- PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00763 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Zeira alone or Zeira with Yi renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’838 patent based on all grounds set forth in the Petition for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not contest this at this stage. See Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’838 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:30–2:48. Therefore, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,212,838 - PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00756 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 on three §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, we institute inter partes review as to all challenged claims and grounds presented in the Petition. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of any of these challenged claims. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review is instituted as to claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 of the ’803 patent to determine whether: 1) claims 1, 5–7, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over TS 36.300, TS 36.321, and TS 36.331; 2) claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson and TS 25.331; and 3) claims 5, 6, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson, TS 25.331, and Sebire; and” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“ordinary meaning, “primary” and “non-primary” cells are all cells that the WTRU is connected to (PO Resp. 16), the plain language in claim 1, and similarly in claim 7, does not require a “primary” node or “non-primary” cell to have a connection to the WTRU. See Ex. 1001, 10:38−56; 11:11–26. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the claims require that the WTRU “be connected to more than one cell,” wherein cells that are “associated with a wireless network node,” but are not connected to the WTRU “at the same time” cannot be “primary” or “non-primary” cells. PO Resp. 16. In the ’803 patent, nothing in the Specification clearly limits “primary” and “non-primary” cells as Patent Owner proposes. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner points to the Specification of the ’803 patent to show that, for softer handover, the WTRU is connected “with more than one cell [] which are controlled by the same Node-B,” and “[o]ne of the[se] cells 808 may be designated as a primary cell 808a, while other cells are designated as a non-primary cells 808b.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:44–46, 9:4–6, Figs. 8A–B). However, this portion of the Specification (describing a softer handover embodiment in which a cell “may be designated” as a primary while other as non-primary) does not provide a clear definition to warrant interpreting the “primary” and “non-primary” cells as requiring “connection” to the WTRU “at the same time.” Id. That is, nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “primary” and “non-primary” cells from being “source” and “target” cell, as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 16. and the Specification, we determine that the terms “primary” and “non-primary” recited in claims 1 and 7 are not limited to cells connected to a WRTU at the same time. We determine no further explicit construction of this term is necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“f) Motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 Petitioner contends that a “POSITA would have been motivated to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 because they are directed to similar technologies and a skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references,” and “would have understood that there was a high likelihood of success in making the combination.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157). In particular, the references “are both reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor, namely protocols for handover in a telecommunications system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). According to Petitioner, the combination “involves the predictable use of interchangeable prior art elements according to their established functions” more than routine engineering.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not present arguments in the Preliminary Response addressing the specific merits of Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331. See generally Prelim. Resp. 15–18. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Ericsson and TS25.331 are “directed to similar technologies,” and that a “skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references.” Pet. 34. On this preliminary record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that a POSITA would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ericsson and TS 25.331.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Kakaes, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems,” and “would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks existing at the relevant time,” wherein “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 12–13. At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,764,803 - Apple Inc. v. Ferid AllaniInstitutedPTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00857 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for claims 21 and 23–26.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1– 27 of the ’058 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A [person of ordinary skill in the art] at the time of the ’058 Patent would have had bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, with two to three years of experience with web-based information systems. Additional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements. Dec., ¶¶37-39. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Patent Owner contends that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art] at that time would be a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a closely related discipline and two years of relevant professional experience in software engineering or a 2 US Patent No. 6,119,155 issued Sept. 12, 2000 (Ex. 1004). 3 US Patent No. 6,037,934 issued Mar. 14, 2000 (Ex. 1005). 4 US Patent No. 6,353,839 B1 filed Apr. 30, 1998, issued Mar. 5, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 5 US Patent No. 6,493,702 B1 filed May 5, 1999, issued Dec. 10, 2002 (Ex. 1008). 6 US Patent No. 6,138,158 issued Oct. 24, 2000 (Ex. 1007). similar field. Alternatively, someone with an advanced degree and less professional experience or less education and more professional experience would also qualify as a [person of ordinary skill in the art]. Prelim. Resp. 11. Given that Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill substantially overlaps with Petitioner’s definition, and given that Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the plain meaning of “beforehand locally stored” requires the claimed selection pages to be present on the local device before a user conducts a preliminary search. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that a user could download and store selection pages to the local device, such downloading and storing must occur before the user locally performs a preliminary search in order for the selection pages to be “beforehand locally stored” within the scope of claims 1 and 27. We construe the terms “said selection pages being beforehand locally stored” recited in claim 1 and “said selection pages being . . . beforehand locally stored” recited in claim 27 as requiring the selection pages to be locally stored before a user locally performs a preliminary search.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Rossman discloses times when accessing a web page over the network is unavoidable. Col. 8; see Pet. 21. Himmel teaches that using a bookmark to directly access a desired page is quicker than navigating through intermediate pages to get to the desired page. See Pet. 22–23, 25. Patent Owner does not address Rossman’s disclosure that a request to a network web page may be unavoidable, and does not address Himmel’s disclosure of making a direct request to the desired web page to save time and conserve network resources when accessing the desired web page. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that adding Himmel’s bookmarks to Rossmann’s cards provides the benefit of directly accessing a particular web function, thus reducing network traffic and data usage as compared to navigating multiple web pages to arrive at the particular web function.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,943,058 - PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00885 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–11 on all petition grounds and granted ADC Solutions Auto LLC’s unopposed motion to join IPR2024-01219 in an understudy role.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We agree with the parties that the Deltran Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art. Under these circumstances, our reasons for instituting review based on Deltran’s petition apply with equal force to the “substantively identical” Petition filed by ADC Solutions. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Institution Decision filed in the Deltran IPR, we institute review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. See generally IPR01219, Paper 8 (Institution Decision in the Deltran IPR).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“(1) the Motion for Joinder is timely, having been filed “no later than one month of the institution decision” in the Deltran IPR (Motion 6); (2) the Petition here “is substantially identical to the petition in the Deltran IPR” (id.; see also id. at 7 (“there are no substantive changes to the facts, citations, evidence, or arguments relied upon”); (3) “joinder should have no meaningful impact on the Deltran IPR trial schedule because the present Petition presents no new issues or grounds of unpatentability” (id. at 8); (4) “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role, which will simplify briefing and discovery” in the joined proceeding, “so long as the current lead petitioner in IPR2024-01219 remains an active party (id. at 9; see also id. at 4, 6);2 and (5) joinder will simplify “briefing and discovery” as all issues will be resolved “in a single proceeding” (id. at 9). Patent Owner does not contest any facts alleged by ADC Solutions in its Motion for Joinder. Having considered Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, we determine that joinder of the instant proceeding with in the Deltran IPR is appropriate. For the reasons in our Decision Instituting Review in Deltran IPR, we find that the Petition in this proceeding also warrants institution of inter partes review and that joinder is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s 2 We understand the “understudy role” as including Petitioner not making any oral argument or presentation during telephone conferences with the Board.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 11,667,203 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00746 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 of the ’151 patent over Levine under §103, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“5. Conclusion as to Independent Claims Having reviewed the contentions Petitioner has presented, with supporting evidence, and in light of Patent Owner’s arguments made in the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contentions of obviousness for claims 1 and 2 of the ’582 patent and claim 1 of the ’151 patent.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. As stated in our summary of Petitioner’s contentions, Petitioner relies on what would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art given Levine’s programming architecture and providing a button or other interface for the avatar to perform an action in that game. It seems reasonable, at this juncture, that Levine’s teachings of various actions that characters of a game can take (picking up a sword, for example), combined with the teaching that a user can press *9999 to “kill” a monster, reasonably support that a person of ordinary skill in the art would use Levine’s teachings of a client interacting with a game object (by clicking a mouse, angling the joystick or pressing a trigger button) to provide a button to “shoot” the sniper’s rifle as argued by Petitioner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 211, 528, 659. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s characterization of Levine as having no need for manual control of the “sniper” rifle. None of the passages of Levine that Patent Owner points to state that the actions by an avatar are automated. And even if some automation of actions were implemented in a game, Levine leaves it to the game designer to implement the set of rules on how the user’s actions would affect the state of the objects in the game. See id. ¶ 351. Accordingly, given the latitude of design options that Levine describes to interact with an avatar, Petitioner’s contention of using Levine’s interface space with buttons appears to be a reasonable and suitable option for playing Levine’s “sniper” game, and require the manual interaction with such a button to “shoot” the rifle.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill, would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. 745 Pet. 4−5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21−25); 746 Pet. 4−5. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,974,151 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00745 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 11, and 13 of the ’582 patent and claims 1–3 of the ’151 patent on all asserted Levine obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’582 patent and at least one claim of the ’151 patent are unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the instant Petitions. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill, would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. 745 Pet. 4−5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21−25); 746 Pet. 4−5. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenInstituted
“We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing at this juncture, that Levine teaches the “location-based game” by describing the use of Locales in the grid system to show the “virtual playfield” in which the games are played, and that the “first character” in Levine is an “avatar” controlled by a user as described by Petitioner and summarized above. We are also persuaded by Petitioner’s showing at this juncture (and as summarized above) that Levine teaches a “first character in said virtual playfield is displayed on a display” because in the example described as the “sniper” game, Levine renders a graphical representation (depicted in Figure 47) of the Locale in which the “sniper” is located and the relative position of other game characters in nearby areas. In addition, it is reasonable to conclude, based on the argument and evidence in the present record, that it would have been obvious to show the required location in the “monster” game given that the users roam around Wall Street with the objective of finding “monsters” to “kill” and as such, it would have been obvious to display, on whichever device users are using to play, the location of the “avatar” and the “monsters.” And currently there is no evidence in the record showing that displaying locations of the “avatars,” “monsters,” or any other character’s locations would have been uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 9,662,582 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00743 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 8, 16, and 18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 16, and 18 of the ’716 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we agree with Petitioner that Claim 16 does not require the virtual object to be displayed and controlled simultaneously. We highlight that claims 1, 14, 16, and 18 use the word “simultaneously” when requiring certain actions to occur at the same time. The fact that patentee used the word “simultaneously” to require certain claimed actions to occur at the same time, but did not use the word “simultaneously” in the claim term “a virtual object is operable to be displayed . . . and controlled” indicates that the patentee did not intend that the actions of displaying the virtual object and controlling of the virtual object are required to occur simultaneously. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms.”). Further, the Specification discloses that a user can manually purge an unseen virtual email located in a virtual trash can, which shows that in at least this embodiment, the user can manually control a virtual object while the virtual object is not being displayed. Patent Owner’s contention that the user is telling the virtual trash can to act does not address the fact that the user’s manual input controls the unseen virtual email by purging the unseen virtual email from the virtual trash can. This embodiment of purging an unseen virtual object further indicates that the scope of this claim term does not require displaying the virtual object and controlling the virtual object simultaneously. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We do not construe “wherein a first virtual object is operable to be displayed on said head-mounted display and controlled with manual input,” as recited in claim 16, to require controlling the virtual object “while it is being displayed,” as proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. . . . A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The ’716 patent “relates to improved portable devices” such as head-mounted displays. Ex. 1001, 1:30, Fig. 9. Ronzani “relates generally to systems and methods for mounting display . . . systems to the human body” such as head-mounted displays. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Ohshima “relates to a game apparatus” such as a head-mounted display. Ex. 1005, 1:9, 5:34–36, Fig. 4. We are sufficiently persuaded that Ronzani, Ohshima, and the ’716 patent are from the same field of endeavor of head-mounted displays. Also, the ’716 patent discloses a camera that addresses the problem of providing video information “of the environment in the user’s field of vision” (Ex. 1001, 14:53–64), which is the same problem addressed by Ohshima’s camera (Ex. 1005, 6:48–49; 7:24–25, 7:64–65, Figs. 4, 5, 8, 9, 11). We are sufficiently persuaded that Ronzani and Ohshima are analogous to the ’716 patent, and that a person of ordinary skill would have had sufficient basis to turn to both Ronzani and Ohshima.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Ronzani and Ohshima. Petitioner relies on Ronzani to teach a head-mounted display device for entertainment applications that display virtual images. Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 2, 5, 170). Petitioner relies on Ohshima to teach implementation details of a specific entertainment application that displays virtual images. Id. at 40–41. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Ronzani’s head-mounted display device to include Ohshima’s virtual reality game for the benefit of achieving Ronzani’s goal of entertainment. Id. (citing Ex. 2:33–38, 6:57–59, 11:22– 26, 11:66–12:2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 135). Petitioner also contends that applying Ohshima’s technique of playing a game using a head-mounted display device to Ronzani’s head-mounted display device would improve Ronzani’s head-mounted display device in the same way. Pet. 41–42. We are sufficiently persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Ronzani’s head-mounted device to run Ohshima’s virtual reality game for the benefit of providing the user of the device with entertainment. We are also sufficiently persuaded that the combination of Ronzani and Ohshima “simply arranges old elements [of a head-mounted display device and a virtual reality game] with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,947,716 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00762 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 and 8–12 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Koskinen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional education” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.6 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Additionally, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known and been familiar with information elements (IEs) that specified an RLC reordering timer value based on (1) general knowledge that IEs carried information in RRC messages and (2) that 3GPP TSs describe an IE carrying recording timer duration information for the RLC layer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 151; Ex. 1014, 219–20. Accordingly, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art “that the PDCP timer information, which used similar variables as its RLC counterpart (Koskinen, ¶¶37-38), would also be carried in a PDCP configuration IE.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 151.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,863,573 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00744 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 21, 23, 31, 37, 41, and 42 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 21 is obvious over Fager and Martins.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’791 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’791 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. Pet. 4 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[t]he prior art cited herein . . . renders the challenged claims obvious under any reasonable construction,” and “Petitioner therefore respectfully submits that, for purposes of this IPR, express constructions are not required.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner contends that “no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Preliminary Response,” and “[t]he challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, consistent with the specification and as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“It is our understanding that Petitioner’s obviousness theory merely relies on Martins’ teaching of using camera images to detect a surface of physical objects. See Pet. 21 (“It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Martins’ teachings regarding using camera images to detect a surface of a physical object with Fager’s augmented reality and head-mounted display system.” (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). The proposed resulting combination is “using the camera of Fager’s head-mounted display to capture images used to detecting physical surfaces of a play area, such as the floor, ceiling, and walls of a room in which a user wishes to play a game of, for example, virtual tennis.” Id. at 21–22 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). According to Petitioner, the combination would use images to detect wall surfaces, and that it would have been obvious “to apply the same functionality to detect the surfaces of other objects in Fager’s game, such as the ‘suspended lamp’ described in Fager and other objects, given that Fager’s system models the behavior and movement of virtual objects (such as a ‘fictitious ball’) based on the determined surfaces of real-world objects.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80, 83, 85). Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the proposed combination would have been obvious as “the combination of prior art elements, with no change in their respective functions, according to known methods—i.e., simply using the camera of the user’s head-mounted display for performing surface detection in connection with modeling the user’s physical environment.” Id. at 21 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). Petitioner also contends that Fager provides a motivation in explaining that its system is primarily applied indoors, where there are surfaces such as floors, ceilings, and walls, and that physical objects may be incorporated into game play. Id. at 22–23. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the testimony of Dr. Cooperstock, which, at this stage, is unrebutted. We determine that Petitioner has shown adequately for purposes of institution that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make the proposed combination and that the proposed combination would result in the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,019,791 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00739 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Jaszlics and Rallison.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 13, and 20 of the ’277 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 4. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. See Ex. 1001, 2:37–41, 2:61–67, 3:21–23, 8:50–64. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s unsupported contention that the location of Jaszlics’s image processor is outside of the display device, this would result in only two identified, predictable locations of the image processor. The image processor would either be located outside of the display device or inside of the display device. We are persuaded that substituting Rallison’s location of inside the display device instead of outside the display device provides sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Jaszlics and Rallison. See Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (reversing the Board’s determination of lack of motivation “because Okubo’s terminal-side plotting and Konishi’s server-side plotting were both well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and Konishi”) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,179,277
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.