• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Meulen and Chao; claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Meulen does not disclose transforming an image captured by its camera.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 19–20). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “From the outset we note that the words of the claim recite “non- uniformly shift[ing] the pixels” and do not recite a “non-linear” transformation. This favors Petitioner’s position, which is based directly off the definition of “non-uniform,” over Patent Owner’s position, which substitutes “non-linear” for “non-uniform.” Generally, then, we would determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term in the context of the entire Specification. Here, however, the ʼ413 patent does not mention “uniform” or “non-uniform” shifting of pixels anywhere except in the claims. The Specification, therefore, provides limited guidance, by itself, as to the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. Nonetheless, even reviewing the portions of the Specification cited by the parties, we see no clear or unambiguous effort to limit the challenged claims to require only non-linear transformations in which the pixels to which a transformation is applied do not have the same amount of shift. is not non-linear. Pet. Reply 1. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the center circle of Figure 2B maintains the original circular shape after the transformation is applied to the image which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that no two pixels will have the same amount of shift. Pet. Reply 1–2. We agree. In Figure 2B of the ʼ413 patent, the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest. Ex. 1001, 4:19–21. After the input image goes through linear scaling (step 204) and then non-linear warping (step 206) the circles become more vertically compressed as they approach the top and bottom edges and more horizontally stretched as they approach the left and right edges. Id. at 4:22–30. But “the center circle is fully corrected so that it maintains the original circular shape of the corresponding circle in the input image 212.” Id. at 4:23–25. This means that at least some pixels, such as those of the center circle, undergo the same amount of shift after being transformed.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “readable instructions” of claims 1 and 2 must occur in a particular order. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the step of “determine a portion within the input image” must occur after “obtain[ing] an image” and before “apply[ing] a transformation to the input image.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the specification does not require such an order and, in fact, describes an embodiment where such an order is not followed. Pet. 3. We determine that the “determine a portion within the input image” step does not need to occur after the “obtain an image” step and before the “apply a transformation to the input image” step. As Patent Owner itself points out, claims 1 and 2 are apparatus and system claims respectively, and an ordering of the limitations of such claims is not necessary. PO Resp. 17. Even if we were to treat the apparatus and system claims as reciting the steps of a method, “as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We see nothing in the claims that would cause us to break this general rule. Patent Owner argues that the claims imply a “specific order because the ‘determine a portion’ requirement operates on ‘the [obtained] input image’ and defines the ‘portion’ that is necessary for the 23; Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Although the steps are recited in a specific order in the claim, as they necessarily must be, the claim does not expressly specify that the certain steps must occur before or after other instructions, nor does logic imply such a requirement. For example, if certain characteristics of the image are known before the image is obtained (e.g. the size, dimensions, resolution, aspect ratio, or content etc.) the determination of the portion of the image could be made before the image is obtained. These characteristics may be based on the specific device taking the image or the subject matter of the image, both of which may be known before the image is captured or obtained. It is, therefore, not necessary that the image be obtained in order for a portion of the image to be determined. Similarly, we do not find the written description to expressly or implicitly specify an order the claimed step of “determine a portion of the input image.” For example, the written description of the ʼ413 patent states that in Figure 2B “the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction as the frame boundary is approached.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–22. Patent Owner emphasizes that this disclosure implies that an input image is obtained before the center portion is chosen. PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:63–64, 4:19–22). But the description of this embodiment does not expressly recite an order. For example, the description of Figure 2A explains that “an input image is obtained” in step 202, “the image is then scaled” in step 204, and a “non-linear warping is then applied” in step 206. Ex. 1001, 3:63–4:3. This description does not mention “determin[ing] of a portion of the image” as a separate step or as part of the listed steps, and therefore, does not specify an order in which this step must occur. is configured so that some areas of the image are fully corrected geometrically, while some other areas are distorted. . . . [T]he center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction.” Id. at 4:17–19. This excerpt from the ʼ413 patent, which the Patent Owner specifically relies on (PO Resp. 19), also does not specify an order in which the determination step (choosing of the region of interest) takes place. Moreover, because the ʼ413 patent states that the warp module is configured so that some areas are fully corrected while others are not, the determination step could take place at the time the warp module was configured, presumably before the image was obtained. Finally, the ʼ413 patent states that “in the case, of video, the area may dynamically change between images (e.g. to follow a moving object).” Ex. 1001, 4:34–36. Patent Owner argues that this description “requires first obtaining the image in order to locate the object that is being followed.” PO Resp. 19–20. This embodiment is related to the case of video or a moving object, which the challenged claims do not mention. We, therefore, decline to limit the scope of the claim based on this embodiment. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence we determine Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Meulen and Chao. For example, Petitioner argues that “[i]t would have been obvious that when performing image scaling, pixels from the input to output positions are shifted based on a scaling factor.” Pet. 91. Meulen teaches scaling but does not provide the details regarding scaling. E.g., Ex. 1007, 1:55–56, 4:37–49. We agree that in light of Meulen’s disclosure of scaling, a POSITA would have looked to other references, such as Chao, for further details on how to perform scaling. Dr. Katsaggelos provides credible support, testifying that “Meulen mentions ‘compression and/or scaling,’ and provides details on how to perform compression. But Meulen does not disclose the details of how to perform scaling. A POSITA when faced with Meulen and having the knowledge about scaling would have been motivated to turn to a prior art reference that discloses the details of scaling.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 262. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no motivation to combine other than asserting that it involves combining prior art elements. PO Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 92). As explained above, however, Petitioner does more than just assert that the motivation involves combining prior art elements. Instead, Petitioner explains that Meulen discusses both compression and scaling, and provides details regarding compression but does not provide details on how to scale. Pet. 91–92; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–262. Thus, Meulen teaches that scaling was a known technique. See Hybritech, (“a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”). Dr. Katsaggelos testifies that, in this situation, a POSITA would have looked to Chao for details regarding scaling. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–263. We determine this establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Meulen’s teachings with Chao. Patent Owner draws a distinction between Meulen and Chao, arguing that “Meulen is concerned with modifying content from a media source to be displayed on a device’s screen while Chao, by contrast, is directed to changing the aspect ratio of a document intended for printing.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 89–90). Patent Owner’s argument is contradicted, however, by Chao’s disclosure which states that “after all the background and foreground elements in the image have been resized . . . [t]he image may be output by displaying the image on or as part of: a display screen such as a computer monitor, camera screen, printer screen, printed page, projected image, or the like.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 32. Patent Owner argues that Meulen’s system avoids distortion near the middle where the user’s focus is more likely to be, while Chao, on the other hand, is directed to avoiding distortion of stylized borders on differently sized pages. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:26–29; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 25; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 91–92). This argument reads the prior art too narrowly and does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner does not rely on Chao for its teaching of avoiding distortion near the borders of the image, but rather on its teaching of scaling the image while maintaining the design intent of the original image. Ex. 1008 ¶ 22; Ex. 1014 ¶ 67. Thus, Petitioner is applying Chao’s techniques of scaling (regardless of where the area of 92. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Chao’s approach of stretching/shrinking only the background and uniformly scaling entire foreground objects is suitable for graphic design but incompatible with Meulen which is concerned with adapting externally derived media source content for display on a fixed size screen. PO Resp. 37–38 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 93). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner relies on Chao’s teaching of stretching/shrinking of background elements and applies that stretching/shrinking to Meulen’s images displayed on its screen. Pet. 91–92 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 28, 63; Ex. 1002 ¶ 263). The fact that Chao applies its teaching to graphic design does not prevent a POSITA from applying those teachings to Meulen’s media content displayed on its screen.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,015,413 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,015,413
• Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01350 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11–14 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed capacity retention after 400 cycles.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have held a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, with at least 4 years of experience in cell design, electrochemical techniques, and battery materials development.” Pet. 4. Petitioner further contends that a “Master’s Degree can substitute[] for some of the relevant experience,” and “[e]quivalent training with battery specific experience can accommodate other degreed fields.” Id. 9 The parties here do not address objective evidence of nonobviousness. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. PO Resp. 20. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’641 patent, the prior art of record, and the parties’ arguments.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties agree that the term “charge cut-off voltage” is “the maximum voltage to which the battery is configured to be charged.” PO Resp 21–22; Pet. Reply 1. The parties dispute, however, whether the “charge cut-off voltage” is a “battery property” or “the voltage applied to the battery during charging.” PO Resp. 21–24; Pet. Reply 1–6. We need not resolve the precise meaning of “charge cut-off voltage” because there is no dispute that Yamaki discloses this limitation under either party’s interpretation of the claim term. Upon review of the prior art and the parties’ arguments, we determine that no terms of the ’641 patent require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Pet. Reply 1 (asserting that the challenged claims are unpatentable under either parties’ construction of “charge cut-off voltage”).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s arguments do not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position. Sakamoto expressly discloses setting the ratio of negative to positive electrode active material in the range of 1.05 to 1.30. Ex. 1005 ¶ 8. Sakamoto also explains why this range is preferable, i.e., if the ratio is roughly equal “the charge-discharge cycle performance is insufficient due to significant deterioration from charging and discharging,” and if the ratio is 10 Citations to the prosecution history of Yamaki are to the page numbers added to the lower right corner of the document. too high “too much of the compound does not participate in charging and discharging.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. These disclosures are sufficient to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to select the ratios disclosed in Sakamoto in Yamaki. Id. ¶ 8 (providing a secondary battery with a capacity ratio between 1.05 and 1.30 and noting that by setting the ratio within this range the resulting secondary lithium battery is “safe due to low risk of heat being generated and an explosion occurring”). We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,749,641
• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting et al. v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable over Begemann, Krames, and Allen; claim 41 is …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive because the Krames declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 21 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “at least one semiconductor chip” (id. at 10:1) where the “at least one semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Id. at EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as meaning “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 54 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 21 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’961 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 19. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need to be “familiar with thermal issues.” Ex. 2015, 26:15– 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’961 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “particularly relevant.” Resp. 14–15. First, Patent Owner argues that “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” means “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater 9 Petitioner states that “Patent Owner thus contends the recited ‘reflective layers’ can include transparent or semi-transparent layers that exhibit some reflectivity (e.g., SiO2) or an interface between two layers (e.g., the buffer and substrate layers) that exhibit differing indices of refraction.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner frames this as being Petitioner’s “novel construction” (Resp. 16), but Petitioner does not expressly endorse this Patent Owner contention. than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner notes that a district court already adopted this construction and notes that the “LED chip” includes LEDs, LED modules, and LED arrays but excludes laser chips, laser modules, and VCSEL chips. Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 15–18). Petitioner argues that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1–2. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is well supported by the record including the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 2003, 15–18. slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other claim terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 6,465,961 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,465,961
• Microchip Technology Inc. v. HD Silicon Solutions LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 13, 2022 · IPR2021-01042 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11, 13–27, and 29–32 are unpatentable as anticipated by Haswell or obvious over Haswell and Itou; claims 12 and 28 were not shown unpatentable over Haswell and Lempel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelDecided for petitioner

    “III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the “type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field.” Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’619 patent would have had the following education and experience: at least (1) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related degree, and at least 3-5 years of experience in computer architecture and cache memory design; or (2) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related degree, and at least 5-6 years of experience in computer architecture and cache memory design. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 27). Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See generally PO Resp. Based on the final record before us, including the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which is also supported by Dr. Sechen’s testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 28.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “A. “instruction cache” Each of claims 1, 21, and 29, specifically require a method or system for instruction error correction that uses “an instruction cache.” In its Petition, Petitioner does not specifically advocate for an interpretation of “instruction cache.” In our Institution Decision, we noted the importance of the meaning of the term because “Patent Owner challenges two of the prior art references (Haswell and Itou) as not disclosing an instruction cache, as claimed, arguing instead that each reference uses a main storage memory or similar.” Dec. on Inst. 21–22. In the Institution Decision, we preliminarily found that the instruction cache is a memory for the storage of instructions that are accessed and executed by the processor. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:62– 64, code (57)). We also noted that lack of argument and evidence at that phase of the proceeding. Id. The parties responded by including additional argument, testimony, and evidence in the final record, which we now consider. Patent Owner argues that an “instruction cache” is distinct from main memory. PO Resp. 31–32. Patent Owner first relies on the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Sechen (Exhibit 2005), Petitioner’s expert. Id. Dr. Sechen testified during questioning that the main memory is not an instruction cache in that “it wouldn’t satisfy the normal definition of an instruction cache, which has certain features.” Id. (quoting Ex. 2005, 61:20– 62:7, 98:3–101:10). Patent Owner further argues that Dr. Sechen “also explained that the retrieval of data from an instruction cache is faster than from main memory due in part to its proximity to the processor.” Id. at 32 (quoting Ex. 2005, 166:8–18). Patent Owner further relies on the description of an “instruction cache” found in the Specification of the ’619 patent, that “[t]he instruction cache 103 is a memory for the storage of instructions 109 that are accessed and executed by the processor 106.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:62–64). Patent Owner also relies on the testimony of its own expert, Dr. Przybylski, who testifies that “the retrieval of data from a cache is faster (and thus takes fewer instruction cycles) than retrieval from main memory,” and “[b]ecause an instruction cache only holds a subset of the contents of main memory at any given time, a cache requires tags, a tag storage, and hit/miss logic in order to autonomously determine whether the fetch of an instruction can be satisfied from the cache.” Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 65, 66; Ex. 1001, 3:19–21.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther

    “B. “means for detecting an error” Independent claim 29 recites “means for detecting an error in each of the instructions concurrently with the fetching of a respective one of the instructions.” Ex. 1001, 12:51–53. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that “[t]his element is interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6 because it claims ‘means for’ and then recites the function of ‘detecting an error in each of the instructions concurrently with the fetching of a respective one of the instructions.’” Pet. 38. Petitioner identifies the corresponding structure as the error correction circuitry 129. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 7:53–55 (“error detection of the same instruction 109 is performed by the error correction circuitry 129 (FIG. 1)”). Patent Owner does not challenge this interpretation. We find Petitioner’s showing persuasive as to the interpretation of the “means for detecting an error” limitation. C. “means for generating a corrected instruction” Claim 30 recites “means for generating a corrected instruction if the error is detected in the instruction, the corrected instruction being a corrected version of the instruction.” Ex. 1001, 12:55–56. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that this element “is interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6 because it claims ‘means for’ and then recites the function of “generating a corrected instruction if the error is detected in the instruction, the corrected instruction being a corrected version of the instruction.” Pet. 40–41. Petitioner identifies the corresponding structure as the error correction logic 143 or circuit 129. Pet. 41. Petitioner relies on the ’619 patent’s disclosure of “when an error is detected ‘in either the instruction 109 or the error correction code 113, then the error correction logic 143 proceeds to generate a corrected version of the instruction 109 and its associated error correction code 113.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 6:7–11; Ex. 1002 ¶ 134). Additionally, Petitioner notes that “the ’619 patent discloses that the error correction circuitry 129 (e.g., collectively) generates a corrected version of the instruction 109 and its corresponding error correction code 113. Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:1– 3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 134) (footnote omitted). Thus, according to Petitioner, “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] POSITA would understand that either the error correction logic 1292 or the error correction logic 143, which belongs to the error correction logic 129, generates the corrected instruction.” Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 134). Patent Owner does not challenge this interpretation. We find Petitioner’s showing persuasive as to the interpretation of the” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “transfer of instructions from memory to a computer processor.” Id. at 1:7–11; see id. at 2:13–15 (“a method and system for detecting error during transfer of data signals from a data memory that permits correction of the error”). Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Haswell discloses “error correction” as required by the preamble of claim 1.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,302,619 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,302,619
• Nanya Technology Corporation / Nanya Technology Corporation, U.S.A. et al. v. Monterey Research, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00170 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over McClure in view of Merritt, Issa, or Kawasumi; Petitioner did not prove claims 2 and 3 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a technical person having “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, applied physics, or a related field, and approximately two years of experience working in the design, development, and/or testing of memory circuits, related hardware design, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 11. For purposes of this inter partes review, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. Resp. 13. Based on the totality of the record including the ’429 patent specification, cited references, and expert testimony, we find that Petitioner’s definition for a person of skill in the art is appropriate.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “amplifiers “by the strobe reset generator instead [of] by the strobe global word line (gwlstrobe) 52”). The Figure 1 apparatus, at the location of the purple oval, merely conveys a strobe signal (gwlstrbuf 20) on a line without substantially changing that signal. Id. Fig. 1. The Figure 2 apparatus, however, illustrates main amp strobe 60 generating output signal 88 by delaying the gwlstrbuf signal output by buffer 58. Id. at 4:6–9, Fig. 2. Given the context of the ’429 patent specification, we decline to construe “main amplifier strobe” in a manner that would fail to distinguish Figure 2’s main amplifier strobe from Figure 1’s unlabeled strobe-carrying line (identified with a purple oval above). See id. (identifying main amp strobe 60 as a “main amplifier strobe circuit 60”). If Figure 2’s identification of a “main amplifier strobe 60” is to be distinguishable from Figure 1’s lack of any identified main amplifier strobe 60, the main amplifier strobe has to be more than just a mere strobe signal or line that carries a strobe signal. The ’429 patent specification explains that “first main amplifier strobe circuit 60 delays the rising edge of the output of the buffer 58” to “ensure[] that the local amplifiers 82, 84, 86 stay on until the main amplifier 108 is on.” Id. at 4:6–9. While we decline to import this exact functionality from the specification into claim 1’s “main amplifier strobe,” based on the discussion above, the main amplifier strobe must affect the transmitted signal and it must affect the signal consistent with the word “strobe.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified McClure’s memory core “such that each sense amplifier 602 is coupled to a pair of global read data lines as taught by Winograd, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi.” Pet. 66. The preponderance of the evidence supports this position at least as to Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Chmelar, states that a person of skill in the art would have modified McClure to “reduce power consumption, circuit areas, and/or readaccess time because the plurality of global data bus drivers 606 . . . could be eliminated.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 215. Dr. Chmelar’s testimony on this point is credible and well-supported by the evidence. As explained above, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi all teach local amplifiers coupled to global read data lines, and a person of skill in the art would have recognized the advantages of the global read data line configuration by studying those references. Petitioner’s position is further supported by the ’429 patent which admits that a structure of local amplifiers connected to global read data lines was known prior art. In particular, Figure 1 of the ’429 patent illustrates “conventional solution” prior art having local amplifiers 22, 24, and 26 connected to global read data lines 38 and 40. Ex. 1001, Fig. 1, 1:26–48 (“The local amplifiers 22, 24, 26 then drive the gdrd (global read data) lines 38, 40.”); see also Pet 8–9 (mapping claim elements to Figure 1). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not establish reason to combine the references’ teachings. Resp. 60–62. We disagree for the reasons explained above. The record as a whole, even if the ’429 patent’s disclosure were not considered, supports by a preponderance of the evidence that connecting local amplifiers to global read data lines was a well-known configuration. See supra 27–32. Connecting McClure’s local amplifiers to global read data lines is no more than use of a known method to yield predictable results. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007). Patent Owner also argues that Kawasumi criticizes its Figure 1 prior art “for its arrangement of having multiple amplifiers connected to global data lines.” Resp. 61–63; see also Ex. 2001 ¶ 176 (Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Hassoum stating that Kawasumi says the Figure 1 arrangement is problematic). Patent Owner does not, however, persuasively dispute that use of main amplifiers with global read data lines was a known configuration or that implementation of such a configuration would have been within the abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 28–29. Instead, Kawasumi, for example, teaches that its arrangement of local sense amplifiers 1 providing data to the data bus 2 is a workable configuration. Ex. 1010, 1:49–63. Although Kawasumi teaches that this configuration may” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified McClure’s memory core “such that each sense amplifier 602 is coupled to a pair of global read data lines as taught by Winograd, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi.” Pet. 66. The preponderance of the evidence supports this position at least as to Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Chmelar, states that a person of skill in the art would have modified McClure to “reduce power consumption, circuit areas, and/or readaccess time because the plurality of global data bus drivers 606 . . . could be eliminated.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 215. Dr. Chmelar’s testimony on this point is credible and well-supported by the evidence. As explained above, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi all teach local amplifiers coupled to global read data lines, and a person of skill in the art would have recognized the advantages of the global read data line configuration by studying those references. Petitioner’s position is further supported by the ’429 patent which admits that a structure of local amplifiers connected to global read data lines was known prior art. In particular, Figure 1 of the ’429 patent illustrates “conventional solution” prior art having local amplifiers 22, 24, and 26 connected to global read data lines 38 and 40. Ex. 1001, Fig. 1, 1:26–48 (“The local amplifiers 22, 24, 26 then drive the gdrd (global read data) lines 38, 40.”); see also Pet 8–9 (mapping claim elements to Figure 1). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not establish reason to combine the references’ teachings. Resp. 60–62. We disagree for the reasons explained above. The record as a whole, even if the ’429 patent’s disclosure were not considered, supports by a preponderance of the evidence that connecting local amplifiers to global read data lines was a well-known configuration. See supra 27–32. Connecting McClure’s local amplifiers to global read data lines is no more than use of a known method to yield predictable results. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007).” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,158,429 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,158,429
• Glux Visual Effects Tech (Shenzhen) Co. / Leyard Optoelectronic Co. et al. v. Ultravision Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2021 · IPR2020-01052 · APJ Denise M Pothier · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Kalua in view of ordinary skill; claims 4–6, 14–16, and 21–26 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts: A person of ordinary skill in the art (i.e., a skilled artisan, or “POSITA”) at the time of the ‘791 patent’s alleged invention would have: (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field, and (ii) at least two years of experience in the design and/or implementation of LED panels . . . Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–44). Patent Owner does not set forth an ordinary artisan’s skill level. See generally Resp. Mr. Credelle, Patent Owner’s expert, states that he do[es] not disagree with Mr. Flasck’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which he lists as (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field, and (ii) at least two years of experience in the design and/or implementation of LED panels. Ex. 2002 ¶ 33. Mr. Credelle further states, similar to Petitioner, “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. In the Institution Decision, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingOther

    “modification kit for converting an existing signage mounting structure to an electronic sign.” Ex. 1001, 87:11–12, 88:1–2, 88:51–52. Petitioner asserts the “preamble is limiting” because the phrase provides antecedent basis for (1) “the existing signage mounting structure” recited in the body of claims 1, 4, and 21 or (2) “the existing signage structure” recited in body of claim 12. Pet. 19. Petitioner further asserts that the preamble breathes, life, and meaning into claims 1, 12, and 21, namely the retrofitting of an existing nonelectric sign into a digital sign. Id. at 19–20 (citing Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ex. 1001, 1:38–41, 1:45–46, 1:52–54, 18:48–52, 23:1–6, 24:1–11, Fig. 3). For these reasons, Petitioner asserts the preamble “should be construed to require ‘a self-contained retrofit kit for on-site use to convert an existing static non-electronic sign into an electronic sign.’” Id. at 19; see id. at 21.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “and further limit either claims 1 or 12. Ex. 1001, 87:63–67, 88:17–18, 88:46–50. We have reviewed the record. Based on the evidence and argument presented, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Kalua in view of Ordinary Skill teach and suggest each limitation in claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20, and has articulated sufficient reasoning, with rational underpinning, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined Kalua with Ordinary Skill in the manner Petitioner proposes. Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 7, 13, 42, 54; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 241–244). Patent Owner does not separately challenge Petitioner’s ground for claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20. See generally Resp. Accordingly, having considered each of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner provides by a preponderance of the evidence and articulates sufficient reasoning to support its challenge of claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20 as unpatentable over Kalua in view of the knowledge and level of ordinary skill in the art as evidenced by Watchfire. (c) Conclusion – Claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20 Having considered each of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kalua in view of the knowledge and level of ordinary skill in the art as evidenced by Watchfire teach or suggest claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20.” slip op. at 84

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “suggest claims 4, 5, 10, and 11. Pet. 41–43 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 145–153; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 55–56, 75, 78, code (57), Figs. 1A, 1C, 1E (annotated)). Claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 ultimately depend from claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 87:31–37, 87:63– 67) and, therefore, include element [1e] as discussed above. Also, the discussion of claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 in the Petition do not further address the “plurality of power routing systems” limitation (i.e., element [1e]). See Pet. 41–43. Accordingly, Petitioner’s analyses of these claims suffers from the same problems we discussed above when addressing claim 1.” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 9,047,791 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,047,791
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00440 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–7, 10–16, 18, and 20 are unpatentable; claims 5 and 8 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21, 30, and 38 are unpatentable as obvious over Sackier and Kirsch.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “3. Dr. Nicosia’s Declaration in support of its Opposition to Patent” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. “clip” The Parties now agree that “clip,” as the term is generally understood,” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

    “as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing this element to be present in Sackier because Petitioner combines features from distinct embodiments in Sackier without establishing persuasively that those embodiments are so directly related to each other such that one of ordinary skill in the art, looking at the reference as a whole, would recognize a disclosure of the invention as claimed. Accordingly, although a very close call, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate anticipation of claims 1, 12, and 20 by Sackier for this reason.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,271,731 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,271,731
• Shenzhen Kean Silicone Product Co., Ltd. v. Pkoh Nyc, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01327 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 20–22, 24, 26, 28–32, and 35–38 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable over Cho.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Goldman, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the bottle/container field as of the time of the filing of the application that became the ’036 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering and at least one or two years’ experience developing container technology.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 4. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and based on the final record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “The Specification of the ’036 patent describes “[t]he elastomeric material is . . . of an appropriate durometer, such as 40 Shore A, to make the squeeze bulb 200 substantially deformable yet resilient,” and the elastomeric material is preferably silicone. Ex. 1001, 2:54–63. Only the claimed wall portion of the receptacle is claimed to be “resiliently deformable.” Id. at 5:9–10. Nothing in the claim, however, precludes or requires any other portion of the receptacle (comprised of elastomeric material) from also being resiliently deformable. Id. at 4:47–48. Notably, the receptacle is claimed to be “flexible and resilient.” Id. Although the “flexible and resilient” receptacle and its wall being “resiliently deformable” are not necessarily identical, this distinction appears to be minor considering the written description of the ’036 patent. Based on the foregoing, we give each of these claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person or ordinary skill in the art. The surrounding claim language for each claim limitation focuses the scope of these terms such that any interpretation we could provide would not be as helpful in understanding the terms as the surrounding claim language. We determine that no terms require express construction for the purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “6 In our decision, we give little weight to Petitioner’s evidence of “scores of popular baby bottles currently on the market,” because the design of these new bottles does not indicate the state of the art at the time the ’036 patent was filed. Further, Petitioner has failed to provide any corroborating testimony related to these new bottles—recent advertisements do not convince us of what a person of skill in the art would have considered at the time of filing. See Pet. Reply 11 (emphasis added) (citing Exs. 1022, 1023, 1024). We likewise give little weight to Petitioner’s uncorroborated article (Ex. 1026) from Wikipedia concerning “Baby bottle.” The record before us does not establish the origin and scientific basis for this evidence, and thus, we weigh Mr. Goldman’s testimony (Ex. 1021 ¶ 13) based on this evidence in a similar manner. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,763 (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data.”). This sentence, standing alone, supports Mr. Fletcher’s conclusion that “an elastomeric, flexible silicone” could be used in the body of Cho’s bottle. See Ex. 1014 ¶ 30. Further, we find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments, supported by the testimony of Mr. Fletcher, that “silicone is primarily known for its elastic properties, and has been widely used in medical applications, including implants and storage containers, due to its chemical inertness, high heat resistance, flexibility and resistance for at least 60 years.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 34). Petitioner also supports its argument as to the suitability of silicone in consumer products, including in baby bottles, with a 1991 New York Times article that explains the elastomeric properties of silicone. Pet. 12; Ex. 1018, 2 (describing “rubbery silicone”), id. at 3 (“When baby gets a bottle these days, the nipple is a rubbery version of silicone.”). The fact that silicone could also possess other properties, or hardness, does not dissuade us from the determination that Cho, as a whole, teaches using a soft, resilient silicone in the body of the bottle.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “At the outset, Mueller is analogous art and Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary flip the analysis from focusing on the problem faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent to the “specific problem(s) found in Cho’s baby bottle.” First, Cho and Mueller are in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention—dispensing containers—as admitted by Patent Owner. See PO Resp. 36. We need not address the second portion of the analogous art test, which focuses on whether the prior art “is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor was concerned.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We do note, however, that the parties have both misapplied this second portion of the analysis. This analysis is focused on the problem faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent, not necessarily the problems addressed in the prior art references. Because neither party sufficiently addresses the problems faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent, and because Mueller and Cho are in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention, we need not address the second portion of the analogous art test.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 7,959,036 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,959,036

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.