- Google LLC v. Withrow Networks Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00775 · APJ Jason J Chung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable, including over Carmel and Mattavelli.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations, such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved need, failure of others, etc.).5 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We analyze the asserted grounds based on obviousness with the principles we identify above in mind.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at 696–97. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Polish, Google argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have possessed at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field requiring learning computation principles, and two years of work experience in networking or streaming media systems, particularly audio and video, over the Internet. Additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“In the Petition, Google states that it “does not presently contend that any [claim] term requires express construction.” Pet. 6. In response, Withrow acquiesces; in particular, Withrow argues “the Board need not construe any terms of the ’849 Patent. Petitioner does not contend any [claim] terms require express construction.” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 6). Based on the preliminary record, there is no readily discernible controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms at this time. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Turning to rationale to combine, Google contends that Carmel and Mattavelli are both directed to processing multimedia data playback “for the appreciation of a user,” while providing the highest perceived audio and video output quality possible in view of system constraints to ensure playback continuity. Pet. 50–51 (citing Ex. 1003, 10:48–54, 11:9–18, 7:35– 49, Figs. 3D, 6B; Ex. 1004, 2309, 2310). Google argues that both Carmel and Mattavelli pertain to compression of multimedia data using well-known coding and compression standards for video streaming. Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:25–26, 11:24–52; Ex. 1004, 2309–2311). Google argues a PHOSITA would appreciate both Carmel and Mattavelli complement each other because Carmel pertains to addressing constraints to available network bandwidth, whereas Mattavalli relates to addressing limits on available processing resources at the client/multimedia player. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003, Abstract, 7:36–41; Ex. 1004, 2309–2312). Google argues that a PHOSITA would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings in Carmel and Mattavelli to create a more robust streaming system that addresses both bandwidth constraints and client processing limits to provide a best possible playback experience. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Google argues that Mattavelli teaches merely optimizing transmission bandwidth is not sufficient and is potentially harmful, which provides an express motivation to combine Carmel’s and Mattavelli’s complementary teachings to ensure that different, related links in the streaming playback chain are optimized together. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 216–217; Ex. 1004, 2310). In addition, Google argues Carmel contains an express disclosure that would have motivated a PHOSITA to combine Carmel with Mattavelli’s complementary teachings because Carmel states that multimedia playback is achieved “preferably with only a minimal necessary transmission and decoding delay.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 218; Ex. 1003, 10:50–54). Withrow does not specifically respond to these arguments, except for limitations 1[c.ii] and 1[c.iv] discussed infra. See generally Prelim. Resp. Nonetheless, the burden of persuasion remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Based on the preliminary record, we discern no deficiency in Google’s characterizations of Carmel, Mattavelli, or the general background knowledge in the art. In addition, for purposes of institution, we are persuaded by Dr. Polish’s testimony concerning the relevant disclosures in Carmel and Mattavelli.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,849 - PTAB · Aug 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00495 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 13, 14, and 18–20 for the asserted §103 ground based on Chang and Chang II; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“the need for this second . . . Petition, the Board should decline to expend its finite resources considering it.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Patent Owner argues that “[n]either the substance nor the timing of [Patent Owner]’s claim interpretations justifies this second Petition.” Id. at 6. We disagree and determine that two petitions challenging claims of the ’420 patent are justified under the circumstances presented here. With regard to substance of the claim interpretations and merits of the challenge, the claim interpretations offered in the instant proceeding have no relation to the claims or the merits of the challenges that are the subject of the first Petition. As stated by Petitioner, “[t]he petition in IPR2024-00228 challenges claims 1-12 and 15-17” and “[t]here are no overlapping claims in these petitions.” PET’s Expl. 1. Petitioner argues, “[t]herefore, the petitions present materially different challenges, each to a unique subset of ’420 patent claims.” Id. We agree that, because of the uniqueness of the claim interpretations asserted in this proceeding that are not at all related to any of the claims challenged in the prior Petition or to any of the challenges asserted in the prior Petition, the instant, second Petition is justified.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“89–92. With regard to discretionary denial pursuant to Section 314(a), Petitioner states that it “hereby stipulates that, if the PTAB institutes this inter partes review, Petitioner will not pursue invalidity of the Challenged Claims in a parallel district court proceeding on the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this Petition.” Id. at 90. Our analysis under Section 314(a) is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”).5 Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Although Patent Owner cites the Director’s Memo and argues for discretionary denial under Section 314(a), Patent Owner fails to provide any reasoning or explanation as to why we should not follow the guidance of the Director. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like that in Sotera, we do not discretionarily deny institution under Section 314(a).” slip op. at 11
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Our rule relating to claim construction provides that “[a]ny prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action . . . that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.” 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b). We have considered the District Court’s claim construction Order and Memorandum (Ex. 1080) that was 6 These alterations in original. timely made of record by Petitioner in this proceeding (Paper 11). Based on our independent review of the ’420 claims and specification, we agree with and adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the District Court that claim 13 should be corrected and rewritten as proposed by the Patent Owner and ordered by the District Court. Therefore, we construe claim 13 by twice replacing “hub” with –host— as shown in claim 13 as reproduced above. See Section I.D. (Challenged Claims) supra.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that no additional claim terms require express construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the 7 Claim 20 depends indirectly from claim 18 and directly from claim 19. Ex. 1003, 12:42. controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,619,420 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00229 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Microchip would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“II. ANALYSIS We consider the arguments and evidence of the parties to determine whether Petitioner has met the reasonable likelihood standard for institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties agree that a POSITA would have a four year or bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science and professional experience related to USB. Compare Pet. 23–24 with Prelim. Resp. 14. And, the parties also agree that a relevant advanced degree or additional education may take the place of at least some work experience and that work experience may take the place of some formal education. Id. Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have more familiarity with USB related documents and systems than contended by Patent Owner. We need not, and do not, resolve this dispute between the parties at this preliminary stage in this proceeding. We invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, at this point, we consider the arguments and evidence from the standpoint of such a skilled artisan. If a POSITA was considered to have the additional work experience with USB systems and familiarity with USB standards as proposed by” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states in the Petition that no terms need construction for this proceeding. Pet. 24–25. Patent Owner states that, at this time, Patent Owner sees no need to construe any claim language. Prelim. Resp. 20. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Ex. 1005, 2:60–66. We determine that this contention seems reasonable in view of the market demands acknowledged in the Specification. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“Often it will be necessary for a court to look to . . . the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace . . . to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”). Petitioner also contends that “modifying Chang to include dual-role ports would further its express goal of ‘easily establishing a connection between a computer and another computer.’” Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 3). And, Petitioner relies on the acknowledgement in the ’962 patent that smartphones have become “standalone computing devices.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 2:44–50). The Petition states: [A] POSITA would have been motivated to include dual-role port(s) to further Chang’s goal of connecting the upstream computer to the downstream phone acting as a computer. Welch, ¶178. Specifically, dual-role ports would allow consumer products, such as smartphones, that operate as computers (in host mode) to “easily establish[] a connection” (EX1014, [0005]) to the upstream host; the smartphone would plug into the dual-role port and automatically connect to the upstream host (through the bridge) when the smart phone switches to host mode . . . without requiring the user to switch between dedicated host- and device-ports. Welch, ¶¶178-179. Pet. 35–36. According to Petitioner with supporting testimony of its declarant, “[t]his avoids the inconvenience, hassle, and confusion of consumers having to keep track of (1) what mode their phone is operating in and (2) what mode(s) are supported by individual hub ports.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1013 (Welch Decl.) ¶ 179). Here again, we determine that this reasoning provides rational underpinning, supported by evidence, that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify the USB hub module of Chang to include dual-role ports as described in Chang II.” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,645,962 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00230 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claim 1 under both asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Chang and Chang II, alone or with Chutorash, render the claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2023). Upon consideration of the papers, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of the challenged claim of the ’072 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art does not substantively impact our analysis for purposes of institution. Rather, we ordinary skill in the art that Petitioner shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in proving the unpatentability of the challenged claim. At this stage of the proceeding, however, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition for one of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 13. This proposed definition is consistent with the ’072 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below. During trial, and in accordance with our Rules, the parties should address what substantive effect, if any, different proposed definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art have on analyzing what the prior art teaches or in otherwise evaluating unpatentability of the challenged claim.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Because the Petition was filed after November 13, 2018, we apply the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), following the standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340–41, 51,343 (Oct. 11, 2018). In applying such standard, claim terms generally are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). physically embedded in a vehicle.” See Pet. 27–28. Patent Owner does not disagree with this proposed construction, but argues that we do not need to construe this term, or any other, for purposes of institution. Prelim. Resp. 19. We agree with Patent Owner. Thus, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we do provide an express construction of any term. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). And we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, based on all the arguments and evidence of record.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“dual-role port and a Mux to route the port to the appropriate transmission path. At this stage, we agree with Petitioner and find that it would have been obvious to substitute Chang II’s dual-role port for Chang’s port 50, as well as to include Chang II’s switching. Pet. 42–44, 64–65; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 184– 185. In particular, we find persuasive Mr. Welch’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to employ dual-role mode ports instead because employing dedicated ports requires having “‘multiple connectors, multiple [application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)] pins and the like,’ which adds ‘overhead’ and ‘increase[s] the cost[s].’” Ex. 1013 ¶ 177 (quoting Ex. 1025,19 1:36–43) (second and third alterations in original). 19 US 8,683,085 B1, issued Mar. 25, 2014 (Ex. 1025, “Castleberry”). Chang II’s dual-role port for Chang’s port 50 “avoids the inconvenience, hassle, and confusion of consumers having to keep track of (1) what mode their phone is operating in and (2) what mode(s) are supported by individual hub ports.” Id. ¶ 179; Pet. 44. As Mr. Welch testifies, “[w]ith a dual-role port, the user would not have to know what mode the smartphone was operating in, and then switch the smartphone between the appropriate dedicated host or device port.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 179. At this stage, we find that this rationale also provides sufficient motivation for one of ordinary skill in the art to employ a dual-role port in lieu of host port 50. In addition, at this stage, we agree with Petitioner that “in view of a dual-role mode USB port, it would have been obvious to include ‘USB multiplexing switches connected to the USB port, the USB hub, and the USB bridge’ to route the downstream USB product to the appropriate path.” Pet. 62 (emphases omitted). This is consistent with Chang II’s teachings, which require such switching. E.g., 1015 ¶¶ 11, 21. In other words, to realize the benefits of the rationales for using dual-role ports in Chang, one of ordinary skill in the art would have included a switch to route the downstream port to the appropriate path. See Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 184–185. In addition, we agree with Petitioner and find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had an expectation of success in modifying Chang to include dual-role ports and switching. Pet. 44. As we discuss above, dual-role ports, host/device detection, and multiplexing switches were already well-known.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,176,072 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00228 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–12 and 15–17 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Chang and Chang II.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–12 and 15–17 of the ’420 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“degree in electrical engineering or computer science and professional experience related to USB. Compare Pet. 22–23 with Prelim. Resp. 13. And, the parties also agree that a relevant advanced degree or additional education may take the place of at least some work experience may take the place of some formal education. Id. Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have more familiarity with USB related documents and system than contended by Patent Owner. We need not, and do not, resolve this dispute between the parties at this preliminary stage in this proceeding. We invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, at this point, we consider the arguments and the evidence from the standpoint of such a skilled artisan. If a POSITA was considered to have the additional work experience with USB systems and familiarity with USB standards as proposed by Petitioner and the level of skill was enhanced, our Decision to institute trial would be further supported. However, our Decision to go forward with trial is supported by either of the definitions offered by the parties.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner states in the Petition that no terms need construction for this proceeding. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, at this time, Patent Owner sees no need to construe any claim language. Prelim. Resp. 18. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Ex. 1003, 2:56–62. We determine that this contention seems reasonable in view of the market demands acknowledged in the Specification. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“Often it will be necessary for a court to look to . . . the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace . . . to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”).” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,619,420 - PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · PGR2024-00011 · APJ Jean R Homere · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is obvious over Chang, Chang II, and POSITA knowledge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute post-grant review on all” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aDenied
“Petitioner hereby stipulates that, if the PTAB institutes this post-grant review, Petitioner will not pursue invalidity of the Challenged Claims in a parallel district court proceeding on the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in this Petition. Pet. 106. Petitioner cites the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, issued June 21, 2022 (“Guidance Memo”)3 in support of its contentions. Pet. 106.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“§ 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art or patent owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments. Id. Only if the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented to the Office do we consider whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. “At bottom, this framework reflects a commitment to defer to previous Office evaluations of the evidence of record unless material error is shown.” Id. at 9.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“At the time of the invention, a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience working with computer network protocols such as USB. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Id. (citations omitted). At this stage, we find Patent Owner’s proposed level of a POSITA to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’643 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We nonetheless invite the parties to further address this issue, if they deem it necessary and appropriate. The parties should also specifically explain how different definitions for one of ordinary skill in the art relate to specific arguments and issues of unpatentability or claim construction, to the extent that a dispute remains as to who constitutes a POSITA.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,681,643 - PTAB · Apr 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00110 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 4–6 based on the § 103 ground combining Kim, Invisalign, and Salah.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“§ 325(d), the Board uses a two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would typically have an advanced degree, such as a Masters’ Degree or Ph.D. in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of work in computer vision, image analysis, medical imaging, or related areas.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Petitioner also contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “could have less education but significant professional experience in one or more of these fields” and “could be a member of an interdisciplinary team.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 16. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As noted above, at this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposals. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly address Petitioner’s contentions for step 3 of claim 1 for purposes of this Decision. For purposes of providing guidance to the parties, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner’s construction of “interior tooth outline” and “exterior tooth outline,” as supported by the Specification. See Ex. 1001, 5:8–15; Ex. 1004, 241–242 (Patent Owner stating “[a]s specified at page 7, lines 3–10, of the subject application, the interior tooth outline qualifies a line which delimits the free end of a tooth on an image and the exterior tooth outline qualifies a line which delimits part of the aligner on an image”). We also preliminarily agree with Petitioner, on this record, that step 2 of claim 1 recites a conditional limitation, that, if met, is not needed to be performed. See, e.g., Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, 243 Fed.Appx. 603, 607 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is of course true that methods steps may be contingent. If the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed.”). This is supported by the Specification: In one embodiment, the dentition image is the aligner image. In other words, the same updated image makes it possible not only to see the aligner outline 28 but also to see the dentition outline 16, through the aligner (FIG. 3). This single image therefore makes it possible to compare aligner 20 and dentition outlines. Advantageously, readjustment step 2), described later, is not needed. Ex. 1001, 6:15–20. These constructions are preliminary and based on the current record. The parties may further address these issues during trial.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combination of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combination of prior art. slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,109,945 - PTAB · Apr 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00052 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 13–16 because Align showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Kim, Invisalign, Salah, and Maninis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“On June 21, 2022, the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),6 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8. There is no dispute that Salah was of record during prosecution of the ’248 patent. Ex. 1001, code (56). There is no evidence, however, that the Examiner substantively considered Salah during prosecution. Nor is there any evidence that Kim, Invisalign, and Maninis were of record during prosecution or that the Office considered the Kim, Invisalign, Salah, and Maninis combination proposed by Petitioner. Although Patent Owner appears to argue that the disclosure in Kim, Invisalign, and Maninis is cumulative to disclosure in the ’248 patent, Patent Owner does not meaningfully explain how the references asserted (i.e., Kim, Invisalign, and Maninis) are cumulative of the references cited during prosecution in light of this disclosure in the ’248 patent. For example, in the Reasons for Allowance, the Examiner stated that the references cited (Matov and Wen) do not teach or suggest the limitations “more than 1 week after the start of the treatment with the aligner, acquisition of at least one image at least partially representing the aligner in a service position in which it is worn by a patient,” “tooth attribute relating to a separation between the tooth represented by the analysis tooth zone, and the aligner represented on the analysis image,” and “a cellphone is used to acquire the analysis image.” Ex. 1004, 960–961. Petitioner relies on Kim, Invisalign, and Salah to teach these limitations, see Pet. 28–41, and argues that the missing elements identified by the Examiner are found in these prior art references, so they are not cumulative. Id. at 61. On this record, we are not persuaded otherwise, as Patent Owner does not address all of these limitations, or explain how Kim, Invisalign, or Maninis are cumulative of the references considered by the Examiner (Matov and Wen), and thus, does not sufficiently support the position that the Examiner considered combinations the same as, or similar to, those presented by Petitioner. Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied because the Petition sets forth a combination of prior art and arguments that are not the same or substantially the same as that considered by the Examiner during prosecution. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would typically have an advanced degree, such as a Masters’ Degree or Ph.D. in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of work in computer vision, image analysis, medical imaging, or related areas.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–61). In addition, Petitioner contends, a person of ordinary skill in the art “could have less education but significant professional experience in one or more of these fields” and “could be a member of an interdisciplinary team.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 17. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,049,248 - PTAB · Mar 5, 2024 · IPR2023-01369 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Institution
Review instituted for claims 1–15 on the §103 ground combining Salah, Carrier, and Maninis; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 would have been obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“evaluated during examination is not persuasive as it is unsupported by evidence in the record before us. Prelim. Resp. 27. For example, Patent Owner does not meaningfully address the art or arguments evaluated by the Examiner during prosecution, nor does the Patent Owner submit a copy of the references applied by the Examiner during prosecution (e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 2018/0168780 issued to Kopelman) into the record of this proceeding. Put simply, Patent Owner does not explain why Carrier and Maninis are cumulative to the references considered by the Examiner and thus, does not sufficiently support the position that the Examiner considered combinations the same as, or similar to, those presented by Petitioner. Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied because the Petition sets forth a combination of prior art and arguments that are not the same or substantially the same as that considered by the Examiner during prosecution. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“Align hereby stipulates that if the Patent Trial and Appeal Board institutes inter partes review on IPR2023-01369, then Align will not pursue in this case, against any of the Challenged Claims, the specific ground advanced in IPR2023-01369 or any ground that reasonably could have been raised in an IPR (i.e., any ground that could be raised under §§102, 103 against any of the Challenged Claims only on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications). Ex. 1028, 2. With the interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion Regarding Independent Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that independent claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Salah, Carrier, and Maninis. 9. Dependent claims 2–15 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–15, which depend directly or indirectly from independent claim 1, would have been obvious over the combination of Salah, Carrier, and Maninis. Pet. 41–70. We have reviewed Petitioner’s initial showing as to the additional limitations of these dependent claims, and find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the combination of Salah, Carrier, and Maninis teaches each of the limitations of these claims at this stage of the proceeding. Id. We further note that Patent Owner does not separately address the patentability of these claims beyond its arguments as to independent claim 1, addressed above. See Prelim. Resp. We determine, on the current record and for purposes of institution, that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its obviousness contentions regarding claims 2–15.” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art or offer a definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. We find Petitioner’s description to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’409 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of institution. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,755,409 - PTAB · Dec 21, 2023 · IPR2023-01046 · APJ Jean R Homere · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and 16–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the obviousness grounds based on Chalom and Aslan, with Grau or Pace for certain claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Based on the current record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but offers a definition of its own. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s or master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, electrical and computer engineering, computer science, or similar educational background; or equivalent on-the-job training, including approximately two to three years of experience in machine learning and/or pattern recognition.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 21). Patent Owner asserts that the “level of skill is approximate and more experience would compensate for less formal education and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 21). We note that the differences between the parties’ descriptions are immaterial and find Petitioner’s description to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’985 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision, albeit without the two instances of “at least,” which introduce ambiguity. See, e.g., In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that it “applied plain and ordinary meanings of all terms and no express constructions are required here.” Pet. 5. Patent Owner “agrees with Petitioner that there are no claim terms that require construction for purposes of the Board’s decision on institution.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage in the proceeding, and without further argument from the parties, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review). We note that this determination does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial, as permitted by our rules and binding precedent. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“related fields, in that they disclose similar techniques of using machine learning for image processing (e.g., using image data to train MLAs to correct the gaze of a video-conferencing user). Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:21–32; Ex. 1007 ¶ 24). Petitioner also contends both “Chalom and Aslan are at least reasonably pertinent to a problem identified in the ’985 Patent of high accuracy MLAs often consuming more computational resources and being slower to run, as compared to efficient MLAs tending to provide less accurate predictions.” Id. at 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:24–30; Ex. 1007 ¶ 45). Thus, “Chalom and Aslan are at least reasonably pertinent to this efficiency- 4 It has been held that where the claimed subject matter involves more than the simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness must be based on “an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18. That is, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Such reasoning can be based on interrelated teachings of multiple patents, the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 417–18. versus accuracy problem. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 1:16–25, 9:48–55, 10:40–60, Fig. 3; Ex. 1007 ¶ 45; Ex. 1001, 16:24–44, 17:14–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 212). Petitioner shows sufficiently for institution that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate Aslan’s teacher-student architecture into Chalom’s image editing and training of its RFC to enhance the overall gains in efficiency and accuracy of the ensuing system. Id. at 42–44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 213–222; Ex. 1007 ¶ 44). For purposes of institution, we find that Petitioner’s rationale, which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Karam, is a sufficient demonstration, at this stage, of a motivation to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18. However, we note that Patent Owner’s arguments may have some merit, and encourage the parties to further develop this issue at trial.” slip op. at 37
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,740,985
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.