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  • PTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · PGR2026-00035 · APJ Robert L Kinder · PGR · Adverse judgment

    The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner for abandoning the contest and canceled the sole challenged claim.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Pursuant to our rules, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4). Our prior order warned that a failure to respond would be construed as an abandonment of the contest under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), and that entry of judgment adverse to Patent Owner and cancellation of the challenged claim may follow. Show Cause Order, 2. Because Patent Owner did not respond by the September 15, 2026, deadline and has not entered an appearance in this proceeding, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Under these circumstances, we enter judgment adverse to the Patent Owner and cancel the challenged design claim.” slip op. at 2

    None
  • PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00885 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–11 on all petition grounds and granted ADC Solutions Auto LLC’s unopposed motion to join IPR2024-01219 in an understudy role.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We agree with the parties that the Deltran Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art. Under these circumstances, our reasons for instituting review based on Deltran’s petition apply with equal force to the “substantively identical” Petition filed by ADC Solutions. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Institution Decision filed in the Deltran IPR, we institute review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. See generally IPR01219, Paper 8 (Institution Decision in the Deltran IPR).” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “(1) the Motion for Joinder is timely, having been filed “no later than one month of the institution decision” in the Deltran IPR (Motion 6); (2) the Petition here “is substantially identical to the petition in the Deltran IPR” (id.; see also id. at 7 (“there are no substantive changes to the facts, citations, evidence, or arguments relied upon”); (3) “joinder should have no meaningful impact on the Deltran IPR trial schedule because the present Petition presents no new issues or grounds of unpatentability” (id. at 8); (4) “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role, which will simplify briefing and discovery” in the joined proceeding, “so long as the current lead petitioner in IPR2024-01219 remains an active party (id. at 9; see also id. at 4, 6);2 and (5) joinder will simplify “briefing and discovery” as all issues will be resolved “in a single proceeding” (id. at 9). Patent Owner does not contest any facts alleged by ADC Solutions in its Motion for Joinder. Having considered Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, we determine that joinder of the instant proceeding with in the Deltran IPR is appropriate. For the reasons in our Decision Instituting Review in Deltran IPR, we find that the Petition in this proceeding also warrants institution of inter partes review and that joinder is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s 2 We understand the “understudy role” as including Petitioner not making any oral argument or presentation during telephone conferences with the Board.” slip op. at 4

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,667,203
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2

    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,656,422
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,435,542
  • PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00736 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 4–7, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Garfinkle and Kosten; claim 11 is unpatentable as obvious over Garfinkle, Kosten, and Allen.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedPetitioner expert discountedGranted

      “Our reviewing court has held that if a declarant fails to qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art, then that person’s testimony regarding the knowledge or motivations of one of ordinary skill in the art is irrelevant as a matter of law. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.”). Mr. Daniels’ declaration consists of an analysis of the cited prior art in comparison to the challenged claims and a discussion of whether there would have been a 2 The motion does not seek to exclude the declaration of the named inventor of the ’725 patent, Nick Stiliadis. See Ex. 2109 (Stiliadis Declaration). motivation to combine the prior art. Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 4–20. Mr. Tulchin’s declaration addresses claim construction issues. Ex. 2131 ¶¶ 5–35. Each declarant, therefore, addresses issues that must be considered from the vantage point of a POSITA at the time of the invention, meaning a person with the level of ordinary skill defined in Section II.E.1 above. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (claim construction); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (obviousness). If Mr. Daniels and Mr. Tulchin do not qualify as POSITAs, as Petitioner alleges, then their opinion testimony is inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 (Testimony by Expert Witnesses). We find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Mr. Daniels qualifies as a POSITA in relation to the ’725 patent. Mr. Daniels has an undergraduate degree in engineering physics in addition to a law degree. Ex. 2121 ¶ 2. His declaration, however, does not establish that he also has “one year of experience related to marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network, or the equivalent.” See Section II.E.1 above. Mr. Daniels characterizes his non-legal work experience as follows: The rest of my professional career has been spent working in my own companies in the research, development and prototyping/commercialization of a number of different technologies, principally including fishing rod technology, digital video file transport, storage and processing, LED-based light-emitting tapes, drone control systems, wearable medical related electronic devices and breath-based diagnostic devices. Ex. 2121 ¶ 3; see also Ex. 1023, 99 (Daniels Deposition) (describing work on “a suite of interactive television innovations,” including “the first working pause button”). None of the projects identified appears to relate to “marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network.” Patent Owner argues that Mr. Daniels “was involved (at the time of the filing of the application which matured into the ’725 patent) in making inventions, that dealt with interactive television, video pause buttons and video file provision over the Internet.” Sur-Reply Br. 6. However, neither Mr. Daniels’ declaration nor his deposition testimony assert that he ever worked on “video file provision over the Internet,” let alone that he did so for one year or more. See Ex. 2121 ¶ 3; Ex. 1023, 98–100. We find that the evidence in the record is not sufficient for us to conclude that Mr. Daniels qualifies as one of ordinary skill in the art. We further find a lack of evidence establishing that Mr. Tulchin qualifies” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the following definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art: “a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus one year of experience related to marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network, or the equivalent.” Dec. 9. Patent Owner’s proposed definition differs from the Board’s only in that it adds a Bachelor of Science in engineering physics to the list of degrees that one of ordinary skill in the art might possess. See id. We view engineering physics as being related to the fields of electrical engineering, computer engineering, and computer science. Accordingly, following a review of the full record, we view Patent Owner’s proposed definition in its Response as consistent with the ’725 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaning

      “When interpreting the meaning of a claim, “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner has, briefly, proposed six claim terms for construction: exhibition; exhibitor; broadcast exhibitor; distribution; marketing; and storing. PO Resp. 10. The Petition states that “[t]o resolve the grounds presented herein, Petitioner does not believe that any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 12. We see no reason why “exhibition” and “exhibitor” should be understood as having a meaning as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. “Exhibition” and “exhibitor” encompass more than just a showing by “one in the exhibition business” because the specification of the ’725 patent identifies certain “exhibitors” that are not “in the exhibition business”: e.g., a high school, libraries, and other non-profit organizations. Ex. 1001, 12:38–41 (“schools, libraries, and other non-profit organizations”), Fig. 1 (“high school”). The plain and ordinary meaning of “exhibitors” is at least broad enough to encompass the types of exhibitors identified in the specification: movie theaters, television stations, satellite television operators, cable television operators, and non-profit organizations such as high schools. Ex. 1001, 4:20–22, Fig. 1. We further determine that some of these exhibitor types, including at least satellite and cable television operators, are “broadcast exhibitors.” Moreover, we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “distribution” is not so narrow as to be limited to “the business of marketing films and providing copies to venues,” as Patent Owner proposes. See PO Resp. 10 (emphasis added). The claimed invention is a “method of marketing and distributing multimedia,” which is not limited to films. We agree with Petitioner that the term is at least broad enough to encompass distribution of any type of multimedia to any type of exhibitor contemplated in the specification. See Ex. 1001, 1:20–25 (multimedia types); Reply Br. 6. Similarly, the plain and ordinary meanings of “marketing” and “storing” are not limited to Patent Owner’s specific examples: interesting individuals in seeing a film and saving to non-volatile storage, respectively. See PO Resp. 10; Tr. at 57:3–7. The invention is directed to marketing and distributing multimedia, not just films, Ex. 1001, 16:21, and while the Specification refers to storing multimedia on “hard drives,” id. at 4:35–37, 4:44–52, there is nothing in the Specification, claims, or prosecution history that would limit storage only to hard drives or other non-volatile storage. The intrinsic evidence suggests that the proper construction of each” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Garfinkle’s video distribution system to implement Kosten’s distribution method to achieve the improvements described therein, such as: access to a large number of video products and advertising materials available at a centralized location (Ex-1007, 54; Ex-1005, 1:42–49, 1:54–2:12), improved advertising capabilities (Ex-1007, 54; Ex-1005, 1:42–49, 1:54–2:12), and improved distribution processes resulting in lower shipping and handling costs and labor intensity, improved security against piracy, wider and more flexible distribution capabilities, cost reductions for movie theaters, increased control over time and locations of exhibitions by studios and distributors, an ability to scale up or down distribution based on success in theaters, and an ability to track and monitor sales and marketing data (Ex-1007, 52, 54). Pet. 14 (citing Dystar Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick, 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (A motivation to combine exists when the “improvement” results in a product or process that is “stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.”)). Petitioner further asserts that such a person would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the objective of efficient content distribution through the proposed combination of Garfinkle and Kosten with no change in their respective functions because: (1) both are “from the same field and address the same well-known issues”; and (2) both references purport to achieve this objective in similar and predictable ways, “such as using the well-known teachings of digitizing content, correlating multimedia and associated advertising materials, and connecting multiple user sites to the central station through a public communications system.” Id. at 13, 16–17 (internal citations omitted) (citing Ex. 1005, 2:58–3:5, 3:32–49, 4:37–39; Ex. 1007, 54); Ex. 1002 ¶ 68. Patent Owner contends that there would have been no motivation to combine Kosten and Garfinkle because each represents a “complete solution[] to different file transport modes, Kosten involving simple file transmission to a theater and billboards, and Garfinkle involving file transmission to a [video-on-demand] user. Neither has a problem which is addressed by the other.” PO Resp. 33. Petitioner argues, however, and we agree, that “(1) a known technique can provide motivation to combine and (2) a known technique does not need to improve upon the primary reference—it just must be a ‘suitable option.’” Reply Br. 21 (citing Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). Thus, it does not matter that Kosten and Garfinkle each represent a complete and functional solution to digitally transporting media files. If the references in the combination address a known problem, such as issues with multimedia distribution, see Pet. 13–14, and the proposed combination is a suitable solution, then there would have been a motivation to combine the two references. Moreover, Petitioner persuasively argues that by combining Kosten and Garfinkle, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to achieve benefits such as lower shipping and handling costs, improved security against piracy, wider and more flexible distribution capabilities, an ability to more easily scale distribution up or down as needed, among other benefits. Pet. 14. We find that these benefits would have provided a sufficient motivation to combine Garfinkle’s technical implementation of a distribution process for large multimedia files with Kosten’s proposed business application, “beaming” films directly to theaters via satellite. Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 7,574,725 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,574,725
  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00300 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 on all asserted grounds and granted LG’s motion to join the Vizio IPR, subject to participation limits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “ANALYSIS A. Institution of Inter Partes Review We instituted an inter partes review in the Vizio IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. Vizio IPR, Paper 12; see also Vizio IPR, Paper 1 (the “Vizio Petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Vizio IPR. Compare Pet. 1–2, with Vizio Petition, 1–2. Petitioner also relies on an identical declaration from the same declarant as relied upon by the petitioner in the Vizio IPR. Mot. 1 (“[Petitioner] . . . relies upon the same expert declaration as relied upon in the Vizio IPR.”); Ex. 1003, 1 (cover page indicating Declaration of Henry Houh in support of the petition submitted in IPR2024-00723), 134 (signature page dated March 21, 2024). Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Vizio IPR, for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Vizio IPR we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Vizio IPR, Paper 12, 12–41 (analyzing challenges in the Vizio Petition).” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because the “Petition is substantively identical to the petition in the Vizio IPR,” “challenging the same claims of the ’384 Patent on the same grounds while relying on the same prior art, arguments, and evidence,” and relying “upon the same expert declaration as relied upon in the Vizio IPR.” Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the Vizio IPR schedule. Id. at 5–6. Petitioner also represents that it “explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role” and “will assume the primary role only if Vizio cease to participate in the Vizio IPR.” Id. at 6– 7.” slip op. at 11

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,578,384
  • PTAB · Feb 13, 2025 · IPR2023-01182 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 16 was cancelled on Patent Owner’s motion; claim 17 was held unpatentable as obvious over Cook ’554 and over Lee and Cook ’523.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent) and at least two to three years of industry or equivalent research experience in the field of wireless energy transfer.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Based on the effective filing date of the ’719 patent, we apply the pre-AIA version of § 103. by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Mark Allen. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37– 41. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description. PO Resp. 14. We adopt Petitioner’s description for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “[i]t will be appreciated that a network of capacitors, as used herein, may in general refer to any circuit topology including one or more capacitors, including without limitation any of the circuits specifically disclosed herein using capacitors, or any other equivalent or different circuit structure(s), unless another meaning is explicitly provided or otherwise clear from the context. Id. at 52:32–38 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’719 patent expressly defines the phrase “a network of capacitors” as any circuit topology including one or more capacitors. Id.” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing. Even if Patent Owner is correct that elements E and F in Figure 4-12 of the Cook Provisional only represent the delivered power level (not the received power level), other portions of the Cook Provisional disclose tuning the resonant frequency of the resonant circuit based on the received power level. See Pet. Reply 5–6. In particular, the Cook Provisional states that “[t]he control system of the receiver is in charge of . . . antenna tuning control.” Ex. 1006, 31. The Cook Provisional also states that “[t]he receiver[’]s control system may determine the model parameters using specific measurements (e.g. antenna current and voltage, input power, etc.) and calibration routines.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Cook Provisional discloses tuning the resonant frequency based on input power. Id.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “D. Motion to Amend Patent Owner’s non-contingent Motion to Amend requests that we cancel claim 16. Mot. Amend 1. Petitioner does not oppose Patent Owner’s request. Id. We grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request to cancel claim 16, and, as a result, we do not reach the asserted grounds for claim 16.” slip op. at 8

    Patent outcomesUS 8,461,719 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,461,719
  • PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01387 · APJ Mahshid D Saadat · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims 1–16 and 19.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “II. Discussion Per 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Also, actions which are construed to be a request for adverse judgement include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. at § 42.73(b)(2). With the filing by Patent Owner of a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–16 and 19 in this proceeding, there are no remaining claims in this trial.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,204,737
  • PTAB · Dec 3, 2024 · IPR2023-01386 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims 1–12 and did not respond to the show-cause order.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “at any time during a proceeding. Also, actions which are construed to be a request for adverse judgement include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. at § 42.73(b)(2). With the filing by Patent Owner of a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–12 in this proceeding, there are no remaining claims in this trial. Because Patent Owner did not respond to the Show Cause Order, we construe Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims 1–12 as a request for entry of adverse judgment against Patent Owner. The request is granted.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,904,405
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00833 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 over all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious, and granted ZEPP’s motion to join the Samsung IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “Although ZEPP is correct that a General Plastic analysis is generally only applicable when the same party files multiple petitions challenging the same patent, the Board has extended General Plastic factor 1 to include a third-party subsequent petitioner who has a “significant relationship” with the prior petitioner, as discussed below. 2. No Significant Relationship between ZEPP and Samsung In Valve Corporation, the Board extended the General Plastic analysis to situations in which a subsequent petition is filed by a different petitioner. Valve Corp. v. Elec. Scripting Prods., Inc., IPR2019-00062, paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (hereinafter “Valve”). Specifically, the two petitioners in Valve were co-defendants in a District Court litigation, had a licensing relationship concerning a product, and were accused of infringing based on the same product. Valve, slip op. at 9–10. The Board considered whether there was a sufficiently “significant relationship” between the two different parties filing the two petitions that the second petitioner should be regarded as the same petitioner under General Plastic factor 1. Valve, slip op. at 2, 10 (emphasis added). Here, Patent Owner asks the Board to exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution under General Plastic (Opp. 3–6). But Patent Owner has not established under General Plastic factor 1 that ZEPP itself (or its privy) has filed multiple “follow-on” petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an inter partes review. Nor has Patent Owner established, also under General Plastic factor 1, that ZEPP (as the subsequent petitioner) and Samsung, have a significant relationship, in the sense contemplated by Valve (i.e., as co-defendants accused of infringing based upon the same product). Valve at 9–10.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine that (1) ZEPP has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’033 patent; and (2) ZEPP has satisfied the threshold requirement to warrant joinder.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “On this record, we find ZEPP has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate, at least because, as set forth above, the Petition here: (1) is substantively identical to the petition filed in the Samsung IPR; (2) contains the same grounds for the same claims based upon the same evidence; and, (3) relies upon the same Declaration of Dr. Benjamin B. Bederson, Ph.D. See Mot. for Joinder 1 (“same expert declarations”); Ex. 1002. ZEPP represents that it will assume “a silent participant role.” Mot. for Joinder 1. ZEPP also represents that it “merely seeks to join an ongoing proceeding as an understudy.” Reply 6 (citing Mot. for Joinder 6). For what constitutes an “understudy role,” see footnote 8, supra. And ZEPP clarifies that it “will not take an active role in the inter partes review proceeding unless the Samsung Petitioner ceases to participate in the instituted IPR.” Mot. for Joinder 1. ZEPP also “does not request any schedule changes” such that “the Board will be able to timely issue a final written decision.” Reply 6–7. On this record, we find ZEPP has satisfied the requirements for joinder, as described above, and has demonstrated that joinder will not unduly complicate or delay the Samsung IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.1(b) (providing for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding” (emphases added)). We, therefore, grant ZEPP’s Motion for Joinder and, as a result, join ZEPP as a party to the Samsung IPR.” slip op. at 11

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,588,033
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