- Google LLC v. Agis Software Development, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2019 · IPR2018-01080 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 14, 15, 17, 21–25, 27, 28, 30, 32–34, 36, 37, 40–43, 45, 49, and 54 are unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Reaching this conclusion, however, requires more than a mere showing that the prior art includes separate references covering each separate limitation in a claim under examination. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Rather, obviousness requires the additional showing that a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have selected and combined those prior art elements in the normal course of research and development to yield the claimed invention. Id. I. Obviousness over Fumarolo, Sheha, and Lazaridis” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,408,055 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,408,055 - Google LLC v. Agis Software Development, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2019 · IPR2018-01079 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Kubala and Hammond; the Board did not find them unpatentable over the Hammond, Johnson, and Pepe combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“2. Terms to be Construed Expressly Petitioner proposes that we construe as means-plus-function under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the terms in claim 1 that include the word “means,” i.e., limitations 1.2 and 1.5 to 1.9. Pet. 10–12. Patent Owner agrees these terms should be construed as means-plus-function, and further argues we should adopt the constructions entered in the district court proceeding for the purposes of consistency across proceedings. Prelim. Resp. 9–14.10” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“creating a forced message alert”) (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1001, 10:14–17 (claim 6, “creating the forced message alert on said sender PDA/cell phone by attaching a voice or text message to a forced message alert application software packet to said voice or text message”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, by the very language of the claims, a message is forced because it is attached to a forced message alert software packet. Nothing in the claim language indicates that what makes the message forced is forcing its display without any action on the part of the recipient.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Accordingly, we are persuaded that “implementing Hammond’s” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 8,213,970 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,213,970 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 7, 2019 · IPR2019-00838 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1, 13–18, 22, and 33–38 under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art had been presented to the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In evaluating whether to deny institution on the basis of § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, the Board considers the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (2) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (3) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (4) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (5) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (6) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Feit Electric Company, Inc. v. Signify Holding B.V. F/K/A Philips Lighting Holding B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 18, 2019 · IPR2018-00921 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 22, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over Biebl; claims 7 and 14 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed combinations lacked sufficient support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The Specification supports the construction that an oscillating signal is periodically varying. For instance, the Specification states that “the low frequency oscillating signal changes from low to high.” Ex. 1001, 2:35–37. In another example, “the oscillating signal can be a square wave oscillating between 0 and 16 volts with a frequency of 200 to 300 Hertz.” Id. at 4:17– 20. In these examples, the ’890 patent uses term “oscillating” to describe signals having periodic variation or change. Thus, we construe “an oscillating signal” as a signal with periodic variation. generating an oscillating signal. Petitioner’s definition from a technical dictionary merely adds that an oscillator is (1) an electronic circuit and (2) “converts energy from a direct-current source.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1021, 3 (McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 1341–40 (4th ed. 1989))). There is no dispute about a direct-current source. The Specification discusses an “oscillator” in terms of its function. See Ex. 1001, 2:17–19, 26–27; 44–48. Thus, we determine that “oscillator” means an electronic circuit that generates an oscillating signal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Patent indicates that either set of resistors can perform the claimed function. Prelim. Resp. 12. For instance, R1A1, R1A2, and R1A3 appear in the schematic diagram in Figure 2A. This diagram shows a first power supply 112 that supplies current to LED array 114. Ex. 1001, 3:11–12. LED array 114 responds to signals for the STOP input 104 or TURN input 102. Id. at 3:12–14. The resistors are between the first power supply 112 and LED array 114 to sense current. Id. at 3:31–35. By contrast, R1B1, R1B2, and R1B3 appear in the schematic diagram in Figure 2C. This diagram shows a second power supply (130) that supplies power to LED array 126. Id. at 3:55–56. LED array 126 responds to signals for the STOP input 104 or TAIL input 106, depending on the input mode. Id. at 3:56–59. Figure 2C shows the resistors connected to the second power supply 130. Id., Fig. 2C. So the two sets of resistors perform the same function but are connected to different power supplies. Thus, the structures disclosed in the Specification as corresponding to the claimed function are (1) R1A1, R1A2, or R1A3 or (2) R1B1, R1B2, or corresponding structure because it is immaterial to our analysis below.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Any difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are immaterial because, as Dr. Zane explains, “applying Dr. Shackle’s standard for the level of ordinary skill in the art would not affect [Dr. Zane’s] analysis and conclusion regarding the patentability of any challenged claim.” Id. ¶ 27. So we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, which appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted references. See Okajima v. Bordeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Yet nothing in the claim suggests that visual characteristics are relevant. Rather, claim 1’s system uses the recited states for a purpose unrelated to viewing waveforms—i.e., to determine whether to supply power or not. See Ex. 1001, 5:24–27. So we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that slope or other visual characteristics should be the only basis for defining the states. See PO Resp. 15. Thus, Petitioner has shown that Biebl teaches “an oscillating signal having a first state and a second state.”” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 6,586,890 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,586,890 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00736 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations taught the claimed conversational protocol.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’128 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 12–13. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim. Petitioner’s evidence and argument fails to persuasively and adequately explain how the speech acts or performatives as described in Nodine are the events recited in the challenged claims. Although both Finin and Bayardo define and disclose performatives (Ex. 1016, 297; Ex. 1017, 197), Petitioner does not discuss these disclosures or explain sufficiently how the speech acts/performatives in Nodine, Finin, and Bayardo alone or combination teach the “layer of conversational protocol defined by event types and parameter lists associated with one or more events, and wherein the parameter lists further refine the one or more events” limitation of claim 22 and 45. Petitioner asserts that “Nodine in combination with Steiner and Finin discloses or suggests this limitation” of claim 45 (Pet. 49), but Petitioner does not identify adequately any reliance on Steiner for this limitation (id. at 28–33, 49). slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“in the art at the time of the invention of the ’128 patent would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline, and one to two years of work experience in networked computer systems or a related area. Ex. 1002 ¶ 14; Pet. 4. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Dr. Olsen’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“The parties do not propose a construction for any claim term. Petitioner avers that no express constructions are required. Pet. 12–13. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s failure to set forth its construction of any term is reason to deny the Petition, and Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any term. Prelim. Resp. 6. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2019 · IPR2019-00735 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted combinations rendered claim 1 and its dependent claims obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim. slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because (1) it relies on similar art that applicant overcame during prosecution of the parent ’115 patent, and (2) it is duplicative of the co-pending petition in IPR2019-00733. Prelim. Resp. 48– 61. Because, for reasons discussed below, we deny the Petition on other grounds, we need not determine whether it also would be appropriate to deny the Petition pursuant to our discretion under § 325(d).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not propose a construction for any claim term. Petitioner avers that no express constructions are required. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s failure to set forth its construction of any term is reason to deny the Petition, and Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any term. Prelim. Resp. 6. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Pet. 25. Petitioner’s arguments offer conclusory statements that equate Nodine’s speech act/performative types to “event types” recited in the challenged claims, and the parameters associated with Nodine’s speech act/performatives with “one or more of the events” recited in the challenged claims. See id. Petitioner argues that Nodine thus discloses the conversational protocols defined by events. Id.; see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 106–107. In sum, Petitioner maps Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” to the “events” recited in claim 1. We note that Petitioner does not offer a construction for “event” or “event types” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 13–14. Petitioner also does not explain persuasively or sufficiently why or how Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” qualify as the “events” recited in the claim. Although “the [prior art] reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required to teach a claim limitation, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), neither Petitioner nor its declarant, Dr. Olsen, explains persuasively or adequately why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Nodine’s “speech acts” or “performatives” as teaching or suggesting the “events” recited in the independent claim.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,036,128 - Google LLC v. Agis Software Development, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 25, 2019 · IPR2018-01079 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied AGIS’s rehearing request, leaving in place institution based on the reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be shown unpatentable over Kubala and Hammond.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“petition decision is abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party seeking rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified: (d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, and opposition, or a reply. 37. C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Hammond), Petitioner relies on Kubala, a printed patent application, as the primary reference. For limitation 1.5, which recites “requiring the forced message alert software on said recipient PDA/cell phone to transmit an automatic acknowledgment to the sender PDA/cell phone as soon as said forced message alert is received by the recipient,” Petitioner relies on Kubala’s disclsoure of automotaically sending, when an e-mail arrives at its intended destination, a return receipt to the sender, thereby providing acknowledgement that the e-mail has been received by the intended recipient. Paper 2, 30 (“Petition” or “Pet.”) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 6). Because Kubala describes sending a return receipt as a prior art solution, Patent Owner argued in the Preliminary Response that Petitioner must show a motivation to combine this feature with “Kubala’s device,” e.g., the device described in Kubala as the alleged invention. Paper 6, 36–37 (“Prelim. Resp.”). According to Patent Owner, Petitioner failed to articulate sufficient reasoning. Id. In particular, Patent Owner argued there is no motivation to combine return receipts with Kubala’s device, which uses flags to indicate to e-mail recipients that a mandatory response is required. Id. Patent Owner argued, furthermore, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood Kubala to teach away from using return receipts in Kubala’s device. Id. In the Request, Patent Owner asserts that we overlooked and/or misapprehended its arguments. Req. Reh’g 2–5. We disagree. We considered, and addressed, Patent Owner’s arguments, and found them to be unavailing. Inst. Dec. 30–32. As noted in the Decision, Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Williams, articulated a rationale to combine, namely that due to uncertainty as to whether an e-mail message was received, return receipts provided a well-known benefit. Id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 103). Also discussed in the Decision, based on the record at the time, we disagreed that Kubala teaches away from the use of return receipts, and provided the reasons for disagreement, explaining that contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, there was no evidence of incompatibility between sending return receipts and flagging e-mail messages to indicate requirement of a mandatory response. Id. at 30–32. Thus, we considered Patent Owner’s arguments in rendering the Decision.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,213,970 - PTAB · Jul 1, 2019 · IPR2019-00485 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because ZTE filed a civil action challenging the patent’s validity before filing the petition, barring review under § 315(a)(1).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we determine that under the circumstances presented here, institution of inter partes review is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1). Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. In addition, because institution of inter partes review is barred under § 315(a)(1) and this section does not provide an exception for joinder under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion as moot.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that § 315(a)(1) bars institution of inter partes review in this case. There is no dispute that ZTE is the petitioner and a real party-in-interest in this proceeding. See Pet. 1 (identifying ZTE as the petitioner); see also id. at 79 (identifying ZTE as a real party-in-interest). Patent Owner contends, and Petitioner does not dispute, that on October 9, 2018, prior to the December 20, 2018 filing date of the Petition, ZTE filed a complaint for declaratory judgment alleging invalidity of the ’970 patent. Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing ZTE (USA), Inc. v. AGIS Software Devlopment LLC et al., No. 4:18-cv-06185 (N.D. Cal.) (filed October 9, 2018) (“ZTE action”)). Because ZTE filed a civil action challenging the validity of the ’970 patent before the date on which it filed the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner that inter partes review is barred by ZTE’s civil action. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingDenied
“Unlike 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which provides an exception to the statutory time bar when a request for joinder is filed, nothing in the language of § 315(a)(1) indicates that the time bar does not apply if a party files for joinder. Consistent with the plain language of § 315(a)(1), which does not include a joinder exception, the Board has expressly held that a motion for joinder does not exempt a petitioner from the statutory bar under this section. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Colas Sols. Inc. v. Blacklidge Emulsions, Inc., Case IPR2018-00243, slip op. at 6, 9 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2018) (Paper 10) (informative)).” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,213,970 - Hytera Communications Co. Ltd. v. Motorola Solutions, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · May 13, 2019 · IPR2017-02183 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7 and 8 were not shown unpatentable under any of the three § 103 grounds because the cited combinations did not teach transmitting on a non-assigned timeslot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“and the specification to determine whether they expressly or implicitly require a specific order. See Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1369–70. Here, we agree with Patent Owner that the language shows that the results of a step are used in the next step; that is, “step 7[b] ‘preparing to transmit a particular payload type in a timeslot’ [comes before] step 7[c] ‘determining whether the timeslot is a current desired timeslot for the TDMA system,’ because the transmitting device looks at the ‘the timeslot’ identified in the ‘preparing’ step to ‘determin[e]’ whether that timeslot is ‘a current desired timeslot.’” PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (quoting Ex. 1001, cl. 7).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the ordered steps 7[c] to 7[e] require transmitting on an alternate timeslot, that is, a timeslot that is not an assigned timeslot. PO Resp. 7–9. The plain language of claim 7 states that the preparing step of limitation 7[b] is for “a timeslot,” indicating that it is broader than the assigned timeslot of the TDMA system. In limitation 7[c], the claim expressly requires a determination of whether the timeslot in the preparing step is the “current desired timeslot” (assigned timeslot) and selecting (limitation 7[d]) the appropriate synch pattern. The “selecting” step of claim 7[d] requires: “if the timeslot is the current desired timeslot, select[] a synchronization pattern selected from the first set of synchronization patterns . . . otherwise select[] a synchronization pattern selected from the second set of synchronization patterns . . . .” The synchronization pattern that is selected in limitation 7[d] is then used during transmission in limitation 7[e]. Thus, although the claims and specification do not explicitly refer to an alternate timeslot, the claim requires transmitting on the timeslot that is not the current desired timeslot (assigned timeslot). See PO Resp. 19–20; Ex. 2008 ¶ 89.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner
“arguments are directed to products produced by Petitioner, rather than by Patent Owner, products that were found in an Initial Determination (“ID”) of the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to infringe challenged claims 7 and 8 of the ’991 patent. Ex. 2009, 192–202. In addition, the Administrative Law Judge in that ID found that Petitioner intentionally copied Patent Owner’s patented technology. Id. at 226–228. That finding was based, in part, upon an adverse inference drawn from the repeated invocation of the Fifth Amendment when former employees of Patent Owner were questioned about allegations that they downloaded confidential documents of Patent Owner shortly before becoming employed by Petitioner. Id. at 241–242 (citing LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 123–24 (2d Cir. 1997)). In addition to Patent Owner’s detailed discussion of how Petitioner’s products embody all limitations of the challenged claims, these specific administrative findings support Patent Owner’s position that there is sufficient nexus between its evidence and the challenged claims. PO Resp. 57–62; Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013).” slip op. at 27
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“We are not persuaded by this argument. Petitioner’s arguments go to the weight that should accorded to the ID, not to its admissibility. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Vaughan’s challenge goes to the weight of the evidence rather than the admissibility of Lueptow’s testimony and analysis.”). As Patent Owner responds, the ITC “determined not to review the portions of the ID’s findings regarding the ’991 patent.” Paper 43, 4. And we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s argument that the Final Determination is subject to approval by the President lacks merit because the President did not act on the Final Determination within the period specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2). Id. at 4–5. The ID recounts evidence that has been considered and evaluated by an objective and disinterested judge, and articulates findings that are relevant to whether there is a sufficient nexus between the challenged claims and Patent Owner’s evidence regarding Petitioner’s products. The ID is also relevant to the issue of copying by Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserts that the ID is prejudicial or confusing, it provides insufficient argument to support those assertions. With respect to Exhibits 2010, 2012–2019, and 2021, Petitioner contends that these exhibits are Hytera advertising and marketing documents, which do not supply sales numbers or third-party praise to prove commercial success. Paper 40, 3–4. Again, this argument relates to the weight to be accorded to that evidence, not to its admissibility. As we note above, we agree with Petitioner that these factors impact the appropriate weight to be accorded to the evidence, and we have accounted for that impact. Finally, we deny Petitioner’s request that Exhibit 2020 should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402 because Patent Owner’s demonstrative slides in Exhibit 2020 rely on Exhibits 2010, 2012–2019, and 2021. As the Board reminded the parties in its Order granting oral argument, “[d]emonstrative exhibits are not evidence.” Paper 44, 3. Exhibit 2020 is merely a demonstrative and is not evidence.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,279,991 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,279,991 - Ruiz Food Products, Inc. v. Macropoint LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · May 6, 2019 · IPR2017-02016 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Ruiz Food Products, Inc.’s request for rehearing, finding no persuasive showing that it misapprehended or overlooked matters in dismissing the proceedings as untimely.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“background legal principle (id. at 2–7), the Decision considers the principle but follows the Federal Circuit’s guidance that the principle is not “firmly established and unequivocal” and therefore cannot justify applying an exception to the unambiguous language of § 315(a)(1). Decision 9–10 (citing Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that a “background legal principle” must be both “firmly established and unequivocal before it can justify ignoring the plain text of the statute”; holding that the principle that “a dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if the underlying complaint had never been filed” is “anything but unequivocal”)).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“(Paper 18) and terminating the proceedings, the Board determined that the Petitions were untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) and that the Board therefore lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings. More specifically, the Board determined that a complaint for declaratory judgment filed before the Petitions triggered the time bar of § 315(a)(1) even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice after its filing. Decision at 2–3.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,275,358
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.