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  • PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held all challenged claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 unpatentable as obvious and granted the motion to amend for substitute claims 30–49.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d Relying on the declaration testimony of its expert, Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’678 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 5–6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’678 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” PO Resp. 24–25. Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’678 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysis below.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
  • PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,971,612
  • PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · PGR2025-00086 · APJ Tawen Chang · PGR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the PGR as to claims 1–34 after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 12,290,598
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01340 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–12 and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Whitehead, alone or with Marcus ’904; claims 13 and 19–24 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “establishes that the subject matter of independent claim 19 would have been obvious in view of Whitehead. Claim 19 recites “an aggregator having a memory and a processor, the processor adapted for . . . providing an output signal including data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Ex. 1001, 15:51–16:3. As discussed above (Section II.C.2), we construe claim 19 as requiring a signal including both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.” Accordingly, we consider whether Petitioner has shown that Whitehead teaches or suggests that the “aggregator” “provid[e] an output signal including” both “data indicative of the selection and of user data.”” slip op. at 46

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” represent data about users that Cristofalo’s system uses to “select a specific media object” (advertisements) from received “multi-object programming data.” Cristofalo at ¶ [0048]. For example, a user identifier may indicate that a given user is a Coca-Cola drinker, and when the receiving system receives the multi-object programming data it can select a particular media object out of several possible media objects (e.g., a Pepsi advertisement) to push to the user. Id. This user data exists independently of, and does not relate to, any particular media stream or streams. See Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 135. Petitioner seems to recognize this when tersely referring to “user identifiers” as “data,” not “data relating to a plurality of streams.” Pet. at 71. Accordingly, Cristofalo’s “user identifiers” are not the claimed “data related to the plurality of media streams.” Goodrich PO Resp. Decl. at ¶ 136.” slip op. at 73

    Patent outcomesUS 8,145,704 mixed
    § 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,145,704
  • PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01342 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4 and 6–10 are unpatentable as obvious over each asserted ground; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable because the petitions failed to establish its additional feed and time-period limitations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1b, 1c, and 1e of claim 1 and in claims 4 and 5 of the ’753 patent. Patent Owner contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of “feed” is “one or more associated media elements.” See, e.g., PO Resp. 4. However, as discussed below, this alleged plain and ordinary meaning of feed is not supported by the claim language, the specification of the ’753 patent, or dictionary definitions of feed as contended by Patent Owner. We reject this contention and the related contentions that the cited art may be distinguished from the claims of the ’753 patent based on the recited term “feed.” Patent Owner relies on the language of claim 1 to support its” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties’ definitions are similar, although we observe that Patent Owner proposes that the person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree or an equivalent or professional experience, whereas Petitioner proposes that such a person would have both a degree and experience. Neither party presents any arguments relating or referring to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth and is consistent with the ’753 patent and the asserted prior art. However, our obviousness analysis would be the same under either party’s assessment. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 17 (Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Goodrich, stating that “I note that my definition of a POSITA is similar to that of Dr. Almeroth” and “My opinions in this declaration would not change were I to adopt the definition of a POSITA offered by Dr. Almeroth.”).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “16 With regard to claim 5, the Petition cites paragraphs 97 and 98 of the Almeroth Declaration (Ex. 1002). See Pet. 28–29. We have considered the cited paragraphs in the Almeroth Declatation and found that they consist of nothing more than the inadequate and conclusory contentions in the Petition preceded by, in paragraph 97, “[i]n my opinion” and “it is my opinion” and, in paragraph 98, “[i]t is also my opinion.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97, 98. As related to claim 5, we accord the Almeroth Declaration little or no weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65 (a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). that might become out-of-date before a user accesses access [sic] them. Ex. 1003, 11:49–58 (emphasis added). The cited passage in Whitehead mentioning “near real-time” does not support finding that Whitehead teaches or suggests the elements recited in claim 5.” slip op. at 39

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends, “[a] POSITA would have modified Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm (running on Marcus ’904’s receiver) for receiving, selecting, ordering, and assembling different media streams (both for content and advertising).” Pet. 33. Petitioner supports this contention by articulating the following reasons for the asserted modification of Whitehead’s mixing server 130 to incorporate Marcus ’904’s algorithm: “makes it more likely the system will identify content best suited for a particular user,” “allows for more targeted advertising and/or an opportunity to maximize revenue,” “improves Whitehead’s ability to target content and advertising to a particular user,” “would unlock new revenue sources for Whitehead,” “Marcus ’904’s content selection and concatenation algorithm improves Whitehead’s efficiency,” “[b]oth Whitehead and Marcus ’904 generate custom media programming based on a user profile,” “incorporating Marcus ’904’s teachings would not require redesigning Whitehead’s architecture and instead merely supplements Whitehead’s disclosure,” and “Petitioner’s proposed modification can be implemented entirely in software and does not require any hardware modifications. Indeed, Whitehead acknowledges that such modifications are possible. EX1003 at 19:64-20:6, 22:26-40.” Id. at 33–35 (citing Ex. 1002 (Almeroth Decl.) ¶¶ 110–115) (emphasis omitted). Based on this undisputed showing, we find that one of ordinary skill would have had a motivation to combine the teachings of Whitehead and Marcus ’904 as asserted in the Petition with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 48

    Patent outcomesUS 8,886,753 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,886,753
  • PTAB · Dec 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00973 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–7, 9–13, and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Reiner and over Reiner with Takahara; claims 2, 8, and 14 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “patentability based solely on arguments considered above in the context of claim 4. See, e.g., PO Resp. 42–43, 47–52. Therefore, Patent Owner has waived any other argument. See Inst. Dec. 44; Paper 10, 10. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments concerning these claims having been obvious over Reiner as our own in this Decision. See Pet. 40–44, 50–56, 57–70, 71; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–142, 154–168, 174–221, 227. Accordingly, we conclude a preponderance of the evidence establishes these claims are unpatentable as having been obvious over Reiner.” slip op. at 83

    • Expert testimonyOther
    • Skill levelOther
    Patent outcomesUS 9,184,157 mixed
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,184,157
  • PTAB · Nov 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand

    Claims 1, 4–8, and 10–16 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 2, 3, 9, and 17 were not shown unpatentable on any asserted ground.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “The Director then issued an Order, Paper 47 (“Director’s Order” or “Dir. Ord.”) granting Director Review, vacating-in-part the Final Written Decision, and remanding the case to this Board panel for proceedings consistent with the Order. The Director vacated-in-part the Final Written Decision because it did not sufficiently address Patent Owner’s arguments with respect to claim 17 (and similar claims 2 and 9). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand from Director Review is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). Having reviewed the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable except for claims 2, 3, 9, and 17.” slip op. at 3

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “2. Analogous Art – DSL-Book A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the” slip op. at 75

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “4. Motivation to Combine Amit and Jacobsen Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have modified “Amit’s” slip op. at 31

    Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 mixed
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,594,249
  • PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00422 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on the asserted obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim-construction brief.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14

    • Strike new argumentGranted

      “FURTHER ORDERED that Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief is stricken from the record; and” slip op. at 80

    Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentable
    Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,861,260
  • PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00128 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

      “d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Baig, Costa, and Zwicky. 5. Analysis of Claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137– 145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 Petitioner argues that the combination of Baig, Costa, and Zwicky teaches the limitations recited in claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137–145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own. Patent Owner does not separately address those claims. See PO Resp.; 422PO Resp. Instead, Patent Owner only relies on the arguments discussed above for claim 1. See PO Resp. 13–16; 422PO Resp. 13–16. For the same reason as discussed above in Section II.D.4(b), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the reason to combine the references. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence” slip op. at 50

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

      “F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74

    Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,861,260
  • PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00421 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable over the asserted prior art and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim construction brief.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a” slip op. at 50

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14

    • Strike new argumentGranted

      “F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74

    Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,861,260
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