- Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00423 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–4 and 6–29 because it instituted the ranked IPR2025-00422 under the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Paper 34. Birchtech Corp. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Request for Director Review in each case. See Paper 40; IPR2025-00422, Paper 39. The Director denied the request without prejudice in each case and remanded the cases to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 49, 4. The Director later issued an Order Supplementing Director Review Decision in each case, instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’430 patent. Paper 72, 3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,668,430 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00278 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company and PacifiCorp’s petition because it had instituted the earlier-filed IPR2025-00274 challenging the same patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“request from Patent Owner for Director Review, finding that Patent Owner introduced “evidence sufficient to put RPI and privity at issue” and remanding with instructions to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues” including “at least materials sufficient to clarify the evidence the Board found to be ‘ambiguous’ and to avoid the need for the Board to ‘speculate as to the nature of the redacted material.’” Paper 57 (Decision on Request for Director Review). The Director instructed that after allowing such discovery, we “should then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025- 00278 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that its Petition is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00274, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00274, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 . . . before IPR2025-00278.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00274. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00274, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00274. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’114 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 before IPR2025-00278, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,343,114 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00281 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because it had instituted IPR2025-00280 challenging the same patent, consistent with the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00280, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00281, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 . . . before IPR2025-00281.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00280. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00280, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00280. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’517 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 before IPR2025-00281, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,596,517 - Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable
“obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 12,119,463 - Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc. v. Spruce Biosciences, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00032 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Section 42.207(e) states that “[n]o post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e). Because the Patent Owner has disclaimed all claims challenged by the grounds in this Petition, we determine that no trial will be instituted.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,115,166 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00065 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the Petition’s strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“stipulation would only eliminate the District Court’s consideration of Haddad204. Despite the stipulation, the District Court would still have to consider invalidity of every claim the Petition addresses and would still have to consider the Alie, Baggenstoss, and Park references. Cf. Stellar at 4 (“Petitioner’s invalidity arguments in the district court are more expansive and include combinations of the prior art asserted in these proceedings with unpublished system prior art, which Petitioner’s stipulation is not likely to moot.”). In other words, “Petitioner’s stipulation does not ensure that [this proceeding] would be a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 3–4. Because of the remaining overlap between the Petition and the District Court proceeding, Fintiv factor four weighs strongly in favor of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“for back side illumination (BSI), which appears to teach or suggest a textured region with surface features “located on the light incident side of the semiconductor layer and configured to interact with incident [EMR].” Pet. 22–27 (citing Ex. 1006, Fig. 5, ¶¶ 53, 68, 96; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 88–95, 101–107). As Petitioner and its expert explain, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device because BSI devices allow more incident light to reach the semiconductor layer, resulting in more light being absorbed, an increase in the quantum efficiency, and an improvement in the signal to noise ratio. Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 68, 70; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40, 92, 95). Patent Owner argues that Alie does teach, suggest, or disclose “a textured region comprising a plurality of shallow trench isolation features.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. But it appears Petitioner has at least shown Alie teaches or suggests this element. See discussion supra. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner fails to present any proof that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Figure 5 of Alie into a BSI device. Id. at 11–15. But, in our view, Petitioner has provided an adequate motivation to modify Alie—so that more light will be absorbed, yielding an increase in the quantum efficiency and an improvement in the signal to noise” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“17 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,347,682 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00064 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–44 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favoring denial outweighed the petition’s strong merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“arguments, and evidence presented in the parallel proceeding.” Fintiv at 12 (emphasis added). “[A] timely-filed Sotera stipulation . . . from a petitioner”—“that, if an IPR . . . is instituted, the petitioner will not pursue in district court . . . any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in the IPR”—“is highly relevant, but will not be dispositive by itself. Instead, the Board will consider such a stipulation as part of its holistic analysis under Fintiv.” March 2025 Fintiv Guidance 2–3. Here, Petitioner’s invalidity contentions in the district court case cover” slip op. at 14
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“18 Petitioner filed petitions for IPR2025-00064 and IPR2025-00065 at the same time. Both petitions address the ’682 patent but apply different art. Patent Owner also argues the second petition (IPR2025-00065) should be denied because one petition is sufficient. Patent Owner’s Response to Petitioner’s Notice Ranking Parallel Petitions, Paper 11. Because we deny institution based on Fintiv discretion, it is not necessary to reach Patent Owner’s multiple petition argument.” slip op. at 22
Discretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,347,682 - Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Exelixis Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00210 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–3 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, we find that on the current record Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Brown, Kubo, and Remington would inherently result in less than 200 ppm impurity and Petitioner has not shown that it has a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the obviousness ground.” slip op. at 29
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedReference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Here, there is no dispute that the ’349 patent and Wilson, which issued from a patent application from which priority was claimed for the ’349 patent, share the identical disclosure of a pharmaceutical composition comprising Compound IA or IB; one or more fillers; one or more disintegrants; one or more glidants; and one or more lubricants. In this embodiment, the filler comprises microcrystalline cellulose. In this embodiment, the disintegrant comprises croscarmellose sodium. In this embodiment, the disintegrant comprises croscarmellose sodium and sodium starch glycolate. In this embodiment, the glidant comprises fumed silica. In this embodiment, the lubricant comprises stearic acid. Ex. 1001, 21:1–12; Ex. 1002, 20:51–62. There is express ipsis verbis disclosure of the elements recited in claim 1 of the ’349 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“1. Reason to reduce contaminant levels We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner identifies no teaching in the prior art providing any reason to reduce levels of 6,7-dimethoxy-quinoline-4-ol specifically. And while Brown does teach a desire to form “substantially pure” compounds, Brown focuses on “at least about 90 wt.%” of the compound, then lists specifically “about 90, about 91, about 92, about 93, about 94, about 95, about 96, about 97, about 98, about 99 and about 100% wt. %.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. This permits a range of concentration for contaminants from about 0 to 10%.” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“to modify Brown’s process with Kubo to eliminate the added step. See, e.g., Id. ¶ 73. But even with that combination, Dr. Dichtel states only that a “POSA would have expected there to be a decrease in the amount of 6,7- dimethoxy-quinoline-4-ol at the end of cabozantinib (L)-malate’s synthesis that was attributable to hydrolytic degradation of the 4- (nitrophenoxy)quinoline intermediate by avoiding its use in the synthesis.” Id. ¶ 78. That is not, however, the standard for inherency. It must be the necessary result, not a possible expected result. The Federal Circuit in Par explained that: Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient. If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.” slip op. at 28
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,298,349 - Precision Cancer Technologies Inc. v. Oncoustics Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00242 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–20 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Thus, for reasons explained below, we deny institution of inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’330 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“area” in the challenged claims was added by amendment. Ex. 1004, 181.8 In making the amendment, Applicant stated that the language added by amendment was intended to distinguish the pending claims over Uniyal,9 which Applicant characterized as disclosing a “time series” of ultrasound data. Uniyal relies on a time series of ultrasound data. In order to distinguish Uniyal, the claims have been amended to recite a single static set of ultrasound RF data in a single frame of the tissue area. As explained in the Interview, the claims rely on a signle [sic, single] “snapshot” frame of the ultrasound RF data rather than a time series or [sic, of] RF data as disclosed in Uniyal. Applicant respectfully submits the amended claims are allowable over all of the cited reference. Id. at 186–187; see also id. at 185 (Applicant’s remarks accompanying amendment, stating: “As explained in the Interview, a static set of raw ultrasound RF signals is collected for an area. This is a snapshot of the tissue area as opposed to taking a time series of RF signals”), 191 (Examiner interview summary, stating: “Inventor noted that Uniyal uses a time series US [ultrasound] data whereas the invention uses images that are non-coherent in time (e.g., a static frame)”).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“transducer, Petitioner points to Hope-Simpson’s teaching that its neural network may be “capable of ‘analyzing patterns using a with a [sic] multi-dimensional (2-or more dimensional) data set, which may also be thought of as localized data sets.’” Id. at 22 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 6; alteration by Petitioner). Petitioner then asserts that “[t]he localized data sets described by Hope-Simpson are equivalent to the claimed ‘single set of raw ultrasound [RF] data forming a single frame of a tissue area.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 86 (testimony of Dr. Papanicolau)). But Petitioner does not explain why Hope-Simpson’s “localized data sets” equate with a single frame of a tissue area rather than, for example, a time series of frames taken at the same location. Pet. 22. Petitioner cites the testimony of Dr. Papanicolau, but Dr. Papanicolau’s testimony lacks both technical reasoning and evidentiary support; it simply mirrors the statement in Petition. Ex. 1002 ¶ 86. For this reason, we give Dr. Papanicolau’s ipse dixit testimony little weight. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24 ,2022) (Decision Denying Institution) (precedential) (finding that conclusory testimony that “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support [that testimony] . . . is entitled to little weight”); see also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Accordingly, to the extent this is the data that Hope Simpson provides to the processor, on this record, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that it constitutes a “single static set” of raw RF ultrasound data “forming a single frame.”” slip op. at 15
Claim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,602,330 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Sionyx, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00161 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–18 under § 314(a), concluding that the Fintiv factors, viewed holistically, favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2019); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2019) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence of record, we exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“view of a parallel proceeding, we consider the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 7 Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication No. 2009–188316 A, published Aug. 20, 2009 (Ex. 1011). A certified translation, to which we cite, is provided (Ex. 1012, “Yamada”). 8 E. Fred Schubert, LIGHT-EMITTING DIODES, 2nd ed., 163–190, 2006 (Ex. 1013, “Schubert”). discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,721,714
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.