- Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Sma Solar Technology AGRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 25, 2022 · IPR2020-00021 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claims 1–10 unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–3, 5, and 7 over AAPA and Frezzolini; claims 4, 6, and 8–10 over AAPA, Frezzolini, and Iwamura.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Updated Guidance. See Opp. Reh’g 4–8. Instead, Patent Owner argues that we correctly determined in the Final Written Decision that AAPA was the foundation or starting point of the ground. Id. However, the language that we relied upon from the Guidance Memo in the Final Written Decision has been deleted from the Updated Guidance. Compare Guidance Memo 6 (directing the PTAB to determine if the applicant admitted prior art is the foundation or starting point), with Updated Guidance (language omitted). Although we properly followed the Guidance Memo in the Final Written follow the clear and unambiguous requirements of the Updated Guidance. Moreover, Patent Owner does not direct us to any Federal Circuit case law that suggests using the foundation or starting point test of the Guidance Memo. See Opp. Reh’g 4–8. Although the Qualcomm panel was aware of the Guidance Memo (see 24 F.4th at 1373), the Federal Circuit neither discussed the test set out in the Guidance Memo, nor directed that the PTAB apply the foundation or starting point test. See 24 F.4th 1367.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner argues—supported by the testimony of Dr. Wood—that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and at least two years of design experience with photovoltaic systems.” Pet. 20 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 18– 22). In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s description of a person having ordinary skill in the art, “except that we delete[d] the qualifier ‘at least’ to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of practical experience.” Inst. Dec. 15–16. Patent Owner does not address that determination. See PO Resp. Accordingly, for the reasons given in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of practical experience. See Inst. Dec. 16. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and two years of design experience with photovoltaic systems.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that all claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning at the time of the invention. Pet. 20. Patent Owner argues that two terms require explicit constructions: “the power line modem” and “the data signal coupler.” PO Resp. 20–22. Patent Owner’s proposed claim constructions limit the “power line modem” and the “data signal coupler” to DC power lines. PO Resp. 20–22. However, during the Oral Hearing, Patent Owner agreed that, consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning, the other limitations of the claims require that the components operate on DC power lines. Tr. 37:5–23. As discussed in more detail below, Petitioner’s combination of prior art references uses DC power lines. Accordingly, no express construction is needed to resolve any dispute in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“of the background knowledge possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Guidance Memo 6–7; Updated Guidance 4–5. Although Patent Owner had the opportunity to make such an argument in the Sur-reply when addressing the Guidance Memo (and by implication, the identical language of Updated Guidance), Patent Owner chose not to do so and, accordingly, forfeited the argument. See Paper 9, 7. Although Patent Owner raised the argument at the oral hearing,17 that is not enough to preserve the argument as no new arguments can by made during the Oral Hearing. See CTPG at 85– 86 (“During an oral hearing, a party . . . may only present arguments relied upon in the papers previously submitted.”); Dell, 818 F.3d at 1301 (“[T]he Board denied Acceleron its procedural rights by relying in its decision on a factual assertion introduced into the proceeding only at oral argument, after Acceleron could meaningfully respond.”). Just as a movant may not make a new argument in a request for rehearing, a party opposing such a request cannot raise new arguments that it did not make before. See Apple Inc. v. Taction Tech., Inc., IPR2022-00057, Paper 15 at 4 (“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity . . . to present new arguments.”) (Denying Request for Rehearing). Accordingly, because Patent Owner did not argue that the limitations taught by the AAPA were not known in the prior art in its Patent Owner Response or Sur-reply, that argument is forfeited and cannot be considered on rehearing.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,922,048 - PTAB · May 6, 2022 · IPR2022-00360 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds and granted Google’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we institute an inter partes review.2 Further, for the reasons set forth below, we grant the Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“institution of the Apple IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Apple IPR. See Mot. 1. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Apple petitioner. See id. at 5. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Apple petitioner. See id. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Apple IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “‘understudy’ role” and agrees that this role “shall apply so long as the current petition[er] in IPR2021-00922 remains [an] active” party.10 Id. at 6. Petitioner further represents that it will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by Apple in the consolidated filings. Id. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Apple IPR. Id. at 6.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,553,079 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2022 · IPR2022-00091 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–31 on all petitioned obviousness grounds, granted LG’s motion to join the Apple IPR, and terminated this proceeding into that joined case.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Grounds of Unpatentability and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)-(4) Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response repeats the same arguments over the Petition’s grounds of unpatentability and under 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(3)–(4) that Patent Owner presented in the Apple IPR. Compare Prelim. Resp. 9–25 with Apple IPR, Paper 8, 9–25. Thus, for the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Apple IPR, we determine that the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1–31 would have been obvious. See Apple Dec. 11–22. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on the same basis as we instituted review in the Apple IPR.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“In Apple v. Uniloc, the petitioner filed a first petition for inter partes review that was denied and then, after another party filed an additional petition for inter partes review of the patent, the petitioner filed its second petition with a motion for joinder. Apple v. Uniloc at 6. However, not only was that the second petition for inter partes review filed by the petitioner, but the petitioner was also barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing any further petitions. Id. at 6–7. Thus, under these facts, among others, the panel exercised its discretion to decline institution of the petition after applying the General Plastic factors. Id. at 13. Here, however, none of the unique facts in Apple v. Uniloc are present. The Petition is substantially identical to the petition in IPR2021- 00920 (“the Apple IPR”), which it seeks to join, and it presents us with a standard “me too” petition with a motion for joinder. Patent Owner presents no unique facts here that separate the Petition from most other “me too” petitions with a motion for joinder, with the possible exception that Patent Owner sued both Petitioner and the petitioner in the Apple IPR for patent infringement, which is those parties’ only connection to one another identified by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 29.9” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 315(d) states: “if another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office, the Director may determine the manner in which the inter partes review or other proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.” Though we agree that 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) gives the Director authority to determine how to proceed in the present circumstances, we decline the invitation to deny the Petition based on the existence of co-pending ex parte reexamination No. 90/014,901 and our finite resources.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). Petitioner timely filed the Motion no later than one month after institution of the Apple IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122 (b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Apple IPR. See Mot. 2. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Apple petitioner. See id. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Apple petitioner. See id. at 6. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Apple IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “understudy role” and “will only assume the lead role in the proceedings if Apple is no longer a party to the proceedings or unable to advance arguments for one or more claims, or grounds, for example, because of § 315(e)(1).” Id. at 2. Petitioner further represents that it “will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by Apple in the consolidated filings.” Id. at 3. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Apple IPR. Id.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,933,431 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2022 · IPR2022-00090 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–30 on all petition grounds and granted LG’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“over the Petition’s grounds of unpatentability that Patent Owner presented in the Apple IPR. Compare Prelim. Resp. 5–21 with Apple IPR, Paper 8, 5–21. Thus, for the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Apple IPR, we determine that the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1– 30 would have been obvious. See Apple Dec. 7–17. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on the same basis as we instituted review in the Apple IPR.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“Here, however, none of the unique facts in Apple v. Uniloc are present. The Petition is substantially identical to the petition in IPR2021- 00922 (“the Apple IPR”), which it seeks to join, and it presents us with a standard “me too” petition with a motion for joinder. Patent Owner presents no unique facts here that separate the Petition from most other “me too” petitions with a motion for joinder, with the possible exception that Patent Owner sued both Petitioner and the petitioner in the Apple IPR for patent infringement, which is those parties’ only connection to one another identified by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 25.10 The statutes and rules governing inter partes review expressly provide for joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. 42.122(b). For example, 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) states: Joinder.— If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. Under Patent Owner’s reasoning (see Prelim. Resp. 24–29)11, essentially any petition with a motion for joinder would be denied under the General Plastic factors, even though our governing statutes and rules expressly allow the practice. Patent Owner does not address why we should ignore our governing statutes and rules allowing joinder to use the facts surrounding a motion for joinder to decline to institute the petition, and we decline to do so.” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Board and . . . co-pending [ex parte] reexamination [No. 90/014,900 of the ’079 patent], the Director should deny the Petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). Prelim. Resp. 29. 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) states: “if another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office, the Director may determine the manner in which the inter partes review or other proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.” Though we agree that 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) gives the Director authority to determine how to proceed in the present circumstances, we decline the invitation to deny the Petition based on the existence of co-pending ex parte reexamination No. 90/014,900 and our finite resources.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“institution of the Apple IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122 (b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Apple IPR. See Mot. 2. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Apple petitioner. See id. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Apple petitioner. See id. at 6. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Apple IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “understudy role” and “will only assume the lead role in the proceedings if Apple is no longer a party to the proceedings or unable to advance arguments for one or more claims, or grounds, for example, because of § 315(e)(1).” Id. at 2. Petitioner further represents that it “will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by Apple in the consolidated filings.” Id. at 3. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Apple IPR. Id.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,553,079 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,246,093 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,618,707 - Hulu, LLC v. Pucs, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 10, 2022 · IPR2021-00811 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Pucs, Inc. on claims 1–7 after the patent owner disclaimed all claims remaining in the instituted trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Patent Owner disclaims claim 1−7 of the 619 patent, which are all claims for which trial was instituted such that there are no remaining claims in the trial. Ex. 2005, 1. In its Request for Judgment, Patent Owner requests adverse judgment against itself with respect to the claims of the ’619 patent. Paper 18, 1.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,728,619 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Sma Solar Technology, AG.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 30, 2021 · IPR2020-00965 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–23 after it disclaimed those claims, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“DISCUSSION Actions construed as a request for adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed claims 1–23 of the ’630 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253 according to the procedures set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). See Ex. 2102, 1. We agree with Petitioner that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) provides that the Board should construe Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer to be a request that the Board enter adverse judgment against it with respect to claims 1–23, the only claims at issue in this trial. Pet. Reply 1; see also Unified Patents, LLC v. Arsus, LLC, IPR2020-00948, Paper 18 at 2 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2021) (construing statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims as request for adverse judgment), aff’d Case No. 2021-1648, 2021 WL 5315423 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2021).” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,779,630 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Sma Solar Technology, AG.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 30, 2021 · IPR2020-00964 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against the Patent Owner on claims 1–23 after it disclaimed those claims, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“DISCUSSION Actions construed as a request for adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed claims 1–23 of the ’630 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253 according to the procedures set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). See Ex. 2002, 1. We agree with Petitioner that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) provides that the Board should construe Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer to be a request that the Board enter adverse judgment against it with respect to claims 1–23, the only claims at issue, in this trial. Pet. Reply 1; see also Unified Patents, LLC v. Arsus, LLC, IPR2020-00948, Paper 18 at 2 (PTAB Jan. 27, 2021) (construing statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims as request for adverse judgment), aff’d Case No. 2021-1648, 2021 WL 5315423 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2021)..” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,779,630 - Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Shower Enclosures America, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2018 · IPR2017-00573 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–14, and 16–26 are unpatentable; claims 4, 6, 10, and 15 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 33 and 34 are granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention. Pet. 26. Patent Owner sets forth many assertions related to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. PO Resp. 3–14, 20–30; PO Supp. Resp. 15–20. Petitioner responds to those assertions. Pet. Reply 2–4, 9–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15–16. While we will address each of those assertions, as a substantive matter, Petitioner asserts that “PO does not dispute the definition of a PHOSITA, offer a contrary definition, explain how a different definition might affect the Board’s analysis, nor contest the Board’s specific interpretation of the prior art references to put the PHOSITA determination at issue.” Pet. Reply 16–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15– 16. We agree with that assessment. Moreover, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is often reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Accordingly, as an initial matter, we address Petitioner’s unopposed substantive assertion with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“1. “track members” Independent claims 1, 12, 19, and 22 each recite “track members.”” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“B. Patentability of Substitute Claims 33 and 34 Petitioner asserts that various claim limitations are disclosed in the” slip op. at 100
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“701, 702 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that Mr. Poenariu’s testimony is entirely based on his finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, and because Mr. Poenariu did not articulate a sufficient factual basis for his conclusion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, his entire testimony us unreliable and should be excluded. PO Mot. 5–6. Petitioner responds that Mr. Poenariu discloses more than a sufficient amount of underlying facts on which to base his testimony, and, thus, Patent Owner’s assertions go to weight and not admissibility. Pet. Opp. 6–9. We agree with Petitioner.” slip op. at 105
Patent outcomesUS 7,174,944 mixedClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,174,944
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.