- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00220 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art; a separate ground was not reached because those claims were shown obvious on other grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with electronic displays. Dec. 7–8. The parties’ positions have not changed from those we considered in the Institution Decision, and neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of a particular level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we apply the same definition in this Decision. Our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions, however, and we note that our conclusion would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 8
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Paper 47, 1–5. We do not rely on either of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“that Patent Owner fails to adduce evidence showing how the claimed invention satisfied the alleged need for effective outdoor cooling. See Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a proponent of objective evidence of long-felt need must show that “the claimed invention satisfied a long felt need”). Patent Owner states in conclusory fashion that “[d]espite the demand for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having attempted to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn conceived of his invention.” PO Resp. 75. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition, so Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 64
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“objective indicia of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (instructing that evidence of secondary considerations, when present, must always be considered in determining obviousness). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include evidence of commercial success, licensing, copying, praise by others, long felt but unresolved need, and” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 9,173,322 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,173,322 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,854,595 - Bizlink Technology, Inc. v. Anderson Power Products, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00687 · APJ Lisa L Tsang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 7–12 are unpatentable; claim 4 is not shown unpatentable because Winkler does not establish that its insulating barriers press against each other when partially disconnected.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner’s first argument that a level of ordinary skill in the art that encompasses an individual having experience with electrical circuits but not electrical connectors is not consistent with the technology and descriptions in the ’017 patent. See PO Resp. 7. The field of the invention of the ’017 patent is “electrical connectors, and more particularly, . . . an electrical connector that suppresses arcing if connected or disconnected while current is flowing.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9. Consistent therewith, the challenged claims are directed to “[a]n electrical connector pair” and recite structural features of the electrical connector pair. Id. at 4:20–56, 5:1–20.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We find that the intrinsic evidence supports maintaining our construction in the Institution Decision that “insulating” means “electrically insulating.” See Dec. 11–12. In particular, we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the insulating barriers would be unable to be configured to “block[] substantially all through-air arcing paths between the first and second electrical contacts,” as claimed, unless they were electrically insulating. See Ex. 1001, 4:36–44. Moreover, as Patent Owner avers, our interpretation of “insulating” as it applies to the first and second insulating barriers should be the same as for the first and second housings. See Digital Biometrics, 149 F.3d at 1345 (“whatever interpretation we assign [to a word used in a claim] should encompass both uses because the same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently” (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Ex. 2001 ¶ 102. Accordingly, we find Dr. Eldering’s testimony persuasive as to this issue and determine that the diagram shows what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably inferred Winkler to disclose when the connectors are partially disconnected. Compare Ex. 1004, Fig. 2, with Pet. 33; see also Ex. 1004, 3:14–27 (discussing the process by which the connectors are engaged with each other).” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Id. at 3:27–37 (emphasis added). These wall portions 58 are located between the distal ends of the terminals and where Petitioner proposes to add a printed circuit board or wiring board to Winkler. See id. at Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46 (diagrams showing Winkler as modified to have a printed circuit board or wiring board). As such, movement of Winkler’s terminals appears to be mostly limited to within their respective receiving pockets. Given the above teachings, we fail to see how Petitioner’s proposed modification would have meaningfully interfered with the degree of freedom of movement required by Winkler’s terminals. Notably, Mr. Locati’s testimony regarding this issue is conclusory. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 120. Because movement of Winkler’s terminals occurs primarily in the receiving pockets, we also do not discern how the solder joint of Petitioner’s proposed modification would experience undue stress or risk breaking due to that movement. See Ex. 1004, 1:47–55, 3:14–37, Fig. 2; Pet. 44–46. This is particularly true in view of Winkler’s teaching that each cylindrical end portion may be soldered to a cable. See id. at 2:6–10; see also Pet. 43 (arguing that Winkler teaches soldering to a cable but not specifically to a printed circuit or wiring board). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Winkler and Handbook.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 8,808,017 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,808,017 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell LtdNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00777 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16–27 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to account for limitations 16[b] and 16[i] and their counterparts across the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Human Computer Interaction, or a related technical field, with at least one year of experience working in the field of user interfaces and/or content management.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2040 ¶ 53). The Decision on Institution adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 10. We find Patent Owner’s stated level to be less precise than that proposed by Petitioner in that the modifier “at least” used by Patent owner imposes no upper bound on the amount of experience possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, Patent Owner states: “The difference between the Board’s definition and Patent Owner’s (EX2040. ¶53) does not change the arguments set forth herein.” PO Resp. 11. Thus, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.4 4 All of our findings and conclusions would still be the same, however, had we applied Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In its Reply, Petitioner does not assert that the district court’s construction is incorrect. We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction is better than Petitioner’s proposed construction, because for reasons indicated by Patent Owner, which are not disputed by Petitioner, settings in the computer, e.g., dedicated folders for each user are the user profiles, rather than simply data alone of any kind. Further, when asked about the appropriateness of the district court’s construction, counsel for Petitioner expressed that Petitioner has no objection to the Board’s adopting the district court’s construction for “user profile”: JUDGE LEE: So, you’d be fine with just going with the District Court’s construction? MR. HEINTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Tr. 15:22–24. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the district court’s construction for “user profile,” i.e., “a collection of settings and information associated with a user.”” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“PO Resp. 30–31 (Figure 26 omitted). In its Reply, Petitioner still does not provide an articulated reason for placing user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, within Horn’s panes 2601 or 2602. Reply 12–14. Although Horn does describe personalized profile, Petitioner points to no disclosure of Horn as to how a user would have selected his or her own profile from among a plurality of user profiles. Petitioner presents no reason for placing these user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, gleaned from or suggested by Baumgartner, within either pane 2601 or pane 2602 in Horn’s workspace view. Further, pane 2602 contains “a list of all collections defined by MFS and the user,” and pane 2601 lists the source examined by the user to create his or her collections. Ex. 1005, 19:41–46. That disclosure suggests the contents of panes 2601 and 2602 are tied to one particular user. No rational basis is articulated by Petitioner to place user profile selection buttons within these panes which appear to be in the profile space of one user. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not adequately accounted for limitation 16[b].” slip op. at 22
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“The test for sufficiency of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the earlier application’s disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The specification must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained: One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. Id. (“[T]he applicant must also convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”) (emphasis in original). One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention. Although the exact terms need not be used in haec verba, see Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038, 34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“[T]he prior application need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims. . . .”), the specification must contain an equivalent description of the claimed subject matter. A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,017,815 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,017,815 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00726 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not adequately explain which of its three alternative constructions of “risk indices” applied to the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’141 patent is unpatentable. 1” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“risk index” differ in several “particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. The Board does not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied. For example, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. However, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Rather, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term(s), and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,894,141 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00725 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain how the challenged claims should be construed or how the prior art rendered them unpatentable under the proposed constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Petition fails to satisfy the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) to set forth how the challenged claims are to be construed. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review. IV.ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Petition for an inter partes review is denied and no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given Petitioner’s acknowledgment that there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a meansplus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but also propose an alternative construction to be applied if the term is not found to be a means-plus- any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and incorrectly contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,424,035 - Mim Software Inc. v. Progenics Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00630 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition failed to explain which of three alternative constructions of “risk map” applied or how the prior art met the claims under those constructions.
RulingsInstitution decision- BurdenDenied
“particular details,” but those details matter and can make a difference in our patentability analysis, especially given that Petitioner acknowledges there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term. In taking this “choose-your-own-adventure” approach to claim construction, Petitioner fails to satisfy the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)–(4), which specify the content of the petition. In particular, Rule 42.104(b)(3) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” while Rule 42.104(b)(4) requires the petition to identify “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable” under either 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Moreover, by proposing these “choose-your-own-adventure” constructions, Petitioner obfuscates which claim construction the Board is being asked to apply, and under what circumstances each proposed construction should be applied. To be sure, we do not find that alternative claim constructions are per se improper. Nonetheless, there must be reasoning to explain the circumstances under which each alternative construction should be applied or an explanation of how the prior art renders the claims unpatentable under alternative constructions. For instance, Petitioner may assert one construction on the basis that a claim term should be construed as a means- construction assuming the term is not found to be a means-plus-function term. Unlike this example, however, Petitioner does not provide any rationale here for including three alternative constructions. Instead, Petitioner indicates there is no well-established ordinary and customary meaning for the term, and summarily contends that the three alternative constructions are not significantly different without explaining why three different constructions are being proposed or under what circumstances one construction should be applied over the other two constructions. slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,665,346 - Tessell, Inc. v. Nutanix, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00298 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–36 under both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with two years of academic and/or industry experience with database technologies.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 57–70). Patent Owner has not proposed a level of ordinary skill in the art and does not dispute Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Bhattacharjee and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner has not proposed an express construction for any claim term. Neither has Patent Owner. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim term. C.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“Because the inputs are used by the processor to create the database, the inputs must be received by the processor prior to creation of the database. Creation of a database is a way of provisioning a database, as explained in the specification of the ‘818 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:41–43 (“Database provisioning services involve creating and/or associating databases with the database system for management and use.”). The SLA then protects the database “after” it is provisioned (per limitation [1D]) and a snapshot may be captured “after” the database is provisioned (per limitation [1E]). For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that claim 1 would have been obvious over Sivasubramanian and Zha. 4. Dependent Claims 2–7, 22, 23, 28–30 Claims 2–7, 22, 23, and 28–30 each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Ex. 1001, 40:31–57, 42:17–22, 42:35–53. Patent Owner does not present arguments for these claims separate from those it submits for claim 1, which we have rejected above in the context of claim 1. We have reviewed Petitioner’s submissions and determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing obviousness of claims 2–7, 22, 23, and 28–30 over Sivasubramanian and Zha.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“With respect to limitation [1E], Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate into Sivasubramanian Zha’s feature of user input of the frequency for retrieving snapshots and user input of the “times during the day” for retrieving snapshots. Pet. 52–54. Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1E]. With respect to limitation [1F], Petitioner notes that Sivasubramanian already discloses a user interface to receive the first, second, and third inputs, and asserts that if there are fourth and fifth inputs based on an analysis of limitation [1D], then one of ordinary skill would have used the same interface to receive the fourth and fifth inputs. Pet. 54–55. Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1F]. With respect to limitation [1H], Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) “would have understood that the purpose of accepting these inputs [first through fifth] is to use them to ‘create’ a database based on these inputs and based on the amount of storage determined from the user input.” Pet. 57 (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute the assertion. We have reviewed the evidence cited by Petitioner, and agree on this record that Sivasubramanian and Zha reasonably would have suggested limitation [1H], provided that limitation [1D] regarding fourth and fifth inputs is met.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,860,818
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.