- Energysource Minerals, LLC v. Terralithium LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2021 · IPR2019-01603 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied EnergySource’s rehearing request, finding no overlooked or misapprehended arguments or evidence that warranted changing the final written decision on claims 1–18.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“In that regard, Petitioner contends that Christopher’s “aging process resulted in a reduction in ‘at least one elemental component’ (i.e., silica).” Pet. Reply 5–6 (emphasis added). However, this is not buttressed with any evidence. Petitioner has not presented any evidence showing Christopher’s “aging” process reduces “the concentration of at least one … elemental component” to support its contention that Christopher’s brine of Table 1 is a “treated” brine as claimed. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has not shown that the “treated” brine of the claims reads on Christopher’s “aged” brine by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentable
“The Petition discusses Grounds I and II on pages 27–30 of the Petition. Ground I challenges the patentability of claims 1–20 as anticipated by Christopher and Ground II challenges the patentability of claims 1–20 as anticipated and/or obvious over Christopher. Reading pages 27–30 it is plainly evident that it is focused on making the case that Christopher discloses all that is claimed. It is devoid of any reasoning with respect to the obviousness of the claims over Christopher. The Graham factors are not addressed. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The differences between the claimed invention and Christopher are not identified and no rationale as to why one of ordinary skill would have been led to modify Christopher to reach the claimed subject matter is provided. Rather, the entire discussion goes to explaining why, in fact, Christopher discloses all that is claimed. The Board was consistent with that position. Petitioner cites page 12–14 of the Reply as evidence that an obviousness challenge was presented. We disagree. The Reply does not add anything significant to the obviousness challenge presented in the Petition. The Reply is likewise devoid of any reasoning with respect to the obviousness of the claims over Christopher. It repeats that “Christopher teaches using air oxidation and pH modification to selectively precipitate silica, iron, and other heavy metals from a Salton Sea geothermal brine” (Reply 13, emphasis added), where “a POSITA could readily ‘tune’ these parameters to produce the desired results if such were not obtained immediately.” Id. The Board addressed that argument. See Dec. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyOther
“Petitioner cites footnote 3 [sic. 1] in the Petition but it merely states “mg/kg=(g/L*1000)/1.18kg/L due to the density of Salton Sea geothermal brines.” There is no evidence cited to support it. Petitioner cites “Reply, 3; Ex. 2025, 337:5-9” and “337:5-13” (Req. 6) but the Reply does not cite to those lines in Dr. Gallup’s Declaration. See Pet. Reply 3 (“Ex. 2025, 336:3-5-337:2”). We were unable to locate these lines of testimony in the Reply. The Board could not have misapprehended or overlooked evidence demonstrating Petitioner’s 1.18 kg/L density that was not before it.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,644,126 - Energysource Minerals, LLC v. Terralithium LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2021 · IPR2019-01602 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied EnergySource Minerals’ rehearing request, leaving undisturbed the final written decision that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“to ppm by weight” (Req. 8) was not before us, therefore, we could not have overlooked it. Nevertheless, even if we take account of this new argument, the discussion on page 4 of the Reply does not support Petitioner’s position that one ordinary skill in the art reading Christopher would have no other choice but to understand “1.0” “PPM” (Ex. 1006, 42) to mean parts–per– weight. This is so because Petitioner concedes that “ppm can generally be reported as either by weight or by volume.” Req. 8. This is consistent with Dr. Gallup’s testimony. See Dec. 18: According to Patent Owner, “Dr. Gallup explained [that] ppm may be reported as ppm by weight or ppm by volume. (Ex. 2025, 119:16-25; Ex. 2002, ¶64).” Id. [PO Resp. 20] Because we are directed to no evidence contradicting it, we credit Dr. Gallup’s testimony that ppm can be reported by weight or by volume. Given this, one of ordinary skill in the art reading that iron is at a concentration of “1.0 ppm” for stream 3 in Figure 20 may understand it to refer to ppm by volume. Notwithstanding the discussion on page 4 of the Reply that the “general convention” for ppm is that it is weight based, the evidence before us showed, as Petitioner concedes, that ppm can “generally be reported” (Req. 8) by weight or volume. Thus, as we determined, it is possible that one of ordinary skill in the art may understand “ppm” in Figure 20 to “refer to ppm by volume” (Dec. 18).” slip op. at 12
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Regarding Petitioner’s assertion that “[d]uring these proceedings, Petitioner has submitted that when Christopher reduces silica, it necessarily also reduces the elemental components of silicon (Si) and oxygen (O2)” (Req. Sur–Reply 1), this is not a position that Petitioner had previously taken. Rather, Petitioner’s position was only that “Christopher states the silica concentration is reduced.” Pet. 23; cf. Pet. Reply 8–9. A rehearing request is not an opportunity to raise new arguments. We could not have overlooked or misapprehended an argument not raised prior to our decision.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“brine (Pet. 22; Dec. 7), Petitioner had to show that “the brine of Table 1 must ‘have been processed such that the concentration of at least one metal or elemental component has been reduced in the brine.’ Ex. 1001, 7:18–21.” Dec. 9 (emphasis added). As noted in our Decision: In that regard, Petitioner contends that Christopher’s “aging process resulted in a reduction in ‘at least one elemental component’ (i.e., silica).” Pet. Reply 6 (emphasis added). However, this is not buttressed with any evidence. Petitioner has not presented any evidence showing Christopher’s “aging” process reduces “the concentration of at least one … elemental component” to support its contention that Christopher’s brine of Table 1 is a “treated” brine as claimed. Accordingly, on this record, Petitioner has not shown that the “treated” brine of the claims reads on Christopher’s “aged” brine by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,650,555 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00527 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing requests and left in place its § 314(a) denial of institution in both proceedings based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“Petitioner has not shown that this change in circumstance warrants modifying (1) the determination that Fintiv factor 4 weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution or (2) the determination, after weighing all factors and taking a holistic view of the relevant circumstances, to exercise discretion to deny institution. Several of the claims challenged in each Petition are still at issue in the parallel proceeding, and the combinations of references asserted by Petitioner in the district court largely overlap with the combinations of references asserted in the Petitions. Petitioner has not identified any differences among the claims that have been dropped and the claims that remain as a reason to modify our Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 13 (“if a petition involves the same prior art challenges but challenges claims in addition to those that are challenged in the district court, it may still be inefficient to proceed because the district court may resolve validity of enough overlapping claims to resolve key issues in the petition”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,633,187 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00526 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing requests, leaving institution denied in both proceedings based on its Fintiv analysis of the parallel litigation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner
“noted that, “[e]ven if Petitioner’s contentions are true, Petitioner has not shown these contentions will avoid adjudication of Intel’s invalidity defenses” in the related Western District of Texas litigation. Dec. Inst. 13. In light of the record at the time, we found that Petitioner’s arguments in connection with Fintiv factor 6 did not weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution. Id. at 13–15. Accordingly, we maintain our finding that Petitioner’s argument does not weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,633,187 - Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2021 · IPR2020-00582 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing request and maintained its discretionary denial of institution under Fintiv, despite weighing Factor 6 neutrally.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“The change in circumstances regarding the trial date does not persuade us to change our decision to exercise our discretion to deny institution. Even if we were to institute an inter partes review proceeding, the deadline for issuing a final written decision could be no earlier than February 2022. Thus, at this time, it appears likely that trial will occur many months before any final written decision would likely issue in this proceeding. Therefore, we maintain our finding that Fintiv Factor 2” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,292,485 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2020 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied DivX’s rehearing request, leaving the institution decision in place because the rule remained effective and Dr. McDaniel’s testimony was supported on the record.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“assertions regarding Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. Dr. McDaniel testified that (a) Chen teaches video data streams, (b) “[a]s was widely known in the art, for example as disclosed by Grab-333,[1] a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that video data streams were comprised of a series of video frames,” and (c) a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that Chen teaches a plurality of frames of video are encrypted using at least one scrambling key/control word.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 112;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,184,920 - Energysource Minerals, LLC v. Terralithium LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 6, 2020 · IPR2019-01601 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained denial of institution for claims 9–16, finding the petition insufficient on anticipation by Maimoni and Jost and related obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing must identify specifically all matters that the requesting party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“[u]nder these circumstances, where Jost raises the possibility of forming iron (III) hydroxide, while raising a doubt that iron (III) hydroxide even exists – we find that Jost does not describe, expressly or inherently, oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed. At best, Jost is ambiguous about oxidizing to iron (III) hydroxide. But ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim See Wasica Finance GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (“Anticipation requires that a single reference ‘describe the claimed invention with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.’ Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). For this reason, it has long been understood that ambiguous references do not, as a matter of law, anticipate a claim. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (refusing to find claims anticipated when the prior art references were ‘unacceptably vague’); see also In re Hughes, 52 CCPA 1355, 345 F.2d 184, 188 (1965); In re Turlay, 49 CCPA 1288, 304 F.2d 893, 899 (1962) (‘It is well established that an anticipation rejection cannot be predicated on an ambiguous reference.’)”). Because Jost discloses only the possibility of iron (III) hydroxide and no other evidence has been provided to show that Jost nevertheless necessarily oxidizes to iron (III) hydroxide as claimed, based on the information, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Jost reference anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim step of “oxidizing the iron (II) salt to iron (III) hydroxide.” “Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“an explanation as to how “the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5, as required by Claim 9” (Pet. 44). But “[t]here is no explanation” (Dec. 24). We reproduced ¶ 162 of the Gallup Declaration in the Decision (see Dec. 23–24), which states in full that The step in the Hazen process of sparging the brine with air (Stream 6) in the iron reactor will reduce the pH. The reduction of the pH is offset by the introduction of calcium hydroxide (Stream 5) to the iron reactor. In my opinion, the Hazen process discussed by Maimoni describes a step of maintaining and controlling the pH of the geothermal brine at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5. Given the pH of the feed brine, these pH values occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide. We did not and still do not see Dr. Gallup providing any meaningful explanation as to why the steps of sparging and the addition of calcium hydroxide per the Hazen process set forth in Maimoni necessarily maintains the pH to an adjusted level of between 4.5 and 6.5. All that Dr. Gallup testifies to is that the “[g]iven the pH of the feed brine [i.e., between 5.2 and 6.1 (Table 1) or 5.6 (Table 2). EX 1004, at 9-10], pH values [as claimed] occur as a result of the air oxidation and introduction of calcium hydroxide.” Id. As we stated in the Decision, we do not see how this statement is anything but a “conclusory assertion[ ] backed up by no objective evidence, such as experimental results establishing the adjusted pH of Maimoni’s geothermal brine.” Dec. 24. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in our conclusion that “Petitioner insufficiently establishes that Maimoni anticipates, expressly or inherently, the claim 9 step of ‘maintaining the pH of the geothermal brine solution at an adjusted pH of between 4.5 and 6.5.’” (Dec. 26) based on reason (1); that is, Petitioner’s apparent inherency argument made in the Petition, as well as the Gallup Declaration upon which the argument relied, were inadequate (Dec. 21–25).” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,051,827 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2020 · IPR2019-00840 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Microsoft’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because it did not show error in the Board’s § 325(d) analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner did not argue, in the Petition, that FIPA97 was released as individual parts. Petitioner’s Rehearing Request (page 8) cites to the Petition at page 20 and Exhibit 1054. Page 20 of the Petition, however, contains Petitioner’s argument that FIPA97 was made publicly available as a single document, as discussed above. It does not include any argument or suggestion that FIPA97 was released as individual parts. Additionally, Exhibit 1054 is not cited on page 20 of the Petition in the discussion of FIPA97 nor does it appear that Exhibit 1054 was cited anywhere in the Petition. Thus, because Petitioner did not argue, in the Petition, that FIPA97 was released as individual parts, we could not have overlooked that argument. Petitioner’s contention of error in our determination that FIPA97 was involved during examination of the ’128 patent application is premised upon finding that FIPA97 existed as individual parts. Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate that we overlooked an argument that was not made, we are not persuaded of error.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2020 · IPR2019-00838 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Microsoft’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because Microsoft did not show the Board overlooked arguments made in the petition.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“and the prior art relied upon in Petitioner’s challenges to the ’128 patent, Petitioner did not address 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in the Petition (Paper 1). Instead, Petitioner made two critical representations—(1) that the Examiner of the ’128 patent “did not have FIPA97 before him, or any other FIPA reference for that matter” (Pet. 1) and (2) that despite there being seven “Parts” to FIPA97, “FIPA97 was made publicly available as a single document” and was “developed and published as a single, integrated work.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1055 (FIPA97 Table of Contents for Parts 1–7)); Ex. 1026, 5 (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, “Resolution of Munich meeting”). In the Petition (Paper 1), Petitioner never contended that FIPA97 was published or available as separate and distinct parts, such that access to one part might not mean access to each other part. Rather, Petitioner’s sole statement regarding separate parts was that it filed FIPA97 as seven separate exhibits “due to its size and numbering schedule.” Id. at 20. Accordingly, on the record presented, we agreed with Petitioner’s representation and we found that FIPA97 (Exs. 1006–1012) constitutes a single document, which we then found was involved during examination of the ’128 patent application. Inst. Dec. 15.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 3, 2020 · IPR2019-00839 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Microsoft's rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because it did not show the Board overlooked arguments about FIPA97 or misweighed the Becton factors.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“and the prior art relied upon in Petitioner’s challenges to the ’128 patent, Petitioner did not address 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in the Petition (Paper 1). Instead, Petitioner made two critical representations—(1) that the Examiner of the ’128 patent “did not have FIPA97 before him, or any other FIPA reference for that matter” (Pet. 1) and (2) that despite there being seven “Parts” to FIPA97, “FIPA97 was made publicly available as a single document” and was “developed and published as a single, integrated work.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1055 (FIPA97 Table of Contents for Parts 1–7)); Ex. 1026, 5 (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, “Resolution of Munich meeting”). In the Petition (Paper 1), Petitioner never contended that FIPA97 was published or available as separate and distinct parts, such that access to one part might not mean access to each other part. Rather, Petitioner’s sole statement regarding separate parts was that it filed FIPA97 as seven separate exhibits “due to its size and numbering schedule.” Id. at 20. Accordingly, on the record presented, we agreed with Petitioner’s representation and we found that FIPA97 (Exs. 1006–1012) constitutes a single document, which we then found was involved during examination of the ’128 patent application. Inst. Dec. 15.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,036,128
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.