• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Promos Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2018 · IPR2017-01416 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 14–16, 22, and 28–36 are unpatentable: claim 22 is anticipated by Ito; the other claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. Although Patent Owner cites to the testimony of its declarant, Mr. Brahmbhatt, we do not find persuasive his testimony that the “claim element requiring the bias voltage to be ‘arbitrarily close to the ground voltage’ is not met by the Ito design which unintentionally, uncontrollably, and undesirably (per Ito) rises above – VTHP.” The intent, control, and desirability of the detector’s function in Ito is irrelevant to anticipation. See State Contracting & Eng’ g Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (A reference may be directed to an entirely different problem than the one addressed by the inventor and still be anticipatory); Celeritas Technologies Ltd. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Prior art that teaches away from the claimed invention can anticipate the claims based on what it discloses). Based on the disclosed function of the detector circuit in Ito, we determine that it meets the limitations recited in claim 22.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. We determine that Petitioner, in the Petition, explained that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the trip point would be substantially insensitive to variations in VDD based on the parameters set in Baker. See Pet. 31–32. The Petitioner and Dr. Baker provide a reasoned explanation for why the subject limitation, i.e., a “trip point which is substantially insensitive to power supply variations,” is disclosed and suggested by Baker, and why one would have been motivated to configure the inverter in Park to have a stable trip point, per Baker. Id. Further, we reaffirm our determination that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to configure Park’s circuit to have its trip point be substantially insensitive to power supply voltage variations, in keeping with Park’s overall objective of “constantly maintaining a back bias voltage with respect to the variation of an external voltage.” Dec. on Inst. 21–22 (citing Pet. 32; Ex. 1007, 3:45–57; Ex. 1002 ¶ 110).” slip op. at 29

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and at least two to three years of experience in integrated circuit design.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 20). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its Patent Owner Response, but its declarant, Mr. Brahmbhatt, indicates that he has adopted and applied Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of his testimony. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 23. Based on the current record, we are concerned that Petitioner’s articulation contains no upper bounds, i.e., “at least a bachelor’s degree,” such that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner is not sufficiently specific. As such, we adopt the definition provided by Petitioner with minor variations: “a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of invention is a person with a Bachelor’s of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and two to three years of experience in integrated circuit design.” Additionally, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “September 24, 2018, i.e., during the pendency of the instituted proceeding” and contends that the challenged claims should be construed under the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Pet. 10. We agree and determine that the instant patent expired on that date. Under the Phillips standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meanings, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, having taken into consideration the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. In the Decision on Institution, we acknowledged that Petitioner did not propose an express construction for any claim terms. Dec. on Inst. 12 (citing Pet. 11). In its Response, Patent Owner likewise does not propose explicit claim constructions for any claim terms, and its declarant, Mr. Brahmbhatt, indicates that he has assumed “that the claim terms have their ordinary customary meaning and that there are no specific constructions that I am to apply.” See PO Resp.; Ex. 2001 ¶ 24. As such, we determine that no claim terms require express construction and we apply the ordinary and customary meanings for all claim terms, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 6,172,554 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,172,554
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2018 · IPR2017-01149 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 are unpatentable as obvious over Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and the respective additional reference in each trial.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “observations from that deposition or seek authorization to file a sur-reply. In view of these circumstances, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 126

  Patent outcomesUS 6,418,556 unpatentable
  Nonecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,418,556
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2018 · IPR2017-01150 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 are unpatentable as obvious over Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and Moro, Reiter, or Remillard.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claims 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 would have been obvious over the combination of Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and either Moro (48Pet.), Reiter (49Pet.), or Remillard (50Pet.).” slip op. at 126

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “12. Motion to Exclude Patent Owner moves to exclude paragraphs 8, 24, 27–30, 32 and 38 of” slip op. at 123

  Patent outcomesUS 6,418,556 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,418,556
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2018 · IPR2017-01148 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations in each of the three trials.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “of the evidence, that the subject matter of claims 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 would have been obvious over the combination of Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and either Moro (48Pet.), Reiter (49Pet.), or Remillard (50Pet.). IV. ORDER ORDERED that 5–10, 15, 17, 18, 29, 31, 32, 34–38, and 41–48 of U.S. Patent No. 6,418,556 B1 are unpatentable as a result of each trial as a separate matter, IPR2017-01148, IPR2017-01149, and IPR2017-01150;” slip op. at 126

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “observations from that deposition or seek authorization to file a sur-reply. In view of these circumstances, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 126

  Patent outcomesUS 6,418,556 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,418,556
• Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2018 · IPR2017-01151 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 23 and 25–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and any one of Moro, Reiter, or Remillard.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “would not have interpreted Young ’801’s system as restricted to a single page limited to time slots ranging from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm as depicted in Figure 6 of Young ’801. See Ex. 1720 ¶ 24 (describing Dr. Bovik’s restricted view of Young ’801 as unreasonable). This restricted reading of Young ’801 unreasonably constrains the use of the guide to 1.5 hours, something the Petitions do not do, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments that the Reply shifts to new theories. See Rep. Opp. Mot. Exc. 2–5. To elaborate and address Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Bovik’s testimony, Mr. Wechselberger responds with a citation documenting well-known cursor navigation aspects of the same concept involved in spreadsheets (Ex. 1722) and elaborates about minimal program guide layout or format changes that go hand-in-hand with the Petitions’ assertions of guide size reduction. See Ex. 1720 ¶ 24; Opp. Mot. Exc. 9–11 (discussing Ex. 1720 ¶¶ 36–37, 129– 131, 136–137, 158), 11 (noting Dr. Bovik stated in his deposition “a user would have been ‘confined to the visible screen’”) (citing Ex. 1721, 56:16– 23, 108:25–109:8, 116:17–117:2; Ex. 2706 ¶¶ 51–52). In summary, the Petition cites to portions of Young ’801 that describe the page mode and generally advance the theory of moving a cursor across, upward, and to the right to obtain consecutively displayed and successive portions of schedule information, citing portions that describe new pages and cursor jumps. Petitioner did not create a new theory about how the page guide operates but responded to Patent Owner’s arguments. Patent Owner chose not to avail itself of the opportunity to depose Dr. Wechselberger about his second declaration and thereafter file observations from that deposition or seek authorization to file a sur-reply. In view of these circumstances, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 92

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “materially similar description of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 14–15 (citing Ex. 2706 ¶¶ 1–19). During the Oral Hearing, Patent Owner indicated any differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s descriptions do not create a dispositive issue. See Tr. 66:11–18. On this record, Petitioner’s description comports with the level of ordinary skill implied by the prior art references discussed further below. Accordingly, we adopt it.” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “8. Young ’801, Young ’121, Strubbe, and Moro Petitioner persuasively shows that claims 23 and 25–27 the” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 6,418,556 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,418,556
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Promos Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2018 · IPR2017-01412 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Donnelly and Iwamoto; claims 13 and 15 are unpatentable as anticipated by Jefferson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’507 patent “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and at least two to three years of experience in integrated circuit design. (Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 18– 19.)” Pet. 5 (footnote omitted). Patent Owner has not expressed what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the art. We find Petitioner’s proposal vague insofar as it includes the qualifier “at least” to describe the level of education and the amount of working experience. This qualifier results in ranges that are too broad to provide a meaningful indication of what knowledge and skills would have been possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt the level of skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant in that regard (Ex. 1002 ¶ 18), but eliminate the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness. C.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that while Donnelly explains the functionality and general operation of its up/down counter, it does not provide any structural detail of the internal components of the counter, that Iwamoto discloses a shift register in a delay locked loop that has the same functionality as the up/down counter of Donnelly in a delay locked loop, and that Iwamoto discloses the structure of the shift register. Pet. 38. These assertions are supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. Ex. 1002 ¶ 108. We credit Dr. Baker’s testimony and give it substantial weight. Petitioner explains that one of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Iwamoto for the implementation details regarding a circuit having the functionality of Donnelly’s up/down counter to realize a functional implementation of a delay locked loop incorporating the functionality disclosed in Donnelly. Pet. 38. That assertion also is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. Ex. 1002 ¶ 109. Petitioner explains Therefore, just as the state (count value) of the up/down counter 620 in figure 5 of Donnelly selects the tap used to provide the output signal from the delay block 500, the state (location of the HIGH value) of the shift register 4 in figure 17 of Iwamoto selects the tap used to provide the output from the delay line 2. (Ex. 1002, ¶ 117.) Similarly, the phase detector 610 instructs the up/down counter 620 in figure 5 of Donnelly to count up or down based on the phase comparison it performs, while the phase comparator 610 in figure 17 of Iwamoto instructs the shift register 4 to shift UP or DOWN based on its phase comparison. (Id.) The change of state for both references as a result of the up/down indication form the respective phase comparisons by one increment. (Id.) Pet. 42–43. The explanation is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. Ex. 1002 ¶ 117. We credit Dr. Baker’s testimony and give it substantial weight.” slip op. at 42

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The words of the claim are clear in not specifying which signal leads or lags, and there is no express disavowal by Patent Owner, either in the Specification or in the prosecution history, as will be explained below. We must not rewrite the claim to add the requirement proposed by Patent Owner. The Specification of the ’507 patent describes, When the second phase detector 30 determines that CKF [feedback clock signal] is more than 180◦ behind CKI [input clock signal], the second phase detector 30 controls switch 28 to be at position (2). The inverted buffered clock signal is thus selected, so that the input clock signal CKI is reversed by 180◦[.] Through the inversion, the phase difference needing to be compensated by the delay line 16' is made less than 180◦ and within the normal operation capabilities of the phase adjusting loop formed by phase detector 12, shift register 14', and delay line 16'. Ex. 1001, 3:7–15.10 The above-quoted description constitutes an affirmative disclosure of one embodiment, and not a disavowal of anything that is different. Elsewhere in the Specification, there also is no clear language of disavowal.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that for “according to the determining step” to have any meaning, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction must be adopted. Rather, we find substantial meaning in “according to the determining step” without adding the non-inverted clock signal and the inverted clock signal as potential sources to the switch as proposed by Patent Owner. A different switch position is selected depending on the outcome of the determining step. We do not find that reading to be without meaning. As for the “inventive concept” and “fundamental purpose” assertions of Patent Owner, they go about the claim interpretation process in a reverse manner, by starting with the patent disclosure first, and then ensuring, are added to the claims under the name of claim interpretation. That is inappropriate. We must respect the language of the claims. It is a “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova, 381 F.3d at 1115; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (“we look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented invention”); Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (“The written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.”). Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “We do not read limitations from the specification into claims; we do not redefine words. Only the patentee can do that.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366–67. The Federal Circuit has explained,” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 6,069,507 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,069,507
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Promos Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2018 · IPR2017-01413 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10, 11, 13, and 15 are unpatentable as anticipated by Kim because Kim discloses each limitation of the challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “The words of the claim are clear in not specifying which signal leads or lags, and there is no express disavowal by Patent Owner, either in the Specification or in the prosecution history, as will be explained below. We must not rewrite the claim to add the requirement proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that for “according to the determining step” to have any meaning, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction must be adopted. Rather, we find substantial meaning in “according to the determining step” without adding the non-inverted clock signal and the inverted clock signal as potential sources to the switch as proposed by Patent Owner. A different switch position is selected depending on the outcome of the determining step. We do not find that reading to be without meaning.” slip op. at 22

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Pet. 26–28. The explanation is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 72–73. We credit Dr. Baker’s testimony and give it substantial weight. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, discussed below, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showings, summarized above, that Kim discloses “maintaining the phase difference between the input clock signal and the feedback clock signal within approximately 180◦.”” slip op. at 34

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “understand the term.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 28. We do not credit that testimony, because Mr. Gervasi does not adequately explain why the plain claim language of “selecting a switch position according to the determining step” should be read restrictively to require a selection between non-inverted and inverted input cock signals. As discussed above, it is claims which define the scope of an invention, not the Specification.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 6,069,507 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,069,507
• Ebay Inc. / Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Ltd. et al. v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2018 · IPR2016-01828 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing

  Rehearing was granted in part: review was instituted on all challenged claims and grounds, but claims 16 and 28 were not shown unpatentable because their scope could not be determined without speculation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

    “For the reasons explained below, we grant Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to the extent we (1) modify our Institution Decision to institute on all of the challenged claims, including claims 16 and 28, and all of the grounds presented in the Petition, including Ground 2; and (2) modify our Final Written Decision to include a determination with respect to claims 16 and 28. We deny, however, Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to the extent we decline to read claims 16 and 28 on the prior art.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “In SAS, the Supreme Court held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc., 1348 at 1359–60. In our Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would establish that at least one of the challenged claims of the U.S. Patent No. 8,650,591 B2 is unpatentable. Inst. Dec. 23. Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in SAS, we now modify our Institution Decision to institute on all of the challenged claims, including claims 16 and 28, and on all of the grounds presented in the Petition, including Ground 2, and we determine, in this Decision on Patent Owner’s Motion for Rehearing, whether claims 16 and 28 have been shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “If our unpatentability analysis requires “considerable speculation as to the meaning and assumptions as to the scope” of the claims, In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962), the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art cannot be ascertained. See id.; see also BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013-00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing Steele, 305 F.2d at 862–63 for the proposition that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption[s] as to the meaning of the claims” and reasoning that “an obviousness determination based on less than all of the claimed elements is speculative as to the meaning or scope of the claims”). In other words, “[w]ithout ascertaining the proper claim scope, we cannot conduct a necessary factual inquiry for determining obviousness—ascertaining differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art.” Id. at 20 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).” slip op. at 6

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “least one partition of said at least one secondary storage device through said secondary storage partitions window,” “means for manipulating said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window,” and “means for modifying said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window.” Ex. 101, 9:66–10:25. In related litigation, the district court found in its claim construction opinion that the ’400 patent does not provide structure corresponding clearly to the functions of these limitations. Ex. 1010, 49–61. We have reviewed and considered the district court’s analysis and findings and we concur with the district court’s conclusion. We are unable to discern structure in the ’400 patent that corresponds clearly to the functions recited in the “means for” limitations of claim 16. Claim 28 recites similarly “program code for configuring said at least one partition of said at least one secondary storage device through a secondary storage partitions window,” “program code for manipulating said virtual cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window,” and “program code for means for modifying said at least one cabinet record through said cabinet visible partition window.” Ex. 1001, 10:65–11:29. The district court also found that the ’400 patent did not provide structure corresponding clearly to the function of these limitations. Ex. 1010, 49–61. We have reviewed and considered the district court’s analysis and findings and we concur with the district court’s conclusion. We are unable to discern structure in the ’400 patent that corresponds clearly to the functions recited in the “program code for” limitations of claim 28.” slip op. at 5

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,690,400
• Uber Technologies, Inc. v. X One, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2018 · IPR2017-01264 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–11, 13, 22–25, 27, 28, 31–37, 39–42, and 45 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness grounds failed to establish the required link to application startup.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed Dr. Bartone’s testimony, and we find his references to the front end and signal receiving elements were intended to denote that a person of ordinary skill’s understanding should include an understanding of the elements’ use at a system level in mobile wireless communications and navigation systems, but the ordinarily skilled artisan need not “have detailed understandings of every single aspect and every single system.” See Ex. 2007, 48:17–19, see also id. at 46:15–49:6. Under Dr. Bartone’s testimony, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be required to have an understanding of, for instance, the details of the design of user applications or antenna except as required for an understanding of how these elements work within the mobile wireless communications and navigation systems. See id. Additionally, under our review of Petitioner’s proposed qualifications, we decline to adopt the qualifier “at least,” because the use of this qualifier introduces vagueness. Accordingly, on this record, we adopt the qualifications that a person of ordinary skill would have a fouryear degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field of study, or equivalent experience, and two years of experience in or with mobile wireless communications and navigation systems, and this would include an understanding of how system elements work within mobile wireless communications and navigation systems. II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION A. Introduction” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We find that, in light of the specification and the plain meaning of the term, launching is not equivalent to running an application. See Ex. 2004 ¶ 37 (Mr. Sturza’s testimony citing dictionaries in support of his statement that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the ordinary meaning of ‘launching’ is during a program’s start up procedures”). The specification does not use these terms interchangeably; instead, launching refers to the initiation or startup of an application. See e.g., id at Fig 32 (first step in the flow chart is launching the application on a handset); 26:51–59 (describing Figure 32 as depicting the process by which a user can initiate joining a talk group); see also id at Figs 34–40 (depicting launching as the initial step). Thus, the claims require the recited activities to be “responsive to” or “in association with” the startup of the application. Patent Owner’s counsel asserts that the claims require some connectivity between launching the application and displaying the map. Tr. 26:21–27:4. Specifically, “there needs to be a connection either in time or by operation” between the launching of the application and the invocation of the recited method. Id. at 27:5–7. As noted above, the district court found that “‘[r]esponsive to launching’ simply places a temporal relationship on launching and the other claimed functions: they happen in response to launching. ‘In association with an application launched’ is broader, and just requires some relationship between launching and the claimed functions.” Ex. 2006, 39. We agree, but in the interest of providing more specificity, we clarify that the required temporal relationship with the claimed activities is one that requires the claimed functions to occur during or near the time of startup of the application. We provide this clarification because we have determined that the temporal relationship must be anchored to the startup of the application or else the term “launch” loses its meaning. The required relationship is not shown by simply pointing out that the application was started at some point in time prior to the occurrence of the recited activities. Finding otherwise would render meaningless the distinction between launching and running an application because the specification and plain meaning of the term indicate that launching is the startup of the application and running indicates the continued operation of that application. We are charged with giving the claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification and that charge includes respecting the patentee’s specific word choice and giving that choice the appropriate meaning and emphasis. Therefore, we find that the plain meaning of “responsive to launching” requires that there be a temporal relationship between the startup of the recited application and the occurrence of the other recited activities and “associated with launch” is a broader term that requires a relationship between the startup of application and the recited activities. III. ANALYSIS A. Analysis of Asserted Ground of Obviousness Based on Konishi” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “This evidence, however, falls short of what is required under our construction of “responsive to launching.” See supra § II.B. Petitioner has established that an application is running on the mobile device and, thus, the application was launched at some point in time prior to the recited mapping activities. Petitioner, however, fails to provide sufficient evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to invoke the method responsive to the startup of the application. As described above, it is not enough to show that the application was launched, but rather there must be a showing as to the temporal relationship between the launch of the application and the recited method. This limitation is not met by merely showing that the application was launched at some point in time because we must give proper weight to a patentee’s choice to link the invocation of the method to the launch of the application and not to the running of the application. Thus, the evidence presented in this matter indicates that Konishi teaches that an application is launched, but the evidence fails to provide the necessary connection between Konishi’s application startup and method invocation.” slip op. at 21

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “any alleged deficiencies were remedied when Petitioner filed Exhibits 1029, 1030, and 1032, which are declarations of the translators for translated documents, Exhibits 1009, 1012, and 1015.11 Additionally, the declarations in Exhibits 1029, 1030, and 1032 contain statements that willful false statements are punishable by fine and imprisonment. See e.g., Ex. 1029. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s motion to exclude the translations of 11 We granted Petitioner’s motion to file the supplemental declarations, in part, because the information in the supplemental declarations “constitutes additional support that allegedly confirms the accuracy of translations of prior art” and the filing could “obviate the need for filing additional authenticating documents in the future.” See Paper 20, 5. prior art references, Makoto, Konishi, and Mitsuoka (Exs. 1009, 1012, and 1015), their untranslated versions (Exs. 1008, 1011, and 1014), and associated declarations in support of the translations (Exs. 1010, 1013, and 1016). B. Exhibits 1005–1007, 1020, and 1022” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 8,798,647 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,798,647
• Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2018 · IPR2017-01979 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Huawei’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution on grounds 4–6 because the Petition did not adequately explain how to harmonize the references’ conflicting teachings.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We “review [our] decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c). The request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). After considering the Request for Rehearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in denying institution. We deny the Request for Rehearing for the reasons that follow. slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Id. Figure 1 of R1-071000 identifies the scope of its contribution as limited to transmission of control information together with data information. Id. Thus, R1-071000, on its face, is directed to the opposite scenario of R1- 072122, which is directed to transmitting control information without data. Id.; see also Dec. 14–15 citing (Ex. 1008, 1 (Title: “Data non-associated control signal transmission with UL data.”)). Even if we were to accept arguendo Petitioner’s first argument that R1-071000 invites skilled artisans to expand and apply the data mapping scheme of R1-072122, such an invitation does not remedy Petitioner’s failure to explain sufficiently how one with ordinary skill in the art would have modified the system of R1- 072122 to transmit control signals with data, contrary to the express teachings of that reference. See Reh’g Req. 4; Pet. 85–86. For instance, Petitioner does not address how one would reconcile the two references’ diametrically opposed teachings regarding placement of the ACK/NAK. As we stated: Finally, although the cited portions of R1-071000 teach placing data in the symbols directly adjacent to the symbol containing the reference signal, R1-071000 depicts placing the ACK/NAK in the symbols farthest from the symbol containing the reference signal––directly opposite to the cited teachings of R1-072122 describing placing the ACK/NAK in the symbols directly adjacent to the reference signal. Ex. 1008, Figs. 4, 5. Here too, Petitioner and Dr. Akl do not address how or why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have harmonized the disparate teachings of these two references. Dec. 15 (bold emphasis added; italics original). Absent sufficient evidence and explanation, Petitioner’s argument amounts to impermissible hindsight reconstruction of the challenged claims. See, e.g., In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (cautioning against the use of hindsight).” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Rehearing. Reh’g Req. 4–6. A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). Petitioner identifies a single page of its Petition as “the place where [that argument] was previously addressed.” Reh’g Req. 4–6 (citing Pet. 86). The cited page of the Petition, recites only a single sentence and string citation related to this argument: “Further, a number of 3GPP contributions, including both R1- 071000 and R1-072122, expressly disclose and teach that it is advantageous to limit the number of different transmission formats due to complexity of UE design.” Pet. 86 (citing Ex. 1008, 2, 5; Ex. 1006, 2; Ex. 1009, 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 225). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also, e.g., Captioncall, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc., IPR2014-00780, Paper No. 40 (PTAB May 19, 2016) (discussing that a rehearing request is “not intended as a vehicle simply to disagree with [the] outcome or to provide new arguments”). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions on rehearing, the cited portion of the Petition does not provide sufficient explanation for the following statements made in the Request for Rehearing: that “R1-072122 also expressly teaches that a single mapping scheme for control information is preferred”; that “R1-070998, another contemporaneous 3GPP contribution, provides a similar statement”; or that “skilled artisans would have been motivated to apply the same control mapping scheme regardless of the presence of data.” Compare Reh’g Req. 4–6 with Pet. 86. Indeed, the cited page of the Petition does not discuss R1-070777or R1-070998. See Pet. 86. Because Petitioner’s second argument was not presented in its Petition, we do not consider it on rehearing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). To the extent Petitioner contends its declarant Dr. Akl presented the extensive argument that Petitioner now puts forth in its Request for Rehearing, our rules particularly require identification of “the place where [that argument] was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(3) (prohibiting incorporation of arguments by reference).” slip op. at 6

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,761,130

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.