• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
• Penumbra, Inc. v. Rapidpulse, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01261 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach the claimed predetermined cycle for controlling distal fluid flow.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(1) a person with a B.S. in engineering or an equivalent field, with two-four years of academic or industry experience in aspiration embolectomy and thrombectomy or comparable industry experience who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including a physician, to develop embolectomy or thrombectomy devices; or (2) an interventional neurosurgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in embolectomy or thrombectomy procedures, and who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including an engineer, to develop such a medical device. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Petitioner also contends that, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more relevant education but less practical experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner states that for purposes of its PO Response, it “accepts ¶ 44). We adopt Petitioner’s characterization because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’402 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “specification explicitly includes sensors similar to those in the prior art in support of their argument that the claimed “predetermined cycle” must not exclude the use of such sensors. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 32:55–33:7, 40:66–41:5, 44:9–29). We reviewed the portions of the specification cited by Petitioner. We agree with Patent Owner that one excerpt discussing sensor use appears to be directed to triggering the predetermined cycle rather than causing timing changes during the cycle itself (Ex. 1001, 32:55–66) (describing use of a pressure sensor to “determine when the vacuum channel 3 is clogged by a thrombus and automatically perform the unclogging procedures described herein”), while another excerpt discusses a sensor that Petitioner that the ’402 patent discusses the use of sensors to “tune” the system and that such “tuning” can be done statically (setting the cycle timing in advance) or dynamically (adjusting the timing during the cycle itself). See Ex. 1001, 48:19–49:50. Overall, we find that these disclosures involving sensors demonstrate that sensors may be used in various ways in different embodiments. However, none of these disclosures explicitly discuss the use of sensors in conjunction with a “pre-determined cycle.” Therefore, we find that the ’402 patent specification’s discussion of “sensors” are not particularly informative as to the appropriate construction of a “predetermined cycle” and do not outweigh the other explicit disclosures of “predetermined cycle” in the patent. We next turn to the other intrinsic evidence discussed by the parties — the prosecution history. As discussed by Patent Owner, in the Notice of Allowance, the Examiner found that Garrison did not teach or suggest a “predetermined cycle” because Garrison’s controller “changed the cycle of opening and closing the valves based on feedback from sensors.” Ex. 1004, 86. We acknowledge that the patent applicant filed subsequent comments during prosecution in which they stated that they “do[] not concede that the Examiner’s characterizations of the terms of the claims and the prior art are correct.” Id. at 29. However, we agree with Patent Owner that the importance of the Examiner’s statement in the Notice of Allowance does not rely on it being an express disclaimer (a standard which it does not meet). PO Sur-reply 8. We also considered Petitioner’s contention that the Examiner’s interpretation of Garrison may have been in error (PO Resp. 16); however, even if this were true, the Examiner’s statement still provides helpful insight into how the Examiner was interpreting the term sensors to change the opening and closing of valves during a cycle was not a “predetermined cycle.” Id. at 86. In sum, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the usage of the term “predetermined cycle” in the ’402 patent specification and prosecution history. Thus, after considering all of the cited evidence, we construe “predetermined cycle” to mean that “the timing of the sequence of valve operations in the cycle is determined beforehand, i.e., fixed, rather than varying based on feedback after operation begins.”” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. Other Terms The parties also provided proposed constructions for the limitations of “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” and “control[ling] fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” See Pet. 15–16; Pet. Reply 1–8; PO Resp. 22–24; PO Sur-Reply 2–6. However, having evaluated the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that construction of these terms is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Brown propose any combination of Yang and Mullins that does not include Mullins’s pressure sensor in order “to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Indeed, in addressing the “predetermined cycle” limitation, Mr. Brown contends that Mullins discloses a “cycling controller that ‘varies aspiration pressure according to sensed pressure within the catheter lumen.’” Ex.1005 ¶¶ 131–32 (citing, e.g., Ex.1008, 27:40–28:20 (“[a] novel aspect of this pump system is the incorporation of feedback into the pump algorithm in order to produce more effective pressure cycling”)). This use of a sensor to change pressure during a cycle, is not a “predetermined cycle” under our construction. combinations is its discussion of distal end flow control, not for its sensors.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1035 ¶ 83). However, Petitioner’s obviousness grounds rely on the combination of Yang and Mullins, especially with regard to Mullins’s disclosure of “a controller” in order “to control fluid flow in and out.” As discussed above, Mullins relies on the sensor-feedback approach in order to control flow and we find that Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence of how the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins would control flow without using Mullins’s sensor feedback approach. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (error to “consider[] … references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in [them] … that diverge from and teach away from the invention”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the combination of Yang and Mullins discloses or renders obvious “a controller configured to open and close the vacuum valve and the vent valve in a predetermined cycle to change a level of vacuum at the distal end of the catheter and to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Accordingly, having considered the parties’ respective evidence and arguments, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’402 patent would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Yang and Mullins.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,406,402 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,406,402
• Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alipinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–22 under the challenged obviousness grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner misstates the Decision’s reasoning. As is clear from the previous discussion, we determined that Petitioner’s articulated reasons for combining EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning, not because “EP’536 does not relate to ‘air bags,’” but because the means by which EP’536’s device inflates differs fundamentally from that of CN’180’s device. Dec. 17–18. Petitioner did not acknowledge this critical difference in the Petition, and continues not to do so in its Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning because EP’536’s inflation mechanism differs fundamentally from CN’180’s inflation mechanism. Dec. 17–18. As we stated, whereas CN’180’s fall-protection belt uses an airbag that requires an external source of pressurized air to inflate, EP’536’s garment does not need an external inflation device because “the gas generating agent 18 in each envelope automatically generates gas and inflates the envelopes in response to rising temperatures.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5, 19). This difference reflects the fundamentally different purposes of the two devices: CN’180’s device is designed to provide “fall protection” to, e.g., “elderly people,” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 1, 3), whereas EP’536’s device provides “adaptive thermal insulation” for, e.g., garments worn by fire fighters. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1–3, 250. Because of the different means by which EP’536’s and CN’180’s devices inflate and the different purposes for doing so, we were not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references as Petitioner proposed. Dec. 18. We further noted that the modification would not have improved the reusability of EP’536’s device “by having only one mechanism to recharge,” because EP’536’s “gas generating agent does not need any ‘mechanism to recharge.’” Dec. 18. Instead, we noted EP’536’s teaching that its gas generating agent “automatically recombines or condenses in response to a temperature decrease to return the envelopes, and therefore the garment, to its original thickness, at which point the gas generating agent is ready for subsequent reactivation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139–141). Finally, we determined that replacing EP’536’s envelopes with CN’180’s airbag “would have made EP’536’s invention unsuitable for its intended purpose: providing a protective garment with ‘adaptive thermal insulation.’” Dec. 19. We stated that “Petitioner does not suggest, and we have found nothing in the record to establish, that CN’180’s airbag would provide this feature.” Id. at 20.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “rationales for combining EP’536 and CN’180. Reh’g Req. 6–7. First, Petitioner asserts that we “improperly rejected Petitioner’s ‘simple substitution’ evidence in view of [the Board’s] incorrect conclusion that EP’536 does not disclose an ‘external source of inflation [EP’536’s dosing aids].’” Id. at 6 (citing Dec. 18–19). This argument is unpersuasive at least because, as we discussed above, EP’536’s dosing aids do not constitute an external source of inflation. Petitioner further argues that we incorrectly evaluated its “obvious to try” rationale because, contrary to our analysis, Petitioner did in fact identify a problem to be solved by its “finite number of solutions”: “simplify[ing] the design and reduc[ing] the number of required inflation mechanisms.” Id. at 6–7. The Petition’s entire “obvious to try” discussion is as follows: [A] POSITA would have found it obvious to try a one-piece airbag 10 with strip-shaped inflation units 12 in the EP’536- CN’180 airbag system because it would have been a selection from a finite number of identified predictable solutions (i.e., using one chamber with connected individual inflation units 12 versus multiple individual envelopes 20). 5 Petitioner also argues that dosing aids are “needed in order to make the disclosed device reusable.” Reh’g Req. 5–6. This is incorrect, as EP’536 conveys that the reusability of the device is a result of the gas generating agent condensing or recombining when temperatures fall. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139– 141. Even if it were true, however, it is unclear how it would support Petitioner’s argument. Pet. 16. As is evident, Petitioner did not identify a design need, market pressure, or other problem that would have been addressed by its identified “solutions,” and therefore we were not persuaded by this rationale. Dec. 19. Petitioner’s attempt to cure this deficiency in its Rehearing Request is tardy. We cannot misapprehend or overlook an assertion that Petitioner fails to make in the Petition. It is also insufficient. Petitioner does not provide any evidence of a known design need or market pressure to “simplify [EP’536’s] design” or reduce the number of “required inflation mechanism” it uses.” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 12,012,065
• Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed

    “We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,780,689
• Weatherford U.S., L.P v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00990 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–12 and 14–20 are unpatentable; claims 1–10 and 21–23 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 29–37 are unpatentable, and the motion to amend is denied as to them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of skill is uncontested. Patent Owner adopts the level of skill identified by Petitioner as: [at] the time of the alleged invention in 2018, a POSITA[2] would have had a B.S. degree in mechanical or petroleum engineering or a similar technical discipline, with at least five years of experience in oil or gas well drilling, completion, and/or subsurface production operations or in technical support of such operations including at least some experience in unconsolidated formations utilizing sand control methods and means. Also,” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on embodiments of Yeh with concentric sand screens having nine shunt tubes (six transport tubes and three packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 4A–B) and eccentric sand screens with four shunt tubes (two transport tubes and two packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 8A, 8C). See Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Yet, Petitioner’s reasoning as to why “a higher-pressure shunt tube assembly necessitated greater wall thickness” rests on an unspoken one to one comparison between the shunt tubes of the different systems. See id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 291–297 (Petitioner’s declarant comparing possible transport tubes of different pressure regions without considering or addressing any difference in the number of transport tubes). However, the embodiments relied on by Petitioner have different numbers of shunt tubes, and thus the greater wall thickness does not appear to be “necessitated” in the way inferred by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner’s analysis would seem to be most appropriate when comparing two concentric sand screens for different pressure regions, or two eccentric sand screens for different pressure regions. relies on Yeh’s teachings related to a horizontal well bore of 5000 feet for the “concentric screen → crossover tool → eccentric screen” arrangement, as well as, for why the concentric screen needs to be rated for a high pressure. Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Petitioner also refers to these features for why one of skill in the art would combine the teachings of Yeh and Yeh2. Id. at 32. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner’s declarant agreed that it is concentric sand screens having a 6x3 shunt tube design that would provide the noted benefits of being rated for a higher pressure and being more robust (as relied on in the Petition), as compared to eccentric sand screens. Ex. 2013, 42:20–43:8; Sur-reply 4–5. This also exposes another issue with Petitioner’s arguments. Though Petitioner identifies that one of skill in the art would be aware that material choice, wall thickness, and pipe diameter all impact burst pressure of a pipe (Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1017, 24 (Equation (14))), the Petition essentially ignores the fact that the claims do not require a single pipe in isolation. The claims require two shunt tube assemblies, each surrounding a base pipe within a wellbore. It is uncontested that a wellbore provides a confined space for such a system and thus any change in wall thickness of one pipe can result in a significant impact in the function of the other pipes. We find the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 290–297) unpersuasive when discussing wall thickness because it focusses on basic considerations of a standalone pipe, without sufficient consideration of the claimed completion assembly with its required pipe and tube structure. PO Resp. 20–26.” slip op. at 17

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In response to Patent Owner’s argument concerning Yeh’s embodiments relied on in the Petition, Petitioner argues for the first time that Patent Owner’s declarant “conceded, Yeh discloses that both concentric and 47:19–48:21). Petitioner does not provide a citation to Yeh or a citation to where the Petition relies on the same number of shunt tubes between concentric and eccentric screens. The deposition cited by Petitioner discusses Yeh at column 16, lines 26 through 35. However, the Petition does not cite or rely on these teachings of Yeh. Thus, we decline to consider this late argument.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Yeh and Yeh2 teaches determining the shunt tube system operating pressures associated with the distal end of the production zone, but also more generally, determining the operating pressures along the entire production zone. With this knowledge of the system operating pressures, Petitioner argues that one of skill in the art would have selected eccentric screens for the distal end of the production zone “at any point at which the slurry pressure dropped below the pressure capacity of the eccentric screen shunt tubes.” Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:16–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 388). In other words, knowing that the pressure decreases as you approach the toe, Yeh’s low-pressure rated eccentric screens could be used from some point prior to and covering the toe. determined pressure.” PO Resp. 37–38. We disagree. As discussed above, the record supports Petitioner’s position that one of skill in the art would have “understood the need to determine the shunt tube system operating pressure throughout the horizontal wellbore.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 383; see also Pet. 64–65. We find convincing Petitioner’s argument that one of skill with this understanding of the system pressures would select a shunt tube system rated to not only address the distal end, but also to address the needs of the adjacent region, so long as the pressure rating supported such a selection. See Pet. 65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 385–388.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,333,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,333,007
• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Tesla’s rehearing request and left claims 8 and 18 not shown unpatentable under §103 over Hongo, Obradovich, Niki, and Newstrom.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s counsel during the hearing or any of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence. As confirmed by Petitioner’s counsel, Petitioner relies solely on Newstrom’s disclosure of loading its spatial database 20 into solid state memory via a “wireless connection to [a] server” in asserting that the database “may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle.” Pet. 83 (citing Ex. 1012, 8:26–38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 197). Column 8, lines 27–29 is the only disclosure in Newstrom of a “wireless connection.” Although Petitioner argues that Newstrom’s system communicates wirelessly with the geospatial database while the vehicle is being driven (see Dec. 38 (citing Pet. 83); Tr. 19:20–22), Petitioner relies solely on the single instance of “wireless” in Newstrom’s disclosure to satisfy the recitation that the database (which Petitioner maps to Newstrom’s geospatial database 20) is “remote.” In the Decision, we explained that Petitioner’s reliance on Newstrom’s “wireless connection” and its assertion that the geospatial database may be hosted on a remote server were not persuasive to satisfy Petitioner’s burden to prove the unpatentability of claims 8 and 18 by a preponderance of the evidence, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure that the geospatial database is located on the vehicle. Dec. 40–42. For example, we stated: Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that, when first initializing the database manager, the geospatial database is loaded into solid state memory by, for example, wirelessly transferring data from a server means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Similarly, Petitioner does not explain adequately why Newstrom’s disclosure that the database manager can load new portions of the data into solid state memory as the vehicle location changes means that the geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Nor does Petitioner’s conclusory contention that “the geospatial database 20 may be hosted on a server that is remote from a vehicle” (Pet. 83 (emphasis added)) apprise us of disclosure that Newstrom’s geospatial database is remote from the vehicle. Dr. Morellas’ testimony is substantially identical to the Petition (see Ex. 1003 ¶197) and, thus, also fails to provide adequate support for Petitioner’s assertions. During the hearing, counsel for Petitioner confirmed that it relied solely on Newstrom’s disclose of the database using a “wireless connection” by which the database manager communicates with the database in arguing that Newstrom’s geospatial database 20 is remote from vehicle 12. Tr. 19:14–24; see also Ex. 1012, 8:27–29. Petitioner, however, fails to explain adequately how such wireless communication indicates that the database is not located on vehicle, especially given Newstrom’s express disclosure (discussed above) that the database is onboard the vehicle.” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, Petitioner’s reliance on assertions made in its Reply, relying on Dr. Morellas’ second declaration, fail to persuade us that we overlooked or misapprehended any arguments made in the Petition. Such post-institution arguments attempting to bolster the Petition are untimely and, thus, improper. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019).6 Even considering Petitioner’s Reply arguments, however, we are not” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,882,399
• Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alpinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–22 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of its three obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined EP’536 (with or without Hatton) and CN’180 in the proposed manner, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claims 1 and 18. 5. Claims 2–17 and 19–22 Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonably likelihood of prevailing with respect to independent claims 1 and 18, Petitioner also has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the claims that depend therefrom (claims 2–17 and 19–22).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not offer its own definition of the level of ordinary skill or dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s unchallenged description of an ordinarily skilled artisan appears consistent with the subject matter discussed in the references and that of the challenged claims, for purposes of this Decision we apply Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “For purposes of our analysis, we need only address the meaning of “planar structure,” and only to note that this limitation requires that all portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,012,065
• Shopify Inc. v. DKR Consulting LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00133 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR2025-00133 because a district court had found all challenged claims patent-ineligible, making review administratively inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “B. Discretionary Denial Based on Hulu The Hulu decision held that “[b]ecause the patent claims already stand invalid, it is unnecessary to institute another proceeding to review them for patentability under other grounds.” Hulu at 2. The decision reasoned that “[i]n the event the Federal Circuit reverses the district court’s decision, Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand.” Hulu at 3 (remanding the panel’s institution decisions and denying institution). The Hulu rationale is grounded in the statutory estoppel provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) that apply only to a “final written decision;” statutory estoppel does not prevent a petitioner from raising the same invalidity grounds in district court if the petition is denied. See Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Ethicon LLC, 25 F.4th 1035, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2022) decision.”). Even if inter partes review is instituted but later terminated with respect to a petitioner, e.g., after settlement, no statutory estoppel attaches to the petitioner, a real party in interest, or privy. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (“If the inter partes review is terminated with respect to a petitioner under this section, no estoppel under section 315(e) shall attach to the petitioner, or to the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, on the basis of that petitioner’s institution of that inter partes review.”). Thus, discretionary denial would not eclipse Petitioner’s ability to assert invalidity of the Challenged Claims in the District Court litigation. The Petition explains that the District Court granted a Motion to Dismiss and found all of the Challenged Claims to be patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C § 101. 130 Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1025, 10, 14; DKR Consulting LLC v. Shopify, Inc., Case No. 2:23-cv-06904 (C.D. Cal.)); see also Ex. 3001 (District Court judgment stating “[p]ursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, it is ordered that judgment is entered on all claims in favor of Defendant Shopify, Inc.”). In the Show Cause Paper, Petitioner confirms the scope of the District Court Judgment as applying to all of the challenged claims of the ’678 and ’237 patents. See Show Cause Paper at 6 (“All challenged claims are subject to the district court’s Order and Judgment.”). All of the Challenged Claims in this proceeding having been found invalid, we see no reason to institute inter partes review. As stated in Hulu, if the Federal Circuit reverses the District Court’s Judgment that the challenged claims are invalid as patent ineligible under Section 101, “Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand.” Hulu at 3. because the District Court has entered judgment determining all challenged claims of the ’678 and ’237 patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Discretionary denial in the circumstances of this proceeding promotes administrative efficiency and the integrity of the patent system. Discretionary denial also preserves Petitioner’s ability to assert the same obviousness challenges, should the need arise, in the District Court litigation.” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

    “I. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we deny the Petitions in the 130 and 133 IPRs. Therefore, we do not institute inter partes review. II. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petitions in IPR2025-00130 and IPR2025-00133 are denied, and inter partes review is not instituted.” slip op. at 15

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,488,237
• Shopify Inc. v. DKR Consulting LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00130 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPRs challenging claims 1–20 of the ’237 patent and claim 7 of the ’678 patent because a district court had held all challenged claims patent-ineligible.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “Dismiss and found all of the Challenged Claims to be patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C § 101. 130 Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1025, 10, 14; DKR Consulting LLC v. Shopify, Inc., Case No. 2:23-cv-06904 (C.D. Cal.)); see also Ex. 3001 (District Court judgment stating “[p]ursuant to this Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, it is ordered that judgment is entered on all claims in favor of Defendant Shopify, Inc.”). In the Show Cause Paper, Petitioner confirms the scope of the District Court Judgment as applying to all of the challenged claims of the ’678 and ’237 patents. See Show Cause Paper at 6 (“All challenged claims are subject to the district court’s Order and Judgment.”). All of the Challenged Claims in this proceeding having been found invalid, we see no reason to institute inter partes review. As stated in Hulu, if the Federal Circuit reverses the District Court’s Judgment that the challenged claims are invalid as patent ineligible under Section 101, “Petitioner may raise such invalidity arguments in the district court on remand.” Hulu at 3. because the District Court has entered judgment determining all challenged claims of the ’678 and ’237 patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Discretionary denial in the circumstances of this proceeding promotes administrative efficiency and the integrity of the patent system. Discretionary denial also preserves Petitioner’s ability to assert the same obviousness challenges, should the need arise, in the District Court litigation.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “I. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we deny the Petitions in the 130 and 133 IPRs. Therefore, we do not institute inter partes review. II. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petitions in IPR2025-00130 and IPR2025-00133 are denied, and inter partes review is not instituted.” slip op. at 15

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,455,678
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00694 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 11, 14–16, 21, and 22 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 2, 3, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the final record before us, we determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Lippman, LG argues the following: [a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art . . . in August of 2012 would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the interactive media guide arts that are pertinent to the ’040 patent. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they were not published before the ’040 patent’s priority date of August 17, 2012. PO Resp. 13–14. Multimedia referenced a case pending at the Federal Circuit, Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., as pertinent to addressing whether applications for patent published after the priority date of the challenged patent are permissible “printed publications” in IPRs. Id. Multimedia’s arguments are not persuasive because on January 14, 2025, the Federal Circuit in Lynk Labs Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., clarified that inter partes review challenges may be based upon published patent applications, and such published patent applications can be deemed prior art in IPRs as of their filing date. 125 F.4th 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2025). As such, both Choi and Kim are prior art pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Turning to rationale to combine, LG contends that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to implement Kim’s EXTERNAL DEVICE card object 1380 to include Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected to the input ports of smart TV 100 to inform the user which external devices are actually connected to the smart TV versus those that are not connected. Pet. 42–44 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 19 (modifying card object 1380); Ex. 1003 ¶ 137); see also id. at 14 (arguing the same). LG argues this proposed combination is merely combining prior art elements (i.e., Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected via input ports, with Kim’s EXTERNAL DEVICE card object 1380) according to known methods to yield the predictable result of “informing the user which external device is connected to an input port.” Id. at 45; see also id. at 14–15 (arguing the same). LG also argues that this proposed combination represents the use of a known technique (i.e., Choi’s specific symbols representing external devices connected via input ports) to improve a similar device (i.e., Kim’s smart TV 100) in the same way (i.e., “to inform the user which external device is connected to an input port”). See id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 130); see also id. at 15 (arguing the same). LG asserts that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in making this proposed combination because both Kim and Choi disclose “similar televisions” with “external devices connected via an input port,” and implementing Kim with Choi’s thumbnail icons that have specific symbols representing input ports would have been “a matter of routine software programming.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 61).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “Limitation [2.1] requires identifying a user associated with the “received indication,” which is the selection of a home key button or go-tohome button to invoke the home screen, as alleged by LG. See Pet. Reply 20–21. Both Kim and Lee-2 allow a distinct procedure wherein a user can login, but LG has not explained persuasively how these distinct procedures are associated with Kim’s home key button such that a user is identified through its selection. For example, Lee-2’s Favorite Channel List (Figure 39B) is displayed based on the user’s selection of the favorite channel object 2019 on a home screen, but not related to the user’s selection of the home key button to invoke the home screen. See Ex. 1010, 41:41–43 (“Referring to FIG. 39B, upon selection of the favorite channel object 2019 [in FIG. 39A], a favorite channel list screen including a favorite channel list is displayed fullscreen.”).” slip op. at 62

  Patent outcomesUS 9,510,040 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,510,040

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.