- Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held all challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 30–49.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d Relying on the declaration testimony of its expert, Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’678 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’678 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” PO Resp. 24–25. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’678 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,604,678 - Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · PGR2025-00086 · APJ Tawen Chang · PGR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the PGR as to claims 1–34 after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,290,598 - Tiktok Inc. v. Ntech Properties, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01340 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–12 and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Whitehead, alone or with Marcus ’904; claims 13 and 19–24 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“establishes that the subject matter of independent claim 19 would have been obvious in view of Whitehead. Claim 19 recites “an aggregator having a memory and a processor, the processor adapted for . . . providing an output signal including data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Ex. 1001, 15:51–16:3. As discussed above (Section II.C.2), we construe claim 19 as requiring a signal including both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Accordingly, we consider whether Petitioner has shown that Whitehead teaches or suggests that the “aggregator” “provid[e] an output signal including” both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.”” slip op. at 46
- Expert testimonyOther
“Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” represent data about users that Cristofalo’s system uses to “select a specific media object” (advertisements) from received “multi-object programming data.” Cristofalo at ¶ [0048]. For example, a user identifier may indicate that a given user is a Coca-Cola drinker, and when the receiving system receives the multi-object programming data it can select a particular media object out of several possible media objects (e.g., a Pepsi advertisement) to push to the user. Id. This user data exists independently of, and does not relate to, any particular media stream or streams. See Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 135. Petitioner seems to recognize this when tersely referring to “user identifiers” as “data,” not “data relating to a plurality of streams.” Pet. at 71. Accordingly, Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” are not the claimed “data related to the plurality of media streams.” Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 136.” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 8,145,704 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,145,704 - Tiktok Inc. v. Ntech Properties, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01342 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 6–10 are unpatentable as obvious over each asserted ground; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable because the petitions failed to establish its additional feed and time-period limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1b, 1c, and 1e of claim 1 and in claims 4 and 5 of the ’753 patent. Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of “feed” is “one or more associated media elements.” See, e.g., PO Resp. 4. However, as discussed below, this alleged plain and ordinary meaning of feed is not supported by the claim language, the specification of the ’753 patent, or dictionary definitions of feed as contended by Patent Owner. We reject this contention and the related contentions that the cited art may be distinguished from the claims of the ’753 patent based on the recited term “feed.” Patent Owner relies on the language of claim 1 to support its” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ definitions are similar, although we observe that Patent Owner proposes that the person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree or an equivalent or professional experience, whereas Petitioner proposes that such a person would have both a degree and experience. Neither party presents any arguments relating or referring to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and is consistent with the ’753 patent and the asserted prior art. However, our obviousness analysis would be the same under either party’s assessment. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 17 (Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, stating that “I note that my definition of a POSITA is similar to that of Dr. Almeroth” and “My opinions in this declaration would not change were I to adopt the definition of a POSITA offered by Dr. Almeroth.”).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“16 With regard to claim 5, the Petition cites paragraphs 97 and 98 of the Almeroth Declaration (Ex. 1002). See Pet. 28–29. We have considered the cited paragraphs in the Almeroth Declatation and found that they consist of nothing more than the inadequate and conclusory contentions in the Petition preceded by, in paragraph 97, “[i]n my opinion” and “it is my opinion” and, in paragraph 98, “[i]t is also my opinion.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97, 98. As related to claim 5, we accord the Almeroth Declaration little or no weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65 (a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). that might become out-of-date before a user accesses access [sic] them. Ex. 1003, 11:49–58 (emphasis added). The cited passage in Whitehead mentioning “near real-time” does not support finding that Whitehead teaches or suggests the elements recited in claim 5.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends, “[a] POSITA would have modified Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm (running on Marcus ’904’s receiver) for receiving, selecting, ordering, and assembling different media streams (both for content and advertising).” Pet. 33. Petitioner supports this contention by articulating the following reasons for the asserted modification of Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm: “makes it more likely the system will identify content best suited for a particular user,” “allows for more targeted advertising and/or an opportunity to maximize revenue,” “improves Whitehead’s ability to target content and advertising to a particular user,” “would unlock new revenue sources for Whitehead,” “Marcus ’904’s content selection and concatenation algorithm improves Whitehead’s efficiency,” “[b]oth Whitehead and Marcus ’904 generate custom media programming based on a user profile,” “incorporating Marcus ’904’s teachings would not require redesigning Whitehead’s architecture and instead merely supplements Whitehead’s disclosure,” and “Petitioner’s proposed modification can be implemented entirely in software and does not require any hardware modifications. Indeed, Whitehead acknowledges that such modifications are possible. EX1003 at 19:64-20:6, 22:26-40.” Id. at 33–35 (citing Ex. 1002 (Almeroth Decl.) ¶¶ 110–115) (emphasis omitted). Based on this undisputed showing, we find that one of ordinary skill would have had a motivation to combine the teachings of Whitehead and Marcus ’904 as asserted in the Petition with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 8,886,753 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,886,753 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00763 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Zeira alone or Zeira with Yi renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’838 patent based on all grounds set forth in the Petition for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not contest this at this stage. See Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’838 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:30–2:48. Therefore, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,212,838 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01116 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Sudre, Lee, and Penven.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). In other words, a decision to institute under § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). In addition, if the Board institutes trial, it will “institute . . . on all grounds in the petition.” PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 5–6 (Nov. 2019)1 (“CTPG”); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least (1) a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher) in material science, materials engineering, mechanical engineering, textile engineering, or a related field, and (2) a minimum of two years of working experience in textiles engineering, fibers and textiles manufacturing, or a related field.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–22). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. On the present record, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Prelim. Resp. 25–26. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’566 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Both parties argue that no claim terms require express construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 26. On the present record, we agree. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent the parties’ arguments regarding unpatentability do address claim construction issues, we address these issues below.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“articulated a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Sudre, Lee, and Penven. Prelim. Resp. 60–63. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would not have been motivated to look into Penven to modify the teachings of Lee because Lee and Penven disclose substantially different structures.” Id. at 60–61. This argument does not address Petitioner’s proposed reason to combine, which looks to Lee and Penven each to modify Sudre, not to Penven to modify Lee. See Pet. 79–81. In addition, “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). In other words, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA 1981). Petitioner provides “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” to combine the teachings of Sudre with those of Lee and Penven. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). In particular, Petitioner directs us to Sudre’s teaching of “a method for manufacturing PMC,” to Sudre’s lack of teaching of “specific parameters, such as warp thread size and spacing” to satisfy the “particular requirements” of its fabric. Pet. 79 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 248–250; Ex. 1004, 1:2–5, 6:14–17). As Petitioner points out, id. at 79–80, Lee and Penven provided yarn diameters and loop diameters that were conventional, and there is evidence of record that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used these conventional diameters in constructing Sudre’s paper machine clothing. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 258–261, 263–266; Ex. 1006, 3:64–66.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,261,566 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00973 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Reiner and over Reiner with Takahara; claims 2, 8, and 14 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“patentability based solely on arguments considered above in the context of claim 4. See, e.g., PO Resp. 42–43, 47–52. Therefore, Patent Owner has waived any other argument. See Inst. Dec. 44; Paper 10, 10. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments concerning these claims having been obvious over Reiner as our own in this Decision. See Pet. 40–44, 50–56, 57–70, 71; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–142, 154–168, 174–221, 227. Accordingly, we conclude a preponderance of the evidence establishes these claims are unpatentable as having been obvious over Reiner.” slip op. at 83
- Expert testimonyOther
- Skill levelOther
Patent outcomesUS 9,184,157 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,184,157 - DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
Claims 1, 4–8, and 10–16 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 2, 3, 9, and 17 were not shown unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“The Director then issued an Order, Paper 47 (“Director’s Order” or “Dir. Ord.”) granting Director Review, vacating-in-part the Final Written Decision, and remanding the case to this Board panel for proceedings consistent with the Order. The Director vacated-in-part the Final Written Decision because it did not sufficiently address Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to claim 17 (and similar claims 2 and 9). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable except for claims 2, 3, 9, and 17.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“2. Analogous Art – DSL-Book A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the” slip op. at 75
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“4. Motivation to Combine Amit and Jacobsen Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have modified “Amit’s” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.