PTAB
Advanced fields
21 decisions · 580msnewest first
  • PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01130 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 5 and 6 are unpatentable over the instituted grounds; claims 7–9 were not shown unpatentable because their scope could not be ascertained.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “After the hearing, with our authorization,1 Patent Owner moved to dismiss this proceeding because, according to Patent Owner, the Petition did not identify all real parties-in-interest as required be 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). 1 IPR2024-01131, Paper 43, 45:1–8. Paper 42. Petitioner opposed the motion. Paper 44. We denied the motion. Paper 46.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “arguments and evidence in support of its proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we determine that Petitioner’s definition is too broad. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “approximately one or more years of professional experience with electronic and optoelectronic system design.” Pet. 3. But Petitioner does not appear to dispute the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bretschneider, that “the field of optoelectronics” is “broad and expansive and encompasses solar cells, optical fiber, and any application of LEDs, not just the design of LED packages.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 78. Therefore, one having experience with optoelectronic system design would not necessarily have experience designing LED backlights for LCD displays. We have also carefully considered Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence in support of its proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In light of our analysis of the prior art and the AAPA, we determine that Patent Owner’s requirement of “at least one year of practical experience in design of LED packages and one year of practical experience in design of thermal management systems for LEDs” is not sufficiently precise. Patent Owner does not specify that the required experience is in the context of designing LED backlights for LCD displays. One having this experience would necessarily have experience addressing thermal-management concerns associated with such backlights.” slip op. at 18

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Because Dr. Baker does not have the requisite experience designing LED backlights for LCD displays, he is not qualified to offer expert testimony from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art of designing LED backlights for LCD displays. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022).” slip op. at 23

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Neither party asserts that “connecting” is a term of art requiring expert testimony to construe. We agree with Petitioner that “connecting” should be construed consistently with the “fastener” term, because it is the “fastener” (or the second portion thereof) to which the circuit board is “connecting.” Because the parties agree that “fastener” is “[a] feature that attaches or holds something in place, “connecting” means “attaching or holding.”” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 7,168,842 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,168,842
  • PTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00094 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 3–5 are unpatentable over Kobayashi and Hshieh; claims 2 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over the asserted combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”), “at the filing date of the ’409 [p]atent[,] would have a master’s degree in electrical engineering, and at least two years of relevant work experience in the field of integrated circuit design and manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 55). We adopt Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, which is supported by unopposed declaration testimony and consistent with the ’409 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–3:8 (describing the invention and related art in terms of integrated circuit design and fabrication). Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “Based on the arguments and evidence, we disagree with Petitioner’s proposed construction requiring the corners to be rounded via a particular process, because doing so would improperly import a process of manufacture from the Specification into apparatus claims. See Cont’l Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 799 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that, generally, a novel product that meets the criteria of patentability is not limited to the process by which it was made, however, process steps can be treated as part of a product claim if the patentee has made clear that the process steps are an essential part of the claimed invention). Here, the portions of the Specification relied on by Petitioner (Ex. 1001, 2:10–20, 4:53–64) disclose a process for manufacturing but do not make clear that the process is an essential part of the claimed invention. We also disagree with Petitioner’s assessment of the prosecution history, i.e., that the claims were amended to distinguish the claimed rounded corners from Pfirsch’s rounded corners, which, presumably, are formed as an incidental result of lithography. On the contrary, the Examiner found (and Patent Owner acknowledged) that Pfirsch has rounded corners. Ex. 1002, 276, 295, 302. As Patent Owner correctly points out, the claims were amended during prosecution to include a “circular” contact to distinguish over Pfirsch’s square contact. See id. Petitioner does not otherwise point to evidence that Patent Owner clearly and unmistakably limited the claim scope to rounded corners formed by a particular process.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “is ‘known’ is not sufficient for a motivation to combine.” PO Resp. 47. However, the motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one, and the “known-technique” rationale is adequate to show a motivation to combine. For example, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; see also Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799–800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If there’s a known technique to address a known problem using ‘prior art elements according to their established functions,’ then there is a motivation to combine.”). Here, as discussed above, the record shows that top view rounding was a known technique to eliminate corners, and that corners were a known problem (e.g., corners tend to reach undesirable higher peak electric field leading to premature breakdown voltage). See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 39, 42– 44, 55–57, 122, 133, 135–141; Ex. 1005, 7:57–8:4; Ex. 1006, 1:18–21, 2:19–39, 5:3–17, Figs. 6A–8B; Ex. 1011, 1:29–41; Ex. 1012; PO Resp. 13, 46 (citing Ex. 1011, 1:34–40); Ex. 2021 ¶ 87. Furthermore, there is no dispute that modifying Kobayashi to eliminate corners via top view rounding was anything more than a “minor and commonplace modification” of cell shape within the skill of an ordinary artisan, or that top view rounding would change Kobayashi’s established function. Pet. 60; Ex. 2021 ¶ 86.” slip op. at 30

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “We agree that Kobayashi’ s Figure 5A solely cannot be relied upon as disclosing the claimed diameter. See Hockerson-Halbertstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, 222 F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (patent drawings not designated as being drawn to scale cannot be relied upon to define precise proportions of elements if the specification is completely silent on the issue). However, we do not agree that Petitioner failed to show Kobayashi suggests the recited diameter. We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Dr. Liu’s “vague, purported ‘design considerations’” are “unsupported.” PO Resp. 43. Although Kobayashi is silent on the width/diameter of the trench contact in Figure 5A, Kobayashi discloses trenched gates having dimensions below 0.5 μm, which demonstrates that it was known in the art, and required no more than an exercise of ordinary skill in the art, to create trenched features of widths well below 1 μm. Kobayashi also discloses that the width of each trench, and the distance between the adjacent trenches (which includes the trench contact), must be selected to optimum sizes . . . [and] these sizes . . . have some degrees of freedom.” Ex. 1005, 7:42–48. This demonstrates a POSITA would seek to optimize trench contact width or diameter. Dr. Liu’s testimony regarding design considerations suggests the desirability of a reduced diameter trench contact, e.g., to minimize the width of the trench contact for purposes of easier filling, to minimize the total width of the unit cell, and to minimize manufacturing time by reducing etch back time. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 111–114. As Patent Owner acknowledges, “there is always a motivation to speed up the fabrication process or shrink feature sizes of semiconductors.” PO Resp. 43 (citing 2021 ¶ 131). However, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, these are not generic motivations “untethered” from Kobayashi. Id. Indeed, Kobayashi directly addresses the fabrication process (including new techniques to obtain trench widths under 0.5 μm) and the need to optimize the size of trench gates and the space in between (which includes the trench contact). Ex. 1005, 7:43–54, 7:19–9:53. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner presents no evidence that modifying Kobayashi to have a diameter smaller than 1 μm is predictable. PO Resp. 44. We disagree. As discussed above, Petitioner points to Kobayashi’s teachings that the sizes are to be optimized and that the trench gate width is smaller than 0.5 μm, which suggests making other trench features of that width was within ordinary skill. Ex. 1003 ¶ 112. Furthermore, Kobayashi’s silence as to the dimensions of the trench contact suggests that the trench contact diameter dimension is likely in the ballpark of the other explicitly disclosed trenched feature dimensions and is a matter of routine optimization. In addition, Patent Owner advances no persuasive evidence that the claimed diameter produces unexpected results or is otherwise critical. Patent Owner also argues that reducing trench contact diameter has downsides (i.e., reduced ease of filling for metal plugs and reduced current carrying capacity) not addressed by Petitioner; however, Petitioner is not required to address those tradeoffs in its Petition, and we do not see how those tradeoffs would prevent the proposed combination. PO Resp. 44; see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.”); Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.”). Here, Dr. Liu listed numerous benefits of having a reduced diameter, which weigh against the potential downsides raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 111–114. Moreover, we do not see how the downsides/tradeoffs prevent modifying Kobayashi in the manner suggested when the same tradeoffs appear to be applicable to the ’409 patent. Having considered Patent Owner’s arguments, and taking into” slip op. at 43

    Patent outcomesUS 7,812,409 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,812,409
  • PTAB · Dec 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00954 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3, 4, and 7–9 are unpatentable over Angles under §103; claims 5 and 6 were not shown unpatentable over Angles.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyOther

      “prosecution history and the amendment changing “held at” to “accessible at,” testimony upon which Patent Owner relies to support its position. Specifically, Dr. Medvidović testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the two phrases to be synonymous because, 1) the amendment was not made to overcome a prior art reference, 2) the applicant did not make a statement disclaiming that “being accessible at” does not encompass “being held at,” and 3) the examiner did not object to the amendment as exceeding the scope of the Specification. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 34. We find that Dr. Medvidović’s conclusion is not supported by his reasoning. First, an amendment made not to overcome a prior art reference does not mean an amendment that does not change the scope of a claim. An applicant is free to amend a claim at any time during prosecution, even an amendment that may expand the scope of a claim (one made not to overcome a prior art rejection). Second, whether “being accessible at” encompasses “being held at” is not the issue—because the scope of one term encompasses the scope of another term does not make the two terms” slip op. at 26

    • ExcludeDenied

      “III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1017–1020, 1026, and 1027,” slip op. at 83

    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the” slip op. at 27

    Patent outcomesUS 8,458,028 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,458,028
  • PTAB · Aug 7, 2024 · IPR2023-00538 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 5–10, 13–18, 20–22, 24, 31, and 32 are unpatentable; claims 2–4, 23, and 25–30 were not shown unpatentable. The revised motion to amend was granted in part and denied in part.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

      “d. Summary For the above reasons, we determine that Patent Owner has not shown” slip op. at 100

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedOther

      “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1034 and page 10 of the Reply” slip op. at 86

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “A. “housing” Patent Owner proposes that we construe the term “housing” to mean” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “suggested to one skilled in the art, objective evidence of non-obviousness (“secondary considerations”) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Objective evidence of non-obviousness “may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record” and “may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). For us to give substantial weight to objective evidence of nonobviousness, a proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc., v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining non-” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 9,365,223 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,365,223
  • PTAB · May 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00133 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–6, 13, and 15–18 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 7–12, and 14 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “consistently’ characterizes a claim term in a particular way, it is proper to construe the claim term in accordance with that characterization.” GPNE, 830 F.3d at 1370. It is also true that “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration in original); see also Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1302–03 (“The mere fact that the specification’s examples of translation may involve a change in protocol from a higher to a lower level protocol does not establish that such a limitation should be imported into the claims.”). Thus, the mere fact that the examples in what the Specification clearly identifies as “preferred” embodiments (Ex. 1001, Abstract, 5:1–3, 5:55–59, 6:6–8, 6:67–7:4, 7:23–25) cannot, by themselves, limit the scope of the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (noting “we have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment”).” slip op. at 15

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, plus at least two years of experience in the design and implementation of graphical user interfaces, and would have familiarity with portal design and portlet technology. Additional education in the fields of computer science and/or human factors, such as a masters or doctorate degree, may serve as a substitute for experience in the field.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this proceeding. See PO Resp. 15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill reflected by the Specification and in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Figure 3 illustrates a plurality of portlets relative to a first sub-tab and Gridsphere2’s Figure 2 illustrates a single portlet relative to a first sub-tab, and that other sub-tabs are illustrated in Gridsphere1 and Gridsphere2, which would include one or more portlets. Ex. 1003 ¶ 141. As Dr. Bederson explains, these tabs define “two or more stacks of portlets.” Id. Dr. Bederson illustrates this with an annotated version of Figure 2 from Gridsphere2 reproduced below. An annotated version of Figure 2 of Gridsphere2 showing a first stack of portlets currently presented and second stack of portlets not currently presented. Ex. 1003 ¶ 141. Dr. Bederson explains that Figure 2 shows “the Administration main tab includes a first stack of portlets, having at least one portlet in the Portlets, Users, and Groups sub-tabs, respectively (highlighted in red).” Id. Dr. Bederson testifies that It is also obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that the Welcome main tab (highlighted in green) (or the JSR Portlets tab) would also have a plurality of sub-tabs, each with at least one portlet. This defines a second stack of portlets, which second stack of portlets is not currently displayed. Id. We find Dr. Bederson’s testimony to be rational, well-reasoned, and give it substantial weight. Dr. Bederson further persuasively testifies, “[t]o render the portal in” slip op. at 30

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

      “The motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one. See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). A motivation to combine may be found “explicitly or implicitly in market forces; design incentives; the ‘interrelated teachings of multiple patents’; ‘any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent’; and the background knowledge, creativity, and common sense of the person of ordinary skill.” ZUP, LLC v. Nash Mfg., Inc., 896 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). “[T]he motivation-to-combine analysis ‘need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.’” PACT XPP, 61 F.4th 1380 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). We find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Rose with the GridLab references. See Pet. 64–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 216–223. In particular, we agree with Petitioner and Dr. Bederson that applying Rose’s technique to the GridLab References would have been within the level of skill in the art, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would find it beneficial to index the new portlet [being suggested to be added by GridLab], as per Rose, and compare those indexing results to the existing portlets of the user’s portal, and suggest a tab or sub-tab for the new portlet in the user’s portal, or automatically place the portlet in a content-relevant tab or sub-tab in the user’s portal, as per Rose.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 222 (citing Ex. 1004 § 10.1.6 (40); Ex. 1012, 262–64, 267–68). We address Patent Owner’s arguments below.” slip op. at 49

    Patent outcomesUS 7,543,234 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,543,234
  • PTAB · Aug 12, 2022 · IPR2021-00243 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 6–10, 16, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Lane; claims 18–22 and 24 were not shown unpatentable over the Lane and Thomas combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 7. Petitioner does not challenge Patent Owner’s modification to its proposed definition, and Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Drasler, agrees that experience in the field of prosthetic cardiovascular implants would have included experience with transcatheter prosthetic cardiovascular implants as well as delivery systems and methods used to implant such prostheses. See generally Pet. Reply; Ex. 2048, 11:6–12:1. Thus, based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, modified as proposed by Patent Owner. We note, however, that our analysis in this proceeding would not differ if we did not adopt the modification proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s proposal that the distal end of the delivery catheter “houses the prosthetic” is in tension with the express language of the claim because the proposed construction suggests that “houses” necessarily means more than “at least” part of the prosthesis is disposed in the distal end. Indeed, if “houses” was not more limiting than “at least partially disposed” there would be no need to further define the spatial relationship between the distal end of the catheter and the prosthetic valve. Petitioner further argues that the Patent Owner’s construction is improper because it “wrongly limits the term to require that ‘the proximal end includes a handle that controls the deployment of the implant.’” Pet. Reply at 3 (citing PO Resp. 37–38). Petitioner asserts that the claims do not recite a handle and the ’897 patent’s “specification makes clear that a handle is a separate, optional component that is not integral to a delivery catheter: inner tubular member ‘can’ be connected to handle 907 and outer tubular member ‘can be connected’/‘attach[ed]’ to outer sheath handle 908.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 20:19–29, 26:30–33, claim 10). We again agree with Petitioner. Although the specification describes an embodiment in which proximal end 905 of inner tubular member 904 can be connected to handle 907 and proximal end 902 of outer tubular member 901 can be connected to handle 908 (Ex. 1001, 20:19–26), it is generally improper to read limitations from specific embodiments into the claims. See Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven if all of the embodiments discussed in the patent included a specific limitation, it would not be proper to import from the patent’s written description limitations that are not found in the claims themselves.” (internal quotations omitted)); SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Furthermore, at the oral hearing, Patent Owner indicated that “the proximal end includes a handle that controls the deployment of the implant” part of its proposed construction is not necessary. Tr. 61:8–14. In view of the above, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Furthermore, inventors can act as their own lexicographers if they clearly set forth a definition of a claim term other than its ordinary and customary meaning. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But any such definition must appear in the specification “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Absent any such definition, “limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Here, a definition of “introducer catheter” does not appear in the specification “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” See generally Ex. 1001.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “We determine that we need not expressly construe this claim term to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 9,445,897 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,445,897
  • PTAB · Mar 3, 2022 · IPR2021-00757 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as anticipated by Linden; Petitioner did not show claims 4–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 unpatentable on the asserted anticipation grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have possessed at least three years of experience in the field of information systems, e-commerce, or Internet marketing,” and “would have had a working knowledge about how to create useful software programs, including familiarity with network database systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 18, 21) (Hochman Decl.). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10 We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’443 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

      “Petitioner contends that it “analyzed the claims using their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 9. As a result, Petitioner contends that we “need not explicitly construe the terms here.” Id. Patent Owner adopts our “application of the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms.” PO Resp. 10. Because there is no dispute that the claims should be analyzed using the plain and ordinary meaning thereof, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner must show that Bull searches a repository using at least one search result item identified in step 1[a]. For the search result item in step 1[a], Petitioner relies on Bull’s disclosure of a list of data sources located by a search of DataStore 220 disclosed at column 9, lines 11 to 15. See Pet. 50. DataStore 220 contains an index of “[a] theme or definition of a class of information (e.g., central California travel and tourism or new automobiles)” screened for relevance, quality of information and appropriateness. Ex. 1004, 7:10–14. For step 1[b], Petitioner refers to column 4 lines 27–37 where Bull discloses using, inter alia, a user’s looking pattern to search for associated product advertisements. Petitioner relies on Mr. Hochman’s testimony that the user’s looking pattern “may include what the user looked at on the search results page and the content of any search results page selected, and does not consist merely of the search terms used to obtain them.” Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 213). The question raised by Patent Owner, based on Dr. Schmidt’s testimony, is whether a skilled artisan would understand that Bull’s user’s looking pattern encompasses the results of a search. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 213 (“The Petition does not explain how a ‘user’s looking pattern’ means ‘search result items.’”); Ex. 1015 274:1–275:3. Mr. Hochman does not cite to any part of Bull to support his testimony that the user’s looking pattern encompasses search result items. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 213. In the Petitioner Reply, Petitioner points to several portions of Bull to support its contention that the user’s looking pattern comprises many things. Pet. Reply 15. The first two citations describe prior art patents not Bull’s system and, thus, are of limited relevance to the scope of Bull’s user looking patterns. Ex. 1004, 2:38–41, 3:1. The citations to column 4 lines 10–11 and 21–22 of Bull relate to information provided to the user but do not specifically address user looking patterns. The final citation to column 5 lines 61–63 is parsed out of context by Petitioner and relates to user queries “unmet” when content is retrieved. In any event, none of the citations to Bull provided by Petitioner in the Reply are directly related to the scope of Bull’s user looking patterns and do not support Petitioner’s argument concerning the scope of Bull’s user looking patterns. Our own review of Bull discloses that Bull specifically describes user” slip op. at 46

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “A claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 “only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We analyze the asserted grounds based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 6

    Patent outcomesUS 7,076,443 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 7,076,443
  • PTAB · Mar 3, 2022 · IPR2020-01655 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 are unpatentable as anticipated by Linden; Petitioner did not show claims 4–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 unpatentable on the asserted anticipation grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “1 Chewy, Inc. filed a Petition seeking review of the same claims challenged in Zillow’s Petition and also a Motion for Joinder with this proceeding. Paper 25, 2. We granted Chewy Inc.’s Petition and Motion for Joinder. Id. at 25.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10 We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’443 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner adopts our “application of the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms.” PO Resp. 10. Because there is no dispute that the claims should be analyzed using the plain and ordinary meaning thereof, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “disclose this limitation, i.e., Linden does not perform word matching, is likewise unavailing because it is premised on an ipsissimis verbis test. We turn to Linden’s disclosure relied on by Petitioner. Linden discloses that “[t]he similar items table 60 could also reflect non-collaborative type item similarities including content-based similarities derived by comparing item contents or descriptions.” Ex. 1003, 9:12–15 (emphasis added). Linden also discloses “if the user is currently searching for books on a particular topic and has added several such books to the shopping cart, this method will more likely produce other books that involve the same or similar topics.” Id. at 3:52–55 (emphasis added). Linden also discloses “the current and/or past contents of a shopping cart can be used to generate recommendations in a system in which mappings of items to lists of similar items are generated from a computer-based comparison of item contents.” Id. at 16:52–56. Linden, thus, explicitly discloses generating recommendations by comparing item contents or descriptions and provides a specific example of matching books involving the same or similar topics. We find this disclosure corresponds to the requirement of step 1[c] of “identifying . . . at least one advertisement . . . having at least one word that matches said . . . search result item.” After considering the evidence cited by Petitioner in light of Patent Owner’s contentions, we find Petitioner establishes that Linden discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 7,076,443 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 7,076,443
  • PTAB · Feb 2, 2022 · IPR2020-01405 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4 and 6–10 are unpatentable under the stated obviousness grounds; claim 5 was not shown unpatable over either ground asserted against it.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Patent Owner, for purposes of this proceeding, agrees with Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 11. Petitioner’s description is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Both parties assert that no claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 6; PO Resp. 11–12. On this record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. We discuss below, in the analysis of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 5, the parties’ positions on the construction of “fixed to.”” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art of inflatable products would have been aware that square mesh was a known option for use in a tensioning structure and that square mesh possessed certain advantages even if it also had some disadvantages, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Fireman’s mesh in Hanlie’s product, and that the substitution of Fireman’s square mesh for the mesh of Hanlie’s strap would have yielded predictable results. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the availability of other known and purportedly more preferred options is not persuasive.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “the use of square mesh rather than the several other known configurations, is plucking Fireman out of the sea of prior art and, therefore, engaging in improper hindsight. See PO Resp. 17–18, 54 (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler familiar with both Hanlie and Fireman. Tr. 30:22–31:6; cf. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”). Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); PO Sur-reply 2–4. Patent Owner’s reliance on WBIP is misplaced. When read in context, the court in WBIP was referring to the specific facts of that case. See WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1337 (“The real question is whether that skilled artisan would have plucked one reference out of the sea of prior art (Phipps) and combined it with conventional coolant elements to address some need present in the field (the need for low–carbon monoxide emission marine gen-sets). . . . This is part of the fact question . . . .”). WBIP did not, as Patent Owner’s arguments imply, create a per se rule that the existence of several known alternatives renders non-obvious a claim covering one of those alternatives. In the case before us, it is not as if some obscure option was plucked out a sea of alternatives. Rather, square mesh was a well-known option and was used in inflatable products.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 9,901,186 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,901,186
  • PTAB · Feb 2, 2022 · IPR2020-01416 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–16, 19, 24, 26, and 28–30 are unpatentable under §103; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • ExcludeOther

      “Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2100, 2101, and 2103, the testimony regarding these exhibits (Ex. 2104, 124:17–132:5; Ex. 2105, 229:18–234:9; Ex. 2106, 18:8–31:7), and portions of Patent Owner’s Sur-reply regarding these exhibits (Paper 43, 13 n.5 and 14 referencing Exhibits 2100, 2101, and 1007, and the sentence on pages 25–26 referencing Exhibit 2103). Paper 48, 1. Petitioner argues these exhibits and the portions of the Sur-reply that reference those exhibits are improper because a patent owner sur-reply may not include new evidence other than deposition transcripts of any reply witness. Id. We do not rely on these exhibits. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot both Motions to Strike.” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Patent Owner, for purposes of this proceeding, agrees with Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 8. Petitioner’s description is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Both parties assert that no claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 6; PO Resp. 8–9. On this record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. We discuss below, in the analysis of Petitioner’s challenge to claim 17, the parties’ positions on the construction of “full surface-area contact in spaces between the plurality of strands.”” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We find Dr. Abraham’s testimony to be more credible than Dr. Schroeder’s. Both experts agree that welding was a well-known joining method in the art of inflatable products. Ex. 1002 ¶ 40; Ex. 1038, 115:22– 116:5. Dr. Abraham testifies as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art, having that knowledge, would read Hanlie’s disclosure of attaching internal straps to the top and bottom of an air mattress. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40, 222; Ex. 1040 ¶ 30. Dr. Schroeder, on the other hand, testifies more generally, opining that an ordinary artisan would know that “‘fused’ encompasses many applications other than thermoplastic welding” (Ex. 2016 ¶ 128), but does not credibly address with any specificity how the ordinary artisan would understand the term “fused” in the context of Hanlie’s overall disclosure. See id. ¶¶ 127–130. We find that Hanlie discloses or at least suggests to a person of” slip op. at 46

    Patent outcomesUS 10,165,869 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,165,869
Page 1 of 3
← Previous123Next →

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.