• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · PGR2020-00039 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Supercell’s rehearing request, leaving in place denial of institution of PGR challenging claims 1–24 based on the Fintiv factors and parallel litigation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Additionally, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) further provides that “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” i.e., Petitioner, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

    “the parties jointly requested a trial delay in the prior proceeding, from December 7, 2020, to March 1, 2021, which the district court granted. Ex. 1024, 1. Even considering these post-Decision developments, this three month delay results in a trial date in the parallel proceeding set six months before our final written decision would be due. Similar to the potential delay discussed in our Decision, a jury trial set to begin six months before a final written decision also weighs in favor of denying institution. Dec. 12; see Prelim. Resp. 11 (identifying three prior PTAB proceedings in which institution was denied where trial was scheduled to occur six months before a final written decision, including the precedential NHK Spring decision). We decline to speculate, absent case-specific evidence, as to any future additional delay of the parallel proceeding’s trial date that may— or may not—be requested by the parties, and that may—or may not— be granted by the district court. See Ex. 1024, 1, 4 (indicating that the trial date “cannot be changed without showing good cause,” which “is not shown merely by indicating that the parties agree that the deadline should be changed”) (emphasis omitted). On the current record, a cognizable risk of inconsistent results exists, due to the scheduled date of trial and the statutory due date of a final written decision.3” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedOther

    “contentions. In our Decision, we relied in part upon Dr. Claypool’s testimony from related litigation between the parties in determining that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Mastermind was publicly accessible. Dec. 24–25. Specifically, we relied upon Dr. Claypool’s prior testimony that, 4 “Mastermind’s In-Game Builder Idea (with LOADS of pictures!)” (“Mastermind”), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20130915081112/http:/forum.supercell.net:80/s howthread.php/149687-Mastermind-s-In-Game-Builder-Idea-(with-LOADSof-pictures!) (in two parts) (Ex. 1015, “Olesiuk Decl.”). it is my opinion that a diligent, skilled researcher engaged in a reasonable search for prior art would not have found Mastermind as a prior art reference even with the benefit of [Patent Owner’s] infringement contentions before the filing of the Petition for Post-Grant Review. A diligent, skilled researcher would not spend time sifting through the suggestions provided on Internet message boards, as they would normally not include useful or sufficiently detailed suggestions. Ex. 2009 ¶ 164 (emphasis added); Dec. 25.” slip op. at 8

  • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

    “different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–8. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Dec. 6–7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. at 7–8. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedent set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12, 15–16, 18–20. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11

  § 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,307,676
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 12, 2020 · PGR2020-00063 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–9, finding the § 101 arguments previously presented to the Office and the other grounds insufficient to show likely unpatentability.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. The Board recently explained a two-part framework that the Board uses under § 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or 4 “ObjectLabel” (Ex. 1007, “ObjectLabel”). 5 US 2015/0153913 A1, issued June 4, 2015 (Ex. 1008, “Ballard”). substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Board further explained that “[i]f a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute.” Id. at 8–9. “If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Id. at 9. The Becton, Dickinson6 factors, which address discretion to deny when a Petition presents the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously presented to the Office, are instructive. Id. (“[T]he Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” (Footnote omitted)).” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “(“the ’432 patent”). Supercell Oy (“Supercell”) filed a petition requesting post-grant review of claims 1–9 of the ’432 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”). GREE, in turn, filed a preliminary response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). After considering the petition and the preliminary response, as well as all supporting evidence, we determine the petition does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’432 patent is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Thus, we do not institute post-grant review of claims 1–9 of the ’432 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “‘“the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.’” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Rather, ‘the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had ‘possession’ of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.’” Id. (citing Ariad Pharms, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)).” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “information.” Id. at 7:34–41. In particular, Ross explains that “[t]he user may interact with the secondary, tertiary, etc., virtual reality content and then return his view back to the movie wherein the movie has been adjusted to reflect the user’s interaction with the secondary, tertiary, etc., virtual reality content.” Id. at 7:41–45. Ross explains further that “while a user views primary virtual reality content, system 10 may be configured to display a ‘pop-up’ cue indicating that additional virtual reality content (e.g., additional characters) is available in a different (e.g., secondary, tertiary, etc.) content area.” Id. at 7:46–50. Thus, we understand Ross to disclose a system wherein a user can turn their gaze from a primary area to a secondary, tertiary, etc., area to view content related to the content in the primary area. See Ross, 7:21–33 (“Responsive to the user turning his view from the primary virtual reality content . . . a sensory cue comprising . . . secondary, tertiary, etc., . . . may be displayed to the user.”). Further, we understand Ross to disclose a system wherein the user’s focus on an item in the primary area may activate a “popup” cue in the primary area directing the user to additional virtual reality content in a secondary, tertiary, etc., area. See id. at 7:46–50 (“[W]hile a user views primary virtual reality content, system 10 may be configured to display a ‘pop-up’ cue indicating that additional virtual reality content . . . is available in a different (e.g., secondary, tertiary, etc.) content area.”). We do not, however, understand Ross’ “pop-up” cue to be activated in a secondary, tertiary, etc. area based on the user’s gaze position moving to the second area from the first area as required by claims 1, 8, and 9. See id. Therefore, because Ross describes displaying a “pop-up” cue while a user is viewing primary virtual reality content (see Ross, 7:46–50), Petitioner does not show persuasively that Ross discloses that “a gaze position moving to the second area from the first area” is an “information providing condition.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s cited testimonial evidence does not explain sufficiently how Ross discloses the recited “information providing condition.” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 73. For the reasons above, Petitioner does not show adequately that Ross discloses an “information providing condition [that] is a condition of a gaze position moving to the second area from the first area.”” slip op. at 18

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,406,432
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2020 · PGR2020-00038 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution of PGR on claims 1-30, finding no abuse of discretion in applying the Fintiv factors to the parallel litigation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “B. Request for Rehearing Standards When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Additionally, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) further provides that “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” i.e., Petitioner, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”” slip op. at 4

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner

    “the parties jointly requested a trial delay in the prior proceeding, from December 7, 2020, to March 1, 2021, which the district court granted. Ex. 1026, 1 (requesting delay); see also Ex. 1029, 1. Even considering these post-Decision developments, this three month delay results in trial in the parallel proceeding occurring six months before our final written decision. Similar to the potential delay discussed in our Decision, a jury trial set to begin six months before a final written decision also weighs in favor of denying institution. Dec. 12; see Prelim. Resp. 10 (identifying three prior PTAB proceedings in which institution was denied where trial was scheduled to occur six months before a final written decision, including the precedential NHK Spring decision). We decline to speculate, absent case-specific evidence, as to any future additional delay of the parallel proceeding’s trial date that may— or may not—be requested by the parties, and that may—or may not— be granted by the district court. See Ex. 1029, 1, 4 (indicating that the trial date “cannot be changed without showing good cause,” which “is not shown merely by indicating that the parties agree that the deadline should be changed”) (emphasis omitted). On the current record, a cognizable risk of inconsistent results exists, due to the scheduled date of trial and the statutory due date of a final written decision.3” slip op. at 6

  • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

    “different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–8. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Id. at 7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. at 7–8. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedential case law set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12–13, 15–17, 19–21. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

    “Decision, accompanied by a Motion to Excuse Late Filing, which explained that Petitioner attempted to file its Request on October 5, 2020 and contended that good cause exists for excusing the late filing of the Request. Paper 15 (“Mot.”); Paper 16 (“Req. Reh’g”). Petitioner’s Motion demonstrates a lack of prejudice to Patent Owner, who does not oppose the Motion and was served timely with the Request on October 5, 2020, and sufficient good cause in these circumstances. Mot. 1–2, 4. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion to Excuse Late Filing.” slip op. at 3

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,307,675
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2020 · PGR2020-00034 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Supercell’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution based on the Fintiv factors and the parallel district court proceeding.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner

    “this factor. At the time of our Decision, trial was scheduled in the parallel proceeding for December 7, 2020, approximately nine months before our final written decision would have been due, if we were to institute trial. Dec. 10–11. As such, this gap in timing created a cognizable risk of inconsistent results and duplication of efforts, which weighed toward denying institution. Id. at 6, 11–12. Additionally, the Decision notes that some uncertainty exists regarding trial dates, as Petitioner again argues in its Request. Id. at 11; Req. Reh’g 3–4. However, the Decision goes on to determine that even if trial in the parallel proceeding was delayed by two months, consistent with Petitioner’s prior requested delay, the proximity of the trial date to our final written decision would still favor denying institution. Dec. 12 (citing Ex. 2002, 2). As such, Petitioner has not shown that the Board misapprehended the trial date.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Thus, unlike the Request, the Petition did not contend that a skilled artisan would have found it obvious that “[Cho’s communication] may comprise one player specifying, to the server, information identifying another player to be involved in the game.” Compare id. at 46–47, with Req. Reh’g 6–7 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the Petition simply stated that a skilled artisan would understand that Cho taught transmissions through a server, but did not state that it would have been obvious, in light of Cho’s teachings, for this transmission to include first information. As discussed in our Decision, the Petition’s reliance on GSB to supply the transmission of “first information” fails because Petitioner has not explained persuasively why it would have been obvious to transmit GSB’s first information when Cho already establishes a communication between players and because Petitioner fails to explain “how the additional transmission of identifying information would simplify communications or allow easier connection, over the communication that Cho already establishes.” Dec. 24.” slip op. at 9

  • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

    “different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–7. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Id. at 7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedential case law set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12, 15–17, 20–21. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,300,385
• Choirock Contents Factory Co., Ltd. v. Spin Master Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 24, 2020 · IPR2019-00900 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Aprile and Shannon; the Board did not reach the other asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the full record before us, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a related field and at least three years of experience in toy design.” This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’073 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “According to the applicable standard, claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. America Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Our analysis below does not require construing any claim term to resolve the parties’ dispute. Accordingly, we do not expressly construe any claim term.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “b. Analysis Considering the record as a whole, Petitioner’s evidence and arguments provide rational underpinning for its contentions that claims 1–20 would have been obvious in view of Aprile and Shannon. Weighing the parties’ evidence and arguments, Petitioner persuades us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to modify Shannon’s toy to have a magnetically released latch like Aprile’s. Additionally, Petitioner persuades us that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success for such a modification.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Shannon teaches away from using a magnetically released fastener like Aprile’s. PO Resp. 23–29. A reference teaches away “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333– 34 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“We will not read into a reference a teaching away from a process where no such language exists.”). A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Fulton further explains [O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation for the current invention. “[T]he question is whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination,” not whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest that the combination is the most desirable combination available. 391 F.3d at 1200. Additionally, “obviousness must be determined in light of all the facts, and there is no rule that a single reference that teaches away will mandate a finding of nonobviousness. Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,868,073 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,868,073
• Choirock Contents Factory Co., Ltd. v. Spin Master Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2020 · IPR2019-00897 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious based on Tomiyama alone, Shannon modified by Tomiyama, and Shannon, Tomiyama, and Aprile.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “8. Weighing the Graham Factors Based on the full record before us, we find that (1) Petitioner’s” slip op. at 87

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “8. Weighing the Graham Factors Based on the full record before us, we find that (1) Petitioner’s” slip op. at 87

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”), requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–5 of U.S. Patent No. 8,500,508 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’508 patent”). Concurrently with the Petition, Petitioner also filed a “Motion for Joinder to Related Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,500,508 ([Mattel, Inc. v. Spin Master Ltd.,] IPR2018-01672) Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).” Paper 3. Spin Master Ltd. (“Patent Owner” or “Spin Master”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 14) and an Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder to IPR2018-01672 (Paper 7). Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Opposition (Paper 8), and with our authorization (Paper 15), Petitioner further filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 16). Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted an inter partes review of the ’508 patent and at the same time denied the Motion for Joinder. Paper 17 (“Dec. to Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 8,500,508 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,500,508
• Lego Systems, Inc. / Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Inc. v. Figurefun LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2018-00755 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 25 unpatentable under each of three §103 combinations; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also Req. Reh’g 1 (quoting from the rule). Therefore, Patent Owner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Also, the body of independent claims 1 and 25 recite structurally complete inventions, and do not rely on the word “token,” from the preamble, for any antecedent basis of terms in the body of the claim. The deletion of this preamble language would not affect the structure of the claimed inventions and confirms that the language of the preamble, which names the machine or manufacture claimed as a token, and states its intended use, is not limiting. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Further, because the bodies of the claims, reciting an “integrated circuit chip” (claim 1) and “storage section” (claim 25), fully define the structure of the claimed tokens and do not rely on the “token” name of the invention to recite the limitations of their structural components, the term the meaning of the claims. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Because the term “token” does not require construction, and is of no significance in determining the meaning of the claim language, we did not adopt Patent Owner’s additional limitation of a token being required to begin play of a game. B. Whether the Board misapprehended Lee and the showing that the Board” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “Final Written Decision, which finds that each of the combinations (Levy and Lee, Katoh and Lee, and Mawle and Lee) discloses the limitations of claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, and 25 (Final Dec. 19–33, 36–48, 50–62, 64–65), that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted by Petitioner and as claimed (id. at 34–35, 48–49, 62–65), and thus,” slip op. at 6

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,338,377
• Lego Systems, Inc. / Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Inc. v. Figurefun LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Sep 16, 2020 · IPR2018-00754 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left in place its determination that claim 9 was unpatentable over White and Lee under § 103(a).

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The party filing a request for rehearing of a final written decision has the burden of showing a decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); see also Req. Reh’g 1 (quoting from the rule). Therefore, Patent Owner bears the burden of establishing that we misapprehended or overlooked the matters that it requests that we review.” slip op. at 3

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “In our Final Written Decision, we explained that the Specification does not support Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of the term “token” as being disk-shaped, and determined that “we need only determine that the term ‘token’ does not include an ‘action figure.’” Final Dec. 11–12. The full record indicated to us that, even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of “token” as an “item required to begin play of a game,” Petitioner had still shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 9 is unpatentable over White and Lee. As described in our Final Written Decision, we found that “the teachings of White related to tag 5 in base portion 4a of character 4 used in the toy of Figure 1 support Petitioner’s argument that character 4 teaches a ‘game piece with built-in IC chip.’” Final Dec. 32. We understood that “Petitioner is proposing to modify White so that tag 5 is detachable and results in a ‘token with built-in IC chip,’” so that “the modified White character 4 would have base 4a with detachable tag 5 received in recessed portion 3.” Id. at 37 (citing Pet. 65–66; Dec. to Inst. 23; Pet. Reply 24); see also id. at 41–42 (determining that” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We also found that “Lee . . . supports Petitioner’s declarant testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified White so that its tag 5 is detachable in the same manner as Lee so that ‘various action figures can be used with the token.’” Final Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 150). Petitioner, thus, showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Lee teaches or suggests a method of attaching a component to a figure that one of ordinary skill in the art would have applied to White’s tag 5 for the reason asserted by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,001,276
• Parrot S.A. / Parrot Drones S.A.S. et al. v. Qfo Labs, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 11, 2020 · IPR2018-01690 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving claims 13–17 unpatentable and the motion to amend granted for claims 1–10 but denied for substitute claims 21–23.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “II. ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. See also Req. Reh’g. 4 (quoting, in part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)). With this in mind, we address Patent Owner’s arguments below.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Owner’s Motion to Amend in its Rehearing Request. Compare Mot. 11–12, with Req. Reh’g. 7. We considered these arguments in our Decision, and Patent Owner’s arguments express disagreement with our interpretation of “orientation control scheme” but do not show how an argument was overlooked or misapprehended. See Final Dec. 74, 84–86. Patent Owner supplements its prior arguments with contentions that we construed “position” as a verb, not a noun. See Req. Reh’g. 6. Patent Owner does not identify where these additional contentions were previously presented, as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Thus, Patent Owner has failed to show that we misapprehended or overlooked these arguments. See id. Even if the additional contentions had been previously presented, our Decision considered Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of “orientation control scheme.” See Final Dec. 85 (“Even under Patent Owner’s proposed interpretation of ‘orientation control scheme’ (Mot. 11–12), Petitioner persuades us that Louvel and Nagamitsu teach the final recitation of proposed substitute claim 21.”). Patent Owner’s arguments do not show how an argument was overlooked or misapprehended. In any event, we remain convinced that “Patent Owner’s proposed interpretations are not the broadest reasonable interpretation in view of the Specification of the ’292 patent because the Specification does not use these terms or describe state vectors.” See Final Dec. 74.” slip op. at 4

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “We decline to consider Patent Owner’s constitutional challenge because the issue has been addressed by the Federal Circuit in Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1328 (expressly limiting its holding “to those cases where final written decisions were issued (prior to Arthrex)”). See also Caterpillar Paving Prod. Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., 957 F.3d 1342, 1342–1343 (May 6, 2020) (“The court in Arthrex considered and rejected that argument, expressly limiting its holding ‘to those cases where final written decisions were issued.’”) (quoting 941 F.3d at 1340). Our Decision was entered February 20, 2020, after the Federal Circuit issued its October 2019 decision in Arthrex (see 941 F.3d at 1320).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 9,904,292
• Alphatec Holdings, Inc. / Alphatec Spine, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 8, 2020 · IPR2019-00546 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 was not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because the petitioner did not establish a sufficient reason to combine the asserted references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “1059–1062, 1064, and 1065. Mot. 1, 5–8 (discussing Ex. 1064 along with other exhibits). Patent Owner indicates that objections to these exhibits were previously filed. Id. at 1 (citing Papers 23, 36). Patent Owner, as the “moving party,” “has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the full record before us, we see no reason to disturb our preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner does not expressly provide its own definition of a level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner also applies Petitioner’s asserted qualifications for one of ordinary skill in the art. See Tr. 27:19– 28:9. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “‘would have a medical degree with two or three years’ experience performing procedures using interbody spinal fusion implants’” or “‘would have a mechanical or biomechanical engineering degree with at least two years’ experience working in developing implant devices and associated instruments with significant access to orthopedic surgeons or neurosurgeons.’” Dec. to Inst. 13 (citing Pet. 28; Ex. 1002 ¶ 18). This level” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Frey supports Dr. Youssef’s testimony, and the parties do not dispute, that a lateral X-ray would show alignment of markers 1438 when Frey’s implant is properly aligned in the disc space. Ex 1002 ¶ 161; Ex. 1040 ¶ 156; Ex. 2055 ¶¶ 119, 120. Frey also implicitly supports that a lateral X-ray would show markers 1438 not aligned with each other when Frey’s implant is not properly aligned in the disc space. Ex. 1040 ¶ 156. There is lateral X-ray, and Petitioner does not address Patent Owner’s argument that a fourth radiopaque marker would make a lateral X-ray ambiguous. See Pet. Reply 8–9 (arguing under “Motivation to combine” that other references teach a “central region” and Patent Owner reads the references in isolation). In view of the full record before us, we credit Dr. Youssef’s testimony (Ex. 2055 ¶¶ 114–123) over Dr. Branch’s testimony (Ex 1002 ¶¶ 161, 166) because Dr. Youssef’s opinion is more consistent with the teachings of Frey. Ex. 1040 ¶ 156.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Frey supports Dr. Youssef’s testimony, and the parties do not dispute, that a lateral X-ray would show alignment of markers 1438 when Frey’s implant is properly aligned in the disc space. Ex 1002 ¶ 161; Ex. 1040 ¶ 156; Ex. 2055 ¶¶ 119, 120. Frey also implicitly supports that a lateral X-ray would show markers 1438 not aligned with each other when Frey’s implant is not properly aligned in the disc space. Ex. 1040 ¶ 156. There is lateral X-ray, and Petitioner does not address Patent Owner’s argument that a fourth radiopaque marker would make a lateral X-ray ambiguous. See Pet. Reply 8–9 (arguing under “Motivation to combine” that other references teach a “central region” and Patent Owner reads the references in isolation). In view of the full record before us, we credit Dr. Youssef’s testimony (Ex. 2055 ¶¶ 114–123) over Dr. Branch’s testimony (Ex 1002 ¶¶ 161, 166) because Dr. Youssef’s opinion is more consistent with the teachings of Frey. Ex. 1040 ¶ 156. Petitioner also argues that combining Frey, Michelson, and Baccelli “amounts to nothing more than rearranging known mechanical elements to achieve a predictable result.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–144, 148– 150). Even if we were to agree that Petitioner’s proposed combination is a rearrangement of known mechanical elements, as discussed above, placing Petitioner’s a fourth marker at the location that Petitioner proposes would result in an ambiguous lateral X-ray, and the record provides no other support that one of skill in the art would have made this rearrangement. Accordingly, for the reasons above and based on the full record before us, we determine that Petitioner does not present a sufficient reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Frey in view of Michelson and Baccelli.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 8,187,334 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,187,334

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.