- Momentum Dynamics Corporation v. Witricity CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01165 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims were obvious over Stark, with Mecke also supporting certain distance claims.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. Because, as explained above, we do not treat Petitioner’s explanations in the Rehearing Request as belated, based on the explanations offered in the Rehearing Request, it was error to deny the Petition. Petitioner has shown that the Decision should be modified to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Response did not address this testimony. We credit this testimony of Dr. Young. This changed understanding alone is sufficient to justify a modification of the Decision to institute inter partes review, because on this record Petitioner has shown that Stark expressly discloses, in a tuned circuit environment where all frequencies are set to the same frequency, Q1 = Q2 = 1000. Because Stark’s prototype described in Chapter 7 is for tuned circuits, Stark reasonably would have suggested to one with ordinary skill in the art an implementation of its disclosed prototype, which has distance D satisfying limitation [1c], with each of Q1 and Q2 set to 1000. With the changed understanding of Figure 3-9, and the fact that Figure 3-9 shows setting Q1 = Q2 = 1000, we agree with Petitioner, on the record presented, that “it would have been obvious, to implement the same system [breadboard prototype] with Q values in the hundreds or thousands, as described with respect to limitation 1/6[d].” Pet. 36 n.8. Thus, limitations 1[c] and 1[d] would have been met together.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Response did not address this testimony. We credit this testimony of Dr. Young. This changed understanding alone is sufficient to justify a modification of the Decision to institute inter partes review, because on this record Petitioner has shown that Stark expressly discloses, in a tuned circuit environment where all frequencies are set to the same frequency, Q1 = Q2 = 1000. Because Stark’s prototype described in Chapter 7 is for tuned circuits, Stark reasonably would have suggested to one with ordinary skill in the art an implementation of its disclosed prototype, which has distance D satisfying limitation [1c], with each of Q1 and Q2 set to 1000. With the changed understanding of Figure 3-9, and the fact that Figure 3-9 shows setting Q1 = Q2 = 1000, we agree with Petitioner, on the record presented, that “it would have been obvious, to implement the same system [breadboard prototype] with Q values in the hundreds or thousands, as described with respect to limitation 1/6[d].” Pet. 36 n.8. Thus, limitations 1[c] and 1[d] would have been met together.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“I note that while Figure 3-9 appears immediately under the heading “3.1.3 Physical interpretation of ω1 ≠ ω2”, this appears to be the result of a spacing issue with Stark’s figures. Stark’s pole-zero plots are part of its Section 3.1.2 (“Solution with primary and secondary tuned together”). Stark at 52; 93. This is confirmed by the MATLAB code included in Stark and used to generate these plots, which uses only a single value ωn, rather than a distinct ω1 and ω2. Stark at 237–38. Response did not address this testimony. We credit this testimony of Dr. Young. This changed understanding alone is sufficient to justify a modification of the Decision to institute inter partes review, because on this record Petitioner has shown that Stark expressly discloses, in a tuned circuit environment where all frequencies are set to the same frequency, Q1 = Q2 = 1000. Because Stark’s prototype described in Chapter 7 is for tuned circuits, Stark reasonably would have suggested to one with ordinary skill in the art an implementation of its disclosed prototype, which has distance D satisfying limitation [1c], with each of Q1 and Q2 set to 1000.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,741,734 - Dispersive Networks, Inc. v. Nicira, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jul 17, 2019 · PGR2018-00063 · APJ Debra K Stephens · PGR · Rehearing
Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted as to claim 7, which was removed from institution under § 112(b); institution on claims 1–6 and 8–11 remained unchanged.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“We agree. We erroneously instituted review of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). We modify our Decision to the extent that we do not institute on claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). That is, we institute a post-grant review of claims 1–6 and 8–11 of the ’815 Patent on the challenge that these claims are indefinite and unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We agree. We erroneously instituted review of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). We modify our Decision to the extent that we do not institute on claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). That is, we institute a post-grant review of claims 1–6 and 8–11 of the ’815 Patent on the challenge that these claims are indefinite and unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 9,722,815 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2017 · IPR2015-01802 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
Granted rehearing and held claims 2, 4, and 6 unpatentable as obvious over Rabinovich because the wireless-network limitation encompasses a connection through a wireless hub.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub. Because we determine that the “wireless network” recited in dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 need not be an ad hoc network, Patent Owner’s argument that Rabinovich’s replication method would have been unsuitable for use over an ad hoc network does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s showing. Having considered the arguments and evidence of both parties, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rabinovich.” slip op. at 7
- ExcludeNot reached
“We decline to assess the merits of Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Even without excluding the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,904,680 - Prime Focus Creative Services Canada Inc. v. Legend3d, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · May 16, 2017 · IPR2016-01491 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 as obvious over Sandrew alone; other proposed grounds remained unauthorized.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Id. “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“clearly presented, we nonetheless overlooked Petitioner’s alternative reliance on Sandrew alone in as teaching or suggesting the claimed copying, particularly when taken in context of the anticipation ground based on Sandrew for which we instituted review. As stated in our Decision, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 as anticipated by Sandrew. Dec. on Inst. 14. Petitioner’s anticipation challenge based on Sandrew, therefore, identified where it contends each element of claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19 of the ’941 patent is disclosed by Sandrew. Pet. 15–25. Petitioner’s obviousness challenge based on Sandrew alone relies upon these same contentions. Id. at 25–26. As such and based on the foregoing discussion, we find that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relying on Sandrew alone shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing only as to claims 1, 3, 5, 16, and 19.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“Petitioner fails to explain in the record before us how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings of Sandrew, Yuille, and various other references to arrive at the elements recited in claims 4, 11– 13, and 24. For instance, the Petition asserts, and the Request repeats, the following: “Yuille discloses express mathematical algorithms that can almost be cut and copied into the method of Sandrew to yield the invention of the ‘941 Patent.” Reh’g Req. 3 (quoting Pet. 36) (emphasis omitted). As Petitioner recognizes in the Request, this argument is directed to the copying of claim 1, and specifically to meeting an allegation that Sandrew and Yuille together teach automated copying, assuming automation is required by claim 1. Id. at 3–5. Setting aside whether claim 1 actually requires automated copying, as well as whether the alleged combination teaches or suggests automated copying, Petitioner’s articulated rationale to combine the teachings of Sandrew and Yuille does not address how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine their respective teachings not directed to automated copying. For instance, Petitioner fails to address why one would combine the teachings of Yuille with Sandrew to account for the following limitations: (1) the reshaping recited in claims 4, 6–10, and 24; (2) the moving and reshaping of a second mask comprising a polygon, curve, or both recited in claim 11; and (3) the polygon and Bezier curve animation recited in claims 12 and 13. See Pet. 27–34, 42–45. Because Petitioner’s articulated rationale is divorced from the specific limitations required by the claims, we determine Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that each of claims 4, 6–13, and 24 are obvious over the combination of Sandrew, Yuille, and various other references.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,286,941 - PTAB · Mar 29, 2017 · IPR2016-01492 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part to explain institution on Eizenhöfer and Miller anticipation grounds for claims 13–15 and require claim-interpretation briefing; it denied rehearing on § 325(d).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“terminal demand” in a single sentence supported by citations to portions of the Specification and testimony from Dr. Lomp. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:8–11, 18:50–54, 19:1–4, Figure 15A; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 7, 16, 19–21). Based on our review of the cited portions of the Specification, it is not apparent how those sections support WPI’s proffered meaning of “subscriber terminal demand.” None of the cited portions explicitly defines “subscriber terminal demand” or uses the term, and WPI does not explain why those cited portions are relevant to the inquiry. The cited testimony from Dr. Lomp reflects his opinion but is not supported by any citations to other evidence, including the Specification itself. To the extent that WPI’s argument regarding the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” relies upon Dr. Lomp’s testimony, we currently find that argument unpersuasive because it is unsupported by other evidence. TCT has not expressly argued the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” but instead implies a meaning by identifying specific portions of Eizenhöfer that allegedly teach this limitation. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:7–10, Abstract). Absent briefing with citations to relevant evidence, we decline to offer our own express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand.” Rather, we determine that TCT’s implied interpretation and its argument based on that interpretation demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing that Eizenhöfer describes the recited limitation. Because resolution of the dispute may require an express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand,” we also direct the parties to address explicitly the meaning of this phrase at trial and cite relevant evidence from among at least other claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“reasons. First, WPI has failed, as required under Rule 42.71(c), to identify an abuse of discretion stemming from our allegedly “unreasonable” failure to exercise discretion under § 325(d) and deny institution of challenges based on Miller. Second, WPI merely reiterates an argument already considered and rejected, and thus fails to meet its obligation under Rule 42.71(d) to “identify all matters . . . misapprehended or overlooked.” We disagree that WPI offered a “clear comparison” of the entirety of the claims that were allegedly previously considered by the Office during reexamination of the ’326 patent to the claims at issue in this proceeding. Describing claims in the ’326 patent as “closely related” or reciting “similar features” without providing the actual text of those claims fails to provide an adequate basis for comparing those claims to the claims at issue in this proceeding. The paraphrased comparison of claims in the ’326 patent to the claims here is similarly lacking in clarity. Third, even if we were to determine that WPI sufficiently compared the “orthogonal code generator” recited in claims of the ’326 patent to the one recited in the claims at issue, such a comparison fails to demonstrate enough similarity in the claims overall to justify a discretionary denial of TCT’s challenge based on Miller.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“TCT has not expressly argued the meaning of “subscriber terminal demand” but instead implies a meaning by identifying specific portions of Eizenhöfer that allegedly teach this limitation. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:7–10, Abstract). Absent briefing with citations to relevant evidence, we decline to offer our own express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand.” Rather, we determine that TCT’s implied interpretation and its argument based on that interpretation demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing that Eizenhöfer describes the recited limitation. Because resolution of the dispute may require an express interpretation of “subscriber terminal demand,” we also direct the parties to address explicitly the meaning of this phrase at trial and cite relevant evidence from among at least other claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,381,211 - Plaid Technologies, Inc. v. Yodlee, Inc. And Yodlee.Com, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Aug 12, 2016 · IPR2016-00275 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Plaid’s rehearing request and maintained denial of institution because Plaid failed to show good cause to excuse late service and an incomplete, time-barred petition.
RulingsRehearing decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDenied
“treatment of the service issue. Our regulations state that a filing date will not be accorded to a Petition until, among other things, service is effected. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a), 42.106(a). The undisputed evidence put forth by Plaid indicates that it did not attempt to serve Yodlee with the Petition and supporting evidence until December 3, 2015. See Req. Reh’g 2; Ex. 1022 ¶ 9. In our Decision, we applied the regulations to the particular facts of this case and “determine[d] that December 3, 201[5], is the earliest date by which Plaid satisfied the service requirement for according the Petition a filing date.” Dec. 7 (citing 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a), 42.106(a)). Therefore, we maintained the initial filing date accorded to the Petition, which was one day after the statutory deadline under § 315(b), and we termed Plaid’s service activities to be “late service.”1 Dec. 6–7. Indeed, Plaid would have had no reason to file a motion to change the filing date had its actions not been “late.” Moreover, our Decision expressly stated that we did not need to “address whether, under appropriate circumstances, we have authority to grant an earlier filing date.” Dec. 8. Rather, our Decision focused on whether Plaid had shown good cause to waive the service requirements imposed by 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.105(a) and 42.106(a). Id. at 8–10. Irrespective of the interplay among the relevant regulations and statutory deadline under § 315(b), we found that Plaid had not shown good cause and that it was not in the interests of justice to excuse Plaid’s late service under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) and (c)(3). See id. Among other reasons, we were not persuaded that waiting for potential changes from a declarant constituted good cause for Plaid to delay its filing and eventual service of the Petition and supporting evidence. See Dec. 8–9. We also weighed the potential” slip op. at 3
- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,199,077 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2016 · IPR2015-01457 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted, adding claims 8–10 to trial under § 103 grounds over Ejzak and Intel, and Ejzak and Cisco.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“of claim 8 which recites: “said bypass mode data indicating a bypass mode setting for said media gateway.” In the Decision, we stated: “The reference [in Ejzak] merely to ‘policy’ is unreasonably broad and not very meaningful when the limitation pertains to the bypass setting for a particular device.” Dec. 23. We questioned whether “local policy” that may apply generally to all media gateways indicates a specific bypass setting for a particular ALG, BG, or media gateway. Id. at 22. On that basis, we concluded that Petitioner failed to provide adequate explanation on how a “local policy” satisfies the bypass mode data requirement of claim 8. Id. at 23. Petitioner identifies in its rehearing request points we misapprehended in our Decision. The Petition, as filed, adequately explains the “local policy” is specific to the local ALG. Reh. Req. 9–10. Petitioner identifies testimony of Mr. Bress, referred to in the Petition, that explain why one with ordinary skill in the art would understand “local policy” of Ejzak as local and specific to the ALG. Id. at 11 (citing ¶¶ 238–43 of Ex. 1104). We agree that on the record before us, “local policy” appears to be local to the ALG and not generally applicable to all media gateways.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“in our Decision. The Petition, as filed, adequately explains the “local policy” is specific to the local ALG. Reh. Req. 9–10. Petitioner identifies testimony of Mr. Bress, referred to in the Petition, that explain why one with ordinary skill in the art would understand “local policy” of Ejzak as local and specific to the ALG. Id. at 11 (citing ¶¶ 238–43 of Ex. 1104). We agree that on the record before us, “local policy” appears to be local to the ALG and not generally applicable to all media gateways.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,687,640 - PTAB · Feb 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00221 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing to the extent that Patent Owner may file a revised motion to exclude with the improper material removed.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,991,522 - PTAB · Feb 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00222 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing to the extent that Magna may file a revised motion to exclude with the improper material removed.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing. In the interest of avoiding further confusion and non-compliance, a joint telephone conference call will be held to confirm precisely what content will be removed from the Revised Motion to Exclude, what revised opposition will be filed by Petitioner, and what revised reply will be filed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,386,114 - PTAB · Feb 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00220 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing to allow the Patent Owner to file a revised motion to exclude with improper material removed.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“We are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude complied with the Order dated June 20, 2014. Even as characterized in the Rehearing Request, the Motion to Exclude indisputably contained arguments alleging that Petitioner’s Reply was beyond the proper scope of a reply, and not just arguments directed solely to the evidence in support of the Reply. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s explanation is sufficient to justify an opportunity for the Patent Owner to file a Revised Motion to Exclude, which would be the same as the Motion to Exclude but with the inappropriate material removed, as Patent Owner has offered in the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,859,565
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.