• Ebay, Inc. v. Lexos Media IP, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00336 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claim 72 under all three asserted obviousness grounds and granted eBay’s motion to join IPR2023-01000.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’102 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Owner argues that Nielsen relies on the HTML protocol and modifications would require changes to the HTML protocol to provide tooltips that appear as part of a cursor, but that Petitioner did not adequately address the real possibility of such a change. PO Prelim. Resp. 22–24. Patent Owner additionally argues that there would not have been a motivation to make changes to Nielsen, because, in Nielsen, the tooltip is not “indiscriminately and automatically displayed in response to cursor movement” but rather is displayed only after cessation of movement over a part of the display with an associated tooltip. Id. at 24 (emphasis removed). These arguments are similar to those made in the preliminary response in the 01000 IPR. See 01000 IPR, Paper 8, 57–59. In the institution decision in the 01000 IPR, we did not determine whether a likelihood of success had been shown for the Nielsen and Malamud ground, but provided initial views for the benefit of the parties, which are applicable in this proceeding as well. 01000 IPR, Paper 10, 33–35. As discussed above, we have made the decision to institute on other grounds, and we note that our institution is necessarily on all grounds in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting ... review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues that Petitioner is time-barred from seeking inter partes review of the ’102 patent and is “improperly using the joinder procedure in an attempt to circumvent” the one-year time bar set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Opp. 1, 7–8. However, Patent Owner does not persuasively explain, and we do not discern, how filing a petition with a request for joinder properly under 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) is an improper use of the joinder procedure to circumvent the one-year time bar. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) (providing that joinder must be filed no later than one month after the institution date of the inter partes review for which joinder is requested and that the one-year time bar (§ 42.101(b)) “shall not apply when the petition is accompanied by a request for joinder.”)” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant,” who is the Petitioner in this proceeding. Id. Petitioner timely filed its Motion for Joinder on December 20, 2023 (i.e., within one month after the institution of the 01000 IPR on December 12, 2023). See Mot.; 01000 IPR, Paper 9; 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15,4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. The Petition (1) is substantially identical to the 01000 IPR petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration of Dr. Craig Rosenberg. (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 6–9 & n.1. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the 01000 IPR schedule. Id. at 4; Reply 5. Petitioner also represents that it “will accept an “understudy” role unless and until [the 01000 petitioner] is terminated from the proceeding.” Mot. 4, 9–10. Petitioner represents that in its understudy role, it agrees that the following conditions will apply: (a) all filings by Petitioner in the joined proceeding be consolidated with the filings of the petitioner in the 01000 IPR, unless a filing solely concerns issues that do not involve the petitioner in the 01000 IPR; (b) Petitioner shall not be permitted” slip op. at 11

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 5,995,102
• Amazon.Com, Inc. v. Lexos Media IP, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2023 · IPR2023-01001 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 38, and 53 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over Malamud and Malamud with Nakagawa.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1, 38, and 53 of the ’449 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “The Fintiv Memorandum states that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Fintiv Memorandum, 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”)); see id. at 7–9. The Fintiv Memorandum explains that such a stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. Here, Petitioner provides a Sotera stipulation. Pet. 63. Specifically, Petitioner stipulates that if we institute review, “Petitioner will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR.” Id. (referencing Sotera).” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). We apply a two-part test when evaluating whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d). See Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). Specifically, we consider: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the claimed priority date would have had experience in the fields of human factors engineering or human computer interaction. The POSITA would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, human factors engineering, or a related field and would have had at least two years of relevant work experience in the fields of UI design, or equivalent experience. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–35). At this time, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition for one of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 28; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 29. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’449 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art)” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,118,449
• LG Electronics, Inc. / Hisense Co., Ltd. v. Polaris Powerled Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Mar 9, 2021 · IPR2020-01337 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over Oki alone or in combination with Henry or Toffolo.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012)); see also Intelligent Bio- Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3))). Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been anticipated and/or obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. slip op. at 7

  • Parallel petitionsNot reached

    “In our Decision on Institution in IPR2020-01283, which is issuing concurrently with this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one of the claims challenged in that IPR is unpatentable, and thus, we do not institute inter partes review in that proceeding. Petitioner’s challenge in this proceeding is similar to the challenge in IPR2019-00043, and suffers from the same deficiencies that warranted denial of institution in that proceeding. As discussed below, and, for substantially the same reasons as in IPR2019- 00043, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of showing that at least one of the claims challenged in this proceeding is unpatentable, and thus, we do not institute inter partes review in this proceeding. Given that we do not institute inter partes review in this proceeding or in IPR2020-01283, we need not reach the issue of whether more than one petition is necessary for Petitioner’s challenges to the ’117 patent, and/or whether to otherwise exercise discretion to deny institution of inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, optics or a related field, and approximately three years of experience with field of visual displays, circuit design, and related technologies.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art or oppose Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Where a claim lists elements separately, ‘the clear implication of the claim language’ is that those elements are ‘distinct component[s]’ of the patented invention.” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); HTC Corp. v. Cellular Commc’n. Equip. LLC, 701 F. App’x. 978, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The separate naming of two structures in the claim strongly implies that the named entities are not one and the same structure.”). Claims 1 and 15 recite the “user [input] signal” and the “dark level bias” as separate and distinct elements of the claimed “brightness control circuit” and method. Claim 1 recites “a first input configured to receive a user signal indicative of a user selectable brightness setting,” with “a multiplier configured to selectively generate a combined signal based on both the user signal and the sensing signal,” and “a dark level bias 1 To the extent Petitioner contends that a signal “reflecting” or “representing” “a” is different from + a as used in Oki’s equation, we reject that argument. The “a” in Oki’s equation is the same, whether in the first part of the equation, (b – a) x, which Petitioner relies on to teach the “combined signal,” or the second part of the equation, + a, which Petitioner relies on to teach the “dark level bias.” Pet. 44, 46. configured to adjust the combined signal to generate a brightness control signal . . .” Ex. 1001, 12:30–43. Claim 15 recites similar limitations in method form. Id. at 13:36–14:9. In other words, the dark level bias adjusts a combined signal that is generated based on the user signal and the sensing signal. slip op. at 18

  Discretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,223,117
• Ralph Lauren Corporation v. Lexos Media IP, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2020 · IPR2018-01755 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 27, 33, 40, 41, 72, 81, and 82 are unpatentable under § 103; the remaining challenged claims are not determined unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “Decision issues under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having considered the evidence of record, and for the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 27, 33, 40, 41, 72, 81 and 82 of the ’449 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), but has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5–7, 12– 15, 28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 39, 53–56, 58–63, 73–75, and 77–80 of the ’449 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a master’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or a related field, or hold a bachelor’s degree in Computer 4 The record contains no evidence relating to secondary considerations. Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent and have at least two years of relevant work experience in the fields of UI [(user interface)] design and OSs.” Pet. 10–11. In the Institution Decision, we preliminary adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition, noting that the prior art in this case demonstrated the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Inst. Dec. 10 (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Patent Owner does not comment on or dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and instead cites Okajima’s holding regarding the level of skill in the prior art without raising any issues regarding whether the prior art here reflects a level of ordinary skill different from that proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 10 (citing Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355). We adopt Petitioner’s definition as consistent with the ’449 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Petitioner proposed construction of several claim terms in the Petition. Pet. 12–18. However, none of these claim terms require construction to resolve the controversy. Petitioner also argued for a construction of an additional term (“wherein said specified content information further comprises information to be displayed on said display of said user’s terminal”) in its Reply. Pet. Reply 13. Patent Owner contends that this argument is a new argument raised improperly for the first time in the Reply. PO Sur-Reply 10–11. We agree. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding ... patent owner response.” See also Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). Therefore, we will not address the new construction proposed for this claim term.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “A petitioner must choose which grounds of invalidity to assert in the petition and “the expedited nature of IPRs bring with it an obligation for petitioners to make their case in their petition to institute.” Intelligent Bio- Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont'l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Circ. 2017) (a petitioner is foreclosed from “shifting” in post-petition arguments to a new theory of prima facie obviousness based on a different passage of a prior art reference than was used in the petition); see PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019,5 73 (“Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie 5 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated case of unpatentability.”); Trial Practice Guide Update August 2018,6 14 (same). Therefore, we evaluate Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation [c.i] relying upon Malamud’s message relating to a preview cursor in Malamud to teach the “specified content information.” Patent Owner does not make any arguments relating to whether Malamud’s message, in view of the teachings of Anthias, teaches limitation [c.i] of claim 1. See, e.g., PO Resp. 9–18.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,118,449 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,118,449
• Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Oct 30, 2019 · IPR2017-01928 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Valve’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1–24 not shown unpatentable because Valve did not establish that Burns was a prior art printed publication.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Therefore, Valve must demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked matters previously argued and specifically identify the location in its papers at which it made the argument that we misapprehended or overlooked in order to justify modifying our Final Decision. It has failed to do so. Instead, Valve asks us to reconsider and reweigh evidence and” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable

    “As explained in detail, in our Final Decision, we do not consider Exhibit 1003 to be the same as the document accessible using the 1 The cited pages of Exhibit 1040 (pp. 171–179) refer to a copy of the Burns article provided by the Examiner during prosecution of an unrelated but commonly owned patent that appears to have been retrieved from the “Wayback Machine” web archive. See Ex. 1040, 172 (referring to “WAYBACK MACHINE”). However, neither the cited pages nor the Examiner’s Notice of References Cited lists the Webarchive URL. See id. at 165, 171–179 (listing only URL to xboxer360.com domain as source of Burns article). Webarchive URL. Final Dec. 17–29. The URL listed on Exhibit 1003 refers to a URL on the xboxer360.com domain, not the Webarchive URL on the web.archive.org domain. Ex. 1003, 1–10. Contrary to Valve’s contentions otherwise, URLs are not prior art materials themselves, but merely addresses that might permit a user to access information via the internet. Valve also wholly fails to identify any specific argument or evidence that it advanced during the trial that we misapprehended or overlooked in reaching our decision on the issue of whether Valve had proven that Exhibit 1003 was a prior art printed publication.” slip op. at 4

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “Ironburg filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 30, “Mot.” or “Motion”). Valve opposed the Motion (Paper 31, “Opp.” or “Opposition”). Ironburg filed a Reply in support of the Motion (Paper 32, “Mot. Reply”).” slip op. at 3

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 9,352,229
• Kranos Corporation v. Riddell, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 11, 2019 · IPR2016-01646 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board found claims 1–7, 11, 13, 25–28, 30, 32–37 not shown unpatentable on the added grounds; it also denied Riddell’s motion to exclude as moot.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “motion to terminate the appeal in IPR2016-01646 and remand the proceeding, in light of SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), and the Director’s Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, for us to address claims and grounds that we had not instituted.3 In response, we modified our Decision on Institution to institute trial for all challenged claims and all grounds. Paper 32, 3 (the “November 9, 2018, Order”). We ordered briefing on those claims and grounds added to the trial in the November 9, 2018, Order. See Paper 32, 3–7.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsAdverse judgmentGranted

    “certain claims and grounds added to the trial in our November 9, 2018, Order. Paper 33. In the motion, Kranos “requests adverse judgment as to . . . [c]laims 3, 4, 7, 13, and 36.” Id. at 2. The motion continues that claims 6 and 26 remain in this proceeding for the grounds of “[o]bviousness over each of Sears or Rappleyea in combination with Ispas.” Id. As to claims 3, 4, 7, 13, and 36, Kranos’s motion is granted. Accordingly, we will enter the following judgment as to those claims: (1) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Sears; (2) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Rappleyea; (3) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Zeller; (4) claim 36 is not proven unpatentable as obvious over Sears, Rappleyea, or Monica and Halstead; and (5) claims 3, 4, and 7 are not proven unpatentable over Sears or Rappleyea and Ispas.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “record before us, and ultimately found that a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the ’118 patent pertains would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in engineering or physics and at least one year of experience in designing protective equipment, protective helmets, or plastic parts including the design of protective or structural plastic elements. Final Wrtn. Dec. 9–10. We also found that additional experience (at least three years) may be substituted for a formal engineering degree. Id. at 10. We found that the prior art of record reflects this level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 10–11. We noted that our patentability analysis presented below would reach the same findings and determinations under Kranos’s or Mr. Shewchenko’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 11. In the supplemental briefing, neither party argued for a different definition of the level of ordinary skill than the definition adopted in our Final Written Decision, nor do we discern any reason, based on the supplemental record, to change this definition.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The term “aligned along” does not appear in any claim addressed in this Supplemental Final Written Decision. See, e.g., Final Wrtn. Dec. 11 (indicating that the term “aligned along” appears in independent claim 34). In the Final Written Decision, we determined that we did not need to expressly construe the term “integrally formed” to resolve the parties’ dispute. See id. at 16. As will be apparent from our analysis below, we need not address this term further here.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,528,118 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,528,118
• Maxlinear, Inc. v. Cresta Technology Corp. And CF Crespe LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 17, 2019 · IPR2015-00592 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–3, 5, and 10–20 are unpatentable by collateral estoppel; claims 4, 6–9, and 21 were not shown unpatentable because the combination rationale was insufficient.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “After this proceeding was remanded by the Federal Circuit, we invited the parties to address a proposed procedure that would include additional briefing regarding the impact of the prior holdings that claims 1–3, 5, and 10–20 are unpatentable, and the parties filed their respective proposals. Papers 78–80. In its proposal, Petitioner suggested that Patent Owner “has waived the right to address the patentability of claims 4, 8, and 9” because “Patent Owner never separately argued for the patentability of these claims.” Paper 79, 1; see MaxLinear, 880 F.3d at 1378 n.4 (“On remand, the Board may consider whether CRESPE has waived arguments concerning these claims.”). But those claims were not challenged in the earlier proceedings that held claims 1–3, 5, and 10–20 unpatentable. Rather, those claims were only challenged in this proceeding with respect to art that was not at issue in the earlier proceedings. In advancing its contention, Petitioner effectively makes the untenable argument that Patent Owner must provide separate reasons for the patentability of claims 4, 8, and 9, even when we determine that its own case-in-chief for those claims is insufficient. In addition, Petitioner’s proposal requests briefing on the issues of “whether claims 6, 7 and 20 materially alter the [unpatentability] analysis on which the prior [unpatentability] determinations rested.” Id. We have considered, and deny, that request. The Federal Circuit’s remand order noted that the fact that “MaxLinear was not a party to the other IPRs is . . . irrelevant since Cresta, the predecessor in interest to CRESPE, was party to the original determination.” MaxLinear, 880 F.3d at 1377. But the Federal Circuit’s order does not state or suggest that the fact that different prior art was considered in the earlier proceedings is similarly irrelevant. Indeed, we agree with Patent Owner that “[t]he Federal Circuit has not ordered the Board and the parties to start over from scratch, and certainly not with new prior art.” Paper 80, 3; see Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The Board may control its own proceedings, consistent with its governing statutes, regulations, and practice.”). Patent Owner is correct that “[a]llowing new prior art to be considered on remand after the Final Decision on the merits would essentially be starting a new IPR proceeding.” Paper 80, 9. As Patent Owner asserts, “[t]he parties and the Board would have to argue and consider new grounds, new expert testimony would have to be taken and presented, and a new Final Decision would have to be rendered.” Id. The Federal Circuit’s instruction is limited: “We remand this case to the Board so that it may consider the patentability of the surviving disputed dependent claims 4, 6-9, and 21.” MaxLinear, 880 F.3d at 1378. We have complied with this instruction in two ways: first, by applying the Federal Circuit’s instruction regarding the collateral-estoppel impact on challenged claims 1–3, 5, and 10–20; and, second, by clarifying that Petitioner’s argument regarding the combination of Van De Plassche and Ishikawa compels a conclusion that Petitioner’s showing is insufficient with respect to claims 4, 6–9, and 21, independent of any conclusion previously reached with respect to independent claims 1 and 17. While the Federal Circuit includes language in its remand order that might be construed as suggesting applying different prior art in the latter analysis, 880 F.3d at 1377, the scope of this proceeding is limited by the prior art and the arguments in the Petition here. SAS Institute, 138 S. Ct. at 1356 (“in an inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint”); see Paper 80, 8 (Patent Owner addressing potential ambiguity of Federal Circuit’s instruction).” slip op. at 35

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Experience is but one of several factors that may be considered when determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (identifying factors as including the “type of problems encountered in the art,” “prior art solutions to those problems,” “rapidity with which innovations are made,” “sophistication of the technology,” and “educational level of active workers in the field”). “In a given case, every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.” Id. Patent Owner’s distinction relates to a portion of one factor (education) in a determination that involves several factors. The significance of the level of ordinary skill in the art is the role it plays in an obviousness analysis. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention”); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry”). Patent Owner does not explain persuasively how the alleged omission by Petitioner impacts the obviousness analysis. We conclude that Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is consistent with the level of skill generally reflected by the prior art of record, reflects an appropriate skill level. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 11

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Importantly, we find that Patent Owner did not exhaust avenues available to it in attempting to secure answers to its questions from Dr. Hashemi. The line of questioning involving Exhibit 2008 occurred late in the day, “well after the close of business on the east coast,” and an attempt by the parties to telephone the Board during the deposition was unsuccessful. See Opp. 3; Ex. 2006, 154:24–155:4. The parties discussed contacting the Board the following day, and continuing the deposition the day after that, when Petitioner would make Dr. Hashemi available for further cross-examination after receiving guidance from the Board. Ex. 2006, 155:5–157:13. Rather than proceed in this fashion, Patent Owner decided to abandon the line of questioning and passed the witness for redirect: “I think after we talked about it a bit, I think we will withdraw our questions on this document and just move on to redirect.” Id. at 157: 22–25 (emphasis added). Dr. Hashemi could have answered the questions and sought a protective order that would insulate his answers from the public record, providing the Board with the information needed to perform a focused evaluation of the credibility and reliability of specific statements in his testimony. But a significant measure of responsibility for whether Dr. Hashemi’s testimony is tainted with bias lies with Patent Owner for declining to pursue the issue to a point of greater clarification. Indeed, we are limited in how strongly we can fault Petitioner for failing to submit a clarifying declaration from Dr. Hashemi, in light of Patent Owner’s decision to “withdraw” the questions at issue. Because the evidence is insufficiently developed, we are similarly limited in the degree to which we can draw adverse inferences from Dr. Hashemi’s refusal to answer questions, and unable to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Hashemi’s testimony is tainted by an undisclosed bias. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Not reached

    “C. Petitioner’s Motion to File Supplemental Information Pursuant to our authorization, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Exhibits 1213–17 as Supplemental Information, which Patent Owner opposes. Papers 83, 86. The Motion asserts that such information is “relevant to the issues in the case, specifically the lack of nexus between any purported secondary consideration, including surprising or unexpected results.” Paper 83, 1. We do not reach Patent Owner’s arguments regarding secondary considerations because we conclude that Petitioner’s case-in-chief is insufficient. Accordingly, we dismiss the Motion as moot.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,075,585 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,075,585
• Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00948 · APJ Phillip J Kauffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable: Tosaki anticipates them, and Enright with Tosaki also renders claim 20 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In our Decision to Institute, we explained that a preliminary response cannot serve as an effective objection for two reasons.2 Dec. 4–5 (entered on September 27, 2016). First, objections must be made after institution of trial. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1) (objections are due ten days from institution of trial). Second, an objection and a preliminary response may not be combined into a single document. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (prohibiting combined documents).” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “The Petition fails to address a claimed characteristic of the elongate members (flexibility). See PO Resp. 39–41 (arguing that Enright does not disclose elongate members that are flexible as claimed). This cannot be corrected in Petitioner’s Reply. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012) (a reply may not raise a new issue or belatedly present evidence); 35 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(3) (requiring petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) (a petition for inter partes review must identify how the construed claim is unpatentable under the statutory grounds on which the petitioner challenges the claim and must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Paper 39, 2 (pointing out that Petitioner is making a new argument).20 Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Enright and Tosaki. The same is true of claims 2–11, 13, 16, and 17 by virtue of their dependence from claim 1. 20 Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s contention could not have been addressed earlier because the Board did not explicitly construe this claim limitation. Petitioner’s burden is not alleviated by the lack of a claim construction by the Board.” slip op. at 38

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “In our Institution Decision, we observed that the Petition does not explain persuasively how observations from a UK patent examiner, which presumably are based on UK law and not United States law, are of use in our proceeding. Dec. 4. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Donohoe must be a person of ordinary skill because the level of ordinary skill is low, and because the UK Intellectual Property Office employed Mr. Donohoe to examine the video game controller art. Pet. Reply 16–17. Petitioner chose not to address our concern regarding the distinctions between United States and UK law. Because of those distinctions, Petitioner’s assertions and evidence with regard to Mr. Donohoe are entitled to little or no weight. This shortcoming is not fatal to this ground of unpatentability because, as explained below, the prior art of record is reflective of the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 39

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that the level of skill in the art is relatively low and that “less than a year of experience or other training in controller assembly or tooling is required.” PO Resp. 34; Ex. 2002 ¶ 30 (Patent Owner’s expert opining that the level of skill is “no more than a year of experience or other training in controller assembly or tooling”). Patent Owner bases this level of skill on the education level of the inventor and the type of problems encountered in the art. PO Resp. 35. Regarding the education level of the inventors, Patent Owner provides evidence that the named inventors have degrees in unrelated fields. Id. (citing Ex. 2008, 3; Ex. 2009, 4). Patent Owner asserts the problem solved was that users of conventional game controllers were at risk of hand strain or injury from having to operate many different controls on the front of the controller with only a user’s thumbs. Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 10; Ex. 1001, 1:33–40, 3:56–61). Petitioner does not contest the education level of the inventors or the problem solved by the ’525 patent. Pet. Reply 15–16. Rather, Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner has taken the illogical position that the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art are maximum levels of experience or training rather than minimums. Id. To the extent that Patent Owner’s assertion suggests that the level of skill may not exceed a year of experience or other training in controller assembly or tooling, we disagree. Patent Owner does not cite, nor are we aware, of any legal precedent supporting the assertion that education and experience levels are maximums that must not be exceeded. Regarding the problem solved by the ’525 patent, the portions cited by” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,641,525 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,641,525
• Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Robert Bosch LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 12, 2017 · IPR2016-00041 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 6 was not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not establish a reason to use a binary spoiler material.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “included the ability to make predictable use of the materials and components described above according to their established functions.” Id. Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had either an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a similar discipline, or several years of experience in the field of wiper blade manufacture and design.” PO Resp. 1. Patent Owner then argues that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill confuses the “content of the prior art” Graham factor with the “level of skill in the art” Graham factor.8 PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill would include anyone with an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or similar discipline, regardless of whether they had any actual knowledge or experience in the present field of endeavor, i.e. windshield wiper blades. See id. at 1 (proposing “mechanical engineering . . . or . . . experience in the field”). Patent Owner’s proposed level would include virtually anyone with a mechanical engineering degree. We cannot accept Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill because it reads out at least “in the art” in “a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Instead, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level [of skill]”).” slip op. at 10

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “With respect to the testimony of Mr. Merkel, our analysis in IPR2016- 00039 is applicable here. For the reasons giving in that proceeding, Petitioner has demonstrated that Mr. Merkel’s testimony from the Pylon litigation is inadmissible hearsay, and with respect to this evidence, Petitioner’s Motion is granted. With respect to the testimony of Mr. Kashnowski, our analysis in IPR2016-00038 is applicable here. For the reasons given in that proceeding, Petitioner has not demonstrated effectively that the testimony at issue is inadmissible hearsay, and with respect to this evidence, the Motion to Exclude is denied.” slip op. at 7

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “Petitioner moves to strike the testimony of Mr. Merkel in Exhibit 2005. Paper 37. Patent Owner filed an opposition. Paper 40. Petitioner’s Motion to Strike and associated papers do not differ from the Motion to Strike in IPR2016-00038 in any meaningful way. We adopt that analysis here, and accordingly, that Motion is denied.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “discussed was Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner failed to meet the requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) to construe means-plus-function claims. Dec. on Inst. 7–11. However, the construction of that term was not at issue in our Decision to Institute. Neither party raises a claim construction issue in its subsequent briefs, nor do we discern a term that requires construction for rendering our Decision. Therefore, we do not construe any terms.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 8,099,823 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,099,823
• Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Polaris Industries Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 30, 2017 · IPR2015-01781 · APJ Phillip J Kauffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 88, 90–101 are unpatentable as obvious over Nechushtan combined with Hill and the respective additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Each of the grounds of unpatentability relies on Nechushtan, and Nechushtan discloses a space frame for “all-terrain vehicles.” Ex. 1008, 1:17–20, Figs. 1, 2; Pet. 7, 10 (Nechushtan is an all-terrain vehicle). We need not determine if the preamble of claim 88 is limiting, because each of Petitioner’s proposed combinations is for an all-terrain vehicle. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that only those terms which are in controversy need to be expressly construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

    “not “give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claims. Pet. Reply 2 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Petitioner goes on to assert that if the Board interprets the preamble as limiting, the broadest reasonable interpretation is a “vehicle capable of driving on a variety of terrains.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 1:13-14). Each of the grounds of unpatentability relies on Nechushtan, and Nechushtan discloses a space frame for “all-terrain vehicles.” Ex. 1008, 1:17–20, Figs. 1, 2; Pet. 7, 10 (Nechushtan is an all-terrain vehicle). We need not determine if the preamble of claim 88 is limiting, because each of Petitioner’s proposed combinations is for an all-terrain vehicle. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that only those terms which are in controversy need to be expressly construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “1. Previous Determinations In the Institution Decision, we determined that front, mid, and rear frame portions as recited in claim 88 should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, with no further construction being necessary. Dec. 8–9. In the Institution Decision we also determined that claim 88 does not require that the floorboard and base portions of the passenger compartment be distinct. Dec. 9–10. Neither party challenges these determinations, and, accordingly, we adopt them here. See SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (The Board may not change a claim interpretation from the institution decision where neither party anticipated that “already-interpreted terms were actually moving targets.”).” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART The analysis of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Davis, is predicated on the level of skill in the art being either: (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a related field, and at least one year of experience working in automotive engineering or a related field, or (2) experience working in the field of automotive engineering for 2–3 years. See Ex. 1001 ¶ 27. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion. The prior art of record reflects a level of skill consistent with that asserted by Petitioner. We apply this level of skill to our analysis below.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,827,028 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,827,028

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.