- PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · PGR2025-00002 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Adverse judgment
After Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–78, the Board granted its motion for adverse judgment and terminated the post-grant review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” which includes “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“there is no claim remaining for trial . . . when, as here, all of the challenged claims have been cancelled”). Thus, actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,134,952 - Apple Inc. / Google LLC v. Spacetime3d, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00344 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the listed combinations of Anthony, Hanggie, Matthews, and Robertson.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Board instituted an inter partes review of the challenged claims pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. Paper 11 (“Dec.”). We joined Google LLC as a party to the proceeding (collectively, with Apple Inc., “Petitioner”) based on a petition and motion for joinder filed in IPR2023-00578. Paper 14.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Google LLC, which filed a petition in IPR2023-00578, has been joined as a petitioner in this proceeding. See Paper 14, 8.” slip op. at 1
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“1. “3D space” and “two-dimensional (2D) space” The parties agree that the claim terms “3D space” and “two-” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“use of items in 2D space and difficulties in finding files, this argument is based on Anthony’s prior art discussion offered to identify the need for improvements that are solved by its 3D invention. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 8. But the issue identified as the problem with 2D items, that is, difficulties in finding 2D files, is not at issue in the combination of the prior art that Petitioner proposes. As discussed, in the combination that Petitioner asserts, with the selection of a maximize button on a 3D window, the window would be displayed in 2D and would occupy all or most parts of the screen—so in that combination, difficulties in finding the 2D files would not be an issue. Pet. 57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Further, Petitioner offers the advantages that this presentation in 2D space would conserve power and allow certain users to interact with an application in a 2D environment. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66, 69. Accordingly, we credit Dr. Fuchs’s testimony that Petitioner’s proposed “specific experience [of the combination] would not deter a user from replacing images in 3D space with an object in 2D space.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 48. We also do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that Anthony’s approach is different from the claimed invention because its method for” slip op. at 65
Patent outcomesUS 9,696,868 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,696,868 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 9, 2023 · IPR2022-00429 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–20 over Chowdhary under §§ 102 and 103, and claims 1–20 over Chowdhary and Tobey under § 103.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine that we need not address whether Toyota was improperly excluded as an RPI because, “even if it were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315.” See SharkNinja, Paper 11 at 18. Other than asserting that “estoppel provisions are implicated by this case” (PO Sur-reply 2311), there is no allegation or evidence that Toyota or any other RPI is barred or estopped from this proceeding, or that 11 Patent Owner asserts without explaining that the ’475 patent “is currently being asserted by Patent Owner against Toyota, as well as GM (another paying Member of Unified similarly situated to Toyota.). PO Sur-reply 23. However, the record indicates that the Toyota case has been dismissed and the GM case stayed. See Paper 32, 1 (Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al. v. Toyota Motor Corp. et al., 2:21-cv00389 (E.D. Tex. October 19, 2021) stipulated dismissal without prejudice on March 20, 2023); see also id. at 2 (Intellectual Ventures I LLC et al. v. General Motors Company, 6:21- cv01088 (W.D. Tex. October 19, 2021) (stayed pending settlement on April 6, 2023)). And, upon further inquiry, PACER Case Locator indicates that the GM case was dismissed in an order granting joint motion to dismiss entered on June 20, 2023. See GM case, Document 116. Petitioner purposefully omitted any other RPI to gain some advantage in our forum. See Unified Patent, LLC v. MemoryWeb, LLC, IPR2021-01413, Paper 76 at 5 (PTAB May 22, 2023) (Director Review Decision) (“The Board can and should make a determination of the real parties in interest or privity in any proceeding in which that determination may impact the underlying proceeding, for example, but not limited to, a time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) or an estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) that might apply. That is not the situation here.”). Because we determine that neither the time bar nor estoppel provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 315 are implicated in this case, “we need not address whether [Toyota] is an unnamed RPI.” See Unified Patent, Paper 76 at 5 (“The Board should not have determined whether [there were additional] RPIs in this proceeding given that determination was not necessary to resolve the proceeding.”).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that at the time of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in vehicle telematics.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 37–40). Petitioner asserts that “[a] lack of experience can be remedied with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, a lack of education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Id. Patent Owner essentially agrees with Petitioner’s assertion, but contends that the work experience should more broadly be in “mobile communications.” PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 27). In our Institution Decision, we determined that there was “not much difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s assertions, but noted that “we find that Patent Owner’s broader definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is more consistent with the scope and content of the ’475 [p]atent.” Inst. Dec. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:53–54; Ex. 1003, 3:15–18, Fig. 1). In its Reply, “Petitioner accepts the level of skill definition adopted in the Institution Decision,” and notes that “[n]either party contends that the differences in the proposed definitions affect the patentability of the challenged claims.” Pet. Reply 7. Based on this record, we apply Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill, which also was applied in our Institution Decision, because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“We begin our analysis by considering the language of the claims. At the outset, we note that none of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 require “actively notify[ing] the recipient soon after the violation,” as Patent Owner proposes. Independent claim 1 requires that if the computing device located within the vehicle determines that the vehicle committed a violation, the computing device located in the vehicle sends an indication of the violation to a remote computing system. Ex. 1001, 10:55–55. Independent claim 1 further recites “wherein the remote computing device is configured to notify a recipient about the violation committed by the vehicle.” Id. at 10:56–58. Independent claims 8 and 15 includes substantially similar limitations. Id. at 11:14–28, 12:11–25. Thus, the independent claims broadly recite “notify[ing] a recipient about the violation” without reference to any type, i.e., “active” or “passive,” or timing of the notification. Turning to dependent claims 4 and 5, claims 4 and 5 both begin by reciting “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the remote computing device is configured to notify the recipient about the violation committed by the vehicle by.” Ex. 1001, 10:66–67:1, 11:3–5. Claim 4 further limits independent claim 1 “by permitting the recipient to view the indication of the violation via a browser” (id. at 10:67–11:2) and claim 5 further limits claim 1 “by sending a communication to the recipient in response to receiving the indication of the violation from the computing device” (id. at 11:4–6). Thus, we understand the recitation of “configured to notify a recipient” in claim 1 as being broad enough to cover both the notification recited in claim 4 that “permit[s] the recipient to view . . . via a browser” and the notification recited in claim 5 that “send[s] a communication to the recipient in response to receiving the indication of the violation from the computing device.” Id. at 10:66–11:7.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“At the outset, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments are all premised upon its proposed construction of the phrase “configured to notify a recipient,” which, we do not adopt. See § III.C.1. As discussed above, we are not persuaded that the phrase “configured to notify a recipient,” as it appears in the context of claim 1, requires any type of active notification, as Patent Owner proposes. Consequently, Patent Owner’s argument that Chowdhary fails to teach the limitation at issue because Chowdhary “is wholly silent with regard to anything that is configured to actively notify someone about a violation” is unavailing. PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 2017 ¶ 57); see also id. at 27 (“[N]either the shortcuts to the reports shown in Figure 10 . . . or any other disclosure in Chowd[h]ary, actively notifies the fleet manager that a violation has been committed by the driver of the vehicle.”). Notwithstanding, to address this limitation, Petitioner directs us to Chowdhary’s disclosure that its “VSM application server automatically generates reports when new event data is received based on previously set criteria.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 47–51, 96–97, 102–103, 114, Figs. 10–30; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 84–87). Petitioner provides the following copy of Figure 10 of Chowdhary, annotated to identify, among several items, icon 1102 and icon 1104. Figure 10 illustrates “an example screen display for one embodiment of the VSM user interface” that includes “an ‘Alert/Notifications’ and ‘Messages’ screen.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 97. Petitioner explains that Chowdhary discloses VSM application server receives speeding event data and prepares speeding reports based on the received event data. [Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7, 47–51, 96–97, 114, Figs. 10–30]. An administrator sets alerts and/or notifications for reports that are of particular interest to the administrator so that an Alert/Notification is posted providing the title of the report (orange), the date/time the report was created (green), a link (via icon 1102, blue) to access the report each time a new speed limit violation report is created, and an icon 1104 (red) to remove reports so only new Alerts/Notifications are shown. [Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 97–98, 120, Fig. 10]. Pet. Reply 12–13. Relying on the deposition testimony of Mr. Wilson, Petitioner asserts that “Mr. Wilson testified that a clear notification would occur when a user logs in to a website, and there is an indication that a new message is available for the user to view.” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 2015,” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 9,291,475 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,291,475 - Dji Europe B.V. v. Textron Innovations Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Feb 15, 2023 · IPR2022-00163 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against the Patent Owner on claims 1–8, 10–13, and 15–25 after those claims were statutorily disclaimed.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“indicating that all challenged claims had been disclaimed, requesting adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), and entering the respective Disclaimer, dated November 16, 2022, into the record of this proceeding as Exhibit 2020. Paper 18. Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 1–8, 10–13, and 15–25 means that Patent Owner has no claims remaining in the present proceeding and adverse judgement is therefore appropriate. II. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–8, 10–13, and 15– 25 of the ’647 patent; and” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,243,647 - Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308 - Asustek Computer, Inc. / Asus Computer International v. Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. LtdRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00647 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s request for reconsideration and added institution of the §102 Cioffi challenge to claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that our Decision to Institute overlooked or misapprehended the matters discussed in this Decision, and that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its challenge as to the patentability of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 as being anticipated by Cioffi. The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim terms. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,430,148 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,672,104 - Foursquare Labs, Inc. v. Silver State Intellectual Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 26, 2015 · IPR2014-00159 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Fraccaroli does not disclose all claim limitations arranged or combined in the same way.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“example when reviewing an allegedly anticipating prior art reference. Reply 7 (citing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369 n.5). Nevertheless, we still must determine whether the reference discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, even while looking at the reference as a whole. See Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Claim 1 is a method claim reciting specific steps. Limitation [f] recites the step of “receiving, from the user, additional data regarding the user, the additional data being related to the geographic location of the user.” In Fraccaroli, only the convention application includes this step, with the information in the event field corresponding to the “additional data” recited in the claim. See Ex. 1003, 8:57–9:5. For limitation [h], which recites the step of “receiving from the user an access list of possible requesters of the data and the additional data,” Petitioner relies on information provided by the user in Fraccaroli’s closest friend application, i.e., a list of known persons with whom the user wishes to share information. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:44–48). Notably, Petitioner does not contend that the user in Fraccaroli’s convention application places the information center or registration desk on an access list. See Pet. 30–31; Tr. 60:7–11. Thus, the convention application does not include the step of receiving an “access list” from the user (limitation [h]), and the closest friend application does not include the step of receiving “additional data” from the user (limitation [f]). For limitation [j]—the step of providing location data and additional data to possible requesters on the access list—Petitioner cites Fraccaroli’s description of message signals sent after a match is made. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner contends that message signals containing information from a user’s matching profile are sent in any of the embodiments disclosed in Fraccaroli. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:40–67). Nevertheless, Fraccaroli does not describe a process that includes both the steps of receiving “additional data” from a user and receiving an “access list” from a user. Therefore, even if message signals are sent in all embodiments or applications described in Fraccaroli, the reference does not disclose a process in which message signals including “additional data” are sent to possible requesters on an “access list,” as set forth in limitation [j]. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Fraccaroli discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in claim 1 and, thus, has not shown that Fraccaroli anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“example when reviewing an allegedly anticipating prior art reference. Reply 7 (citing Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369 n.5). Nevertheless, we still must determine whether the reference discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, even while looking at the reference as a whole. See Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Claim 1 is a method claim reciting specific steps. Limitation [f] recites the step of “receiving, from the user, additional data regarding the user, the additional data being related to the geographic location of the user.” In Fraccaroli, only the convention application includes this step, with the information in the event field corresponding to the “additional data” recited in the claim. See Ex. 1003, 8:57–9:5. For limitation [h], which recites the step of “receiving from the user an access list of possible requesters of the data and the additional data,” Petitioner relies on information provided by the user in Fraccaroli’s closest friend application, i.e., a list of known persons with whom the user wishes to share information. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:44–48). Notably, Petitioner does not contend that the user in Fraccaroli’s convention application places the information center or registration desk on an access list. See Pet. 30–31; Tr. 60:7–11. Thus, the convention application does not include the step of receiving an “access list” from the user (limitation [h]), and the closest friend application does not include the step of receiving “additional data” from the user (limitation [f]). For limitation [j]—the step of providing location data and additional data to possible requesters on the access list—Petitioner cites Fraccaroli’s description of message signals sent after a match is made. Pet. 31–32. Petitioner contends that message signals containing information from a user’s matching profile are sent in any of the embodiments disclosed in Fraccaroli. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:40–67). Nevertheless, Fraccaroli does not describe a process that includes both the steps of receiving “additional data” from a user and receiving an “access list” from a user. Therefore, even if message signals are sent in all embodiments or applications described in Fraccaroli, the reference does not disclose a process in which message signals including “additional data” are sent to possible requesters on an “access list,” as set forth in limitation [j]. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Fraccaroli discloses all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in claim 1 and, thus, has not shown that Fraccaroli anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Subsequent to institution, Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing, Paper 8, which we granted for the limited purpose of modifying our construction of one claim term, Paper 13 (“Reh’g Dec.”). Thereafter, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response, accompanied by a Declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg. Paper 14 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent Owner Response, along with a Declaration of Mr. Chris Schmandt. Paper 17 (“Reply”); Ex. 1027. We held an oral hearing on February 24, 2015. A transcript of the oral hearing is included in the record. Paper 27 (“Tr.”).” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 7,343,165 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,343,165 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC / Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. v. Velocity Patent LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 6, 2015 · IPR2014-01247 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request to cancel challenged claims 31 and 32 and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner before institution.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“of claims 31 and 32 (Paper 19). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), cancellation of all challenged claims leaving no remaining claims for trial is construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 31 and 32 of U.S. Patent No. 5,954,781, is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered herein against Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 5,954,781 - PTAB · Sep 2, 2014 · IPR2014-00472 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion to terminate the preliminary IPR proceeding and terminated it without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment2 and terminate without rendering a final written decision under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that the joint motion to terminate this proceeding is GRANTED and the proceedings are hereby terminated; and FURTHER ORDERED that the settlement agreement shall be treated as business confidential information.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,096,358
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.