until being stopped by the receptacle (260) (Ex. 1006, 5:50–6:15, Fig. 2) would align Kurita’s optical array (20), and lens (30)) (Ex. 1004 Fig. 3) passively in the same manner that Lemoff’s ferrule (255), after being inserted until stopped by the receptacle (260), passively aligns the optical fiber (250) with the optical components (optical imaging element 220 and light emitters within emission apertures 120) (Ex. 1006, 5:50–6:15, Fig. 2; Reply 15–16). Regarding Patent Owner’s argument that the light from each of Kurita’s lasers (11) depicted in Figure 3 cannot pass through a separate focusing lens (30) pie shaped sector because the lasers (11) and collimating lenses (21) are arranged linearly rather than being arranged about a circular axis (PO Resp. at 37–42), we do not agree. Claim 1 requires “focusing means having n separate radial sectors on its surface, and each of said n collimated beams passes through a separate one of said n sectors of said focusing means” (Ex. 1001, 5:34–37), claim 2 requires “four lasers and four collimating lenses are each formed in a two-dimensional, two by two array [centered on the focal axis of lens 30], wherein said focusing means is a single focusing lens, and wherein each radial sector is a pie-shaped quadrant” (id. at 5:41–44), and claim 7 requires “focusing means having four separate quadrants on its surface, and each of said four collimated beams passes through a separate one of said quadrants of said focusing means” (id. at 6:35–38). Kurita meets those claim requirements. Kurita’s two by two array (10A) of lasers (11), collimating lens (21) array (20), and focusing lens (30) are shown in Kurita’s Figure 3 (cropped) as follows: The image is a portion of Kurita’s Figure 3 showing Kurita’s laser array, collimating lens array, and focusing lens (30). Relative to a point at the center of the laser array (10A) or the collimating lens array (20), each laser (11) and each collimating lens (21) is in a separate quadrant that can be a quadrant of a circle (pie-shape) on lens 30 (Reply 12– 13, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–91).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 7,198,416 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,198,416
• Eden Park Illumination, Inc. / Larson Electronics LLC et al. v. S. Edward NeisterAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00695 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 and 7–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Eckhardt and Sosnin.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in an engineering discipline such as biological, chemical, environmental, electrical, mechanical, and/or systems engineering, or an equivalent degree such as one in physics or similar subject matter.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Petitioner further argues that “[s]uch a person would also have two to three years of work or research experience with UV disinfection technology and/or systems and would be familiar with the fundamentals of UV excimer lamps” but, “less education could be compensated by more experience and vice versa.” Id. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’951 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’951 patent and the” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “art references advanced in this Petition” but “[b]eyond these arguments, the challenged claims require no express construction to evaluate their patentability.” Pet. 16–17. After considering the arguments and information Petitioner presents, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reasons to combine Eckhardt’s teaching of narrow spectrum UV light in the range of 220 to 310 nm to disinfect skin (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31, 69–70), with Sosnin’s teaching of a KrCl excimer lamp having a narrow band UV emission at 222 nm to kill bacteria (Ex. 1005, 320). In particular, Petitioner shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have wanted to obtain the benefits of Eckhardt’s teaching of disinfecting skin using any light source capable of sterilization or disinfection and would therefore have considered Eckhardt’s suggestion of using narrow spectrum UV light in combination with Sosnin’s disclosure of using germicidal excimer lamps within the range of wavelengths taught by Eckhardt. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (stating that the “mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement” suggests obviousness). The teachings of both Eckhardt and Sosnin support Petitioner’s combination. In particular, both references teach using UV lamps with narrow bands or monochromatic emissions to sterilize surfaces. Eckhardt teaches “light source 7 may be any light source that emits light capable of sterilization or disinfection” and may be a UV light source such as a lamp that “may emit narrow spectrum light (e.g., a line spectrum) or broad spectrum light” including UVA, UVB, and UVC light. Ex. 1004 ¶ 31. Eckhardt also teaches flash light source 7a generates a flash sufficient for sterilization or disinfection and may be a xenon flash lamp having a wavelength in the range of 220 to 310 nm. Id. ¶¶ 43, 70. Additionally, Eckhardt teaches “[t]he sterilization/disinfection units previously described are designed to have a beneficial effect when used on bare skin.” Id. ¶ 69. Sosnin teaches using excimer lamps for sterilization and specifically discloses a KrCl lamp which generates photons having wavelengths of 222 nm. Ex. 1005, 320. We find that Eckhardt would have led a person of ordinary skill to consider using a 222 nm excimer lamp because that wavelength falls within the range of UV light (220–310 nm) suggested by Eckhardt, and the range known to provide disinfection. Ex. 1004 ¶ 70; Ex. 1005, 320 (describing “the high rate of bactericidal effect of excilamps”). We find that Eckhardt also supports Petitioner’s contention that it was within the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to use UV light in the range of 254 nm for disinfection, even though that wavelength presented safety concerns. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 54, 56; see Pet. 25.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Based on the evidence before us, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the combination of Eckhardt and Sosnin discloses claim limitation [1A]. We find that Eckhardt’s disclosure of a lamp emitting sterilizing light in the range of 220 to 310 nm (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31, 43, 70), combined with Sosnin’s disclosure of irradiation of E. coli with a KrCl excimer lamp generating a 222 nm wavelength (Ex. 1005, 320, Fig. 3), which correspond to peak absorption wavelengths of DNA or RNA (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116–118), discloses limitation [1A]. [1B] Petitioner contends that the Eckhardt-Sosnin combination teaches “directing the photons to a substance or surface to be disinfected, whereby the photons are generated to destroy a plurality of chemical bonds within the proteins, DNA, or RNA of the microorganism,” as recited in limitation [1B]. Pet. 30. According to Petitioner, Eckhardt discloses directing light towards wound 1 and surrounding skin 3. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 120; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31–32). Petitioner contends Sosnin teaches the photons destroy a plurality of chemical bonds within the DNA or RNA of the microorganism because it discloses using 222 nm radiation, “which intrinsically destroys proteins and the chemical bonds in the proteins associated with the DNA or RNA of the microorganism.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 121; Ex. 1005, 319– 321). Based on the evidence before us, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of evidence that the combination of Eckhardt and Sosnin discloses claim limitation [1B]. We find that Eckhardt’s disclosure of directing sterilizing light in the range of 220 to 310 nm toward a surface to be disinfected (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31–33, 43, 70), combined with Sosnin’s disclosure of bacterial survival curves resulting from irradiation of E. coli with KrCl excimer lamps (Ex. 1005, 320, Fig. 3), discloses claim limitation [1B]. [1C] Petitioner contends that the combination of Eckhardt and Sosnin” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,246,951 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,246,951
• Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2023-00485 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined disclosures of Yoakim, Jarisch, Rossi, and Castellani.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “have a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40). In the Institution Decision, we preliminarily determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, as well as experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Inst. Dec. 8 (emphasis added). Neither party disputes this conclusion. PO Resp. 9; see generally Pet. Reply. As such, we adopt our preliminary definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan for purposes of this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “designing medical devices and components, and that those experiences represent work designing products similar to mechanical beverage systems, Patent Owner fails to direct the Board to evidence sufficient to establish that this experience, in the aggregate, amounts to at least “five years” or involved “experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Inst. Dec. 8 (adopting Patent Owner’s own proposed definition of one of ordinary skill in the art); see Sur-reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1066, 34:16–35:9; Ex. 1067, 101:3– 12, 102:20–104:9; Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 3–4, 8–10) (failing to establish adequately, if at all, how Dr. Howle’s qualifications include the requisite minimum five-year period of relevant design experience). Accordingly, we determine that Dr. Howle is not qualified to offer expert testimony from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art in this proceeding.10 See Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]o offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case,” including the issue of patent “validity,” the “witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.” Id. (Board’s emphasis). “Without that skill, the witness’[s] opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Id. at 1377.” slip op. at 13

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Second, Patent Owner and Dr. Howell assert that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood upon reading the second German application that the capsule features described would be intended to be combinable with each of the described embodiments.” PO Resp. 40; Ex. 2017 ¶ 61. But Patent Owner and Dr. Howell do not explain how a barcode could be used in the devices depicted in Figures 16–18, which place the detection means 2.4.2 on the outer circumference of the flange (not its underside) and rely on toothed-rings physically interacting with either the chamber, retaining arms, or a pinion. Ex. 1047, 12:22–31, 13:8–18. Indeed, the second German priority application explains that means 2.4.2 physically interacts with retaining arms 30 (embodiments of Figures 16 and 17) or a pinon (embodiment of Figure 18), and if means 2.4.2 were not present in these embodiments the capsule would either “drop through into a waste container” or could not be inserted through the insertion shaft. Id. at 12:22– 27, 13:9–12, 13:16–35 (noting that in the embodiment disclosed in Figure 18 a pinon interacts with means 2.4.2 and only when means 2.4.2 “is formed complementary to the teeth of the means” can the capsule be inserted). At no point does the second German application identify means 2.4.2 as a barcode or suggest a barcode could be used as the detection means. The second German application also states that A person skilled in the art is also aware that for example the insertion shaft may also contain a sensor, for example a camera, clear, however, that element 27 is part of the brewing chamber, and not the capsule. Ex. 1047, 12:27–31, 13:5–8, 13:21–26, 15:36. Thus, we are not persuaded that the toothed ring is in fact on the bottom side of the flange. which senses the shape of the means 2.4.2. For example, it would be possible, in the present case, for the shape of the teeth and/or the spacing between the same to be sensed. This signal, in turn, is passed to a control means, which frees, for example, the brewing chamber if the capsule is the correct one. Ex. 1047, 14:11–19. Again, despite using a camera to determine if a capsule is “the correct one,” the second German application does not suggest using a barcode in place of the toothed-ring structure, or suggest moving the location of the detection means 2.4.2 from the outer surface to the underside of the flange. This reinforces that the inventors did not contemplate using a barcode in the embodiments depicted in Figures 16–18.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As asserted by Petitioner, Jarisch teaches how to move a code in a centrifugal brewing system to the bottom of the flange and how to configure a light-conductive material so that the detector’s light source will reach the bottom of the flange. Pet. 48–49; Pet. Reply 23–24 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 184–185; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 82–84, Fig. 5). And, although Figure 61 of Yoakim discloses a flare in its brewing chamber, bodily incorporation is not required, and we are directed to no persuasive argument or evidence that Yoakim could not be configured with a straight chamber, as generally depicted in Figure 5 of Jarisch. Pet. Reply 24 (noting that Dr. Howle’s testimony on this subject is “conclusory” and depends on “bodily incorporation”). As such, we credit the testimony of Mr. Jobin that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to place the code at the bottom of the flange and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.17 Ex. 1003 ¶ 184. Patent Owner further contends that Yoakim requires that the capsule holder be capable of receiving a set of multiple volume capsules and that 17 As discussed above, Mr. Jobin has extensive experience in the design of brewing devices. Conversely, Dr. Howle has limited experience in this field and is not one of ordinary skill in the art. Although Mr. Jobin’s testimony is more persuasive regardless of the discrepancy in experience between the two declarants, when this difference in design experience is considered, it only serves to increase the weight we give to Mr. Jobin’s testimony. there is a “snug fit” to avoid “unbalances.” PO Sur-reply 8 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 205, 479, 484, 507, 512). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner does not explain adequately how the use of Jarisch’s “straight chamber” with a capsule holder that does not engage with the side wall of the capsule would allow insertion of the multiple volume capsules or permit a “snug fit.” Id.; PO Resp. 28. Patent Owner’s assertion that Yoakim discloses the use of certain capsules that might not fit into a device with Jarisch’s non-flared structure is ineffective to undercut the sufficiency of Petitioner’s showing on this point. As noted by Patent Owner, Yoakim discloses the use of certain capsules which might not fit into a device with Jarisch’s non-flared structure. But Petitioner is not seeking a bodily incorporation of Yoakim and Jarisch, and other embodiments of Yoakim do not require the type of flared capsule identified by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004, Fig. 63. Moreover, we are directed to no persuasive evidence that Jarisch’s lack of contact between the capsule side wall and the holder would render the device inoperable or even less effective. Id. (citing Ex. 2019, 36:18–37:6; Ex. 1005 ¶ 23 (Jarisch explaining that its device includes a capsule holding means and that the capsule may be successfully driven in rotation). As such, we credit the testimony of Mr. Jobin that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to design the chamber of Yoakim to allow reading of a barcode on the underside of the flange and that this design would allow for successfully receiving single-serve capsules and driving them in rotation. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 182–184; Ex. 1005 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 11,230,430 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,230,430
• Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GmbHAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 10, 2024 · IPR2023-00502 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined disclosures of Yoakim, Jarisch, and Rapparini.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “To obtain the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application, Patent Owner bears the burden of producing evidence to establish where each limitation of the challenged claims is disclosed in a single priority application. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 112 F.3d at 1564; NTP, 654 F.3d at 1276. Petitioner identifies limitations of the challenged claims that are missing from each individual German priority application. Pet. 39–42. Patent Owner responds with no evidence or arguments suggesting that the identified limitations are disclosed in a single application. Resp. 10–12. On this record, no challenged claim is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of any of the three German priority applications; therefore, Jarisch qualifies as prior art under at least 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “In other words, even if we accept that Dr. Howle has some experience designing medical devices and components, and that those experiences represent work designing products similar to mechanical beverage systems, Patent Owner fails to direct the Board to evidence sufficient to establish that this experience, in the aggregate, amounts to “at least five years” or involved “experience with sensors for recognizing identifiers.” Dec. 8 (adopting Patent Owner’s own proposed definition of ordinary skill in the art); see Sur-reply 3 (citing Ex. 1066, 34:16–35:9; Ex. 1067, 101:3–12, 102:30– 104:9; Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 3, 4) (failing to establish adequately, if at all, how Dr. Howle’s qualifications include the requisite minimum five-year period of relevant design experience). Accordingly, we determine that Dr. Howle is not qualified to offer expert testimony from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art in this proceeding.12 Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Federal Circuit has made plain that, “[t]o offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case,” including the issue of patent “validity,” the “witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art.” 12 To be clear, we are not saying that a witness supplying expert opinions must have satisfied the requirements of the level of ordinary skill in the art on or before the priority date of the challenged patent, which Patent Owner seems to understand. See Sur-reply 4–5. Instead, we evaluate whether Dr. Howle had at least the requisite qualifications of a person having ordinary skill in the art by the time he rendered his opinions. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA, Inc., Appeal No. 2023-1627, slip op. at 7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2024) (“[A]n expert can acquire the necessary skill later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention,” however, where “the expert was not a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention may well be used during cross-examination to undermine the credibility of the expert.”); see id., slip op. at 5–6 (affirmatively quoting Kyocera). Id. (Board’s emphasis). “Without that skill, the witness’[s] opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Id. at 1377. “‘Admitting testimony from a person . . . with no skill in the pertinent art serves only to cause mischief and confuse the factfinder.’” That testimony would ‘amount[ ] to nothing more than advocacy from the witness stand.’” Id. (quoting Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Alternatively, even if we accept that Dr. Howle possesses “at least five years” of relevant design experience, on this record, we agree with Petitioner that his opinions are entitled to less weight than those of Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Jobin. Reply 27. Unlike Dr. Howle, Mr. Jobin is a designer by profession, with more than 30 years of industry experience. Reply 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–30). For example, Mr. Jobin designed a home-based beer dispensing system utilizing cartridge identification technologies. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Mr. Jobin also “has substantial experience with sensors for recognizing identifiers.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19; Ex. 1072, 3712–19, 67:22–70:19). Dr. Howle, by contrast, “has never designed a beverage machine.” Reply 22; see generally Sur-reply (declining to contest that assertion).13” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In Petitioner’s contrary view, Jarisch teaches how to move a code in a centrifugal brewing system to the bottom of the flange and how to configure a light-conductive material so that the detector’s light source will reach the bottom of the flange. Pet. 45–46; Reply 21–22 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194–195; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 82–84, Fig. 5). Although Figure 61 of Yoakim discloses a flare in its brewing chamber, bodily incorporation is not required, and we are directed to no persuasive argument or evidence that Yoakim could not be configured with a straight chamber, as depicted in Figure 5 of Jarisch. We credit the testimony of Mr. Jobin that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to place the code at the bottom of the flange and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 184. For reasons explained above, we assign little or no weight to Dr. Howle’s conflicting testimony because he has little or no experience designing a mechanical beverage system or similar product. See supra 10– 16. Petitioner lays out persuasive reasons why Dr. Howle’s testimony, on this particular point, is “conclusory” and rests on “bodily incorporation” of the references. Reply 24; see id. at 22–24 (pointing out with particularity fundamental flaws in Dr. Howle’s opinions); In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”). In addition, Patent Owner contends that Yoakim requires that the capsule holder be capable of receiving a set of multiple volume capsules and that there is a “snug fit” to avoid “unbalances.” Sur-reply 8 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 205, 479, 484, 507, 512). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner does not explain adequately how the use of Jarisch’s “straight chamber” with a capsule holder that does not engage with the side wall of the capsule would allow insertion of multiple volume capsules or permit a “snug fit” in the modified device of Yoakim. Id. at 8–9. Patent Owner’s view that Yoakim discloses the use of certain capsules which might not fit into a device with Jarisch’s non-flared structure is ineffective to undercut the sufficiency of Petitioner’s showing on this point. Petitioner is not seeking a bodily incorporation of Yoakim and Jarisch and, in any event, other embodiments of Yoakim do not require the type of flared capsule identified by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004, Fig. 63. Furthermore, we credit the testimony of Mr. Jobin that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to design the chamber of Yoakim to allow reading of a barcode on the underside of the flange. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 187–195. With respect to the argument that the use of Jarisch’s design would not allow a snug fit, we are directed to no persuasive evidence that Jarisch’s lack of contact between the capsule side wall and the holder would render the device inoperable or less effective. Resp. 39–40; see Reply 22 (citing Ex. 2019, 36:18–37:6). Indeed, as Petitioner points out, Jarisch indicates that its device, including its capsule holding means, allows the capsule to be successfully driven in rotation. Reply 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 23).” slip op. at 49

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “That argument is not persuasive. A reference need not identify or discuss another prior art patent or application in order for that reference to be deemed relevant or analogous art. Nor do we endeavor to determine why, or why not, a particular reference is discussed in a prior art reference. The analogous art inquiry focuses on reasonable pertinence and involves assessing the similarities between the claimed invention and the prior art, including the problems addressed and the closeness of the subject matter, as viewed by an ordinarily skilled artisan. Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (relevant analysis focuses on comparing the disclosed embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention to the disclosures of the prior art). Against that backdrop, we reject Patent Owner’s suggestion that the inquiry involves whether the inventors of Jarisch saw a need to discuss Yoakim’s disclosure in Jarisch’s priority document.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,994,923 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,994,923
• Google LLC / Ecobee, Inc. v. Ecofactor, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 1, 2024 · IPR2020-01504 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1–20 unpatentable as obvious over Wedekind and Ehlers and denied Petitioner’s motion to exclude Dr. Palmer’s testimony.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Circuit held that we erred in construing limitation 1m. According to the Federal Circuit, In sum, both the claim language and the specification support a broader construction than the Board accorded the [1m] limitation. The proper construction of the term must allow for any of the five claimed inputs to potentially be used to calculate another claimed input. We agree, then, with Google’s proposed construction, which simply “require[s] that each of the five inputs be used at some point during the determination of the first time prior to said target time.” Appellant Br. 52 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Id. at 1059 (alteration in original). The Federal Circuit further ordered that we “apply this construction on remand.” Id. Following the issuance of the mandate, we held a conference call with the parties. See Paper 51, 2 (Order on Conduct of Proceedings on Remand). As noted in the previous paragraph, the Federal Circuit instructed us to apply Petitioner’s construction for limitation 1m on remand. Google, 92 F.4th at 1059. Because the construction was implicitly argued in the Petition, the parties had notice and opportunity to be heard. Paper 51, 5. Therefore, in accordance with PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 3,4 we “determine[d] that additional briefing [was] not warranted in this proceeding.” Id. at 4.5 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a 4 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ptab_ sop_3-2023-oct.pdf. 5 Neither party requested to submit additional evidence or have an oral hearing on remand. Ex. 3002 (Email from the parties to the Board). unpatentable.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “On the one hand, Patent Owner’s formulation is attorney argument without any supporting evidence. See PO Resp. 5–6. Although not cited in the Response, when Dr. Palmer testifies to the level of skill in the art, he opinion: EcoFactor contends that a person of ordinary skill in the arts at the time of the invention would have had a (a) bachelor's degree in engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study, and (b) at least 2 years of professional experience in electronic thermostats, HVAC controls, building energy management and controls or other similarly relevant industry experience. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Ex. 2002 ¶ 22 (emphasis added). It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are generally entitled to no probative value. See Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Attorney’s argument is no substitute for evidence.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s proposal is supported by Mr. Shah’s testimony. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–27). Because Mr. Shah’s testimony is based on his years of experience, we give it some weight. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 2–10. Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s formulation, except for the qualifier “at least,” is correct.9” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “After briefing, we issued an order inviting supplemental briefing regarding the preambles of the challenged claims. Paper 28. In the Order, we proposed that the preamble of each of the challenged claims was not limiting. Id. at 2–3. In supplemental briefing, both Petitioner and Patent Owner agreed with that construction. PO Claim Constr. Br. 1; Pet. Claim Constr. Br. 5. We adopt the parties undisputed construction that the preamble of each of the claims is not limiting. In doing so, we conclude that the preamble is not limiting because it is “only a statement of purpose and intended result” and “[t]he expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “s) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Wedekind and Ehlers. 4. Analysis of Claims 2–4, 6–20 Petitioner argues that the combination of Wedekind and Ehlers teaches the limitations recited in claims 2–4 and 6–20 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 61–62, 64–75. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Mr. Shah. See id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own.” slip op. at 61

  Patent outcomesUS 8,498,753 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,498,753
• Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · PGR2020-00071 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · PGR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 10 and 27 unpatentable as obvious over Robinson, Greim, and Adams because skilled artisans would have optimized heater length through routine experimentation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Standard Operating Procedure 3 communicating the parties’ positions on submitting additional briefing on remand. Ex. 3001.2 We responded on April 15, 2024, authorizing the parties to file additional briefs limited to the question of “whether the Federal Circuit’s determinations on written description are applicable to an obviousness analysis, and if so, how they should be applied.” Ex. 3001. Petitioner filed its Supplemental Brief on Remand on April 29, 2024 (Paper 41, “Pet. Supp. Br.”), and Patent Owner filed its Supplemental Reply Brief on Remand on May 13, 2024 (Paper 42, “PO Supp. Reply”). B. The Issue on Remand As part of our Final Written Decision, we determined that Petitioner established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 10 and 27 lack adequate written description support. FWD 38–41. In view of this, we declined to address Petitioner’s arguments that claims 10 and 27 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Robinson,3 Greim,4 and Adams.5” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and three to four years of industry experience, or a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, chemistry, or physics, or a related field, and one to two years of industry experience. Such a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been familiar with electrically powered smoking articles and/or the components and underlying technology used therein. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–30). Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of the trial in this proceeding, [Patent Owner] accepts Petitioner’s proposed education and experience level of the [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 13. In view of the foregoing, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The prior art of record reflects this level of ordinary skill. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[t]he challenged claims are unpatentable under any reasonable construction,” and, “for purposes of this proceeding . . . adopts the plain meaning of the claims and submits that no claim term requires construction.” Pet. 14. Patent Owner contends it was improper for Petitioner to adopt the plain meaning of the claims without explaining what it considers the plain meaning of each claim term to be. PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner does not offer a construction for any claim term. PO Resp. 13. After considering the full record developed during trial, we determine that no claim limitations need an express construction for purposes of resolving the controversy.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Although Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner does not direct us to any disclosure of a heating member having a length that “falls within the claimed range,” such a disclosure in the art is not required for a showing of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 136 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Huang, the claim required a racquet grip comprising a textile layer and a polyurethane layer, and that the ratio of their thicknesses be “larger than approximately 0.18.” Id. at 137. The prior art disclosed a textile layer and polyurethane layer in thickness ratios ranging from 0.111–0.142. Id. at 136. Although the prior art did not disclose a ratio in the claimed range, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s obviousness rejection because the evidence showed that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various thicknesses to obtain an optimum range.” Id. at 139; see In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1955) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process reciting use of 25– 70% sulfuric acid at 40–80 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction with 10% sulfuric acid at 100 degrees); In re Hill, 284 F.2d 955 (CCPA 1960) (affirming an obviousness rejection of a claim to a chemical process conducted at 150–250 degrees when the prior art disclosed the same reaction at 300 degrees). The Federal Circuit also noted that “Huang does not contend that he has achieved unexpected results by increasing the thickness of the polyurethane layer.” Huang, 100 F.3d at 139–140. Those principles apply with equal force to the facts in this case. Here, the evidence of record demonstrates that heaters having a length that spans some percentage of the length of the disposable aerosol forming substance were known in the art. For example, Robinson discloses one embodiment wherein heating element 72 has an elongated portion that extends into tobacco segment 89. Ex. 1006, 27:35–39, Fig. 3. Greim likewise discloses a heating element having some length, which may be inserted into a plug of an aerosol-forming substrate. Ex. 1007, 13, Fig. 4. Adams discloses similar information. Ex. 1008 ¶ 45 (“The axial length of the projection 72 is selected so that it does not extend all the way through the tobacco plug.”), Fig. 7. Following the reasoning in Huang, these disclosures of a heater having some length, albeit not necessarily a length in the claimed range, are sufficient to demonstrate obviousness if there is evidence demonstrating “one of ordinary skill in the art would have experimented with various [lengths] to obtain an optimum range” and there is no evidence that the claimed range provides unexpected results. Huang, 100 F.3d at 139.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,492,542 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,492,542

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.