- Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00531 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 and 13–15 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claim 12 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’698 patent. Discretionary denial of institution was determined to be not appropriate in this proceeding, and the proceeding was referred to the Board. Paper 10. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’698 patent on all presented challenges. Paper 11 (“Inst. Dec.”), 15.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2025). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. (“Petitioner”) has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–11 and 13–15, but not claim 12, of U.S. Patent No. 9,168,698 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’698 patent”) are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 9,168,698 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,698 - Google LLC / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 7, 2026 · IPR2025-00059 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Yook, Bauer, and Lee.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) requesting institution of an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 of the ’135 patent. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5–9, 15, 16, 19, and 20 of the ’135 patent on all presented challenges. Paper 8 (“Inst. Dec.”), 2, 23.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentable
“D. Asserted Obviousness Based on Yook 1. Yook (Ex. 1005) Yook relates particularly “to a method and mobile terminal that can divide the screen into individual divided screen areas and simultaneously present user functions on the individual divided screen areas.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 3. Reproduced below are Figures 1 and 2 of Yook. Figure 1 “illustrates an external appearance of a mobile terminal,” and Figure 2 “is an illustration of an exemplary block diagram of the mobile terminal” shown in Figure 1. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 11, 12. Mobile terminal 100 includes touch screen 140, control unit 160, and storage unit 150, as well as radio frequency unit 110, input unit 120, and audio processing unit 130. Id. ¶ 25. Touch screen 140 includes display unit 141 and touch panel 143 that can be arranged in front of display unit 141. Id. ¶ 30. Mobile unit 100 can activate a screen management program stored in storage unit 150 “in response to a user request,” and control unit 160 can cause display unit 141 to divide the screen into several divided screen areas and output functional view areas related to user functions to the individual divided screen areas. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 31, 37. Also, “[t]he screen area management program can be loaded on the control unit 160 in response to program may include:” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 9,141,135 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,141,135 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01046 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 2–15, finding a reasonable likelihood that the 1946 Cyclopedia, Lindström, and Wong render at least claim 2 obvious; claim 1 was disclaimed.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is incorrect, “because design or analysis experience with other industrial wheeled vehicles would not necessarily be applicable to the art of the ’892 Patent.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 38–39). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Id. (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 34, 38). The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years 5 Because Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claim 1, this ground is moot. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 12. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge would not.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 39). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we need not construe expressly any claim term to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“been obvious over the 1946 Cyclopedia and Wong. Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner provides sufficient rational underpinning for its assertion that it would have been obvious in view of Wong to implement a cross-wise extending beam to reinforce the 1946 Cyclopedia’s NSC ore car’s end slope sheet. Pet. 52–53; Prelim. Resp. 28– 30. In response to Petitioner’s assertion that “[t]he upper, outboard end of [Wong’s slope sheet 26] is reinforced by a cross-wise, L-shaped beam positioned under the slope sheet,” Patent Owner argues that “Wong does not provide reinforcement, but simply shows two sheets being connected for lading containment and load transfer.” Pet. 52; Prelim. Resp. 29. At this stage, we find Petitioner has the better position. Although we agree with Patent Owner that Wong shows two sheets connected to one another, that does not negate Petitioner’s correct observation that Wong shows an upper end of its end slope sheet 26 resting on an L-shaped structure, which apparently would reinforce end slope sheet. Pet. 52; Ex. 1003 ¶ 56. reason to look to Wong in the first place,” we again find that Petitioner has the better position at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 29. For example, Wong’s disclosure of “hopper railcar 10” (Ex. 1006, 3:6–9) and the 1946 Cyclopedia’s disclosure of “Freight Cars: Hopper Ore” (Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1054, 27–28) support Petitioner’s position that “Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field.” Pet. 52; see also id. at 76 (“Wong discloses a rail road hopper car (‘hopper railcar’ 10)”), 18–19 (“The ore-car section of the 1946 Cyclopedia—entitled ‘Freight Cars: Hopper Ore’— contains drawings and a photograph of an ore car manufactured by Patent Owner NSC.”); Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (“Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field of hopper railcars”) (citing Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1006, code [57]). This position is not persuasively rebutted by Patent Owner’s argument that Wong’s hopper railcar 10 uses aluminum and steel together for certain reasons. Prelim. Resp. 28–29.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,166,892 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01047 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–44 on all presented challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that FreightCar would prevail on at least one claim based on Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–44 of the ’515 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Pet. 29; Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“to further support the upper, outboard end of the slope sheet with a crosswise, L-shaped beam as in Wong,” and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so, because of “the benefits of reinforcing the slope sheet at its upper end, where its connection with another structure creates a stress concentration.” Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108). Petitioner points to Hart’s transverse beam b3 and argues that it suggests using a transverse beam like Wong if Hart is modified so that upper beam b3 no longer supports the slope sheet. Id. (citing Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Petitioner also argues that the references are in the same field and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108; Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows that its proposed combination of Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong teaches or suggests the above-quoted limitations of claim 24 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,132,515 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - PTAB · Sep 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00954 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all petition grounds and granted NXP’s motion to join the Samsung IPR, subject to stated conditions.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–19 of the ’886 patent based on the same prior art, evidence, and unpatentability theories in the Samsung IPR, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial for the same reasons the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial was satisfied in the Samsung IPR. See Samsung IPR Inst. Dec. 14–27.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“For the reasons stated by Petitioner in the Motion, and in the absence of any opposition by Patent Owner, we agree that Petitioner’s joinder to the Samsung IPR is appropriate and will not materially affect the trial schedule for the Samsung IPR. See Mot. 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“2. Timeliness As discussed above, “[a]ny request for joinder must be filed . . . no later than one month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which joinder is requested.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). We instituted an inter partes review in the Samsung IPR on April 4, 2025. See Samsung IPR Inst. Dec. 1. Petitioner filed the Petition and Motion for Joinder on May 2, 2025. See P-TACTS, Filing Date Papers 1 (Pet.), 3 (Mot.). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b), Petitioner timely filed the Petition and Motion for Joinder. 3. Conclusion Whether the Petition Warrants Institution Because Petitioner (1) satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial; and (2) timely filed the Petition and the Motion for Joinder, the Petition warrants the institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 7,745,886 - Ford Motor Company / General Motors LLC et al. v. Neo Wireless LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00962 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7 and 11 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004 because the combination did not teach a mobile device as construed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Ford requested Director Review of the Institution Denial Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Ford Institution Denial Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”). In addition, the Director sua sponte granted Director Review of the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision and, on March 22, 2024, vacated and remanded the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision for the same reasons as those set forth in the Director’s Decision. GM and Nissan IPR, Papers 12, 16.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“On November 9, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a), after considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Ford Institution Denial Decision”). General Motors LLC and Nissan North America Inc. (“GM and Nissan”) filed a petition requesting inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’450 Patent and a motion for joinder with this proceeding. IPR2023- 00962 (“GM and Nissan IPR”), Papers 3, 4. On December 6, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a) based on the petition filed in the GM and Nissan IPR after consideration of the factors set forth in General Plastic and Valve and denied the Motion for Joinder as moot on the basis of the Ford Institution Denial Decision. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 11 (“GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 10,447,450 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00404 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, 19, 26, 28–41, and 43–46 on both obviousness grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have been someone with at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related scientific field, and (2) either (a) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related field, or (b) two or more years of work or research experience in wireless networking and/or computing.” Pet. 13” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Petitioner identifies the term “client side modem functionality” in claim 5 for construction. Pet. 14. Patent Owner does not address the construction of this term. See Prelim. Resp. 4–6. We determine that we do not need to construe the term “client side modem functionality” for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that the terms “first communication technology,” “second communication technology,” and “third communication technology” should “be understood to have their plain meaning wherein each of these recited communication technologies is a different communication technology.” Prelim. Resp. 5. For purposes of this decision, we will apply Patent Owner’s understanding of these terms. However, we note that Patent Owner does not explain what it means by a “different” communication technology, or how to determine whether two communication technologies qualify as “different.” Id. at 5–6. The parties may wish to explore the meaning of this term further during the trial.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,413,502 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 8, 15, and 22 are obvious over Ferro, Oyobe, Donnelly, Letendre, and Seelig.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“motivated and found it obvious to modify Ferro-Oyobe-Donnelly to include Letendre’s graphical slider on the charge level bar graph of the GUI as a third portion, where the operator moves the slider to specify a desired charge.” Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 235). Petitioner contends that Ferro- Donnelly already reflects a system with a GUI on a touchscreen for depicting state of charge and modifying that GUI to add a slider for specifying the state of charge is expressly motivated by Letendre’s indication that “it is essential that the driver be able to limit any draw down so travel is not affected.” Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 19). Letendre also describes its GUI with the slider as “a control that the driver sets according to driving needs.” Id. at 59 (citing Ex. 1007, 19). Ferro’s express description of an input/output device for managing charging preferences and Letendre’s express description of a GUI for setting charging parameters suggest using Letendre’s GUI with Ferro’s system. Id. at 60–61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 236). Petitioner also argues that its proposed combination constitutes “applying a known technique ([Letendre’s] slider . . .) to a known device ([Donnelly’s] vehicle GUI showing a charge bar graphic) ready for improvement to yield predictable results of easily allowing a user to choose a desired level of charge.” Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 237). Petitioner also contends that “[s]liders on GUIs were known to make inputting information easier, and thus [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would have been motivated to include a slider on the bar graph.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 237). An ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Letendre’s slider in the GUI suggested by Ferro-Donnelly because that GUI already enabled setting charging preferences including “amount of charge” (i.e., minimum and maximum). Id. at 61–62 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 123; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 238–239).” slip op. at 25
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 56–59. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over twice as long as the Petition at 214 pages” with a substantive portion containing “an incredible 29,831 words.” Id. at 57. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the 29,831 words of the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “thirty-seven (37) additional references in addition to Ferro, Oyobe, Donnelly, Letendre, and Seelig.” Id. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 28
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,631,987 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, and 11 are obvious over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Donnelly’s GUI into Sutardja’s display to more easily and conveniently communicate Sutardja’s state of charge information to a user in a graphical format. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 242; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–159. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine Donnelly’s GUI depicting a bar graph indicating the charged and uncharged capacity of a vehicle battery into Sutardja according to well-known methods that would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 160). Petitioner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Donnelly’s GUI as it relates to the state of charge into Sutardja’s vehicle, which already processed information about the state of charge of its battery and included a display showing charging parameters. Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 242, 243, Ex. 1003 ¶ 161).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“includes “at least” a bar graph as shown in Figure 7. Id. at 4. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “proposed construction should be rejected” because it “would wrongly import embodiments from the specification.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Patent Owner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would recognize that the “unitary charge indicator is not limited to a bar graph representation.” Id. at 21. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because Petitioner does not argue that the term is “limited” to the embodiment shown in Figure 7, only that the term “at least includes” that embodiment. Patent Owner does not contend otherwise.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 46–49. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over 140 pages” with a substantive portion containing “multiples of the allotted 14000 words” to a petition. Id. at 47. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the extraneous pages cited within the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “many additional references in addition to references actually ‘relied upon’ by Petitioner.” Id. at 47–48. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,990,788
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.