- LG Electronics, Inc. v. Constellation Designs, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 15, 2023 · IPR2022-01549 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied LG Electronics’ rehearing request, leaving in place its decision denying institution because the Petition did not explain how De Gaudenzi teaches maximizing parallel decode capacity.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented in turn.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“In our Decision, we faulted the Petition for “not sufficiently identify[ing] how De Gaudenzi1 teaches the ‘maximize’ limitation in the independent claims.” Dec. 17. For example, the Petition asserts that De Gaudenzi1 teaches constellation optimization by assignment of labels, but then when explaining how, only states that De Gaudenzi1 “discloses a labelling rule,” that “can be ‘Gray labelling’/‘Gray mapping,’ or ‘the pseudo-Gray labellings.’” Pet. 61; see also Dec. 13–14 (summarizing and quoting the positions in the Petition). As a result, we determined that the Petition “does not sufficiently explain why the existence of a labeling rule maximizes parallel decode capacity,” and that “the record lacks evidence of, and it is Petitioner’s burden to explain, how predetermined constellation point labels are assigned to maximize parallel decode capacity as required by the claim.” Dec. 16, 17.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“attempts to improperly supplement the Petition by advancing two new arguments in the Request: 1) that Gray mapping is “the only specific example labeling scheme disclosed by the ’980 Patent as ‘maximize[ing] the PD capacity’ used in ‘[a]ll the PD optimized PAM constellations.’ EX1001, 10:18-20;” and 2) that “Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Caire, in his own work (EX1013 cited by De Gaudenzi1 and Petition) states that ‘we conjecture that Gray labeling maximizes BICM capacity.’ EX1013, 6.” Req. 12. Neither of these arguments are in the Petition. The Request does not cite to the Petition in making these arguments. The Request does later cite to pages 14 and 63 of the Petition, implying support for these arguments. However, neither page makes these arguments, or even cites to the portions of the references cited in the Request. Thus, we do not consider these new arguments, as Petitioner has not shown they were previously presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,567,980 - Berkeley Lights, Inc. v. The University Of British ColumbiaRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 20, 2023 · IPR2021-01249 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Berkeley Lights’ rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in its prior decision that claims 1, 6, 11, 16, 19, 24, 26, 27, and 30 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2022). There is an abuse of discretion if we have made “a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or in basing [our] decision on an error of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In a request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a 1 We further refer to Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 18, “PO Resp.”), Petitioner’s Reply to the Patent Owner Response (Paper 22, “Pet. Reply”), and Patent Owner’s Sur-reply (Paper 29, “PO Sur-reply”). decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in the record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“light of the background knowledge in the art. In particular, we found that Petitioner had not adequately shown that the background knowledge in the art would have been sufficient to inform a person of ordinary skill in the art how to apply the techniques such as “laser tweezers” that Dimov mentions briefly, in a way that would have allowed further analyses of cells outside Dimov’s device. See Dec. 29–31. We also found that Petitioner had not persuasively shown that modifying Dimov’s device to make its trenches accessible with a micropipette was within the background knowledge in the art at the time of the claimed invention. See Dec. 31–34.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner points to only one brief mention, in its Petition, of piercing the top layer of Dimov’s device to retrieve cells with a micropipette. Id. at 6 (citing Pet. 40). That argument was not backed by any evidence other than a conclusory statement by Dr. Meinhart repeating the argument in the Petition. Pet. 40; Ex. 1002 ¶ 120. We do not credit that testimony because it lacks factual support. Xerox Corp v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (the testimony of a declarant that merely repeats, verbatim, conclusory assertions from a petition, without citing additional supporting evidence or providing technical reasoning to support the testimony, is entitled to little weight). In particular, to the extent that Petitioner argues on rehearing that Dimov’s top layer could have been pierced successfully by a micropipette because it was only 40 microns thick, Petitioner did not properly make this argument during trial or provide adequate evidentiary support.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Although Dr. Meinhart briefly mentions this in his declaration (see Ex. 1039 ¶ 192), Petitioner has not shown that it made this argument during trial, except to the extent that Petitioner improperly incorporated it by reference from Dr. Meinhart’s declaration. See Reply 24 (citing Ex. 1039 ¶¶ 190–196); 37 CFR § 42.6(a)(3). In any event, we do not credit Dr. Meinhart’s testimony on this point because he provides no factual support. See Ex. 1039 ¶ 192; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). As Patent Owner pointed out in its Sur-Reply, Dr. Meinhart acknowledged at deposition that increasing the spot size would have reduced the lateral gradient force of the levitation laser. PO Sur-reply 23 (citing Ex. 2013, 344:18–345:5). We agree with Patent Owner that “Dr. Meinhart . . . did not consider how this reduction in force would have affected the laser’s ability to levitate a cell in Park’s well successfully (especially with cultured cells through Park’s recirculation pattern).” Id.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,087,408 - Apple Inc. v. Identity Security LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 15, 2022 · IPR2022-00171 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving the denial of institution for claims 1–4, 12, and 13 unchanged because Apple showed no abuse of discretion or overlooked matter.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. THE REQUEST FOR REHEARING On request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a surreply.” Id. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“conclusions on the basis that Dr. Russ’s testimony is conclusory. Id. at 11. We disagree. We indicated in the Decision Denying Institution that Dr. Neuman’s testimony is conclusory. Dec. 22. For instance, Dr. Neuman testifies that the modifications that would have been needed for Petitioner’s proposed combination would have been “straightforward.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Dr. Neuman’s testimony, however, is simply a conclusory statement without persuasive, supporting explanation or evidence. Id. As we indicated in the Decision Denying Institution, “Petitioner does not indicate or provide evidence supporting that the proposed modifications would have been made without introducing complexities.” Dec. 24. “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Decision to Institute as relating to only convenience. Req. 1–2, 8–11. In the Decision Denying Institution, we explained that Petitioner’s reasons to combine are insufficient because “Petitioner does not address the full teachings of Gullman.” Dec. 22, 25. We stated “[c]ontrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 33; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81) and consistent with Patent Owner’s position and Dr. Russ’s testimony that Gullman’s system eliminates the risk of the biometric template and input from being stolen during transmission (Ex. 2001 ¶ 119), Gullman describes its system as ‘secure,’ providing ‘secure identification,’ and, importantly, as providing ‘[t]ransmission security.’” Dec. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:46–56). We particularly noted (id. at 23) Gullman’s teachings as follows: The method and apparatus of the present invention have significant advantages over known security systems. Reliable and secure identification is provided which eliminates the need for the user to memorize a code or carry a printed memorandum of the code. Transmission security is provided which is convenient, secure and useful on existing access devices of host systems in current use. In particular, the method and apparatus obviate the need for specially-designed hardware additions or modifications to existing access devices. Ex. 1004, 6:46–56. As we noted in the Decision to Institute, the Petition did not address Gullman’s teaching that its system provides “significant advantages” over known, more complex systems, which might have led an ordinarily skilled artisan away from using Padgett’s more complicated hashing process. Dec. 23–24.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,020,008 - Solvay USA Inc. v. Worldsource Enterprises, LLC, Eco Agro Resources LLC, And Eco World Group LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 1, 2021 · IPR2020-00768 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR on claims 1–17 in place because it found no abuse of discretion under § 325(d).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a 1 Patent Owner originally filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 7) that violated the word count limit in our rules. After conferring with Petitioner and the Board, Patent Owner filed a truncated version of Paper 7 that deletes the text that exceeded the word count limit at the end of the document to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(b)(1). Paper 9. For purposes of this Decision, any references or citations to the Preliminary Response refer to the truncated document filed as Paper 9. decision on a petition, the decision will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Owner does not clearly identify what matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and where those matters were previously addressed. Instead, it simply repeats arguments and information we have already considered and which we used to form the basis for our determination in the Institution Decision. To the extent Patent Owner believes we did not assign the appropriate weight to events that occurred during prosecution of the parent application of the ’231 patent, we note that Patent Owner’s own arguments derived from that information are based on speculation about what is a “more probable” explanation for the Examiner’s conduct. Rather than rely on speculation about the Examiner’s conduct during prosecution of the parent application, we based our determination on facts derived from the prosecution history of the ’231 patent itself. In that regard, we maintain that “[t]he record does not reflect any substantive consideration of CN400 during prosecution of the ’231 patent, including any consideration of CN400 in combination with Iannotta or Kolc, as presented in the Petition.” Dec. 9 (emphasis added). Nothing in Patent Owner’s recitation of undisputed facts persuasively contradicts this determination. Req. Reh’g 8.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Nevertheless, even if we were to give weight to Patent Owner’s argument that “it is more probable that the Examiner believed CN400 could not be properly combined” with Kolc and Iannotta, the outcome here would not change. As set forth in our Institution Decision, we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertions that CN400 is non-analogous art that would not be combinable with Kolc and Iannotta. Dec. 19, 24–25. Thus, to the extent Patent Owner contends the Examiner believed CN400 could not be combined with Kolc and Iannotta for the same reasons Patent Owner presented in its Preliminary Response, we would consider such hypothetical reasoning by the Examiner to involve a misapprehension of the specific teachings of the relevant prior art, which would constitute material error. See Advanced Bionics, 8.” slip op. at 7
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“Iannotta is prior art. Reh’g Req. 10. In presenting its arguments, however, Patent Owner acknowledges “[t]his issue was not argued in the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response,” and is based on new information Patent Owner became aware of since the filing date of its Sur-reply. Req. Reh’g 9. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Moreover, Patent Owner has not directed us to any matters that we overlooked or misapprehended, and the place where those matters were previously addressed. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,301,231 - Smartmatic USA Corp. v. Election Systems & Software, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 30, 2020 · IPR2019-00531 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartmatic’s rehearing request, leaving intact the determination that original claim 16 and substitute claims 21–29 were not shown unpatentable over Johnson and Cummings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Specifically, “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). Petitioner’s First Argument” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“As an initial matter, we disagree that we misapprehended Petitioner’s proffered basis for modifying the teachings of Johnson. Req. 1–2, 4–9. Our Decision makes clear that we understood the challenge as it was presented by Petitioner. For example, we expressly stated that “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the teachings of Johnson with those of Cummings at the time of the invention to provide options for either depositing the paper ballot or returning it to the voter,” and quoted Petitioner’s proffered rationale for doing so––i.e., because “a voter may wish to receive his or her printed ballot if it were incorrectly marked in order to gain assurance that the ballot will not be mistakenly counted during a recount or audit of the paper ballots.” Dec. 18. We also characterized Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as being “over the combined teachings of Johnson and Cummings” and noted how the Petition “set[s] forth the [asserted] obviousness rationale and expectation of successfully modifying the teachings of Johnson with those of Cummings.” Id. at 14–15; see also id. at 17–18 (summarizing Cummings’ teachings); id. at 19–20 (identifying “Petitioner’s proffered modification” as “adding Cummings’ ‘ballot return’ feature to Johnson’s device”). Ultimately, we determined Petitioner failed to show that “the skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the proffered modification to the teachings of Johnson,” and “[i]n particular,” had not shown such artisan “would have modified Johnson to provide a voter with options for either depositing a physical ballot to a ballot box or returning the ballot to the voter.” Id. at 25. Notably, the language in our Decision (id.) tracks, almost verbatim, Petitioner’s proffered motivation for modifying Johnson’s teachings with those of Cummings to arrive at the subject matter of claim 16 (Pet. 57). Petitioner’s emphasis of our use of the phrase “considering Johnson’s teachings as a whole” (Req. 4) reflects a misunderstanding of the context in which this statement was used. Dec. 25. Specifically, this statement was part of an introductory paragraph summarizing the deficiencies in Petitioner’s case, and does not indicate that we focused solely on the teachings of Johnson in assessing the strength of Petitioner’s challenge. Indeed, as the Decision goes on to explain, a detailed analysis of Johnson’s teachings was necessary to determine how the skilled artisan would have viewed Johnson’s silence on the specifics of processing its segregated paper ballots “that have not been approved by the voter.” Ex. 1002, 6:56–60; see Dec. 26 (“According to Petitioner, ‘Johnson does not teach never providing the voter with a ballot.’ Reply 15. Petitioner thus appears to argue that Johnson’s lack of physical access to the printed ballot does not apply to every step in Johnson’s voting process.”). To discern how the skilled artisan would have viewed Johnson’s teachings, we stressed that we are required to consider Johnson’s teachings as a whole, which we did. Dec. 26 (noting that even though Johnson may be silent on specific teachings regarding how to handle disapproved paper ballots, that fact “does not negate our obligation to consider the teachings of the Johnson reference as a whole.” (citing In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); id. at 25–27 (finding “Johnson repeatedly stresses the voter’s inaccessibility to the physical ballot” and that Johnson “when considered as a whole––does not suggest that a voter should be given physical possession of the inaccurate or disapproved ballots after it is segregated”). Only after we undertook this factual inquiry into the full scope and content of Johnson’s teachings were we then able to conclude, as a matter of law, that the claims would not have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Johnson and Cummings. Dec. 34, 41–42; In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009 (“The teachings of a prior art reference are underlying factual questions in the obviousness inquiry.”).” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“(Ex. 1023) and US 2005/0035199 (Ex. 1038), which purportedly “corroborates Dr. Bederson’s testimony as to why a [skilled artisan] would have been motivated to make the proposed modification of Johnson,” we disagree. Req. 6–7. The Decision addresses Chung specifically (Dec. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1023)) and furthermore explains why we ascribed little weight to Dr. Bederson’s testimonial evidence regarding how election audits are carried out (id. at 32–33). Regarding Chung, in the Decision we noted a key difference in how ballots were handled in Chung’s voting system vis-à-vis Johnson’s system–– i.e., “where the paper ballot remains inaccessible to the voter [Johnson], and Chung’s system where the paper ballot is given to a voter in the first instance.” Id. at 27–28. This difference is not to be understated because Petitioner tried to establish similarities between Johnson and Chung to support its argument that Johnson’s disclosure is “consistent with other voting machines that, for some period of time prevent the voter from accessing the ballot, only to later return the ballot to the voter.” Reply 11. Our Decision reflects the reasons we rejected that argument after considering Johnson’s disclosure as a whole. See Dec. 25–31. Specifically, based on the differences between the Johnson and Chung systems, we found Petitioner’s reliance on Chung to lack sufficient probative value. Id. at 27– 28; Ex. 1023, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 86, 99. And while our Decision does not specifically mention US 2005/0035199 (Ex. 1038), we note that Petitioner cited this exhibit in support of Dr. Bederson’s testimonial evidence regarding how election audits are carried out. Reply 24; Ex. 1024 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1038 ¶ 35, and opining “there is no reason all of Johnson’s ballots must be collected to conduct an audit of an election.”). Our Decision makes clear, however, that we ascribed little weight to Dr. Bederson’s opinion on such matters and explained our rationale for doing so. Dec. 32–33 (citing Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); id. at 45 (according this disputed evidence “minimal weight”).” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,096,471 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2020 · IPR2020-00846 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended arguments and no abuse of discretion in instituting review.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that the Institution Decision should be modified is on Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“not be persuasive. We do not view the circumstances to have changed materially. The record still is unclear as to whether the Texas court has set a trial date. Staff at the Texas court has indicated that Patent Owner “may use 7/12/2021 as the scheduled trial date” for a group of trials that will include Petitioners (Ex. 2018, 1), but the record does not indicate that the Texas court has issued any orders to that effect. final decision to assess the weight to be accorded a trial date set earlier than the expected final written decision date. This proximity inquiry is a proxy for the likelihood that the trial court will reach a decision on validity issues before the Board reaches a final written decision. A trial set to occur soon after the institution decision is fairly likely to happen prior to the Board’s final decision, even if the trial date were postponed due to intervening circumstances. Here, however, a July 12, 2021, trial date would be approximately three months before our final written decision is due. Even considering the allegedly changed circumstances raised by Patent Owner, there is at least some persuasive evidence that delays are possible. In these circumstances, the efficiency and system integrity concerns that animate the Fintiv analysis are not as strong—all other things being equal. Accordingly, even if we were to consider Patent Owner’s new arguments, this factor still would be, at best, neutral to whether we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. For the same reasons, our analysis of Fintiv factor 5 also would remain unchanged.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,076,431 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2020 · IPR2020-00847 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place because it found no overlooked matter or abuse of discretion in its Fintiv analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that the Institution Decision should be modified is on Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Fintiv factor 2 looks at the proximity of the trial date to the date of our final decision to assess the weight to be accorded a trial date set earlier than the expected final written decision date. This proximity inquiry is a proxy for the likelihood that the trial court will reach a decision on validity issues before the Board reaches a final written decision. A trial set to occur soon after the institution decision is fairly likely to happen prior to the Board’s circumstances. Here, however, a July 12, 2021, trial date would be approximately three months before our final written decision is due. Even considering the allegedly changed circumstances raised by Patent Owner, there is at least some persuasive evidence that delays are possible. In these circumstances, the efficiency and system integrity concerns that animate the Fintiv analysis are not as strong—all other things being equal. Accordingly, even if we were to consider Patent Owner’s new arguments, this factor still would be, at best, neutral to whether we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition. For the same reasons, our analysis of Fintiv factor 5 also would remain unchanged.” slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,451,084 - Apple Inc. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · IPR2020-00687 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no misapprehension or abuse of discretion in instituting review despite the asserted changes in the Texas case.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that the Institution Decision should be modified is on Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“The circumstances have not changed materially in the Texas court. Although a motion to stay has been filed, the Texas court has not ruled on it. Accordingly, Patent Owner still asks us to speculate as to how the Texas court might rule. We decline to speculate, and instead determine that this factor remains neutral. See Sand Revolution, Paper 24 at 7; Fintiv II, Paper 15 at 12.” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not make this argument in its Preliminary Response or Sur-reply; thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked it. For that reason alone, Patent Owner’s new argument is improper and insufficient. Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the argument, it would not be persuasive.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,451,084 - Apple Inc. v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · IPR2020-00686 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no misapprehension, overlooked argument, or abuse of discretion in instituting review.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2019). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burden of showing that the Institution Decision should be modified is on Patent Owner, the party challenging the Decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). In addition, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Although a motion to stay has been filed, the Texas court has not ruled on it. Accordingly, Patent Owner still asks us to speculate as to how the Texas court might rule. We decline to speculate, and instead determine that this factor remains neutral. See Sand Revolution, Paper 24 at 7; Fintiv II, Paper 15 at 12.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,076,431 - ZTE (USA), Inc. / LG Electronics Inc. v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-01203 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied CyWee’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision allowing joined petitioner LGE to oppose CyWee’s revised motion to amend.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsDecided for petitioner
“In our Rehearing Decision, we determined that “the adversarial system is better served if we allow a Petitioner to raise [statutory, regulatory, or patentability] issues in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend.” Reh’g Dec. 8. Therefore, we held that LGE may present arguments and evidence, independently from ZTE, in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend, and that LGE may request an oral hearing limited solely to the issues raised in the Revised Motion to Amend. Id. at 9.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,441,438
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.