- NEC Corporation / Nokia Corporation et al. v. Neptune Subsea IP LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2019 · IPR2018-01157 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamamoto and Nishimoto; the Chowdhury and Webb grounds, with or without Tanaka162, do not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that each of claims 13–20 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties submit and we agree that there is no need to construe any term to resolve the issues in this decision. See Pet. 7–9; PO Resp. 6; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“e. Summary For the reasons described above, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have had reason to combine Yamamoto’s and Nishimoto’s teachings as asserted by Petitioner and that the combination teaches all of claim 13’s limitations. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 13 would have been obvious over Yamamoto and Nishimoto.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“tunable compensators is a contingent argument, applicable only if one reads claim 13 to require a certain transmission rate. PO Resp. 21–25. We do not read Petitioner’s argument as so constrained. Rather, we understand Petitioner to argue that a desire for higher transmission speeds would drive skilled artisans to use solutions such as Nishimoto’s tunable compensators, particularly in light of Nishimoto’s guidance regarding the ability to achieve high speeds with the system. See Pet. 21–23. In that regard, we agree with Petitioner that the increase in transmission rates from Yamamoto’s to Nishimoto’s disclosures would have given skilled artisans reason to consider Nishimoto’s teachings. Pet. Reply 16–18 (citing Ex. 1005 8:9–11; Ex. 1007, 12:37–39). As Petitioner points out, Nishimoto specifically discloses that higher-speed transmissions were more sensitive to dispersion. Pet. Reply 17 n.9. Thus, we find the desire for higher transmission speeds and the need for techniques such as taught by Nishimoto would have given skilled artisans reasons to combine Nishimoto’s disclosure regarding dispersion compensation with Yamamoto’s system to achieve Yamamoto’s goals regarding the dispersion maps for multiple channels. Further, Petitioner does not rest entirely on the desire for high-speed operation. Petitioner argues also that using Nishimoto’s adjustable compensators and feedback control would “yield an improved WDM system capable of automatic compensation for degradation of the optical signal waveform caused by both wavelength dispersion and polarization mode dispersion of the optical transmission path, resulting in further reduced size and cost.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 99, 101; Ex. 1007, 3:41–60, 4:3–58, Figs. 17, 20, 21), 29–30 (quoting Ex. 1007, Abstract, 3:37–40, 6:56–64, 7:53–56, 11:41–46, 17:53–55, 17:59–60; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–115); accord id. at 14 (quoting Ex. 1007, 3:19–25). Patent Owner recognizes that basis for the combination but argues that the record lacks evidence to support Petitioner’s claim of reduced size and cost. PO Resp. 25–26. Patent Owner does not contest that the modification would give Yamamoto’s system the ability to automatically compensate for signal degradation from dispersion. Nishimoto discloses that as transmission speeds increase, “changes in wavelength dispersion characteristics due to temperature changes of optical fiber; and the influence by polarization mode dispersion” both “can not be neglected,” therefore requiring a system for automatically compensating for wavelength dispersion and polarization mode dispersion,” as taught by Nishimoto. Ex. 1007, 1:34–41. We find that a skilled artisan would have had reason to make the combination because the system would gain capability for automatic compensation. Regarding reduced size and cost resulting from the combination, Patent Owner does not provide any contrary evidence and we conclude that Nishimoto’s statements regarding the benefit of its invention also would have motivated skilled artisans to make the combination. See Ex. 1007, 3:17–26 (“to thereby provide a dispersion compensating apparatus of reduced sizes at a reduced cost”).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 8,351,798 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,351,798 - Mexichem UK Ltd. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 12, 2019 · IPR2019-00529 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–11, and it declined to institute the remaining grounds under § 314(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Resp. 7–8. Patent Owner contends that “a POSITA is a person with a masters or doctorate degree in chemistry and/or chemical engineering, and having at least 3 years of experience working on the research, development, manufacture and formulations of HFC, HCFC and HFO compounds and mixtures.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 23). Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Thrasher testifies, however, that he has “reviewed Dr. Sandford’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art” and his opinions “do not change under Dr. Sandford’s definition.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 24. We agree with the parties that a POSITA would have had an advanced degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, and experience in the research, development, and/or manufacture of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) and hydrofluoroolefins (HFO), which is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions, and we note that our conclusions would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (applicable to inter partes reviews filed on or after November 13, 2018). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner does not propose a construction for any of the claim terms. Pet. 21–22. For purposes of this Decision, based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires explicit construction.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“sufficiently establishes that Rao ’434, Rao ’781, and Rao ’597 disclose compositions comprising HFO-1234yf, 3,3,3-trifluoropropyne, and at least one additional compound, as recited in independent claims 1, and 7 of the ’709 patent, or compositions comprising HFC-245eb, 3,3,3- trifluoropropyne, and at least one additional compound as recited in independent claim 11 of the ’709 patent. The ’709 patent states that the examples present a “general procedure [that] is illustrative of the method used for analyzing the products of fluorination reactions.” Ex. 1001, 12:30– 33. Examples 1, 2, and 3 of the ’709 patent use that procedure to measure the reaction product of (1) vapor phase dehydrofluorination of HFC-245eb to HFO-1234 with fluoride alumina catalyst, (2) pyrolysis of HFC-245eb, and (3) liquid phase dehydrofluorination of HFC-245eb to HFC-1234yf, respectively. Id. at 13:1–14:16. Although the ’709 patent provides the amounts of a number of different reaction products detected in each example, i.e., HFO-1234yf, HFO-1234ze, and HFC-245eb, notably absent is a measurement for 3,3,3-trifluoropropyne. Id. There is no indication, therefore, that the products in the examples of the ’709 patent represent the claimed compositions of the ’709 patent, each of which requires the presence of 3,3,3-trifluoropropyne.” slip op. at 15
- Burden
“this result. An experiment reproducing or recreating an example falls within the scope of that example so long as the reproduction is consistent with the teachings of the example, any deviations are immaterial, and the reasons for any deviations are adequately explained. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Epic Pharma, LLC, 811 F.3d 1345, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding “no clear error” in the district court’s determination that the prior art application’s process was recreated “fairly, accurately, and with no material variation”); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1047 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding no error in the district court’s determination that one skilled in the art would have understood that testing departing from the “strict letter” of a prior art example was nonetheless consistent with that example). Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that its replication of Rao ’434’s example falls within the scope of the example.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,147,709 - Ditec Solutions, LLC v. Woblleworks, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 13, 2019 · IPR2018-01414 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Ditech’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because the arguments did not show that the Board misapprehended or overlooked its construction of claims 1 and 13.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. THE REQUEST FOR REHEARING In pertinent part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“held cake decorator extruder” as “a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device” in the ʼ444 patent’s Notice of Allowance. Req. 4; Ex. 1002, 344. When viewed in context, however, we do not share Petitioner’s view that the Examiner’s mere characterization of Young’s extruder as a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device, on its own, rises to the level of a “rejection” of Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing 3D drawing devices from devices that deposit material in layers over time. Ex. 1002, 317–322.2 In fact, the Examiner provides no discussion whatsoever regarding the “three-dimensional” aspect of Young’s device in the Notice of Allowance, but rather focuses on Young’s internal actuators, motor, and gear train. Id. at 344. Thus, the Examiner’s isolated statement that Young’s device is a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device, without more, is not enough to 2 We disagree with Petitioner’s contention (Req. 5) that Patent Owner’s statements made during prosecution were not sufficiently “clear and unmistakable” to invoke the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining how “explicit statements made by a patent applicant during prosecution to distinguish a claimed invention over prior art may serve to narrow the scope of a claim” because “[b]y distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover.”). persuade us that the Examiner was unequivocally rejecting Patent Owner’s construction of “a three-dimensional (3D) drawing device.”” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Thus, Petitioner’s Request raises new arguments that could have been raised in its Petition. Specifically, the prosecution histories of both the ʼ444 patent and the ʼ266 application provided ample notice to Petitioner of Patent Owner’s previous claim construction positions. Petitioner could have presented a countervailing claim construction argument in its Petition, but instead raises new arguments here in its Request. These new arguments fail the standard set forth in Rule 42.71(d) at the outset because the Board cannot overlook or misapprehend an argument that was not before it. Nevertheless, we determine that even if these arguments were timely made in the Petition or in a Board-authorized Reply, they do not persuade us that the claim construction for the phrase “three-dimensional (3D) drawing device” as set forth in our Decision was erroneous. Dec. 11.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,731,444 - HTC Corporation / HTC America, Inc. v. Invt Spe LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01556 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claim 4 was obvious over Padovani and Gils.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“B. Principles of Law In an inter partes review, “the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied on). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Although Petitioner contends “a POSITA would have been motivated to provide greater protection for the decimal integer portion (an error in which would be magnified versus an error in the decimal fraction portion)” in Padovani (Pet. 33), Petitioner does not identify any passage or combination of passages in Padovani that teaches or suggests providing, or even the need to provide, greater protection for one decimal portion than the other decimal portion, let alone by using “different coding schemes for the different parts.” Id. As Patent Owner asserts, “Padovani discloses using a single code to encode the DRC message[,]” and “does not teach using multiple codes to encode different portions of the DRC message.” Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1009, 45:20–22 (emphasis added)). We recognize that Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Min, testifies that, “by virtue of Padovani contemplating the use of an (n,k) coding scheme,” the POSITA “would have naturally sought out similar coding schemes [as those of Gils] to protect DRC messages.” See Pet. 41 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 156). Dr. Min further testifies that “a POSITA would have been motivated to provide greater protection for certain bits by selecting appropriate code words generated by one or more of the coding schemes contemplated by Gils,” and thus, use “different coding schemes for the different parts.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 132. Dr. Min’s testimony, however, does not address adequately why one of ordinary skill in the art would have used together different coding schemes from Gils, let alone a separate scheme for certain bits over the other bits. As Dr. Min testifies, “a single UEP coding scheme could also be used depending upon how a POSITA would have wanted to implement unequal error protection.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 132; see Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 132). As such, Dr. Min acknowledges that a single unequal error protection coding scheme could be used as well as applying different coding schemes to different parts of a message. Here, Dr. Min’s testimony that a single unequal error protection coding scheme could be used further undermines Petitioner’s position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used the different coding schemes for different parts as set forth in Gils. Thus, Dr. Min’s testimony does not adequately explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have applied different coding schemes from Gils to the DRC message of Padovani, much less in the manner proposed by Petitioner, of providing greater protection for the decimal integer portion than the decimal fraction portion, especially when Padovani discloses “using a single code to encode the DRC message.” See Prelim. Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1009, 45:20–22).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Here, for these reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence from prior art references or Dr. Min’s declaration testimony to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used Gils’s techniques to encode Padovani’s DRC message in the manner required by the claims—such that the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors. Petitioner also has not demonstrated articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, we conclude that Petitioner used improper hindsight to reconstruct the claimed subject matter by using the claims as a guide to combine the prior art references. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize- Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.’” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Moreover, Dr. Min’s contention that “[t]he nature of binary numbers (or other base-x number systems) means that the leftmost bit of any binary number is the most significant bit” (Ex. 1017 ¶ 154) is conclusory. As Patent Owner points out, “Dr Min’s declaration, however, merely repeats the allegations of the Petition without any explanation or citation to any supporting or corroborating evidence.” Prelim. Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 154). That is, “[t]here is no proffered evidence that it was well understood by a POSITA at the time that the leftmost bit in binary numbers, and specifically in the DRC message of Padovani, is the ‘most significant bit.’” Prelim. Resp. 20. For that reason, we give little weight to Dr. Min’s uncorroborated testimony that “the leftmost bit of any binary number is the most significant bit.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations[.]”).” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,206,587 - Apple Inc. / Zte(Usa) Inc. v. Invt Spe LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 5, 2019 · IPR2018-01474 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claim 4 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Bender and Piret rendered it obvious; claim 3 had been statutorily disclaimed.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claim 4 would have been obvious over Bender and Piret. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (To prevail in an inter partes review that has been instituted, “the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’587 patent challenged in the Petition. IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged claims of the ’587 patent, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 17
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“We agree with Patent Owner. “A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.” Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri–Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477 (1935)). An inter partes review cannot be instituted on claims that have been disclaimed and no longer exist. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). This conclusion is consistent with other panel decisions addressing this issue. See, e.g., Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Ethicon LLC, Case IPR2018-00935, Paper 9, 9–10 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2018); Vestas-Am. Wind Tech. Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., Case IPR2018-01015, Paper 9, 12–14 (PTAB Nov. 14, 2018). Accordingly, we treat claim 3 as having never been part of the ’587 patent, and do not institute inter partes review on this claim. As discussed above, we regard claim 4 as the only challenged claim. See Sections I.A and I.E.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“Accordingly, a plain reading of the reference does not support a finding that Bender teaches or suggests that the FEC scheme is used to encode the SNR itself. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Bender’s FEC description would have provided reason to look to Piret’s encoding techniques for encoding Bender’s “quality” information. That is, although we agree with the Petitioner that Piret teaches and suggests a method of encoding less significant bits differently from the more significant bits of each data word, wherein the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors (Ex. 1005, 1:20–33), that alone is insufficient to support a conclusion of obviousness of providing an encoder that encodes Bender’s SNR “quality” information, as required by claim 4. That Piret discloses encoding transmitted information does not address the requirements set forth in KSR to provide articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. That is, the Petitioner’s obviousness position does not explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have encoded the SNR value in Bender, which may not even be transmitted, using Piret’s encoding method. Indeed, Petitioner does not direct us to persuasive evidence that encoding the SNR value would have been expected to provide any advantage, outside the teachings of the ’587 patent. Here, for these reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence from prior art references or Dr. Singer’s declaration testimony to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used Piret’s techniques to encode Bender’s SNR values in the manner required by the claims—such that the most significant bit of the plurality of bits is encoded to be less susceptible to errors. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, we conclude that Petitioner used improper hindsight to reconstruct the claimed subject matter by using the claims as a guide to combine the prior art references. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction by using ‘the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. In that regard, Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Singer, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ʼ587 Patent’s invention would have been a person having a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent plus three years of experience working with wireless communication systems or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering with an emphasis on communication systems or the equivalent plus one year of experience working with digital communication systems or in network engineering. Pet. 6; Ex. 1003 ¶ 39. At this juncture, Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Singer’s assessment on the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the current record, we apply Dr. Singer’s assessment for purposes of this Decision. We also note that the prior art of record currently in the instant proceeding is consistent with this level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,206,587
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.