- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,854,595 - Aylo Freesites Ltd v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-00940 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Leaning and over Leaning with Klemets; claims 12–20 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Houh, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media, or a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its post-institution papers. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’234 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that no construction of “virtual timeline” is necessary. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, as discussed below, the parties’ dispute appears to be about whether the “virtual timeline” identified by Petitioner is used to arrange the requested streamlets, as is also recited in claim 9. We address that argument below. See infra § II.D.10.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“On this record, we determine that the recitation “to achieve continuous presentation” is limiting and requires an amount of continuous (uninterrupted) playback/presentation after an upshift or downshift. The specification describes agent controller 702 determining whether to upshift based on a trigger threshold Θup, which itself is based on various factors including a current read ahead margin and a minimum safety margin. See Ex. 1001, 17:44–58. If agent controller 702 can sustain upshift quality, then it will upshift and request higher quality streams. See id. at 17:58–61. Conversely, when an upshift is not possible, agent controller 702 determines whether to downshift based a different threshold Θdown, which itself is based on the same sort of factors. See id. at 18:4–7. When the stream quality is not adequate, it downshifts. See id. at 18:7–14. These disclosures are similar to the language of claim 12, which recites “repeatedly generating a factor indicative of a current ability to receive the digital content at a rate sufficient for presenting the digital content as the digital content is received, . . . wherein the factor relates to a performance of the network” and “making the successive determinations whether to change the requested bit rate based on the factor to achieve continuous presentation of the digital content using the individually-requestable portions of the highest bit rate one of the copies determined receivable at that time.” Ex. 1001, 20:5–16 (emphasis added). That is, claim 12 refers to “achiev[ing] continuous presentation” based on what is “sufficient for presenting the digital content,” trading quality to ensure continuous playback.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“server comprises at least two servers and wherein at least one streamlet is requested from a first of the at least one server and at least one other streamlet is requested from a second server of the at least one server other than the first server.” Ex. 1001, 19:7–12. Petitioner references its mapping of the “at least one server” in claim 1 to Leaning’s server 1. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:15–16, 2:18–22, 2:31–32, 5:8–14, Fig. 1), 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:13–26, 9:3–7, 16:6–12), 37; see supra §§ II.D.2.b–c. Petitioner contends that, “[t]o the extent Leaning does not disclose at least two servers wherein one sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a first server and another sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a second server such an arrangement would have been obvious in view of the knowledge of a [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Id. at 37. Citing the common nature of such an arrangement, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to provide multiple web servers containing the same sets of sub-files for streams in order to have redundancy in the system and allow for clients to establish connections with multiple servers and request a first sub-file from a first web server and, if the connection between the first web server becomes congested or the first web server otherwise fails or becomes unavailable, request a subsequent sub-file from the second web server. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1012, 108,5 Fig. 4-11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for claim 3. We are persuaded that it would have been obvious to implement Leaning’s server 1 as two servers that store different streamlets based on Dr. Houh’s uncontested testimony about system redundancy. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. His testimony is backed by a contemporaneous reference about HTTP that shows requests for different objects from different servers over parallel TCP connections. See, e.g., Ex. 1012, 108–09, Fig. 4-11. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 3 would have been obvious over Leaning.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,991,234 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,991,234 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - The Boeing Company v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00761 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–24 not unpatentable because the asserted references did not show the glass element propagating a modified stress wave to generate tensile stress at the interface.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’684 patent “would have had an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering or a related field, and at least five years of experience using laser systems to characterize and test mechanical behavior in materials” and that “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“Both parties maintain that no claim term needs to be construed. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40); PO Resp. 20. Patent Owner, however, provides an express construction for limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and the similar limitation of independent claim 13, namely limitation [13.c]. PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). To resolve the controversy before us, we determine that these limitations require express construction. 1. “the glass element is configured to propagate and modify a stress wave to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile stress between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [1.d]) and “propagating and modifying a stress wave through the glass element to the coating/substrate interface to generate a tensile force between the substrate and the coating” (limitation [13.c]) Patent Owner argues these limitations mean “changing the profile of the laser generated compressive wave and propagating the wave profile as modified to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 25). Petitioner does not refute this proposed construction and, during the oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it agrees with the proposed construction. Tr. 8:16–9:12. We so no reason to depart from the parties agreed-upon construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Accordingly, for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt the parties’ construction of limitations [1.d] and [13.c].” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“a shock in the compression wave in the fused silica substrate. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Wang-Dissertation’s fused silica substrate modifies the compression waveform, we would not be persuaded that the fused silica substrate propagates the modified wave to the free surface of the coating, which upon reflection from the free surface as a tension wave generates a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface, as limitation [1.d] requires. In view of the presence of tension-wave-1 in Wang-Dissertation’s experiments, we find Petitioner has not demonstrated persuasively that the fused silica substrate propagates a modified stress wave to the free surface of the coating to generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Also, we find credible Dr. Gupta’s unrebutted testimony that any modified compression wave would attenuate in the substrate and not propagate to the free surface coating or generate a tensile stress at the coating/substrate interface. Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 93–98. Petitioner does not dispute that the experiments in Wang-Dissertation include tension-wave-1. See Ex. 1005, 65 (“The experimental picture is complicated somewhat by the presence of a tensile wave, reflected from the back of the confining layer.”). Nor does Petitioner dispute that Wang-Dissertation discloses that the tension-wave-1 propagates faster than the compression-wave-1 and eventually overtakes compression-wave-1. See id. at 65–66 (“Being tensile, it propagates faster that the peak compressive stress, and faster than the low stress tail of the main pulse. It eventually overtakes the compressive pulse and linear dissipative mechanisms govern the final thickness of the shock.”). Rather, Petitioner relies on Dr. Wang’s testimony regarding the timing of the waves through the sample and argues that tension-wave-1 does not overtake compression-wave-1 in the fused silica substrate. Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1038 ¶ 5). Dr. Wang testifies that the peak stress from tension-wave-1 is about 2 ns behind the peak of compression-wave-1 and will not reach the interface before the reflected tensile peak of compression-wave-1 reaches the interface in 0.3 ns. Ex. 1038 ¶ 5. However, as Dr. Gupta persuasively explains, the delay between tension-wave-1 and compression-wave-1 depends on the properties of the confining layer, and Wang-Dissertation acknowledges that these properties are not well controlled. Ex. 2011 ¶ 54; see also Ex. 1005, 65 (“The surface properties of that confining layer are not well controlled.”).” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“claimed subject matter. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. In doing so, Petitioner continues to rely on Wang-Dissertation to disclose limitation [1.d] of independent claim 1 and limitation [13.c] of independent claim 13. Pet. 35–38; Pet. Reply 23–24. Petitioner does not put forth any further obviousness rationale in this ground based on Wang-Dissertation for teaching these limitations. For the same reasons discussed in sections II.C.2–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that Wang-Dissertation teaches or suggests limitations [1.d] and [13.c]. Thus, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wang-Dissertation renders obvious the subject matter set forth in claims 4, 6, 9, 15, 17, 20, 23, and 24, which depend from independent claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,487,684 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,487,684 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00188 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–10, finding a reasonable likelihood that Cisco would prevail on the §103 challenge based on EDC_525, EDC_892, and Hanif.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review. B. Real Party in Interest” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s reading and interpretation of the stipulation. Petitioner’s stipulation states that “Petitioner will not pursue in the co-pending district court litigation (WSOU Investments, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00332 (E.D. Tex.)) the specific grounds asserted in the IPR2025-00188 petition, or any other ground that could have been reasonably raised against Challenged Claims 1 through 10 of U.S. Patent No. 8982691 in an IPR.” Paper 7, 2 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s reservation of rights also states that “Petitioner does not relinquish any rights or opportunities to pursue in the co-pending district court litigation (WSOU Investments, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00332 (E.D. Tex.)) any ground on which the PTAB declines to institute an IPR trial. Id. (emphasis added). When read together, Petitioner’s stipulation limits Petitioner to pursue in district court a “ground on which the PTAB declines to institute an IPR trial.” This means that the Board must first have “decline[d] to institute” a “ground” in “an IPR trial” before the Petitioner would be allowed to pursue that “ground” in the “co-pending district court litigation.” In our view, Patent Owner misinterprets and overstates Petitioner’s limited reservation of rights in its Sotera stipulation. In Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corporation, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”), the Board considered a stipulation similar to the one Petitioner now offers in its “mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions,” and determined that “Petitioner’s broad stipulation ensures that an inter partes review is a ‘true alternative’ to the district court proceeding.” Id. at 19. Following the analysis in Sotera, we find that Petitioner’s stipulation weighs strongly against exercising discretion to deny institution. See Sotera at 18– 19.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner provides sufficient evidence and argument for combining the teachings of the asserted art in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Patent Owner does not substantively dispute Petitioner’s evidence or arguments for combining the asserted references. Based on this preliminary record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that at the time of the claimed invention a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the asserted art in the manner described by the Petition.” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) as a person having “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of network communications and would be knowledgeable regarding MPLS techniques.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). According to Petitioner, “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but “submits that the above POSITA at the time of the ’691 Patent may alternatively have additional years of practical and 2 The ’691 patent was filed before the March 16, 2013, effective date of the §103 provisions in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29. Ex. 1001, code (22). Accordingly, we cite to pre-AIA § 103(a). technical education, and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 28–29. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the subject matter of the ’691 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,982,691 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00347 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds and granted joinder to IPR2024-00918, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024); Paper 8 (referral to panel after no discretionary denial briefing under the Interim Processes memorandum). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’564 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the fuboTV/MasterClass petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same testimony from the same expert (Dr. Henry Houh, Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 5–9. Petitioner also represents that joinder will not impact the fuboTV/MasterClass IPR schedule. See, e.g., Mot. 6–7 (“joinder will have minimal, if any, impact on the trial schedule, as all issues are substantively identical, and Petitioner will accept an ‘understudy’ role. . . . Lastly, the briefing and discovery will be simplified by resolving all issues in a single proceeding”), 9–10 (“[b]ecause the Instant Petition is substantively identical to the fuboTV/MasterClass [p]etition, with the same grounds applied to the same claims as instituted by the Board, there are no new issues for Patent Owner to address,” and “[j]oinder of this proceeding with the fuboTV/MasterClass IPR would not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule in any meaningful way”).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 9,407,564 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00348 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–21 on all petition grounds and granted joinder to IPR2024-00919, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“fuboTV/MasterClass IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. See fuboTV/MasterClass IPR, Paper 14 (institution decision). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the fuboTV/MasterClass petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same testimony from the same expert (Dr. Henry Houh, Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 5–10. Petitioner also represents that joinder will not impact the fuboTV/MasterClass IPR schedule. See, e.g., Mot. 6–7 (“joinder will have minimal, if any, impact on the trial schedule, as all issues are substantively identical, and Petitioner will accept an “understudy” role. . . . Lastly, the” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,868,772 - Intel Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00301 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1–11, 16, and 21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial, and denied joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“2026. This date is nearly five months prior to the date on which the final written decision would be due if trial were instituted in this proceeding. And, even if we assume Petitioner’s alleged February–March 2026 trial date, this date too is several months prior to the projected final written decision deadline. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding would issue before trial in the district court, unless the trial was delayed or rescheduled for a later time. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. See ARM Ltd. v. Daedalus Prime LLC, IPR2025-00207, Paper 10 at 2 (May 16, 2025) (Before the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (exercising discretion to deny institution with the same relative timing between district court trial and final written decision deadline).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review. Additionally, for the same reasons and because institution was denied in IPR2024-01248, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“[T]he Director . . . may join as a party . . . any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.”).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,814,071
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.