- Incyte Corporation v. Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Apr 9, 2018 · IPR2017-01256 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Incyte’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–15 on Ground 3, finding it had applied overly restrictive standards for lead compound analysis and combining references.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Having considered the Request for Rehearing, the current record, and our Decision denying institution, we are persuaded that we applied an overly restrictive standard for the lead compound analysis and for the reason to combine the cited references. See Reh’g Req. 2–12. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and concurrently issue a decision granting institution on Ground 3. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the Request for Rehearing, the current record, and our Decision denying institution, we are persuaded that we applied an overly restrictive standard for the lead compound analysis and for the reason to combine the cited references. See Reh’g Req. 2–12. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and concurrently issue a decision granting institution on Ground 3. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,249,149 - Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Purdue Pharma L.P., The P.F. Laboratories, Inc., And Purdue Pharmaceuticals L.P.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2017 · IPR2016-01027 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over McGinity, Joshi, and Palermo.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“DISCUSSION A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex.1009 ¶ 17). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 26. We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The Specification teaches the following: The term “sustained release” is defined for purposes of the present invention as the release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at such a rate that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over an extended period of time, e.g., from about 12 to about 24 hours as compared to an immediate release product. Preferably the sustained release is sufficient to provide a twice-a-day or a once-a-day formulation. Ex. 1001, 4:56–64. The use of “e.g.” in the above definition for “sustained release” plainly indicates that a 12 to about 24 hour time period is exemplary. Thus, we decline to limit the claim term as Patent Owner would have us do. Rather, we construe “extended release” as “release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at a rate such that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over a period of time longer than that of an immediate release of the opioid analgesic.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Claim 1 is drawn to a dosage form—a composition. Patent Owner does not point out how the recitation of “abuse deterrent” in the preamble modifies the structurally complete dosage form recited in the body of claim 1. See Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’”) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed.Cir.1997)). We conclude, therefore, that the term “abuse deterrent” is a goal of the invention, that is, it is merely a statement of intended use that is not entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“iv. “core matrix” The parties agree that the broadest reasonable construction of “core matrix” is “a blended mixture having: (a) PEO having a molecular weight of from about 300,000 to about 5,000,000 daltons, (b) magnesium stearate, and (c) oxycodone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of oxycodone.” Ex. 3001. We adopt that agreed-upon construction for purposes of this Decision. v.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 9,060,976 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,060,976 - Republic Tobacco, L.P. v. Fan BaoAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 27, 2016 · IPR2015-00072 · APJ Jennifer Meyer Chagnon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–24 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chen alone or Chen and Kastner; adverse judgment is entered and claims 1 and 25 are canceled.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“1 Patent Owner expressly requested cancelation of claims 1 and 25 of the ’752 patent. PO Resp. 9; see also Tr. 19:7–19 (Patent Owner’s counsel conceding the unpatentability of claims 1 and 25). Although Patent Owner did not file a Motion to Amend or statutory disclaimer, we construe Patent Owner’s statements regarding claims 1 and 25 as an abandonment of the contest as to these claims and, thus, as a request for entry of adverse judgment with respect to claims 1 and 25. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Accordingly, claims 1 and 25 will be canceled. 2 CN 201138314Y, published Oct. 22, 2008 (Ex. 1006). Ex. 1006 includes both a certified English translation, and the original publication in Chinese. All citations to Ex. 1006 are to the English translation portion of the document, and refer to the page numbers added by Petitioner at the bottom right-hand corner of each page.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“the art would have a Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent engineering design experience, as well as “familiarity with machines to achieve consolidation through compression of loose materials like tobacco to fill hollow tubes and other receptacles and experience in designing machines to achieve consolidation through compression.” Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 10). While we agree with Patent Owner that one of skill in the art will have some familiarity or experience in the design of consumer products, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s assertion that the relevant art should be defined so narrowly as to specifically require experience in designing cigarette making devices. Patent Owner presents no evidence beyond the uncorroborated testimony of its declarant (who also happens to be the inventor of the ’752 patent) that the design of cigarette making devices is particularly specialized and beyond the skill of a mechanical engineer. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner and decline to insert any specific experience or specialized knowledge of cigarette making devices into the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art of the ’752 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“weight.8 PO Resp. 1–2, 11–18. Patent Owner’s argument is based, in part, on its definition of a person of ordinary skill—namely, a person with “at least 4 years’ experience in the design of consumer products, including at least 2 years in the design and operation of cigarette making devices.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 16). Patent Owner asserts that “merely being a skilled engineer is not enough to qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art of the ’752 patent, unless that person has sufficient experience in cigarette making devices specifically.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 17).” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“argues that the 1896 date printed on Brown is hearsay and cannot be used to establish dissemination or public availability. Id. at 24. As noted by Petitioner, however, “Brown, including the printed date of 1896, falls within the exception to the rule against hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16).”9 Reply 7. Further, Petitioner provides evidence regarding the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,261,752 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,261,752 - Neptune Generics, LLC. v. Auspex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01313 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–10 were unpatentable under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1–10. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We recognize that an obvious analysis requires us to consider whether an ordinary artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success, not absolute predictability of success. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–904 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We agree with Patent Owner, however, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the ordinary artisan would have combined Fogelman with Miwa with a reasonable expectation of arriving at the invention claimed by the ’317 patent. Although Fogelman teaches that ODV may account for 90% of the pathway for intrinsic clearance of VF (Ex. 1003, 483), Fogelman 9 Amanda Yarnell, Heavy Hydrogen Drugs Turn Heads, Again, 87(25) Chem, Eng. News 36–39 (2009). teaches also that ODV has a receptor affinity profile similar to its parent compound VF (id. at 481). As noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 32), Petitioner has not explained, through evidence or adequate scientific reasoning, why the ordinary artisan would have wanted to prevent the metabolism of VF to its pharmaceutically active metabolite, ODV. Stated differently, because ODV is a desired metabolite, as it has the same pharmacological activity as its parent compound, VF, Petitioner has not explained why the ordinary artisan would have had a reason to prevent VF from being metabolized to ODV, rather than only preventing metabolism to a non-active metabolite, or make a substitution that would prevent the further metabolism of ODV.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesNot shown unpatentable
“We agree. In In re O’Farrell, the Federal Circuit set forth two situations in which an “obvious to try” rationale was usually applied improperly. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903. The first improper situation was to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters are critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful.” Id. The second improper situation was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.” Id.; see also In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358–1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that the rationale in O’Farrell was “affirmed in the logical inverse” in KSR, 550 U.S. at 417, in a statement that “§103 bars patentability unless ‘the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’”). Based on the above framework, we conclude that it would not have been obvious to try to achieve the invention of claim 1 of the ’317 patent. As noted by Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 35), and not disputed by Petitioner (see Pet. 10–11), there are approximately 227-1, or 124,217,727 deuterated forms of VF, minus some number of forms which are equivalent due to symmetry or rotatable bonds. Although Petitioner contends that as P-450 enzymes act on two main sites of VF—that is, -OCH3 and –N(CH3)2, arguing that it would have been obvious to deuterate only those sites (Pet. 10–11)—as discussed above, the ordinary artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation that deuteration of those sites would result in enhanced bioavailability and maintaining the activity of VF for a longer period of time. Thus, the ordinary artisan would be left with trying the over 100,000,000 possible deuterated forms of VF until possibly arriving at a successful result.” slip op. at 20
- Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, deniedDenied
“III. PENDING MOTIONS Patent Owner filed a Motion for Additional Discovery (Paper 9). In addition, Petitioner filed a Motion to Seal (Paper 18), as well as a Motion to Expunge Paper 17 (Paper 19). We grant Petitioner’s Motion to Expunge. We deny Patent Owner’s Motion for Additional Discovery as moot in view of our denial of the Petition. Finally, as we did not rely on the material Petitioner sought to seal, we decline to address the merits of the Motion to Seal. Petitioner is authorized to file a motion to expunge any material that it seeks to keep confidential within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision, or within thirty (30) days of a decision on rehearing, if rehearing is requested.” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,456,317 - Eli Lilly And Company v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute At Harbor-Ucla Medical CenterNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 22, 2015 · IPR2014-00693 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 were not shown unpatentable because Whitaker did not anticipate the required continuous administration for at least 45 days.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Whitaker anticipates claim 1 by a preponderance of the evidence. To anticipate, a prior art reference “must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).” slip op. at 8
- ExcludeOther
“1115–1116, 1118–1121, 1124, 1127, 1128–1130, 1131, 1135–1137, 1139– 1140, 1142, 1144, and portions of Dr. Bivalacqua’s deposition testimony (Ex. 1122). As we did not rely on any of those exhibits in this Decision, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“E. Objections to Demonstratives Each of Petitioner (Paper 42) and Patent Owner (Paper 43) objected to the other’s demonstratives. In view of those objections, we expunge the demonstratives from the record. Thus, Petitioner’s demonstratives (Paper 41) and Patent Owner’s demonstratives (Paper 40), are expunged.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 8,133,903 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,133,903 - Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited / Apotex, Inc. et al. v. Novartis AG And Mitsubishi Pharma Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 24, 2015 · IPR2014-00784 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–32 are unpatentable as obvious over Chiba and Aulton; the motion to amend with proposed claims 33–64 is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of U.S. Patent No. 8,324,283 B2 (“the ’283 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 2 (“Pet.”).1 On December 1, 2014, the Board instituted trial to review patentability of the challenged claims. Paper 11 (“Dec. on Inst.”). Apotex, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Apotex,” or, together with Torrent, “Petitioners”) filed a separate Petition also seeking to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of the ’283 patent. IPR2015-00518, Paper 1 (“IPR-518 Pet.”). This second Petition was accompanied by a motion seeking joinder with the trial that had been instituted in IPR2014-00784. IPR2015-00518, Paper 2 (“IPR-518 Joinder Mot.”). On February 17, 2015, the Board instituted trial in IPR2015-00518 and joined the proceedings in IPR2014-00784 and IPR2015-00518. IPR2015-00518, Paper 8 (“IPR-518 Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“unexpired patent according to its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under that standard, absent any special definitions, we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For this reason, we do not construe several terms for which constructions were proposed in the Petition but about which the parties do not disagree.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Where the prior art teaches the claimed invention, a claim is not rendered patentable by virtue of being motivated in the inventors’ minds by a newly-discovered advantage of the prior-art combination; allowing such a claim to stand “would remove from the public that which is in the public domain.” In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1022 (CCPA 1979); see also Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“One of ordinary skill in the art need not see the identical problem addressed in a prior art reference to be motivated to apply its teachings.”). Here, Patent Owners argue that the newly discovered low-dose instability of fingolimod when mixed with common excipients motivated the inventors’ choice of the allegedly less common mannitol as an excipient. PO Resp. 12–15 (citing Ex. 2043 ¶¶ 14–19, 22, 24–36). As explained above, though, it does not matter that the prior art failed to recognize this advantage of a fingolimod-mannitol combination. “[T]he motivation in the prior art to combine the references does not have to be identical to that of the [patentee] to establish obviousness.” In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,324,283 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,324,283 - Biomarin Pharmaceutical Inc. v. Duke UniversityRehearing grantedPTAB · Jul 14, 2015 · IPR2013-00535 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing but again held claim 19 unpatentable as obvious over Reuser ’771, Van Hove 1997, and Brady.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“In relation to Patent Owner’s contentions in this regard, we grant a rehearing to reconsider the teachings of Brady in relation to “Day 1.” Taking a closer look at the reference as a whole, we see that Brady discloses, in the paragraph discussed above, that “[t]he effort to immunosuppress the patient was initiated on July 26, 1993.” Ex. 1012, 3. Reading the entire paragraph, it is clear that July 26, 1993, corresponds to “Day 1” as presented in Table 1, i.e., the first day that the patient received both an immunosuppressant and enzyme therapy. Id. Earlier in the reference, Brady states that the “patient was admitted to NIH for periodic evaluation on January 21, 1992, 6 months after the initiation of enzyme replacement therapy.” Id. at 2 (under the heading “Clinical Course”). The reference also states that “[o]n March 19, 1993, 1 day after routine intravenous infusion of Ceredase, the patient experienced severe pain in his left shoulder . . . .” Id. Thus, we are persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions that Brady does not disclose administering immunosuppressant prior to any and all administration of hGAA, as required by claim 19. Req. Reh’g 6. Accordingly, we now reconsider the arguments and evidence, including the aspects of Brady discussed above, and address the question of whether claim 19 is obvious over the combination of Reuser ’771, Van Hove 1997, and Brady.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Brady does not teach prophylactically administering an immunosuppressant under our construction of claim 19. We determine, however, that the preponderance of evidence shows that the prophylactic administration of an immunosuppressant would have been a predictable variation of the use of immunosuppressant disclosed in Brady. Brady teaches administering the immunosuppressant in an “effort to immunosuppress the patient” and to reduce neutralizing antibodies in the individual. Ex. 1012, 3 (including sections titled “Intervention” and “Reduction of Neutralizing Antibody Titer”). Dr. Pastores testifies that administration of foreign protein could lead to an immune response (Pastores Dec. ¶ 94), such as the adverse immune response seen in Brady, and that hypersensitivity to replacement enzyme may be addressed by pretreatment with antihistamines or widely used immunosuppressants such as corticosteroids (Dr. Pastores ¶ 95 (citing Ex 1011, 130)).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,056,712 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2015 · IPR2014-01110 · APJ Rama G Elluru · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding without a final written decision on the challenged claims.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“I. DISCUSSION On March 10, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion to terminate this proceeding (Paper 13), as well as a Joint Request (Paper 14) to have their settlement agreement treated as business confidential information under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). The parties also filed a true copy of their settlement agreement. Ex. 2011. The parties indicate in their Joint Motion that termination of this proceeding is appropriate because they have reached an agreement regarding their dispute with respect to this inter partes review. See Paper 13, 1. The parties indicate that they have agreed to move to dismiss the related district court litigation involving the ’183 patent. Id.” slip op. at 1
NonePatents in suitUS 8,474,183 - Target Corporation v. Destination Maternity CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 12, 2015 · IPR2014-00509 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Target’s request for rehearing of the denial of institution, for the reasons given in the related IPR2014-00508 decision.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“our Decision Denying Joinder of the instant proceeding with IPR2013-00533 (Paper 18), as well as our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review (Paper 19). Paper 20 (“Request for Rehearing”). Patent Owner, Destination Maternity Corporation, was authorized to file an Opposition (Paper 22), to which Petitioner was authorized to file a Reply (Paper 23). For the reasons discussed in the Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing in related IPR2014-00508 (Paper 28), we grant the Request for Rehearing.” slip op. at 2
None - PTAB · Nov 24, 2014 · PGR2014-00010 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · PGR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated PGR2014-00010 without a final decision; it also granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Patent Owner’s preliminary response is not yet due. On November 20, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the proceeding (Paper 7) and a copy of their written settlement agreement (Ex. 2001). Along with the motion to terminate, the parties also filed a joint motion to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information and keep it separate from the file of U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (“the ’219 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 327(b) and 37 C.F.R § 42.74(c). Paper 8, 1.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,598,219
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.