• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01310 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Remand

  On Director remand, the Board determined claims 1–15 unpatentable under § 103, including claims 1–11 over Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “all Challenged Claims unpatentable and denying Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Paper 47 (“Original Final Decision”). Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Request for Director Review and Petitioner filed an authorized Response thereto. Papers 48, 49. On July 29, 2026, the Director granted review, vacated-in-part the Original Final Decision, and remanded the case to the Board. Paper 50. In particular, the Director directed the Board “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to the webserver limitation in deciding whether Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–11 are unpatentable under Petitioner’s Ground 1B.” Id. at 4. We do so in this Final Written Decision on Remand (“Remand Decision”). See infra § III.E (Ground 1B). For completeness, we repeat herein our analysis in the Original Final Decision for all other grounds.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In this context, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; see CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is “a ‘heavy presumption’ that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Petitioner contends that “[t]he claim terms of the ’218 [patent] should be given their plain and ordinary meaning” as understood by the relevant artisan. Pet. 6. Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan “would have understood a ‘socket’ to be a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server where first event information is provided to a [viewer client device] VCD.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 170). Petitioner argues that the relevant artisan also would have understood an “event socket,” in turn, to be “a socket where information about one sporting event is provided to VCDs.” Id. Beyond such proposed plain meanings for “socket” and “event” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “(6) Conclusion as to Objective Indicia of Non- Obviousness For the foregoing reasons, although we have considered Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness, we accord it little weight, and find that it does not outweigh Petitioner’s strong countervailing evidence supporting a conclusion of obviousness.” slip op. at 53

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “engineer with substantial experience in Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols, including an understanding of relaytype and orchestrator-type webservers, would have considered the subject matter of claim 1 as a whole, including the webserver, to be obvious in light of the combined teachings of Ellis, Spivey, and Herzog. Based on the context discussed above, and for the reasons provided above, we determine that the answer is yes. See Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that [the relevant artisan] would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 11,039,218 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,039,218
• Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Usui’s interconnect structure or Yu’s metal gate stacks satisfy the construed “electrode stack” limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 6–7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’562 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “comprises the recited metals and has the recited thickness, which forms an electrical contact for use on a semiconductor device generally or a group III- V semiconductor in particular. This is consistent with our determination that “electrode stack” is a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device We disagree with Patent Owner that “electrode stack” as used in the challenged claims should be limited to the specific electrodes shown in the embodiments described in the Specification. See PO Resp. 4–9. Although the Specification describes embodiments using source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes as electrical contacts, we see no reason to construe the term “electrode stack” itself to be limited to these components as Patent Owner proposes. Claims 1 and 13 expressly recite that electrode stacks comprise the claimed “electrical contact,” without expressly including or precluding any specific type of electrode. Ex. 1001, 5:54–63, 6:37–47. The Federal Circuit advises that the Specification “is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The Specification does teach electrical contacts that include source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes, but claims 1 and 13 are directed to electrical contacts that are not expressly so limited. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding limitations, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the claim term “electrode stack” to mean “a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.”” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Piner testifies, with evidentiary support, that interconnects (such as Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure) and electrical contacts (such as that claimed in the ’562 patent) are not the same thing. See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 63–70. For example, Dr. Piner explains: In other words, not all metals in a semiconductor device have the same purpose and could not be said to be interchangeable. By August 2009 it was well known to a POSA how to discern if a metal component in a transistor is an interconnect or serves as an electrical contact such as a gate contact or ohmic contact, based on the structure and functionality of the metal component. For example, interconnects are made up of metal strips and are deposited on insulators. EX-1011 (Mishra) at 216. Interconnects are low resistance conductors that can carry very high current densities. Id., 216, 217. Unlike Schottky contacts and ohmic contacts, interconnects do not provide non-linear IV response like Schottky contacts nor inject electrons and holes into semiconductors like ohmic contacts. Id., 218. As many of the references cited by Dr. Zhao illustrate, electrical contacts had their own highly complex design challenges. EX-1008 (Pearton), 41-59 (Pages 53-71 of 383) (discussing electrical contacts); EX-1017 (Kramer), 11-126 (Pages 18-130 of 151) (same). And while Dr. Zhao cites these as supporting a POSA’s knowledge of an electrical contact, none of these references describe electrical contacts as interconnects. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Piner further testifies that Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure is an interconnect, and not an electrical contact, because “Usui states that ‘[t]he structures fabricated by the process of the present invention are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.’” Id. ¶ 148 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:11–14) (alteration in original); see also id. ¶¶ 150– 151 (Dr. Piner testifying that Usui’s interconnect metallization structure is not an “electrode stack” under a broad definition of electrode). Dr. Piner’s testimony in this regard rebuts Petitioner’s and Dr. Zhao’s conclusory assertions to the contrary.” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.” Thus, Petitioner must show that Usui’s layers 13–15, 18, and 19 provide a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Zhao to support its contention that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 8,686,562 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,686,562
• Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00094 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground because Petitioner failed to establish the proposed modifications and combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, and because it appears to be consistent with the ’003 patent and the asserted prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes construing any claim terms. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 1–76. In addition, as discussed below, we are able to determine the outcome of this proceeding without expressly construing any terms. Thus, we do not construe any terms for the purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “challenged claim. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–419. On the other hand, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418; accord In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, a petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, a petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the prior art references. In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In determining whether there would have been a motivation to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention, it is insufficient to simply conclude the combination would have been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art would have made the combination.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In arguing for the obviousness of claim 1 over the combination of Bonn and Mizuta, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bonn to perform high-frequency signal amplification. Pet. 19–25. In particular, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify the circuit of Figure 1 [of Bonn] and use Figure 7’s structure for high frequency signal amplification in place of mixer 40,” followed by additional modifications to the circuit of Figure 1. Id. at 22–25. These additional modifications include removing LO port 55, removing FET 20 (along with voltage source 80, capacitors 16, 26, and 34, resistor 18, and inductors 22 and 24), removing capacitor 34 and shorting gate structure 324 to ground, and removing resistors 46 and 48 and shorting terminal 51 to ground. Id. According to Petitioner, the motivation for these modifications was that “Bonn . . . teaches using its dual gate structures for signal amplification without signal mixing.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:26–37). On the record developed at trial, we disagree. Bonn does, as Petitioner argues, teach that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored to provide superior performance over the prior art dual gate FET structures in high frequency signal mixing as well as other applications such as high frequency signal amplification.” Ex. 1006, 11:33–37. But the tailoring that Bonn refers to relates to changes to the structure of the field-effect transistor itself, not to the circuitry surrounding that transistor. Id. (teaching that the reason that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored” is that “the parameters such as gate width, dopant concentration, and channel depth, under each gate of the dual gate FET are individually adjusted for optimum performance”). Thus, although Bonn might have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to have made changes to the dual-gate FET itself, we are not persuaded that it would have motivated the additional changes to the circuit of Bonn’s Figure 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Mishra’s Figure 5 is a second gate in favor of a new position. Petitioner’s new argument is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to connect the field plate of Mishra’s Figure 5 to the source instead of the gate, converting the field plate into a second gate. Compare Pet. 83 (equating “drain side gate” with “field plate 66, Figure 5”), 86–88 (identifying field plate 66 as a “second gate”), with Reply 21–22 (identifying only the embodiment of Mishra’s Figure 10 as a source-connected field plate), 22–23 (arguing that Mishra teaches that the Figure 5 embodiment “could be arranged as ‘a single transistor with a dual gate structure’”). Although “the introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial proceedings,” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. LP v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the shifting of arguments is not, Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Petitioner’s change of arguments here is inappropriate. Moreover, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s inappropriate new argument, we would conclude that Petitioner does not support the argument with sufficient evidence. “Whether [an obviousness ground] is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.” In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner’s new argument relies on a person of ordinary skill in the art modifying the Figure 5 embodiment of Mishra to connect the field plate to the source rather than the gate. Reply 21–24. Petitioner does not, however, show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make this modification or a reasonable expectation that this combination would be successful. Id. Petitioner argues instead that “[n]o ‘reason’ is needed.” Id. at 24. Thus, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Mishra and Ren.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,264,003 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,264,003
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Genius Sports Ltd. v. Sportscastr Inc. D/B/A Panda InteractiveAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01308 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable under § 103 over Ellis and Spivey, with Herzog added for claims 2–6; the alternative Herzog, Spivey, and Ellis ground fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties. slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “socket” and “event socket” (Pet. 37) are not disputed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 2, 12. In fact, by arguing that Spivey’s topic queues are neither “uniquely addressable” nor “communication endpoint[s],” Patent Owner appears to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “socket” as a “uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Id. As Patent Owner acknowledged during Oral Argument, “I don’t think there’s any dispute of what we mean by socket, a uniquely addressable communication endpoint.” Tr. 73:11–13.6 6 Patent Owner also refers to the District Court’s construction of “event socket” during Oral Argument, by claiming the court’s Claim Construction Order was a part of the record as “Exhibit 1069.” Tr. 73:14–74:17. However, as there is no “Exhibit 1069” in this proceeding, we will not “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this record, we give “socket” and “event socket” their ordinary and customary meaning. And, as to “socket,” both parties agree that the ordinary and customary meaning for “socket” is a uniquely addressable communication endpoint on a server. Pet. 37; PO Resp. 2. We decline to provide further analysis or an express construction as doing so is not needed to resolve the dispute between the parties.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field or an equivalent number of years of working experience, and one to two years of experience in networking environments, including at least some experience with live-streaming network architecture.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education or experience in related fields could compensate for deficits in the above qualifications.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a POSITA at the time of the invention of the ’697 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with Internet video streaming, Internet communication, and related protocols.” PO Resp. 13. The parties have not addressed whether the differences in these definitions impact the unpatentability analysis before us. We apply Patent Owner’s definition of a POSITA at the time of the claimed invention because, based on the record, this proposal is consistent with the ’697 patent, the asserted prior art, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Wicker. We note that we would reach the same determination under Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “ability for the clients and the server to communicate,” which can be any system that can “provide real-time sports,” but “doesn’t discuss whether it’s a push system or a pull system,” wherein Spivey, on the other hand, “expressly indicates that it is a push type of data system which reduces latency over prior art systems that utilize push technologies.” Tr. 15:13–19. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that, “[a]s explained by Dr. Wicker, . . . a POS[IT]A would have been motivated to implement real-time data delivery using Spivey’s data pushing technique to reduce latency.” Id. at 16:2–4. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner fails to “articulate why a POSITA would have been motivated to make the necessary modification and proposed combination.” PO Resp. 41. Here, Petitioner points out that its proposed combination would have been made to improve latency issues in Ellis’s system. Pet. 17–21. In particular, Spivey’s discloses that its techniques “may reduce . . . delay [on the order of seconds (e.g., 30 to 45 seconds) or minutes] to an order of milliseconds (ms) (e.g., 100 ms) or less, providing a significant advantage over the conventional practices.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 28. Spivey also discloses pushing data to the “subscribed connected client devices” substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source, e.g., “with a time delay of 100 milliseconds or less,” which Spivey discloses is “at least two orders of magnitude shorter than conventional time periods of legacy devices.” Id. ¶ 96; see also id. at code (57) (disclosing pushing “the topic entry to a subscribed client device substantially simultaneously with the message queue server receiving the topic entry from a live data source”).” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,425,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,425,697
• Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 30, 2026 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 3–5 are unpatentable; claims 1 and 2 are not shown unpatentable. Claims 3 and 4 are obvious over the applied grounds under the remand construction of “movement vector.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “was incorrect, vacated the Final Written Decision as to claims 3 and 4, and remanded the case to the Board to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” and decide the outcome for claims 3 and 4 in accordance with that meaning. Atos, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1482404, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025); Paper 35 (“Federal Circuit Remand,” “Remand,” or “Fed. Cir. Remand”). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instructions, the Board authorized the” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “considered individually and together, have well-understood, common meanings to ordinarily skilled artisans as of the invention date, reflected by the ’174 patent’s specification and other evidence of record noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” is “a vector indicating movement of an object.” 3) “operation indicator” Petitioner” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Dr. Kanellakopoulos’s explanation that angular momentum is not inherent to an object, and its computation requires an arbitrary choice of a point of origin that has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle motion, also supports Patent Owner’s position. Id. ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 2004, 262). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument, that angular momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning, is persuasive. Id. We also find persuasive, as Dr. Kanellakopoulos explains, that Petitioner’s argument regarding the figure on Kleppner 234 is based on misinterpretation of the vectors in that figure. Id. ¶ 67 (explaining that Kleppner 233–234 does not depict a gravity vector).” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Kleppner does not disclose a rotation vector, a person of ordinary skill would have used the knowledge of a rotation vector (because it is a term of art) alongside Kleppner’s teaching, to arrive at claim 1. See Pet. Reply 11. This argument does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Petitioner does not explain which teaching of Kleppner a person of ordinary skill would have selected and combined with their knowledge of a rotation vector to yield the method of claim 1, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have recognized based on Kleppner that estimating the angle between a rotation vector and gravity vector could be used to detect a vehicle turning. Nor does Petitioner respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that Kleppner provides no rationale for estimating an angle of alignment between a rotation vector and gravity vector as a way of detecting a vehicle turning. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 65.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,846,174 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,846,174
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. B.S.D. Crown, Ltd.Other
  PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00057 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Remand

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the conjunctive construction required a hardware action, which the asserted grounds did not show.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) when the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations.4 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “(1) The Claim Language Supports a Conjunctive Construction There is a “heavy presumption” that the terms used in claims “mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.” SuperGuide, at 875 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002)).” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. First, the construction of the phrase “at least one of [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action” is conjunctive in light of the language of the claims and the specification of the ’887 patent. As such, Petitioner has the burden, but fails to show all three (3) components to be reproduced at Yun’s mobile device, including: [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action by the HW component of the mobile device. Second, as Patent Owner observes, and we agree, “Petitioner ignores the requirement for ‘the hardware (HW) action’ entirely” and does not even mention any “hardware (HW) action.” Prelim. Resp. 14 (Paper 10).” slip op. at 34

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “6 In the Petitioner’s Reply to the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, Petitioner presents several arguments to address the Fintiv factors, Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In support of Factor 6, Petitioner argues for the first time that Overton (not Yun or Lu) is allegedly teaching “the hardware (HW) action” aspect of the claims. Prelim. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:13–24 “force feedback . . . to the input devices 142 [shown in Figure 1]”). However, we decline to consider this belated argument raised for the first time in the context of a Fintiv analysis instead of the Petition.” slip op. at 41

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,934,887
• Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00037 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–14 because Petitioner did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 321 . . . demonstrates that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of claims 1–14 of the ’463 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of a postgrant review of claims 1–14 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, material science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries. Additional formal education focusing on processing of lithium batteries may substitute for practical experience and additional practical experience can substitute for less education.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner does not contest this definition of a person of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’463 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “distinct from “comminute[ion],” Petitioner offers only the testimony of its expert, Mr. Juzkow, who equates Tomioka’s “cutting” with “comminute[ion].” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 121. However, Mr. Juzkow provides insufficient reasoning to support his conclusion, particularly given the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence discussed above. In contrast, Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Dantam, provides extensive reasoning, supported by citations to other evidence, to support his conclusion that Tomioka’s “dismantling” is not the claimed “comminution.” Thus, we give more weight to Mr. Dantam’s testimony than Mr. Juzkow’s testimony. Weighing this evidence all together, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka’s teaches the claimed comminution under Petitioner’s first theory.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundTeaching away not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “obvious. Pet. 34–35. However, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has also failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka renders this limitation obvious. See Prelim. Resp. 28–31. To begin with, Petitioner’s contentions lack sufficient reasoning explaining why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Tomioka in the manner proposed. “[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Petitioner merely asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use the roller system in place of the dismantling disclosed for the embodiments in Figures 19 and 20. On this record, we find this bare contention insufficient. actual disclosure of Tomioka. The rollers in Tomioka are used to separate the “battery body” from the “resin package enclosing the battery body,” and Tomioka specifically discloses that this technique is designed to “avoid damaging the battery body.” Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25, 26, 29; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 72–73. Thus, there is a significant difference between what Tomioka teaches and what Petitioner proposes to use the roller system to do. In addition, as Patent Owner points out, Tomioka specifically discloses there are risks associated with mechanically crushing battery packs, such as “risk of sparking due to residual voltage if the battery units are damaged in the process.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 5. Although we do not agree with Patent Owner that this amounts to a “teaching away,” see In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we do believe that this teaching suggests a trade off that should be weighed in determining whether to make the modification, see Medichem S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, Petitioner has failed to account adequately, if at all, for this trade off. Thus, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that it is more likely than not that Tomioka accounts for the claimed “comminuting.”” slip op. at 15

  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 12,119,463
• Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not shown unpatentable under the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner

    “G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we” slip op. at 32

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner

    “III. WHETHER THE PETITION IS TIME BARRED The parties dispute whether the Petition is time barred based on a” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. Among other things, the Director determined based on a “review of the current record” that (1) Menard is not a real party in interest in this proceeding and (2) Menard is not a privy of Petitioner. Id. at 5. Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenMixed

    “U.S. Patent No. 10,299,336 B2 (“the ’336 patent”) (Exhibit 1001). For the reasons explained below, a preponderance of the evidence shows that claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 in the ’336 patent are unpatentable and does not show that claims 8, 16, and 17 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2024).” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,299,336
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held that Petitioner had not shown claims 1–18 unpatentable under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen because the combination did not teach or motivate transmission responsive to correlation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “the Final Written Decision for “not clearly explaining its holding or rationale regarding motivation to combine and whether the proposed combination teaches the final limitation of claim 1: transmitting an indication of the first host responsive to the correlating.” Palo Alto Networks, 122 F.4th at 1384. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit explained that the Final Written Decision “never made a clear finding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Paxton by adding Sutton’s step of transmitting a notification of malicious activity after Paxton’s correlation step,” as proposed by Petitioner. Id. at 1385. The Federal Circuit stated that the Board “failed to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Paxton to provide the recited notification as taught by Sutton in response to the correlation disclosed in Paxton.” Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]y reading Paxton and Sutton in isolation, the Board erred,” and that we vacate and remand for the Board to clarify and explain its holding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit the identity of the first host (e.g., to an administrator) as taught by Sutton, responsive to the correlating disclosed by Paxton to improve network security.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the alleged invention of the ’903 patent “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is similar, with Patent Owner contending that the ordinary skilled artisan “would be someone with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or related field, and either (1) two or more years of industry experience and/or (2) an advanced degree in computer science or related field.” PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 27– 31). Similar to Petitioner, Patent Owner also states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “may have additional industry experience in lieu of a formal degree.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “responsive to the correlation, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these references in the manner advocated by Petitioner. Petitioner contends that this combination would only involve “[t]he application of known techniques (e.g., Sutton’s implementation of rules and data to define security policies, disallowed websites, etc.) to improve similar devices (e.g., servers, gateways, firewalls, etc. in Sutton’s and Paxton’s systems) to provide predictable results in the same way (e.g., to provide packet-filtering functions preventing communications with potentially malicious hosts).” Id. at 22–23.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,530,903 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,530,903

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.