- Yealink (USA) Network Technology Co., Ltd. / Yealink Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Barco NVNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00598 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–31 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the asserted combinations did not teach required claim limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“admissions by Patent Owner in litigation, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master of Science (M.S.) degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and five years of work experience in a related field” and that “[a]dditional educational experience could substitute for some of the work experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art (Petition, 5) at this time.” PO Resp. 6. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is uncontested and is consistent with the technology described in the ’347 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Preliminary Response, “Patent Owner accept[ed] the Petition’s claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 6. However, in the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner argues that “the claims of the ’347 Patent require no construction as they are valid under their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 6. Based on the complete record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Beel actually discloses the following: [0321] On the peripheral device 32 the video packets are received at the corresponding plug and play port, e.g. the USB port 11, read by the Human Interface Driver (HID) interface handler 13, unpacked to remove HID protocol headers in an unpacker 20 and then transmitted to the communications network by a transmitter 21. The network can be wireless for example WiFi or LiFi network. [0322] Having been routed over a communications network to the base unit 33, the incoming stream is read from the communications interface such as a WiFi access point 22, unpacked in an unpacker 25, decoded in a decoder 26 and then inserted into a suitable composition such as an OpenGL based composition in the compositor 29 for display on a central display device. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 321–322 (emphasis added to portions quoted by Petitioner). Patent Owner notes that “[t]he Petition mistakenly cites to ¶ 322 of Beel but quotes ¶ 321.” PO Resp. 20 n.3. However, it appears that Petitioner has grafted together a portion of paragraph 321 that introduces peripheral device 32 with a portion of paragraph 322, which discusses features of base unit 33. However, this grafting has been done in such a way as to convey (incorrectly) that peripheral device 32, not base unit 33, includes unpacker 25, decoder 26, and compositor 29 that process the first processed video data received by the first peripheral device to generate second video data. Dr. Almeroth’s testimony, which copies Petitioner’s incorrectly altered quotation to paragraph 322 of Beel, is unreliable as to this claim limitation and is entitled to no weight.4 Thus, Petitioner has no expert testimony on which to rely for this claim limitation.” slip op. at 19
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“5 At the oral argument, when challenged on its reliance on paragraph 322, Petitioner argued that paragraph 321 of Beel teaches this limitation. Tr. 22:26–23:24. Petitioner did not make this argument in the Petition and, instead, raised it for the first time during oral argument; thus, it will not be considered. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it chose to exercise its waiver authority under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b), the Board was obligated to dismiss Dell’s untimely argument given that the untimely argument in this case was raised for the first time during oral argument.”). Even if we were to consider this new argument, it would not be persuasive. As Patent Owner observes (PO Resp. 20), any processing performed by peripheral device 32 in paragraph 321 is on data received from the processing device and destined for the base station via the network, rather than data flowing in the direction of the first processed video data of claim 1.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,966,347 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,966,347 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,232,158 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01078 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–22, and 24–30, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1011, 5:18–21. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’371 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “a person having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronic gaming technology.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–26). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (“Evolution does not set forth an alternative level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’371 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “a first selected position . . . to have an increased payout . . . greater than a first non-selected payout.” See Pet. 25–27, 30, 35, 36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35–36 (“had the first selected position not been randomly selected, the player would only be eligible for the basic payout”). Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,756,371 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00819 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable because the references did not teach its required comparison of desired and interferer signal strengths.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 9. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 9; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In our Institution Decision, we stated that we “will give the term ‘signal path’ its ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ and not limit it only to analog components, as the district court found and the parties agree.” Inst. Dec. 11. Given that the parties continue to agree on this point, we see no need to depart from the construction we adopted in our Institution Decision. Moreover, applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR for the same reasons as discussed above. In this proceeding, the dispute between the parties concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path,” “in the signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 43–45. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language to the extent it requires adjusting an impedance and/or bias current of a circuit while it is in the signal path. See Id. at 50–51.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther
“Patent Owner’s arguments generally fail to address why Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “plurality of circuits [comprising/including] . . . a filter,” and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting the bias, in or of a circuit.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be a single ‘circuit,’ or to reflect variation in ‘an impedance’ or ‘a bias’ in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent (which has the same specification as the ’164 patent) “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” See id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’164 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” 8:28–30. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:41–42. The ’164 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Id. at 8:30–33 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” Dr. Larson also relies on Figure 6 of the ’164 patent to conclude that” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 11,564,164 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,564,164 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25–27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 10; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 36–38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “component” or “impedance” that is dynamically adjusted, and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting a variable impedance of a circuit or component thereof, while it is in the signal path.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit” or “component.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be “a component,” “a circuit,” or “an impedance” in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” Id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” or “component” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’330 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” that describes a “possible power saving technique[].” Ex. 1001, 3:30–33, 8:20–25. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:33–34. The ’330 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Ex. 1001, 8:22–25 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit,” “component,” or “impedance.”” slip op. at 42
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The absence of meaningful disclosure of the implementation details of the circuit in the ’330 patent suggests that the circuit implementation details Patent Owner argues about now would have been within the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. That is, Patent Owner did not provide in its own specification “the type of detail [it] now argues is necessary in prior art references,” which permits a “finding that one skilled in the art would have known how to implement the features of the references and would have concluded that the reference disclosures would have been enabling.” In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994). When a patent specification does not “specifically describe[]” any “equipment or techniques to be used,” it may be deduced “that all of the equipment and technical knowledge required to perform the claimed method” is known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1407 (CCPA 1973); see also Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire LLC, 870 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (without proof to the contrary, when there is no focus on a disputed claim limitation in the specification, the limitation is merely “an observed result of an old process”). To that end, Petitioner provides persuasive testimony from Dr. Abidi that signal strength measurement circuits were known in the art, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to implement a known technique for measuring signal strength, which is not disputed by Patent Owner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180– 181; Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 12–16; see Pet. Reply 24–26; Pet. 60–62. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that Behbahani’s disclosure at least suggests circuitry for performing such a determination of signal strength. See Pet. Reply 24 (citing Pet. 60–61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–98, 179–181). Petitioner further argues that Tan “provides an example of circuitry used to detect signals at various points in the low-pass filter signal path as a means of implementing a prefilter automatic gain control.” Pet. 60–61 (citing Ex. 1006, 481); Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. The example in Tan is a peak detector circuit. Pet. 61; Ex. 1003 ¶ 180; Ex. 1006, Fig. 8. Dr. Abidi testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Tan’s signal strength measurement circuitry to measure nodes AI and AO. Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. In response to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how to use Tan’s peak detector in Behbahani (PO Resp. 70), Dr. Abidi provides testimony explaining how Tan’s peak detector circuit provides a measure of the signal strength, which we find persuasive, and is unrebutted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1042 ¶ 15.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 7,010,330 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,010,330 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00817 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan; Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments and declaration testimony is responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–11 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008– 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; rather, Petitioner responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Thus, the parties do not dispute the meaning of “signal path,” and we adopt the district court’s construction of plain and ordinary meaning, as agreed by the parties. See PO Resp. 40–41; Pet. 9; Ex. 2025, 14. The dispute concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 40–42. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language in limitation 1(e) and the corresponding limitations in independent claims 3, 5, 7, and 8 – i.e., that “[t]he plain language requires adjusting a bias current, or a bias current and an impedance, in a circuit, while it is in the signal path.” See PO Resp. 48. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 20
- Settled expectationsNot reached
“Owner’s] settled expectations in long-standing patent rights, and Office policies and efficiency.” Id.; see id. at 25–26. Patent Owner’s arguments essentially reassert the arguments made in the Preliminary Response that inter partes review should be discretionarily denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In the Institution Decision, we were not persuaded by these arguments. Inst. Dec. 15–22. Patent Owner argues that in Ecto World, LLC v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2024-01280, Paper 13 (PTAB May 19, 2025) (§ A precedential) supports denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Sur-reply 25. However, Ecto World was designated precedential on May 19, 2025, and our Standard Operating Procedure 2 provides that “[a] precedential decision is binding Board authority in subsequent matters involving similar facts or issues.” SOP2, 7 (emphasis added). Therefore, re-evaluation under Ecto World does not appear to be appropriate under the circumstances here. Patent Owner also argues that proceedings can be properly dismissed post-institution in the Director’s discretion. Sur-reply 26. In support, Patent Owner cites to Hulu LLV v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024- 01252, Paper 17, at 3 (PTAB April 17, 2025). Id. However, in Hulu, the patent owner timely sought Director Review after the institution decision, and upon Director Review, the institution decision was vacated and denied. IPR2024-01252, Papers 16, 19, 27. By contrast, here, Patent Owner raised this issue for the first time in the Sur-reply (filed August 5, 2025, nearly three months after Ecto World was designated precedential), approximately three weeks prior to oral argument. Patent Owner also did not file a motion to terminate the proceeding. Although we recognize that “that the Board has the inherent authority to reconsider institution decisions (beyond the regulatory time for a patentee’s entitlement to seek reconsideration),” Sling TV, L.L.C. v. Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, 840 F. App’x 598, 598–99 (Fed. Cir. 2021), we decline to do so at this late stage in the proceeding.” slip op. at 63
Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00818 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 4–23 were not shown unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan because the combination did not teach comparing desired and interferer signal strengths.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Behbahani teaches “comparing the strength of the desired signal to the strength of the interfere signal,” as recited in limitation 1(a). See PO Resp. 68–69; Sur-reply 21–23. Although Petitioner argues that Behbahani “expressly teaches comparing the desired and interferer signal strengths,” Petitioner does not cite to sufficient evidence in support of this statement. Pet. 38. The basis of Petitioner’s argument is that Behbahani teaches the same process for determining signal strengths as shown in Figure 4 of the ’202 patent. Figure 4 of the ’202 patent is reproduced below: Figure 4 shows, among other things, signal strength indicator circuits 440 and 450 connected to input line 410 and output line 460, on either side of gain element 420 and filter 430. Ex. 1001, 6:53–57. The input signal on input line 410 is shown as desired signal 412 and interferers 464 and 466. Id. at 59–61. Figure 4 is further described as follows. The signal strength indicators 440 and 450 do not provide information as to the relative sizes of the desired and interfering signals. Rather, a cumulative signal level is provided at their outputs. For example, the first signal strength indicator 440 outputs a level corresponding to the sum of desired signal 412 and interfering signals 414 and 416, while the second signal strength indicator 450 provides a signal level corresponding to the sum of desired signal 462 and interfering signals 464 and 466. In this specific example, the gain of the gain and filter circuit combinations is shown as approximately one, while the interfering signals 414 and 416 signal levels are reduced. A comparison of the signal levels provided by the signal strength indicators 440 and 450 indicates that much of the combined received signal on line 410 has been filtered. Accordingly, it may be deduced that large interfering signals present at the input are being filtered by the filter 430. From this information, as will be shown in greater detail below, the bias, impedance, and gain of the gain stage 420 and filter 430 combination may be optimized to reduce power dissipation. Ex. 1001, 6:61–7:13 (emphasis added). In other words, Figure 4 shows a comparison of a sum of the desired and interferer signals output from the strength indicator circuits, not a comparison of the strength of the desired signal and the strength of the interferer signal, as required by the claim language. See Sur-reply 22–23. The ’202 patent describes Figure 4 as “an embodiment,” and claims are not limited to specific embodiments described in the specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner even admits that Figure 4 “compar[es] a cumulative signal strength at a first node to a cumulative signal strength at a second node.” Pet. 36 (emphasis added). In the Reply, Petitioner argues that Patent Owner “ignores the” slip op. at 33
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments in the Reply and Reply declaration testimony are responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–12 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); see Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008–1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; rather, Petitioner responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We also note that our Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“CTPG”) states that In most cases, the Board is capable of identifying new issues or belatedly presented evidence when weighing the evidence at the close of trial, and disregarding any new issues or belatedly presented evidence that exceeds the proper scope of reply or sur-reply. As such, striking the entirety or a portion of a party's brief is an exceptional remedy that the Board expects will be granted rarely. CTPG at 80, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,280 (Nov. 21, 2019). We follow that guidance here. Further, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Abidi’s testimony as a co- author of Behbahani is “self-serving and unsupported.” Mot. 6–7. The fact that Dr. Abidi is a co-author of Behbahani, as well as Petitioner’s expert, is not, in and of itself, sufficient to discredit Dr. Abidi’s testimony. The CTPG provides that “[t]he Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.” CTPG 35. We are capable of discerning from the testimony and the evidence presented whether Dr. Abidi’s testimony should be entitled to any weight, either as a whole or with regard to specific issues. We will weigh the testimony on an issue-by-issue basis as appropriate. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner has pointed out the inadequacies of Dr. Abidi’s testimony, we are also capable of noting those inadequacies and weighing that testimony accordingly. For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We also disagree with Petitioner that “Dr. Abidi provided well- reasoned analysis that Behbahani teaches determining and comparing desired and interferer signal strengths.” Reply 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 179– 181). We have reviewed the Dr. Abidi’s testimony cited in the Petition and Reply for limitation 1(a) (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95, 96, 113–120, 179–181; Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 12–16), and we disagree that Dr. Abidi provided well-reasoned analysis that Behbahani teaches comparing desired signal strengths with interferer signal strengths. Rather, Dr. Abidi’s testimony focuses on determining or measuring desired and interferer signal strengths, generally simply repeats what is in the Petition, and only provides a conclusory assertion that Behbahani expressly teaches comparing the strengths of the desired and interferer signals without providing any explanation. See TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”). Accordingly, Dr. Abidi’s supporting testimony is also deficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). As Patent Owner points out, the only comparison mentioned by Petitioner in Behbahani is to derive the strength of the interferer signal. Sur-reply 22 (citing Pet. 38–39); Ex. 1004, 1207 (“[B]y comparing the signal level at the input and the output of the digital filter (DI and DO), the relative strength of the out-of-channel signal that passes through the analog filter is calculated”). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we determine that Petitioner has not shown that Behbahani teaches limitation 1(a).” slip op. at 36
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - PTAB · Aug 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00343 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 and 8–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“and 4) does not address Petitioner’s first two arguments and evidence, which, on this record, appear to show that Bucknell’s prioritized queue length is based on buffered data in either, or both, of a first and second iteration. Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, we need not reach Patent Owner’s assertions as to the third alternative argument and evidence Petitioner provides, namely the combination of examples 2), 3), and 4). For completeness, however, we acknowledge that Bucknell does not expressly combine examples 2), 3), and 4), mainly because example 4) only refers back to example 2). However, we note that from a plain reading of Bucknell’s written description it may not be a significant leap to understand that the disclosed combination of examples 2) and 4), with first and second portions 90 and 95 populated in reverse order as taught in example 4), that this combination could be subsequently modified by example 3) to provide a “second iteration . . . based on buffered data.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26–27. In other words, on the current record it is not clear why “the unused resource” of Bucknell’s second portion 95 cannot also “be made available,” to the first portion 90 if the order was simply reversed per the combination of examples 2) and 4). 3. Conclusion as to Claim 1 In summary, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Eckert in view of Bucknell and Lohr-1. On the current record, we find that Bucknell discloses “a first iteration” based on receiving the priority values for logical channels associated with the MAC-d flows. Ex. 1006 ¶ 26. And, as discussed above, Bucknell’s described “priorities,” are plural, just like the claimed “received parameters.” Ex. 1001, 14:11; Ex. 1006 ¶ 26. In on a priority.” See Ex. 1001, 13:57–14:16. As to the issue of whether the Petition provides sufficient explanation or motivation to combine Bucknell’s examples 2), 3), and 4), which is an alternative argument to Petitioner’s other mappings for limitation [1.9] which we find sufficient for institution, we leave this alternative mapping issue for development at trial. See Pet. 55 (Petitioner explaining that “Bucknell describes additional ways that limitation [1.9] is disclosed, based on the teachings of examples 2 and 4 (discussed previously) in view of example 3.”).” slip op. at 27
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner points out that in IPR2022-01127 the Board “preliminarily determined that a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” means “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” Pet 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 18–19). Petitioner explains that, in the present proceeding, it has applied “the prior art in accordance with that construction; however, in view of the asserted grounds, no claim term requires express construction to find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Id. (citing Nidec 868 F.3d 1017). Patent Owner neither disputes the prior construction of “a subset of radio bearers,” nor offers additional constructions. To the extent necessary, and in accordance with our prior determination, we construe “a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” to mean “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and we need not construe any other terms for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,292,138 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 10–12, 22–25, 28, 30, 32, and 33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on March 28, 2025. Paper 7. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 20, 2025. Paper 9. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because, as pointed out by Petitioner, claim 1 does not recite limitations directed to the resolution of the source data of a frame that is to be combined “to provide an image having a relatively high resolution.” We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that claims should not be read to encompass prior art distinguished in the specification based on Patent Owner’s citations to the Background passages of the ’180 Patent. The cited passages disclose foveal image sensors for acquiring both a wide and narrow field of view and having smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region, resulting in sensors that have a high resolution only in the narrow field of view. Consistent with Petitioner’s observation (see Prelim. Reply 2–3), this cited passage at best distinguishes prior art foveal sensors with smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region. See Ex. 1001, 2:10–24. Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the prosecution history. Patent Owner does not direct us to persuasive absent any statements by the Applicant regarding that applied prior art, amounts to prosecution history disclaimer. Aside from declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction, for the purpose of institution we need not explicitly construe “combine data of a frame from at least one of the plurality of channels to provide an image having relatively high resolution,” as recited in claim 1. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. 3. Other claim terms and phrases Petitioner also proposes a construction for “data of a frame,” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not specifically address this claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. 23–30. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe “data of a frame” or any other claim term or phrase. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner proposes a similar level of skill in the art as Petitioner, namely, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 80). person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,916,180 - Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,181,743
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.