- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther
“On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01173 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–13, and 16–19 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 are anticipated by Lesniak, and the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. See generally PO Resp. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” and “said deodorant stick” having a particular hardness range. PO Resp. 8–9. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 5–8 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 10. We agree.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate a deodorant stick within the parameters of claims 16 and 17. e) Conclusion as to Claims 16 and 17 We agree with Petitioner that “the challenged claims recite nothing more than well-known deodorant ingredients performing their conventional functions.” Pet. Reply 2. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claims 16 and 17.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,905,647 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,905,647 - PTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4 (2023). For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the patentability of at least one claim of the ’562 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–17 of the ’562 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Neither party proposes any explicit construction of any term. See Pet. 7 (“For the purposes of this IPR, the plain meaning of each term can be applied.”). We do not expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that Usui discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Usui discloses that aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15 is in electrical contact with titanium underlayer 13, and titanium nitride layer 14 is located “intermediate the [titanium underlayer] 13 and the aluminum or aluminum alloy layer 15” to prevent “reaction between the aluminum layer 15 and underlayer 13.” Ex. 1004, 3:27–29, 3:38–41, 3:58–63. Usui further discloses that “a capping layer is provided above layer 15,” and that “[p]referred capping layers are titanium nitride and combinations of as layer 18 of a group IVA metal, preferably titanium with a titanium nitride layer 19.” Id. at 3:67–4:6. Usui teaches that titanium nitride layer 19 is about 150 to 800 Å thick, and that the thickness of titanium underlayer 13 is between about 90 to 110 Å. Id. at 3:31–33, 4:6–8. Usui also teaches that the interconnect metallurgy structures described therein “exhibit[] enhanced electromigration characteristics” and “are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.” Id. at 1:8–14. Usui’s description of a plurality of metal layers (layers 13–18) and a capping layer formed over the plurality of metal layers (layer 19), along with its description of the structure’s usefulness for forming electrical connections in an integrated circuit structure, is sufficient, on this record, to establish that Usui discloses “an electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. Usui’s teaching that the capping layer is a refractory metal nitride (titanium nitride) that has a thickness (150–800 Å) greater than the bottommost layer of the plurality of metal layers (layer 13, 90–110 Å), sufficiently establishes, on this record, that Usui discloses the “said capping layer consisting only of a refractory metal nitride, said refractory metal nitride forming a top of said electrical contact and having a thickness greater than that of a bottommost layer of said plurality of metal layers” limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,684,187 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00399 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 11–14 over Kalliola, Turunen, Oswald, Vauclair, and Kalayjian; claims 15–18 with Thorn; and claim 19 with Thorn and Sharp.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field and 2-4 years of experience with wireless ranging and positioning systems, wireless communication devices, and associated computer programming.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). “Patent Owner agrees that this description reasonably represents the level of ordinary skill required to understand and implement the teachings of the ’246 Patent, as well as the prior art cited in the Petition.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 22). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“device.” This term appears twice in claim 11, once in the phrase “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” and once in the phrase “rotation of the mobile communication device detected by the orientation sensor.” Ex. 1001, 39:13–14, 39:36–38. Patent Owner argues that we should construe this term as limited to “detecting the rotation of the mobile communication device as a whole, not the movement of individual components.” PO Resp. 15–18. Petitioner disputes this, arguing that “rotation of the mobile communication device” should be construed not only to cover rotation of the device as a whole but also should “encompass[] any rotation of the mobile communication device relative to any object, including itself,” which would extend to rotation of “any component of the device.” Reply 4–5. We need not resolve this dispute to determine the outcome of Petitioner’s asserted challenges to the ’246 patent. As discussed more fully below, under either party’s proposed construction of “rotation of the mobile communication device,” Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyOther
“On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Kalliola teaches “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” where “rotation of the mobile communication device” includes rotation of the device as a whole, regardless of whether it also includes rotation of one portion of the device relative to another. Kalliola teaches “motion sensors integrated in WCD 100” that are “used to detect when WCD 100 is being moved,” as well as to detect “when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 84, 86. Although Patent Owner argues that Kalliola’s motion sensors do not detect rotation of the device, this is incorrect on the record as developed at trial. Kalliola teaches that the motion sensor may take “the form of a semiconductor gyroscope chip.” Id. ¶ 84. There is ample evidence that gyroscopes detect rotation. Ex. 1013, 38 (identifying as an “orientation sensor” a “[t]hree-axis gyro” and a “[d]ynamic [h]igh [r]ange [gyro]”); Ex. 1046, 49:18–20 (Dr. Feuerstein testifying that gyroscopes “can be used to detect angular velocity”); Ex. 1047 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1051, 170; Ex. 1053, 9) (Dr. Buehrer testifying that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that gyroscopes are well-known inertial sensors that specifically detect rotational motion”). Thus, by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner has shown that Kalliola teaches the “orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device” of this limitation.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“whether Kalliola’s teaching of pausing and resuming its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, or Kalliola’s teaching of speeding up its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, amounts to determining direction based on rotation. Pet. 63–64; PO Resp. 25–27; Reply 24–27; Sur-Reply 11–14. On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Kalliola teaches determining direction based on rotation. First, Kalliola discloses “pausing a DoA estimation until the motion of the WCD is detected by the motion sensors,” then resuming “the updating of the DoA estimation” when motion is detected. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 84. Second, Kalliola discloses a “correction or compensation mode” that is “employed when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation,” with this “increase[d] speed of the DoA estimation” being triggered by the “[i]ncreased activity detected by motion sensors in WCD 100.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed above with respect to limitation 11(d), the detected motion that triggers either of these modes can be rotational motion of the WCD detected by a gyroscope.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,350,246 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,350,246 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Boyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“approximately two weeks before the statutory deadline for a final written decision, but the most recent median time-to-trial statistics for Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas indicate that the actual trial date will likely be in July 2026, which is later than the statutory deadline to issue a final written decision in this proceeding in mid-June 2026. See Ex. 2001, 7 (median time from filing to trial of 23.2 months); Prelim. Resp. 10. Thus, we find this factor is neutral or weighs slightly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable over the proposed prior art. We analyze the asserted grounds with the above-noted principles in mind.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’713 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“We note that, as discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’713 patent without expressly construing the term “from multiple print heads or deposition lines.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As for Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden to identify how the claims are to be construed, we disagree on the present record. Although Petitioner does not provide a preferred construction for the single term it proposes requires construction, Petitioner does identify which of its two alternative constructions applies to each of its asserted grounds of unpatentability. Pet. 6 (“Under the first construction, [the obviousness grounds] are applicable, and [the anticipation ground] would be excluded from the claim scope. Under the alternative construction, all of [the asserted grounds] are applicable.”). In our view, this approach does not fail to satisfy Petitioner’s burden under 37 U.S.C. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - Njoy, LLC / Njoy Holdings, Inc. v. Juul Labs, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00231 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 14–16, 18, 27–29, 31, and 32 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish the claimed airflow path or a reason to make the proposed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill are similar and differ in that Petitioner’s relevant degrees and corresponding two years of experience additionally includes “industrial design” and “product design” and familiarity with “electrically powered vaporizing articles, their components or the underlying technologies” where Patent Owner requires two years of experience “designing electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree.” Compare Pet. 7, with PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner alleges that “Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability under either standard,” indicating that the level of skill in the art is not a dispositive issue. PO Resp. 3. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’123 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’123 patent and the prior art. We note that the outcome of this Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“In this case, Mr. McAlexander meets both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art. As a result, we are persuaded Mr. McAlexander has the requisite skill and relevant expertise to offer testimony in this matter. For example, Mr. McAlexander has a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and far more than 2 years of experience in the electrical engineering field. Ex. 1027, 3–6, 7. In addition, Mr. McAlexander has provided expert consulting services in a wide range of technology areas involving the process and design of electro-mechanical consumer products. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Through one of Mr. McAlexander’s business ventures, his laboratory has “performed detailed airflow analyses, designing and constructing specialized apparatuses to emulate human breath, allowing for precise activation testing of ENDS devices.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 16. That said, a declarant’s expertise, even clothed as a skilled artisan, does not entitle a naked opinion persuasive weight. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, Patent Owner had the opportunity to, and in fact did, thoroughly cross examine Mr. McAlexander about the purported deficiencies in his testimony. See, e.g., Exs. 2052, 2054; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Vigorous cross examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence . . . are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Therefore, to the extent Patent Owner credibly identifies deficiencies in Mr. McAlexander’s testimony or that testimony lacks factual support or is based on broad, conclusory assertions, we will assign appropriate weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that it is within the Board’s discretion, as the trier of fact, to accord appropriate weight to the evidence presented).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends that the parties proposed a construction for “pressure valve,” a limitation appearing in claims 18 and 31, during the ITC investigation. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 41:58–65). Patent Owner contends that the terms of the ’123 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 4. Because resolution of the issues presented in this case do not require construction of the term “pressure valve,” we do not expressly construe this claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. To anticipate a claim, a reference “must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369. “The requirement that the prior art elements themselves be arranged as in the claim means that the claims cannot be treated . . . as mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Indeed, the prior art reference “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention, however slight, invoke the question of obviousness, not anticipation.” Id.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,130,123 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,130,123 - PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00140 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Nakajima and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1–18 of the ’250 patent is unpatentable, and we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 25). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 28 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 50). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“For purposes of this decision on institution, we adopt the proffered dictionary definition of “mouthpiece” as “a part (as of an instrument) that goes in the mouth or to which the mouth is applied” (see Ex. 2005), and we construe this as an intended use of this component of the apparatus, because this definition is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term which is a compound of “mouth” and “piece” and also because this definition is consistent with the Specification. For example, the Specification describes the use of the mouthpiece as follows: “In use, the mouthpiece is adapted to be configured to the dispensing configuration by a user placing the mouthpiece in the user’s mouth and biting upon or otherwise compressing the appropriate portions of sidewalls 92 of the mouthpiece.” Ex. 1001, 8:45–49. We note that, although the Specification refers to bite-actuation of the mouthpiece, for example in the field of the disclosure and certain embodiments (e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:25–27), the independent claims do not require bite-actuation. The Specification identifies the mouthpiece as item 72 (which is depicted, for example, in Figure 25, reproduced supra). Ex. 1001, 3:7‒8. 7 Exhibit 2005 appears to be from an online Merriam-Webster dictionary accessed March 13, 2025. Ex. 2005, 4. At this time, there is no argument in the preliminary record that this definition would have been different before the critical date of the patent.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Although the construction of this limitation may be helpful in deciding the issues of unpatentability, we determine that the construction of this term would benefit from further briefing during the trial phase of this proceeding, and we invite the parties to continue to brief this issue. Therefore, we do not provide a preliminary construction of the term at this time.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,851,250 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01501 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Trove did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, or 21 obvious over the asserted prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we deny the Petition and do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, and 21 of the ’028 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would have “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56–65). Patent Owner also states that it “discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding.” Id. We agree that there appears to be no material difference in the parties’ definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that this definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’028 patent, based on our review of the limited record. Moreover, the prior art itself may be sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“as a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, because “mechanism” is a nonce word for performing the claimed function without reciting structure for performing that function, and a POSITA would not have understood the term to have “a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure that performs the claimed function.” Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 39). For claim 1, Petitioner identifies two distinct structures described in the ’028 patent that correspond to the claimed “user release mechanism” for performing the claimed functions. Id. at 34. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the ’028 patent describes a first embodiment in which the corresponding structure includes sliding member 238, and its component parts. Id. at 34– 35 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:50–13:25, 13:29–33). In the second embodiment, the corresponding structure includes user engagement portion 260 on rigid collar 170. Id. at 35–36 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:40–54). Petitioner does not separately address the structure corresponding to the “user release mechanism” as recited in claim 21. Id. at 53‒54 (relying on the same arguments presented for unpatentability of claim 1). court issued a claim construction order in the parallel litigation construing the term “user release mechanism” as a means-plus-function limitation under § 112, sixth paragraph. Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 2002, 12–15). The district court ruled that the corresponding structure for claim 1 includes “[s]liding member 238, including its component parts,” or “[u]ser engagement portion 260.” Ex. 2002, 15. For claim 21, the district court ruled that the corresponding structure includes “[s]liding member 238, including its component parts” or “[u]ser engagement pad 240, planar portion 242, tabs 244, collar engagement portion 254, depression 256.” Id. at 17. Patent Owner indicates that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding only,” it does not dispute that the claimed user release mechanisms are means-plusfunction limitations, and it does not dispute the corresponding structure identified by Petitioner, even though the district court did not specifically identify engagement portion 260 as corresponding structure for claim 21. Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2002, 15–19). Although Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed interpretation of the “user release mechanism,” because claim interpretation is a matter of law and the dispositive issue in this Decision turns on the interpretation of this claim limitation, we address it in this Decision. We agree with the parties that the “user release mechanism” elements recited in claims 1 and 21 are means-plus-function limitations governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”). “means,” it uses the nonce word “mechanism” without reciting structure for performing the functions recited in the claims. See Williamson v. CitrixOnline, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Generic terms such as ‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word “means” because they ‘typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure’ and therefore may invoke § 112, para. 6.”).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“[U]nder § 112, ¶ 6 equivalence, functional identity is required” and “[s]tructural equivalence under § 112, ¶ 6 is met only if the differences are insubstantial, that is, if the assertedly equivalent structure performs the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the corresponding structure described in the specification.” (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Here, Petitioner states that Kiyota’s lock release buttons 40 “perform the claimed function in the same way to achieve the same result” as the ’028 patent’s sliding member 238, and its component parts (Pet. 37) without providing sufficient supporting explanation or evidence. Petitioner explains only that the two structures operate in “substantially the same way” by a user pressing an element that that slides towards the mouthpiece assembly to disengage the catch structures. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 89). The Petition does not discuss any of the differences between Kiyota’s structure and the ’028 patent’s structure or provide an explanation of why these differences are insubstantial. Indeed, as Patent Owner persuasively explains, there are notable differences in the “way” the two structures perform the claimed function and the “result” they achieve. See Prelim. Resp. 39–40 (discussing the ’028 patent’s one-finger operation and indirect catch disengagement, versus Kiyota’s two-finger operation and direct catch disengagement). Moreover, the analysis in Dr. Vallee’s declaration substantially parallels the discussion in the Petition and does not provide any additional explanation or evidence to show that the differences between the “way” the two structures operate or the “result” they achieve are insubstantial. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–91, with Pet. 34–38. For these reasons, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that Kiyota discloses an equivalent structure to the structure described in the ’028 patent corresponding to the “user release mechanism” recited in claim 1. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Kiyota. slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,782,028 - Catalyst Orthoscience Inc. v. Shoulder Innovations, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 24, 2025 · PGR2025-00001 · APJ James A Tartal · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of post-grant review of claims 1–22, exercising its discretion under § 324(a) based on the Fintiv factors.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv 5−6. We consider these factors to assess “whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. at 6. In” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“parties, we do not find the merits to be particularly strong on the current record. For example, limitation [1-4] recites, in part, “a locking nut having . . . an external thread on an outside surface of the locking nut.” Ex. 1001, 9:46–47. In alleging obviousness based in part on Orphanos, Petitioner equates the claimed “locking nut” to Orphanos’s collet 230 in a first embodiment of Orphanos, or Orphanos’s collet portion 1052 in a second embodiment of Orphanos. Pet. 37–38. Petitioner acknowledges that the collet and collet portion do not have external threads, but rather are designed to have a snap-fit engagement with the inner sidewall of the baseplate’s central throughbore. Id. at 38. Petitioner argues that modifying the collet and collet portion to have external threads would have been obvious to the skilled artisan in view of Orphanos’s teachings and the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 38–42 (arguing, inter alia, that it would have been “a substitution of a known part for a known problem” and “obvious as a matter of design choice”). Petitioner does not allege that replacing the snap-fit coupling with external threads would either: (1) result in any advantages; or (2) preserve any of Orphanos’s stated benefits of its snap-fit arrangement. See Pet. 34–37. That Petitioner describes no advantages to making its proposed modification potentially undermines Petitioner’s case that the skilled artisan would have done so. Cf. Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit . . . should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANot reached
“Petitioner’s arguments regarding the central post and locking nut include an implicit claim construction argument that these components need not be separate structures. Pet. 74, 76–81. Patent Owner, on the other hand, would have us interpret the claim to require that they be separate structures. Patent Owner raises credible evidence to support its theory. Specifically, Patent Owner directs us to the language of claim 1, which separately recites “a central screw” and “a locking nut.” Prelim. Resp. 51; see Ex. 1001, 9:44–53. Patent Owner further contends, in view of the claim language, that the claimed central post and locking nut are separate and distinct components. According to Patent Owner, however, Lefebvre’s main head and anchor rod portions are parts of a single monolithic anchoring screw. Prelim. Resp. 53–58. Where a claim lists elements separately, there is a rebuttable presumption that these elements have separate and distinct physical structures. See Google LLC v. EcoFactor, Inc., 92 F.4th 1049, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231–1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). The presumption may be rebutted by the intrinsic record. Id. At this stage, however, Petitioner does not address that claim 1 appears to separately recite a central post and a locking nut, and does not direct us to any portion of the intrinsic record that might rebut the presumption that these elements are, therefore, separate and distinct structures. See Pet. 73–77. Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77.” slip op. at 17
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)Not reached
“Petitioner also argues that the claim terms “baseplate central channel” and “central channel . . . configured to interface with the baseplate” are indefinite. Pet. 95–102. Patent Owner argues that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms is clear and that Petitioner “had no problem” arguing how the asserted art purportedly rendered the claims obvious. Prelim. Resp. 69–77. In sum, even if Petitioner’s contentions show it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable, we find Patent Owner’s arguments identify credible weaknesses in Petitioner’s contentions. Accordingly, we find that that the sixth Fintiv factor is neutral and does not weigh against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,023,254
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.