• College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01042 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review for claims 1, 21, 26, and 28 of the ’876 patent because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action triggered § 315(a)(1).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1). For these reasons, after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, we determine that § 315(a)(1) bars institution of inter partes review for these proceedings.” slip op. at 10

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Here, there is no evidence that Patent Owner filed a claim as a plaintiff against Petitioner in the Northern District of Iowa and that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim in opposition to or against such a claim. Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner should be precluded from arguing that the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim is also not persuasive. Pet. 7. Regardless of whether Patent Owner subsequently argued that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim (an argument made in the context of a motion of consolidation), subsequent arguments by Patent Owner would not retroactively transform the Iowa DJ action, which was filed before any claim was filed by Patent Owner against Petitioner in that jurisdiction, into a counterclaim. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent. The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1).” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,274,876
• College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01043 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petitioner’s earlier Iowa declaratory judgment action challenging the patents triggered the § 315(a)(1) bar.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards Section 315(a)(1) of 35 U.S.C. states that “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner or real party in interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” Section 315(a)(3) states that “[a] counterclaim challenging the validity of a claim of a patent does not constitute a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent for purposes of this subsection [section 315(a)].”” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,495,374
• College Products, Inc. v. Intirion CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-01041 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR because College Products filed a civil action challenging the patents’ validity before filing the petitions, triggering § 315(a)(1).

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “of the Petitions pursuant to § 315(a)(1). In Avigilon, the Board analyzed the ordinary, common meaning of “complaint,” noting the definition of “‘complaint’ as ‘[t]he initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, and the demand for relief.’” Id. at 7 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 323, 1491 (9th ed. 2009)). Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action meets this definition because it was an initial pleading that started a civil action and stated bases for their claims. See Ex. 1017; Ex. 2006. Specifically, the plain language of § 315(a)(1) does not include an exception for Petitioner’s action (filing a declaratory judgment action challenging validity before filing the petitions) and the terms of § 315(a)(1) have ordinary, common meanings, as discussed above. Id. at 8. The Board in Avigilon also disagreed with Avigilon’s assertion that their declaratory judgment action included counterclaims to infringement allegations under § 315(a)(3) because the declaratory judgment complaint was filed after and in response to infringement allegations. Avigilon, Paper 11, 10. The Board determined that “a counterclaim typically is asserted in an existing civil action, in contrast to a complaint, the filing of which begins a civil action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (defining counterclaims as distinct from pleadings, including a complaint, set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7); Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”)). The Board also noted the definition of “counterclaim” as “a defendant’s claim in opposition to or as a setoff against the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 11 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Here, there is no evidence that Patent Owner filed a claim as a plaintiff against Petitioner in the Northern District of Iowa and that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim in opposition to or against such a claim. Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner should be precluded from arguing that the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim is also not persuasive. Pet. 7. Regardless of whether Patent Owner subsequently argued that the Iowa DJ action was a counterclaim (an argument made in the context of a motion of consolidation), subsequent arguments by Patent Owner would not retroactively transform the Iowa DJ action, which was filed before any claim was filed by Patent Owner against Petitioner in that jurisdiction, into a counterclaim. Thus, we find that Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of a patent. The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1).” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

    “The plain language of § 315(a)(1) bars institution of the Petitions because Petitioner’s Iowa DJ action was filed before the Petitions. For the reasons discussed above, the Iowa DJ action is not a counterclaim under § 315(a)(3). Specifically, the Iowa DJ action is a civil action that was filed before the petitions and challenged the validity of the ’206, ’876, and ’374 patents. Therefore, the filing of the Iowa DJ action created a bar to institution of the Petitions under the language of § 315(a)(1). For these reasons, after considering the parties’ evidence and arguments, we determine that § 315(a)(1) bars institution of inter partes review for these proceedings. III. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the Petitions are denied, and no trials are instituted.” slip op. at 10

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,791,206
• Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, and 8–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3 and 11 were not shown unpatentable, and claim 7 was not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification currently before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For purposes of our Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” See Pet. 8. In addition, we note that we agree with Patent Owner’s statement that the distinction between the parties’ proposals is not material to any dispute before us and we find that our determinations would be the same under either definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that Dr. van der Weide’s cited testimony is of a nature that should lead us to give his testimony no weight. We note that Patent Owner did not move to strike or exclude Dr. van der Weide’s testimony. When considering credibility and weight of evidence below, we consider Dr. van der Weide’s testimony as a whole as well as all other evidence of record and accord it the appropriate weight.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “provide an express construction of the full breadth of a claim term. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As such, we proceed in line with Federal Circuit case law, which “prescribes—deciding only the issues necessary to resolve the dispute before it.” Nichia Corp. v. DSS, Inc., No. 2022-1704, 2023 WL 7211097, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Federal Circuit has long recognized that “[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope” and that claim construction may be required in an obviousness context “when the meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires resolution in order to determine obviousness.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In order to determine whether Petitioner’s obviousness grounds meet their required burden of proof, we need not expressly state the full scope of this claim term. Thus, we are within our authority to proffer a construction that determines the scope of a claim term in a manner sufficient to determine whether the asserted art teaches the claim. In other words, there may be other ways to meet the disputed limitation, but for the purposes of our Decision, it is proper to expressly determine a claim term’s scope only as much as is required to resolve the disputed issues before us.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the invention(s), but rather as examples of some of the embodiments.” Id. at 25:65–26:1; see also id. at 6:18–20 (embodiments “should be construed as illustrative rather than limiting”), 5:22–24 (“non-limiting example”). The Federal Circuit has noted that “[e]mbodiments in the specification—even if there is only one embodiment—cannot limit the scope of the claims absent the patentee’s ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Hill- Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). After reviewing the complete record, we see no such manifest exclusion or restriction in the ’240 patent specification. We decline Patent Owner’s request to limit the claims to the described single-frequency embodiments. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. We need not provide further express construction of this claim language for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 9,165,240 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,165,240
• Advanced Micro Devices Inc. v. Realtek Semiconductor CorporationInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 28, 2023 · IPR2023-00920 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 12–18 would be unpatentable over Jiang, Jiang2, and Jiang3.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’218 patent. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

    “Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “generic motivations” to “increase power savings” fail to provide sufficient motivation to modify Jiang’s power gating system to supply multiple voltages. Prelim. Resp. 33– 39. Patent Owner asserts that the devices in each reference operates effectively and that Petitioner has not offered any motivation to modify what Jiang has already achieved. Pet. 38–39. On the present record, we disagree with Patent Owner. Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have understood that different portions of a chip have different power requirements and that providing high voltages to the portions requiring high voltages and providing lower voltages (as opposed to no voltage) to the portions of the rest of the chip that require lower voltages would result in power savings. See Pet. 26–27; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 90–93. Whether it would have been obvious to replace Jiang’s global power mesh with a mesh having two separate power sources is an issue that is best resolved on a full record.” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “A reference patent or published patent application can be entitled to the benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes on two conditions. First, the provisional application must provide sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1381 (“A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.”). Second, the provisional application must provide sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or published patent application. See In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A]n applicant is not entitled to a patent if another’s patent discloses the same invention, which was carried forward from an earlier U.S. provisional application or U.S. non-provisional application.”); Ex parte Mann, 2016 WL 7487271, at *5 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2016) (stating that the party claiming priority also must show that the subject matter relied upon in the non-provisional is sufficiently supported in the provisional application [and that t]his subject matter test is in addition to the comparison of claims required by Dynamic Drinkware”); Here, Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that Chiu’s Provisional Application (Ex. 1011) provides written description support for either (1) any claim of Chiu or (2) the subject matter that Petitioner relies upon in Chiu for prior art purposes. Petitioner provides no comparison or analysis of the material disclosed in Chiu’s Provisional Application with either Chiu’s claims or the subject matter in Chiu that Petitioner relies upon in its unpatentability argument. See Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s invitation to the Board to compare the disclosure of Chiu and Chiu’s provisional application is not sufficient to meet this burden. See Benitec Biopharma Ltd. v. Cold Spring Harbor Labs., IPR2016-00016, Paper 8 at 9 (PTAB Mar. 31, 2016) (stating the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the asserted reference qualified as prior art when it failed to provide expert testimony or sufficient evidence that the provisional application provides support for the claims in the asserted reference); Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC v. Promptu Sys. Corp., IPR2018-00345, Paper 10 at 25–26 (PTAB July 2, 2018) (stating the petitioner’s “barebones analysis” was insufficient to show “how the [provisional underlying the asserted reference] provides support for the subject matter relied upon [in the asserted reference]”). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that Chiu is entitled to the priority date of its provisional application, and thus has not sufficiently shown that Chiu qualifies as prior art to the ’218 patent.” slip op. at 29

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. As noted above, claim element 12[c] recites “a global power mesh, coupling to the first local power mesh and the second local power mesh, to provide the power needed by the first power domain and the second domain separately.” Neither party has provided an express or detailed claim construction analysis of this claim language. Nor does the ’218 patent appear to indicate that the phrase recited in claim element 12[c] should be afforded any special definition. See Ex. 1001. A plain and ordinary reading of this phrase, however, indicates that the global power mesh must be able to provide power needed by the first and second power domains separately. Pet. 21–22; Ex. 1004, Abstract, 1–2, Fig. 1(b); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–85. Petitioner sufficiently shows that Jiang’s global power mesh is able to provide power separately to the first and second power domains by selectively turning off and on each domain’s sleep transistors, each of which is provided power by the global mesh.14 Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 81). Dr. Subramanian explains that the use of sleep transistors between the global power mesh and the first and second local power meshes enables the global power mesh to power each domain “separately” by 14 Petitioner has sufficiently shown, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Jiang teaches sleep transistors are independently operable. Pet. 22–23; Ex. 1004, Abstract, 1–2, Fig. 1(b); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–85. selectively turning off each domain’s sleep transistor when desired. Ex. 1003 ¶ 81 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstract, 1, 2). Dr. Subramanian further explains that turning off the power to the local power mesh, through use of the sleep transistors, will necessarily turn off the power to the macro (power domain) underlying the partial local power mesh. Ex. 1003 ¶ 81. Thus, Petitioner’s argument and evidence that Jiang discloses connecting global power mesh power VDD to the gated macros (power domains) through the sleep transistors and the local meshes provides a sufficient showing that Jiang discloses a global power mesh that provides power to the power domains through the sleep transistors and local power meshes.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,006,218
• Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-00831 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the sole design claim would have been obvious over any asserted primary reference.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of the challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claim. slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “different, but not incompatible. On one hand, Petitioner proffers a person with a degree in industrial/product design who consults with a person of ordinary skill in the art having an electrical engineering, or similar degree. On the other hand, Patent Owner proffers a person having “a degree in Industrial Design or Mechanical Engineering, and at least two years of professional experience creating Industrial Designs of consumer products.” Prelim. Resp. 3. Considering that this is a design for an electronic “charger,” we find that both parties’ assertions as to the designer of ordinary skill appropriately include engineering and industrial design experience well-suited to a robust understanding of the function and aesthetics of charger devices. And, we do not find it out of the ordinary, as Petitioner contends, that a designer of ordinary skill would have collaborated with other technical professionals in designing such products. We also note that, under the present record, our analysis of this case would be the same under either party’s definition of the designer of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In this case, a verbal description of the claimed design is helpful to our analysis. Petitioner’s claim construction, particularly as it erroneously calls for certain elements to be “factored out,” is too general, and does not adequately address the overall ornamental visual impression of the claimed charger. See Pet. 14–30. With some exceptions, we find Patent Owner’s claim construction the more persuasive and consistent with the appropriate scope and overall ornamentality of the claimed charger. Prelim. Resp. 3–10. Our claim construction, below, is based on, and paraphrased to some extent, from Patent Owner’s proposed construction: Considering the overall visual impression of the claimed charger as shown in Figures 1–11 of the ’131 patent, the charger has an overall appearance of a compact ice hockey puck shape having a top face with a circular recess that evokes a contemporary appearance. The claimed design includes an overall cylindrical shape, with a circular shape that is visible in plan and bottom views. The top face is dominated by a prominent circular recess that is inset relative to a flat ring having a distinct proportional width relative to the circular recess. The overall cylindrical shape has a distinctive ratio of width (e.g., diameter) to height that, as shown in the figures of the claimed design, evoking the overall appearance of a compact ice hockey puck shape. The overall cylindrical shape includes non-orthogonal transitional edges (e.g., beveled or curved edges) between the sidewall and the top and bottom faces which contributes to the charger’s overall compact ice hockey puck appearance. The featureless flat bottom surface and sidewall are shown as continuous, unbroken, and uninterrupted by features that distract from the continuity of the design, and also contribute to the charger’s overall compact ice hockey puck appearance.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “’131 patent compared with Lee, we are persuaded that Lee is not an appropriate primary reference. While we agree that a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have considered the front face of the claimed charger and Lee as similar in appearance, a designer of ordinary skill in the art would consider not just the front face of the designs, but the overall appearance of the designs as a whole. See Borden, 90 F.3d at 1574 (The obviousness “inquiry focuses on the visual impression of the claimed design as a whole and not on selected individual features.”). the front face of the claimed design, but the smooth uninterrupted cylinder walls that seamlessly transition to a flat, planer, bottom surface that is a cleaner and more contemporary appearance from Lee’s stepped sidewall and raised yellow ring on the bottom face of Lee’s charger. The cylindrical characteristics of the claimed design evoke a stocky ice hockey puck shaped appearance different from the Lee’s narrower stacked disc shaped design. We find that the cumulative visually apparent differences of the sidewall, bottom face and overall cylindrical ice hockey puck shaped appearance and proportions of the claimed charger outweigh any similarity of the front faces, and thus we are not persuaded that Lee’s charger is a primary reference “the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design.” Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391.” slip op. at 37

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
• Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-00865 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 14 are obvious over Carr and Lauka.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “III. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least claims 1 and 14 of the ’465 patent are unpatentable as obvious over Carr and Lauka. And because Instacart demonstrates that at least one claim of the ’465 patent meets the threshold for institution, we institute an inter partes review of all claims as challenged in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a),(c); SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–19 of the ’465 patent is instituted; and” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art would have been “someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like” and that “industry experience can make up for a lack of technical training, and more education can make up for a lack of industry experience.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Consumeron’s definition appears to overlap significantly with Instacart’s definition. Accordingly, for purposes of institution, we adopt the level of skill in the art as articulated by Instacart.” slip op. at 5

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “product ordered by the customer is available and does not contemplate a scenario where the product is unavailable or otherwise describe the action to be taken if the product is unavailable. See Pet. 17–22. We agree, at least based on the preliminary record. In particular, with reference to Figures 2 and 3, the ’848 parent application describes a method where (1) a customer chooses “a store where a desired product is being sold” (step 105), (2) the customer selects a delivery agent and sends an “acquisition request” to the delivery agent (steps 108, 109, 110), and (3) “the selected delivery agent travels to the store location . . . and finds the desired product to be acquired” (step 113). Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 17, 20, 23 (emphasis added). “The delivery agent then communicates to the customer that the product has been identified, and the customer has the option of inspecting the product in real-time” (step 117). Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). “Next, the customer either approves or rejects acquisition of the inspected product” (steps 119, 120, 122). Id. ¶ 24 (emphasis added). That description in the ’848 parent application clearly presumes that the product ordered by the customer has been located and is available for inspection, which is at odds with the additional requirements of claims 1 and 14 of “failing to locate an identified product” and “determining that the identified product is not available.” Ex. 1001, 11:20 (claim 1), 12:30 (claim 14) (emphases added). To the extent Consumeron argues otherwise, we are not persuaded at this preliminary stage. According to Consumeron, the customer’s rejection of the product means that “the agent fails to locate a product that is satisfactory.” See Prelim Resp. 11. But nowhere do we discern that the ’848 parent application hinges the identity and availability of a product on whether it is satisfactory to the customer. That a product might not meet a customer’s satisfaction does not negate the description in the ’848 parent application that the agent locates and identifies the product in the first instance before giving the customer the option to inspect and reject the product. Indeed, because the customer placed the online order with a store advertising the product, the presumption is that the advertised product is available and satisfactory to the customer.8 And, while conceivably the purchase of a product cannot be fulfilled in the event the product is unavailable, it would seem to be improper hindsight to derive written description support by “[w]orking backward from a knowledge of the claims.” Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed. It extends only to that which is disclosed.” Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, based on the preliminary record, the ’848 parent application does not provide sufficient written description for the terms noted above. As such, we find that Instacart demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in showing that the asserted references are prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “and Lauka. See Pet. 30–44, 47–49. We begin with Instacart’s challenge of method claim 1. Instacart provides a detailed mapping of how Carr satisfies all the recited limitations of claim 1, except limitation [1.0.3], for which Instacart points to Lauka. See id. at 35–44. In particular, Instacart cites the following evidence in support of its contentions that Carr and Lauka, when combined, teach or suggest each of the recited limitations of claim 1: Limitation 1.0.1—“A method for remote acquisition and delivery of goods through one or more agents of a service provider” (Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 39, 43, 45, 92, Figs. 1, 3, 6;; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 97–100)); Limitation 1.0.2—“each agent having a mobile agent system in communication with at least one remote server,” (Pet. 35–37 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 2, 6, 40–43, 53, Fig. 1 (annotated); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–104)); Limitation 1.0.3—“with each mobile agent system including: a digital image capture device and a communication device, said method comprising:” (Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 74, 88, 94, 122; Ex. 1006, 3:19–28, 3:49–57, 4:10–21; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105– 109)); Limitation 1.1—“receiving, through the at least one remote server, a first acquisition request from a customer for a first set of one or more goods;” (Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9, 60, 73, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–112)); Limitation 1.2—“contacting, through the communications device, the one or more agents;” (Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 57, 74; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113–115)); Limitation 1.3—“upon failing to locate an identified product of the set of one or more goods, electronically transmitting information on a replacement product for the identified product of the set of one or more goods to the customer using the digital image capture device of the agent, including:” (Pet. 38–40 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 95, 96, 105, 107, ; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116– 119)); Limitation 1.4—“obtaining a bar or QR code of the replacement product;” (Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 95, 107; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 120– 122)); Limitation 1.5—“determining the information from the bar or QR code, wherein the information includes at least one image of the replacement product; and” (Pet. 40–42 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 95–96, 116; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 123–127)); Limitation 1.6—“sending the information for the customer to approve the purchase of the replacement product based on the information determined from the bar or QR code; and” (Pet. 42– 43 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51, 96–99, Fig. 12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 128– 130)); and Limitation 1.7—“upon receiving approval of the purchase from the customer, acquiring the replacement product, via the agent.” (Pet. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 99, 101; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 131–132)); Instacart also provides a reason why one skilled in the art would have combined the teachings of Carr and Lauka with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 31–34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 86–96); see also id. at 37 (“In view of the teachings of Lauka, a POSITA would have recognized that it was obvious to implement the UPC scanner functionality of Carr’s handheld device using an ‘imaging device’ such as that taught by Lauka, which specifies that the ‘imaging device 206 can comprise a video or still camera’ and ‘can be used to capture images.’ Ex.1006, 3:49-57; Ex.1003, ¶¶105- 107.”).” slip op. at 11

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 11,238,465
• Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2023-00807 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes construing “defining an optically transparent window.” Pet. 8–10. Petitioner proposes that “for a cover to ‘define’ an optically transparent window simply means to allow passage of light to a relevant component through the cover.” Id. at 10. Patent Owner “does not object to the constructions proposed by Petitioner at this time.” Prelim. Resp. 18. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no express construction of any term is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. The Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 10–14, and 16–20 Over” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not explain persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reconfigured Kotanagi’s two rear electrodes meant for determining whether a potential between the electrodes decreases (to indicate lack of skin contact) to enable ECG measurements using the particular configuration recited in the claims. We have considered Petitioner’s contentions in light of both Kotanagi and Coppola and Petitioner’s proposed combination appears hindsight driven. The combination requires that a person of ordinary skill in the art selectively pick portions of each reference while also frustrating the purpose of Kotanagi’s electrodes of ensuring skin contact by determining a potential difference.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,474,483
• Nintendo Co., Ltd. / Nintendo Of America Inc. v. Gamevice, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00643 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Willner and Park.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. In our previous decision in the 1197 IPR, we exercised our discretion to deny institution under § 314(a) based on our consideration of the Fintiv factors. 1197 IPR, Paper 13, 23. The decision in the 1197 IPR noted that although “there does appear to be some strength to the merits of Petitioner’s challenges,” this determination was based particularly on the fact that “the ’393 patent’s claims share some of the same claim limitations addressed by the Board previously in the ’119 patent’s IPRs.” See id. at 20–21. Therefore, we did not fully address the substantive merits of any of Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability. 10 We also are not persuaded that the changes between the Petition in the 1197 IPR and the present Petition demonstrates “ample evidence” of road-mapping. Instead, we agree with Petitioner that “[t]hese changes are not road-mapping because they are unrelated to the record in the earlier [1197] IPR.” Pet. Reply 2–3. And, as we explained above, our earlier decision did not fully address the substantive merits of any of Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability, nor did we address the substantive merits of any of Patent Owner’s counterarguments. See General Plastic, Paper 19, 17 (warning against allowing “petitioners the opportunity to strategically stage their prior art and arguments in multiple petitions, using our decisions as a roadmap.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at fn.14 (citing Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, IPR2014-00581, Paper 8, 12–13 (PTAB Oct. 14, 2014) (criticizing petitioner’s use of “our prior decision as a roadmap”) (emphasis added). In addition, Patent Owner acknowledges that the present Petition challenges “the same claims 1–7 based on identical prior art references and substantially similar grounds.” Prelim. Resp. 1 (emphasis omitted). Thus, we find Patent Owner’s “road-mapping” concerns to be minimized based on the similarity of the unpatentability challenges between those raised in the 1197 IPR Petition and the present Petition. For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that factors 1–3 weigh in favor of institution. See Code200, Paper 18 at 5 (“Where the first-filed petition under factor 1 was discretionarily denied or otherwise was not evaluated on the merits, factors 1−3 only weigh in favor of discretionary denial when there are ‘road-mapping’ concerns under factor 3 or other concerns under factor 2.”).” slip op. at 10

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “based on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 17–27; see Fintiv, Paper 11, 12 (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue the same invalidity grounds against the challenged claims of the ’393 patent in the parallel litigation [or] any 14 grounds that could have been reasonably raised in this petition” (Pet. 85)7, we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “At the outset, we note that the exercise of discretion in Advanced Bionics did not turn on mere citation in an IDS of the art asserted in the petition. Rather, the Board’s exercise of discretion in that case turned on the Examiner’s application and discussion of that art. Specifically, the Board 18 found in Advanced Bionics that the asserted art, Zimmerling, “is the same art previously presented to the Office” because “the Examiner rejected [the claims] as anticipated by Zimmerling” and “Zimmerling was discussed during prosecution.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6, 13. In other words, the criteria adopted by the Board for denying the petition in Advanced Bionics included not only the fact that the art was made of record, but also the fact that it was applied and discussed during prosecution. Anything less disregards the express reasoning behind the Board’s exercise of discretion in that case. Here, Patent Owner has not shown that any Petitioner’s cited art (i.e., Willner, Park, Schoenith, Kessler, Hirschman) was applied by the Examiner or discussed during prosecution. Instead, during examination of the ’393 patent, the record shows that the Examiner allowed the pending claims over “Wu (2006/0252537) in view of Willis (2014/0274394).” Ex. 1009, 26–29. In doing so, the Examiner stated that a “[g]ame controller with structural bridge is well known in the art” (id. at 27), but found that “Wu in view of Willis is silent on” the subject matter claim 1. See id. at 27–28 (quoting the subject matter of independent claim 1 in its entirety). However, on this record, Petitioner demonstrates that the Examiner overlooked the combination of Willner and Park’s teachings of the limitations that were the basis for allowing the challenged claims. Id. As discussed in more detail below, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least independent claim 1 of the ’393 patent is unpatentable over the combination of Willner and Park. See Pet. 19–41 (citing Exs. 1002, 1003, 1004).” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “4. Conclusion for Claim 1 Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Willner and Park teaches all limitations of claim 1. Petitioner also has put forth sufficient reasons for combining these references with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 133–139, 150–157; Ex. 1003 ¶ 50; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–46). For example, Petitioner asserts that “Park’s adjustable bridge ‘would greatly expand the number of devices that [Willner’s] product would support, leading to the predictable result of having a larger base of customers.’” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1011, 19; Ex. 1018, 185 Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Willner and Park.” slip op. at 37

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,391,393
• Moleculight, Inc. v. Swift Medical Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2023 · PGR2022-00041 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were cancelled; substitute claims 21–24 and 27–38 were unpatentable as obvious, and withdrawn claims 25–26 were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the record as a whole with emphasis on the technical level the ’345 patent’s disclosure and asserted prior art, we agree with Patent Owner that a degree in physics and/or optics rather than engineering could be sufficient. We disagree, however, that “at least two years work experience” is unclear. “At least two years work experience” refers to two or more years of experience working in the field of design, operation, and functioning of imaging systems. We, thus, determine that that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering, physics, or optics with relevant coursework, and the equivalent of at least two years of work experience in the design, operation, and functioning of imaging systems, amounting to familiarity with concepts related to illumination and detection schemes for optical imaging systems. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “For purposes of this decision, we determine that express claim construction is unnecessary. Our decision here would be the same whether based on plain and ordinary meaning or based on the various alternatives Petitioner presents when addressing claim construction. Pet. 9–14.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “The matter now before us is distinguishable from Xerox. As we explain below, Petitioner establishes unpatentability of the amended claims by extensively citing evidence including the prior art at issue. Petitioner and Dr. Georgakoudi properly map the Patent Owner’s amended claims to the explicit teachings of the asserted art. Sur-Reply 1–2. Thus, the position of Petitioner and Dr. Georgakoudi is not unduly conclusory. Rather, Dr. Georgakoudi’s testimony is generally credible because it is consistent with and tied closely to the teachings of the cited art. Thus, when choosing whether or not to cite Dr. Georgakoudi’s testimony and consider whether or not it is credible with respect to any given issue, we do so while considering the record as a whole.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “5. Reason to Combine We first address the combination of Petit and Fawzy . Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine Petit’s long pass filter with Fawzy’s imaging apparatus. Opp. 8. Petitioner’s argument is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Both Fawzy and Petit teach devices for capturing and analyzing images of dermatological conditions based on light wavelengths reflecting off a patient’s skin. Id. (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 89, 92; Ex. 1020 ¶ 88). The preponderance of evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that emission filters, such as those taught by Petit, are a well-known mechanism to predictably filter out wavelengths of light that are not relevant to the imaging at hand. Id. (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 87). A person of ordinary would have understood that filtering out undesired wavelengths could avoid undesired interference. Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 44,80). Petit teaches a long-pass filter having a cut-on wavelength of 450±25 nm. Ex. 1020 ¶ 98. Such a filter would be helpful in accomplishing Fawzy’s goal of “control[ling] optical coupling of the digital camera to capture only reflected light originating from the interaction of light from the spectral light source with an object being imaged.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 107. The combination would also be helpful for determining effective treatment as Petit teaches. Ex. 1020 ¶ 87. As such, we determine that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Petit’s long pass filter with Fawzy’s imaging apparatus and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 11,266,345 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,266,345

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.