- Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2020 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied DivX’s rehearing request, leaving the institution decision in place because the rule remained effective and Dr. McDaniel’s testimony was supported on the record.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“assertions regarding Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. Dr. McDaniel testified that (a) Chen teaches video data streams, (b) “[a]s was widely known in the art, for example as disclosed by Grab-333,[1] a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that video data streams were comprised of a series of video frames,” and (c) a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that Chen teaches a plurality of frames of video are encrypted using at least one scrambling key/control word.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 112;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,184,920 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2019-00003 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its determination that claims 1–14 are unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“public accessibility, . . . . which involves examining the evidence for proof that each non-patent reference was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Req. Reh’g 3 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). We do not agree. On the contrary, we addressed with particularity the substantial evidence tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 12. Specifically, in our Decision, we properly credited indicia on the face of Petitioner’s References, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Using Varenna 2012 as an example, those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including the statement “Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 15–16 (quoting Ex. 1005). In the same manner, the totality of evidence supports our finding that each of Petitioner’s References was publicly available prior to the critical date of the invention. Id. at 15– 18.” slip op. at 3
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,867,839 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2018-00092 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving unpatentable claims 1-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16-18, 23-25, and 27-29 based on Varenna 2012 anticipation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“acknowledged Acceleration Bay and addressed with particularity the evidence of record tending to show that each of Petitioner’s References “was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Dec. 15. Specifically, in our Decision, we credited indicia on the face of Verrena 2012, such as printed dates and citation information, which are “part of the totality of the evidence” bearing on the issue of public accessibility. Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Those indicia included details of the copyright notice, indicating publication of Varenna 2012 “by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society for Rheumatology” in “2012;” and also additional legends, including “the statement ‘Advance Access publication 30 November 2012,’” and a conventional edition identifier from the journal Rheumatology. Dec. 17 (quoting Ex. 1005). Patent Owner advanced no” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions and note that we addressed these same arguments in our Order denying Patent Owner’s motion to strike. Paper 24; see also Paper 13, 1 (Patent Owner contending that “Exhibit 1044 and related argument are new evidence and argument regarding the alleged accessibility of Varenna 2012 (Ex. 1005) that Petitioner could have submitted with the Petition, but chose not to.”). Rather than pointing out any matters that the panel misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner expresses disagreement with that decision, and attempts to offer additional reasoning and argument not advanced during trial. Req. Reh’g, 12–15. That effort is ineffective to establish reversible error. Furthermore, in our Final Written Decision, we noted that Even if we set aside Dr. Robinson’s Declaration, . . . we are persuaded that the indicia of publication on the face of Varenna 2012 are sufficient to establish that Varenna 2012 was “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” and “disseminated or otherwise made available” to the interested public before the critical date, and consequently, a printed publication. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Dec. 19 n.4. For that reason also, Patent Owner shows no reversible error in our Final Written Decision holding that Dr. Robinson’s testimony bolsters” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,820,999 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2018-00092 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
The Board granted the petitioner’s rehearing request, vacated the final written decision, and will issue a revised decision after overlooking Varenna 2012 in Grounds 5–7.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,820,999 - Unified Patents, Inc v. Mv3 Partners LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 2, 2020 · IPR2019-00474 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing denied; the Board maintained that claims 1–6, 8, 10–21, 23–38, 40, 42–53, and 55–61 were not shown unpatentable because Wang did not teach the separate determining limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“of the “determining” limitation, not a construction of the language in that limitation. As noted in the Decision, the claim language plainly requires that the STB separately determine whether the user is permitted to provide to the external display device a specific media content received at the mobile device. Id. at 16–17. This is consistent with Petitioner’s view expressed at the hearing. See Tr. 20:6–16 (Petitioner acknowledging that the claim recites the “authenticating” step and “a separate determining step” where “the determining step happens after the authenticating step” (emphasis added)). Although Petitioner disputes that the Specification adequately supports the “determining” limitation, it is not an issue necessitating review by our mere recitation of the claim language. Further, we are not at liberty to ignore the “determining” limitation, despite its alleged lack of written description, in assessing it during a prior art challenge. As set forth in the Decision, we fully addressed the language of the claims as challenged in the Petition. We are not persuaded that in doing so we misapprehended or overlooked any argument raised by Petitioner. In particular, we noted that Petitioner provided sufficient evidence to show that Wang teaches integrating the authentication feature into the STB to authenticate mobile users to access content. Final Dec. 16–17. However, we found such teaching to fall short of satisfying the separate and distinct “determining” limitation, as required by the claim. Id. at 18. As explained in the Decision, Petitioner and its expert addressed the “authenticating” and “determining” limitations together, even though they are separate limitations of the claim. Id. (citing Pet. 39–41; Ex. 1003 ¶ 73). We were unpersuaded by Petitioner’s theory that the “determining” limitation “automatically” occurs by virtue of the authenticating step. Id. Furthermore, we noted the evidence of record was insufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed modification of Wang would have taught or suggested “any additional determination beyond authenticating the user.” Id. at 19.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,863,223 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2020 · PGR2019-00027 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Harden combined with one or more of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore; the written-description challenge was not proven.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“Based on the full trial record, we find that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious. Varenna 2011 teaches that neridronate “seems to possess an excellent efficacy profile” in treating CRPS. Ex. 1006, 233. In the context of reporting the use of “[n]eridronic acid for the treatment of bone metabolic diseases,” Gatti teaches that “[i]ntravenous high doses of bisphosphonates are increasingly used for the treatment of [CRPS].”13 Ex. 1008, 1305, 1308. Gatti also reports that a clinical trial of neridronic acid “is underway.” Id. Muratore teaches that neridronate was “efficacious in the treatment of [CRPS].” Ex. 1007, 89. Thus, on this record, each of these references sufficiently teaches the efficacy of neridronic acid or its salt in treating CRPS, suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use neridronic acid in treating CRPS. With respect to the limitation of claim 1 requiring that the neridronic acid be “parenterally administer[ed],” each of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore teaches intravenous administration of neridronic acid. Ex. 1006, 233; Ex. 1007, 89; Ex. 1008, 1308. Intravenous administration is a type of parenteral administration. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. 13 Gatti uses the terms “reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome” and “algodystrophy.” Ex. 1008, 1308. On the present record, we interpret both of these terms as synonymous with “complex regional pain syndrome,” “CRPS,” “complex regional pain syndrome type I,” “CRPS I,” “reflex sympathetic algodystrophy,” “reflex sympathetic dystrophy,” and “causalgia.” Ex. 1006, 227 (equating “algodystrophy,” “complex regional pain syndrome type I,” and “CRPS I”); Ex. 1007, 89 (using the term “reflex sympathetic algodystrophy”); Ex. 1019, 713 (equating “complex regional pain syndrome,” “CRPS,” “reflex sympathetic dystrophy,” and “causalgia”). Harden teaches that the Budapest Criteria are used as “clinical diagnostic criteria for CRPS” and that they include changes in skin blood flow, by reference to the symptoms of “temperature asymmetry” and “skin color asymmetry.” Ex. 1009, 274 (Appendix II). Further, Harden teaches that 69.4% of patients diagnosed with CRPS were observed on examination to exhibit temperature asymmetry, and 83.9% were observed on examination to exhibit skin color asymmetry. Id. at 271 (Table 2). Thus, Harden teaches that a majority of patient with CRPS suffer from changes in skin blood flow. Because Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore teach that neridronic acid is effective in treating CRPS, the combination of any of those references with Harden14 would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that neridronic acid would be effective in alleviating changes in skin blood flow associated with CRPS. Thus, the combination of Harden and one or more of Varenna 2011,” slip op. at 26
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Assuming that “October 2011” is hearsay, it is still admissible evidence under Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Opp. Mot. 3–4 (asserting this hearsay exception). Under Rule 807, a statement “is not excluded,” even if it is hearsay, if it meets two requirements. First, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness— after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1). Second, the statement must be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Id. at 807(a)(2). Here, both requirements are satisfied. The statement “October 2011” on the face of Varenna 2011 is offered to prove that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. This statement is accompanied by several guarantees of trustworthiness. The statements “Received on July 15, 2011” and “Accepted on August 30, 2011,” when offered as corroboration of the October 2011 publication date, are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801 (statement is hearsay only if offered in evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). Accordingly, they may be admitted for this purpose, and they corroborate a publication in October 2011. Moreover, Exhibits 1038 and 1040 also provide some evidence that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. Ex. 1038, 1 (article with same title as Varenna 2011 published in “Fascicolo 5 2011”); Ex. 1040, 1 (“Fascicolo 5 2011” published in 2011). Thus, the record contains sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness of Varenna 2011’s statement that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. See Opp. Mot. 3 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40). We find that Varenna 2011’s statement, indicating that the reference was published in October 2011, is “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2). It is difficult to imagine evidence more probative of the publication date of a journal article than the article’s own contemporaneous statement about when it was published.19 See Opp. Mot. 2–4 (for well-supported arguments on point). Accordingly, we determine that the exception of Rule 807 applies, and we conclude that the statement “October 2011” in Varenna 2011 should not be excluded.” slip op. at 48
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’774 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1002, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’774 patent, “[a] method of treating” changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1002, 90:33–40, 91:14–21, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’774 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1002, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’774 patent, “[a] method of treating” changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1002, 90:33–40, 91:14–21, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims. Moreover, as discussed below with respect to the asserted grounds of obviousness, Petitioner directs us to evidence that the prior art teaches or suggests the subject matter of the preambles, even when those preambles are construed as limiting in accordance with the meaning of “treating” provided in the specification.8 Thus, whether or not we treat the preambles as limiting, the outcome does not change. Given this circumstance, we treat the preambles of the challenged claims as limiting and assign them a meaning consistent with the specification’s definition of “treating.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 10,039,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,039,774 - Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2020 · PGR2019-00026 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Harden and one or more of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore; the written-description challenge fails.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“INTRODUCTION A. Background Grünenthal GmbH (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting a post-grant review of claims 1–30 of U.S. Patent No. 9,931,352 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’352 patent”). Antecip Bioventures II LLC (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response. We instituted review of all challenged claims on each of the grounds asserted in the Petition. Paper 6 (“Dec. Inst.”).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther
“regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’352 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1001, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’352 patent, “[a] method of treating” hyperalgesia (claim 1) or edema (claim 17) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from hyperalgesia (claim 1) or edema (claim 17) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1001, 90:39–43, 91:23–27, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims. Moreover, as discussed below with respect to the asserted grounds of obviousness, Petitioner directs us to evidence that the prior art teaches or suggests the subject matter of the preambles, even when those preambles are construed as limiting in accordance with the meaning of “treating” provided in the specification.8 Thus, whether or not we treat the preambles as limiting, the outcome does not change. Given this circumstance, we treat the preambles of the challenged claims as limiting, and assign them a meaning consistent with the specification’s definition of “treating.”” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner’s asserted references provides data showing that administering neridronic acid improves the symptoms of CRPS. PO Resp. 18–19. But “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–904 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is sufficient that Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore would have informed the ordinarily skilled artisan that successful treatment of CRPS and its symptoms was likely; there is no requirement that Petitioner show that the prior art taught that success was certain.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“qualifies as a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102. PO Resp. 4–17; PO Sur-Reply 14–21. “To qualify as a printed publication, a reference ‘must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quoting Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, there are two ways to show that a reference was sufficiently accessible: show it was disseminated or show it was “otherwise made available to the extent that” interested people of ordinary skill in the art could have located it after exercising reasonable diligence. Id. Here, according to Petitioner, the asserted references “are articles published in periodical journals by an identified and reputable publisher.” Reply 3.11 Petitioner argues that the references were “disseminated on the[ir] stated publication date[s].” Id. at 5. We agree.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 9,931,352 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 9,931,352 - PTAB · Jun 19, 2020 · IPR2019-00834 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Intel’s rehearing request and left in place its denial of institution for claims 1–3, 6, and 7 under §§ 325(d) and 314(a).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“§ 325(d). Inst. Dec. 7–16. We evaluated each of the factors presented in Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph) (“the Becton, Dickinson factors”). Id. We concluded that, “[o]f the six Becton, Dickinson factors, the first factor weighs strongly in favor of denying institution, the third and fifth factors weigh somewhat in favor of denying institution, the second and fourth factors are neutral, and the sixth factor weighs somewhat against denying institution.” Id. at 15–16. Petitioner now argues that this analysis was flawed, with the fourth, fifth, and sixth Becton, Dickinson factors all “strongly favor[ing] reaching the merits and instituting” inter partes review. Req. Reh’g 5–11.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“decision denying institution in the earlier proceeding. But the third General Plastic factor does not require access to the earlier institution decision; it requires only access to either that decision or the corresponding preliminary response. Here, at the time Petitioner filed this Petition, it already had received Patent Owner’s preliminary response in IPR2018-01574. This is sufficient to satisfy the third factor.” slip op. at 8
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“we interpret the Request for Rehearing as arguing that discretionary denial of a second petition is always improper whenever a first petition remains pending.7 Petitioner does not explain the authority for that legal position, and we can find none in either § 314(a) or § 325(d). Institution of inter partes review is never compulsory under § 314(a). Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). As for § 325(d), the statutory language appears to refute Petitioner’s position directly. As long as “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office,” discretion exists to “reject the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). There is no mention in the statute 7 Alternatively, the Request for Rehearing could be interpreted as arguing that we should have withheld any decision on the second petition until the rehearing request on the first petition was decided. If we were to interpret the argument this way, we would find it unpersuasive because it would have required us to violate 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(1), which requires us to issue a decision on institution no later than three months after the filing of the preliminary response. of a limitation on that discretion that requires us to avoid “reject[ing] the petition” whenever the earlier proceeding in which “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented” remains pending. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded that any of the special circumstances that Petitioner describes warrants a conclusion that we abused our discretion in denying institution.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,070,719 - PTAB · Jun 19, 2020 · IPR2018-01574 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and maintained its denial of institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–3, 6, and 7 unpatentable.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“solely on Liaw’s Fig. 2C, ignoring the portions of Liaw relied on by [Petitioner] and the balance of the unrebutted evidence which uniformly established that a person of ordinary skill would have envisaged Liaw’s dielectric spacer layer as surrounding the gate line.” Req. Reh’g 12–13. We did not ignore any evidence. As discussed above, Petitioner argued that Liaw’s process of blanket deposition followed by anisotropic etching inherently would produce as a result the “spacer surrounding the gate line” recited in the challenged claims. A reference inherently discloses an element of a claim “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Here, Dr. Thompson testified that Liaw’s process would result in the formation of spacers surrounding the gate lines, Ex. 1002 ¶ 223, but Liaw itself showed that a process of blanket deposition followed by anisotropic etching need not necessarily produce that result. Ex. 1003, 3:61–4:6, Fig. 2C. That our Decision focused on the evidence demonstrating the failure of Petitioner’s inherency argument does not mean that we ignored any other evidence. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that this argument shows an abuse of discretion.” slip op. at 9
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“deposition alone,” without any later anisotropic etching, forms a spacer surrounding the gate line, “satisf[ying] the limitation at issue.” Req. Reh’g 7–9. This is a new argument, not previously presented by Petitioner. As noted above, Petitioner argued previously that Liaw’s entire process (including both blanket deposition and the anisotropic etching that follows) “leaves dielectric sidewall spacer material on all vertical surfaces (or sidewalls) of the gate line.” Pet. 33. Similarly, Dr. Thompson testified that “Liaw’s sidewall spacers surrounded the gate line” because, “[a]fter [Liaw’s] etching step, dielectric sidewall spacer material was left on the perimeter of the gate (i.e., spacers on the long lateral sides and at the end faces of the gate line).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 223. Dr. Thompson also testified that the process described in the challenged patent (including both “blanket deposition” and “Reactive Ion Etching”) “resulted in sidewall spacers that ‘surround the respective gate lines.’” Id. ¶¶ 269–270 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:11–23). Petitioner argued the same. Pet. 33. In addition, Petitioner argued that Mandelman produced its spacers by blanket deposition followed by “reactive ion etching or plasma etching.” Id. at 62–63; see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 317 (Dr. Thompson testifying that Mandelman produces its spacers in this way). Thus, Petitioner’s argument on rehearing that a spacer surrounding the gate line would have been formed by blanket deposition alone, even in the absence of etching, is new. The presentation of such a new argument violates the requirement that Petitioner identify the place in the record where it previously addressed any argument it raises in the Rehearing Request. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Accordingly, this new argument is improper on rehearing, and we do not consider the merits of this argument.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,070,719 - PTAB · May 11, 2020 · IPR2016-00734 · APJ Michelle N Ankenbrand · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding its constitutional challenges forfeited because it did not raise them in its opening brief on appeal.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the Board should modify its decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner
“LSPI, however, forfeited any challenges to the panel’s constitutionality by failing to raise those challenges in its opening brief to the Federal Circuit in its appeal of our Final Written Decision.1 Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 941 F.3d 1173, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Our law is well established that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Vivint, Inc. v. Alarm.com Inc., No. 19-2438 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2020), ECF No. 29 (nonprecedential); see LiquidPower Specialty Prods. Inc. v. Baker Hughes, A GE Co., LLC, No. 18-1141, ECF No. 29 (LSPI’s Opening Brief on appeal, which fails to raise any constitutionality or APA arguments on appeal). 1 Indeed, LSPI failed to raise any constitutional challenge in its Patent Owner Response, Sur-reply, or during the oral hearing in the case before remand. Paper 47 (Response); Paper 70 (Sur-reply); Papers 76, 77 (hearing transcripts). LSPI also did not raise any constitutional challenge before the Federal Circuit on appeal of our Final Written Decision, either in its briefing or during oral argument. See LiquidPower Specialty Prods., Inc. v. Baker Hughes, A GE Co., LLC, No. 18-1141, ECF Nos. 29, 39; Oral Argument, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2018-1141.mp3. And LSPI did not raise any constitutional challenge in the additional briefing we ordered on remand. Paper 87. LSPI cannot cure that forfeiture by raising constitutional challenges for the first time in its request for rehearing of our decision on remand.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,022,118
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.