PTAB
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35 decisions · 610msnewest first
  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00173 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–2 over Stanesic, Rothkop, and Cicotte; claims 3–6 over that combination with Lee, Fisker, Gruenwald, or Fu, respectively.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “tray is “deeply concave” but fails to direct us to any part of the Specification using the term “deeply concave” let alone a clearly stated definition of “deeply concave” in the context of a vehicle floor tray. The response to office action, cited by Patent Owner, refers to the tray as concave not deeply concave and thus, does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Ex. 2097, 11. For these reasons, to the extent that Patent Owner relies on the prosecution history as a disclaimer of the full scope of claims, we find that the cited response to the office action does not constitute “a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope.” Uship, 714 F. 3d at 1315.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “As explained below in our conclusion on motivation to combine, we” slip op. at 56

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “argument that Fu is not analogous art. PO Resp. 51. Dr. Kurfess first testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “never would have looked to Fu, or anything related to those fields, let alone micro-devices such as hearing aid shells to solve problems related to the automotive industry.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 144. Dr. Kurfess then testifies that “Fu is a disclosure for a hearing aid shell . . . and a [person of ordinary skill in the art] . . . would not consider the art of medical devices when trying to solve problems with vehicle floor mats.” Id. ¶ 188. Lastly, Dr. Kurfess testifies that “I completely disagree with Mr. Perreault’s conclusion that ‘a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” slip op. at 97

    Patent outcomesUS 9,138,917 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,138,917
  • PTAB · Jun 6, 2024 · IPR2023-00172 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations of Stanesic, Rothkop, and the respective additional references.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a closely related field, or equivalent formal training, education, or practical experience in a field relating to product design, CAD, or manufacturing.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner further contends that the person of ordinary skill in the art “would also have a minimum of three to five years of experience in plastics engineering, CAD, manufacturing, plastic product design, or a related industry,” but that “a higher level of training or practical experience might make up for less education, and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering, industrial design, or a closely related field, or equivalent formal training education or practical experience in a field relating to product design, CAD, or manufacturing.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner further contends that such an ordinarily skilled artisan “would also have two or more years of manufacturing/industrial experience in the automotive aftermarket art.” Id. Petitioner replies that its “level of skill is more appropriate given the claims’ focus on three-dimensional scanning and modeling (which apply to many industries).” Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1001, claim 1; Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 7– 13). According to Petitioner, however, “the claims would have been obvious even under [Patent Owner]’s proposed skill level.” Id. (citing Ex. 1055 ¶ 13). Petitioner refers to Dr. Kurfess’s declaration testimony as admitting that three-dimensional scanning and modeling are pertinent to the ’655 patent. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 2023 ¶ 18). In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s definition of” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “[A] conclusion of obviousness requires a reasonable expectation of success.” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). Further, “the ‘predictable result’ discussed in KSR refers not only to the expectation that prior art elements are capable of being physically combined, but also that the combination would have worked for its intended purpose.” DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1326 (citations omitted). “Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we evaluate the parties’ respective contentions. Patent Owner’s argument that there is no reasonable expectation of success in the proposed combination revolve around the scanning of a vehicle footwell. The ’655 patent describes that “points on the vehicle foot well for which the floor tray is to be manufactured are digitally measured and captured. Preferably this step uses a coordinate measuring machine (CMM).” Ex. 1001, 16:41–44. Further, the “FARO® Arm has been efficacious in obtaining these data using a contact method.” Id. at 16:47–48. The company manufacturing the FARO Arm was “[f]ounded in 1982 to provide portable CMMs in the medical industry” and “transitioned to the worldwide industrial market in 1993.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 49. Patent Owner does slip op. at 49

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “argument that Fu is not analogous art. PO Resp. 51. Dr. Kurfess first testifies that an ordinarily skilled artisan “never would have looked to Fu, or anything related to those fields, let alone micro-devices such as hearing aid shells to solve problems related to the automotive industry.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 144. Dr. Kurfess then testifies that “Fu is a disclosure for a hearing aid shell . . . and a [person of ordinary skill in the art] . . . would not consider the art of medical devices when trying to solve problems with vehicle floor mats.” Id. ¶ 188. Lastly, Dr. Kurfess testifies that “I completely disagree with Mr. Perreault’s conclusion that ‘a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to turn to Fu as an effective way to implement Stanesic’s reservoir’” and “[c]ommon sense dictates that a prior art disclosure for a custom hearing-aid would not inform a [person of ordinary” slip op. at 98

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue when: (1) a prior action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in the prior action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and (4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped party.” slip op. at 109

    Patent outcomesUS 8,899,655 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,899,655
  • Painteq, LLC v. Orthocision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2023-00451 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Vestgaarden-981, Vestgaarden-818, and Lins, with Paltzer additionally applied to claims 6, 7, and 10–23.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is sufficiently supported by the record. Therefore, we apply that understanding in our analysis herein.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner submits that the parties have submitted joint claim construction in the Florida litigation, and asserts that “[t]he grounds set forth in this [P]etition render the challenged claims obvious under either party’s construction.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 34; Ex. 1017). Nevertheless, Petitioner urges that “express construction is not necessary.” Id. at 7. We agree that no express construction is required for this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 9

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner. Figures 30, 32A and 32B in the Specification depict a working channel with tangs 180a and 180b. See Ex. 1001, Figs. 30, 32A–B. These figures and all of the related description in the Specification describing a working channel with tangs appear in the Parent (Ex. 1006, Figs. 30, 32A–B, 3:17–21, 6:47–54, 15:25–51), but not in the Grandparent. See also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–43 (explaining the same). Accordingly, the Grandparent application does not provide sufficient written description for the limitations requiring that the working channel have tangs in the independent claims. See Ex. 1001, 42:7 (limitation 1.b.4 “at least one tang on a distal end”), 43:9–11 (limitation 10.b.2 “two bilateral blunt tangs on a distal end”), 44:31–32 (limitation 18.b.2 “plurality of blunt tangs on a distal end”). For this reason, the challenged claims are not entitled to the benefit of the Grandparent’s filing date.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “We find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning for combining the asserted references. Vestgaarden- 818 expressly incorporates the teachings of Vestgaarden-981, providing a motivation to use the implant and related tools taught in Vestgaarden-981 in its method for fusing a SI joint. Ex. 1010, 4:10–16. Moreover, we credit Dr. Bovinet’s testimony describing additional reasons for combining Vestgaarden-981’s implant and surgical implants with Vestgaaren-818’s method. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–74. Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Lins’s guidance slots and protrusions is also supported by the evidence of record. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–84. In particular, Dr. Bovinet persuasively testifies that a POSA would have motivated to make this combination because it “enables a surgeon to visually align the guide protrusions on a shaft with the guidance slots of the working channel,” which is “a major improvement” over the flat portion depth stop taught in Vestgaarden-981. Id. ¶ 83; see also id. ¶ 84 (“As someone who has personally performed hundreds of SI joint fusion surgeries, I can attest that the guide protrusions and guidance slots taught in Lins would offer a surgeon a significantly better user experience” as compared to Vestgaarden- 981’s flat portions). Finally, Petitioner has demonstrated that the combination would have produced a “predictable result” and therefore that a (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76, 85).” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 11,083,511 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 11,083,511
  • PTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00844 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 4–25 are unpatentable as obvious over the Chen/Guangjing-based combinations; the Board did not reach the alternative Kickstarter-based grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “In its petition, DGL adopts the definition of the level of skill in the art as proposed by Hangzhou in the parallel district court litigation. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1016, 8). There, Hangzhou asserted that one skilled in the art— would have at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, or equivalent experience, and (2) at least two years of experience in the area of: (i) robotics or feedback control for electromechanical systems; (ii) mechanical design, dynamic analysis, and/or control design for mechatronic systems, or (iii) equivalent experience in (i) or (ii). Ex. 1016, at 8. Hangzhou agrees that the above definition from the parallel litigation should control. See PO Resp. 4–5. Because the parties’ definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the level reflected by the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of our analysis.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Here, the parties summarize their claim construction positions from the parallel district court litigation for three claim terms: “electric balance vehicle,” “controller,” and the various iterations of the “control” limitation of the claims, i.e., “control the hub motors,” “controls the motors,” and “controlling the first and second hub motors.” Compare Pet. 22–23, with PO Resp. 8–9. At the same time, however, the parties state that an express claim construction is not needed for purposes of this inter partes review. See PO Resp. 8–9 (submitting “no construction was necessary.”); Pet. Reply 1 (submitting that “[c]laim construction is not required in this inter partes review.”). Nonetheless, the parties note their agreement that “electric balance vehicle” means “electric self-balancing vehicle.” PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 1. We find the parties’ construction of that term is reasonable and adopt it for purposes of our analysis. As for the other two claim terms, we agree with the parties that no further construction is needed to decide this case. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where the construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Resp. 25–29. In doing so, Hangzhou makes the mistake of arguing the references individually without ever acknowledging the combination of their teachings as a whole. For instance, Hangzhou argues that the asserted combination is improper “because Chen at least does not disclose the inner cover.” PO Resp. 24. But DGL never argued that Chen discloses an inner cover. Instead, DGL observed that one skilled in the art “would have been inclined to employ the inner cover of Guangjing with the electric balance vehicle of Chen because of the benefits expressly taught by Guangjing: improved structural strength, lighter weight, lower battery load, faster response speed, and longer batter[y] run-time,” which “would have merely been the predictable result of using the elements of Guangjing according to their known function.” Pet. 29 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 83) (emphases added). Similarly, Hangzhou argues that the asserted combination is improper because “Guangjing discloses controlling the device through the use of a steering rod” (PO Resp. 25–26) and “[i]ncluding the steering mechanism of Guangjing would be necessary for the user to control turning of the device” (id. at 24). But, again, DGL never proposed using Guangjing’s steering mechanism in the asserted combination. Instead, DGL argued that one skilled in the art would have modified each of the foot platforms in Chen to include an inner cover, thereby preserving the rotatable relationship of the two foot platforms and their ability to independently turn and otherwise operate the wheels as originally intended by Chen. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85). We also disagree with Hangzhou’s contention that the asserted combination “would lead to an inoperative result.” PO Resp. 24. Apparently, Hangzhou believes that “combining the single piece, non- rotatable-frame of Guangjing, with that of Chen would result in a device capable of only moving directly forward or directly backward.” Id. (emphasis added). But that argument relies on the false premise that Guangjing’s single-piece framework would extend the length of both of Chen’s foot platforms, while ignoring DGL’s express position that one skilled in the art would necessarily account for the rotatable relationship of Chen’s foot platforms when incorporating Guangjing’s teaching of an inner cover. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–86); Pet. Reply 3–4 (same). Indeed, in undertaking the combination, it would have been unthinkable for one skilled in the art to destroy the very essence of Chen’s invention— independently rotatable foot platforms for steering the vehicle. More reasonably, one skilled in the art, seeing Guangjing’s teaching of an inner cover for improving the structural strength of a self-balancing vehicle, would have immediately envisaged installing an inner cover into each of Chen’s foot platforms in a manner that preserved the ability of the user to steer the vehicle via the rotatable foot platforms. In that regard, we find the testimony of DGL’s expert more persuasive and credible than Hangzhou’s expert. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–86, with Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 31–33, 36.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “away” from structures like Guangjing’s inner framework. PO Resp. 30. According to Hangzhou, Guangjing’s inner framework equates to the “prior art” device that Chen disparages, which includes “a multi-component parallelogram structure” that “adds to the weight, bulk, complexity, and potential for mechanical failure.” Id. at 29 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 5). We disagree. In quoting Chen, Hangzhou omits that the “multi-component” structure disparaged by Chen is used “to coordinate/link movement of the two platform sections and the wheels,” which reasonably refers to a mechanical linkage for steering the vehicle. Ex. 1004 ¶ 5. Chen’s disparagement of a multi-part steering linkage does not, in our view, teach away from using a static cover or frame to strengthen the underside of the foot platform itself, as taught by Guangjing. Nor can Hangzhou reasonably argue that Guangjing’s inner cover would add to the vehicle’s weight or bulk, given Guangjing’s express disclosure that the inner framework “reduc[es] the overall weight of the vehicle body.” Ex. 1006, 2:15–16; see also id. at 2:27–29 (“the weight is slightly lighter”). Similarly, Hangzhou argues that Chen’s disclosure of the platform sections being formed of “metal, sturdy plastic, or other suitable material” that is “reinforced” means that Chen “specifically teaches away from including additional structures, which would include an inner cover.” PO Resp. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 18). Again, we disagree. Chen simply states that “[t]he housing may be molded and incorporate strengthening reinforcements” and “[t]he housing may be formed of metal, sturdy plastic or other suitable material.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Thus, these are not requirements in Chen. At most, Chen is describing a preferred embodiment. However, “[a] reference does not teach away ‘if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.’” Huawei Techs. Co. v. Iancu, 813 F. App’x 588, 591–92 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Here, while Chen may indicate a “general preference” for the use of strengthening reinforcements or certain materials, nothing in Chen criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of Guangjing’s inner cover. Indeed, in our view, one skilled in the art would have recognized that replacing Chen’s molded strengthening reinforcements in each of the foot platforms with an inner cover, as taught by Guangjing, is nothing more than substituting one strength-enhancing structure for another equivalent structure. Accordingly, Chen does not teach away from employing the inner cover of Guangjing in the electric balance vehicle of Chen.” slip op. at 13

    Patent outcomesUS 10,597,107 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,597,107
  • PTAB · Sep 25, 2023 · IPR2022-00739 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Sun, Dodick, and Sharma; the Board did not reach the separate Dodick and Sharma ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “(iii) Conclusion with respect to Group I patients In sum, we find that the only difference between Sun’s patients who” slip op. at 33

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “be advantageous as compared to galcanezumab on the basis that galcanezumab is a “less selective agent” than erenumab. Patent Owner and Dr. Grosberg cite Shi 2016 (Ex. 2049) as teaching the “high selectivity” of erenumab for blocking the CGRP complex as compared to “less selective agents,” and use this teaching to imply that galcanezumab is less selective than erenumab. PO Resp. 22; Ex. 2037 ¶ 218. But, as Dr. Hay explains, “[t]he ‘less selective agents’ that Shi 2016 refers to are the small-molecule CGRP receptor antagonists, Gepants, not galcanezumab.” Ex. 1239 ¶ 29. We find Dr. Hay’s testimony on this point persuasive, as it is consistent with Shi 2016. See Ex. 2049, 2 (discussing concerns regarding small molecule CGRP antagonists that have prevented their approval and opining that “[a] monoclonal antibody may be a preferred modality to target the CGRP receptor”). Moreover, Shi 2016 concludes with a discussion of the advantages of the superior selectivity of mAbs as a class. Id. at 8 (discussing advantages of mAbs over small molecule CGRP-receptor antagonists, noting “[i]n addition to high potency and superior selectivity, which may provide the benefit of fewer off-target side effects, monoclonal antibodies provide advantages that make them better suited for preventive treatment compared with small molecules”); Ex. 1239 ¶ 32 (interpreting Shi as teaching that “antibodies as a class have limited off-target effects as compared to small molecules because they bind to fewer biological targets and are therefore considered more specific.”). Accordingly, the evidence of” slip op. at 50

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “1. “A subject having refractory migraine” The phrase “a subject having refractory migraine” appears in the preamble to claim 1. Ex. 1002, 173:2–3. The parties agree that the preamble is limiting because it provides context and antecedent basis for terms in the body of the claim. Pet. 12 (“Claim 1’s preamble . . . should be construed as limiting at least because it provides context and antecedent [basis] for the claimed ‘therapeutically effective amount.’”); PO Resp. 9 (“There is no dispute that the preamble ‘[a] method of treating or preventing migraine in a subject having refractory migraine, the method comprising’ is reasons expressed by the parties. Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the phrase “treatment of sleep apneas” in the preamble of an interference count was limiting because it provided antecedent basis for the phrase “to a patient in need of such treatment” in the body of the interference count); see also Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Pharmas Int’l GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (discussing construction of claims directed to “methods of using a composition for a specific purpose,” explaining, “while there is no bright-line rule for determining whether a preamble is limiting, we have generally construed statements of intended purpose in such method claims as limiting”). We turn now to the meaning of the phrase “a subject having refractory migraine.” The parties agree that the ’161 patent expressly defines the phrase “a subject having refractory migraine.” Pet. 13; PO Resp. 9. In this regard, the ’161 patent states: As used herein, refractory migraine patients (or “subject having refractory migraine”) are considered refractory if they have a documented inadequate response (in a medical chart or by treating physician’s confirmation) to at least two preventive medications (from a different cluster, defined below). Refractory migraine patients can also be considered refractory if they have a documented inadequate response (in a medical chart or by treating physician’s confirmation) to two to four classes of prior preventive medications (from different cluster[s], as defined below), e.g., inadequate response to two classes of prior preventive medications, inadequate response to three classes of prior preventative medications, or an inadequate response to four classes of prior preventative medications. Ex. 1002, 18:61–19:7. Thus, a “subject having refractory migraine” should be construed as: a migraine patient having a documented inadequate least two preventive medications from a different cluster. Id.” slip op. at 8

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “A. Exhibits 1065, 1073, 1088, 1089, 1220, and 1221 We do not rely on Exhibits 1065, 1073, 1088, 1089, 1220, and 1221 in our Final Written Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion as it relates to these exhibits.” slip op. at 107

    Patent outcomesUS 11,028,161 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,028,161
  • PTAB · Sep 25, 2023 · IPR2022-00738 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Sun, Dodick, and Sharma; the Board did not reach the alternative ground.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the problems” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “1. “A subject having refractory migraine” The phrase “a subject having refractory migraine” appears in the preamble to claim 1. Ex. 1001, 173:2–3. The parties agree that the preamble is limiting because it provides context and antecedent basis for terms in the body of the claim. Pet. 12 (“Claim 1’s preamble . . . should be construed as limiting at least because it provides context and antecedent [basis] for the claimed ‘therapeutically effective amount.’”); PO Resp. 9 (“There is no dispute that the preamble ‘[a] method of treating or preventing migraine in a subject having refractory migraine, the method comprising’ is limits the claim for the reasons expressed by the parties. Rapoport v. Dement, 254 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that the phrase “treatment of sleep apneas” in the preamble of an interference count was limiting because it provided antecedent basis for the phrase “to a patient in need of such treatment” in the body of the interference count); see also Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Pharmas Int’l GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (discussing construction of claims directed to “methods of using a composition for a specific purpose,” explaining, “while there is no bright-line rule for determining whether a preamble is limiting, we have generally construed statements of intended purpose in such method claims as limiting”). We turn now to the meaning of the phrase “a subject having refractory migraine.” The parties agree that the ’160 patent expressly defines the phrase “a subject having refractory migraine.” Pet. 13; PO Resp. 9. In this regard, the ’160 patent states: As used herein, refractory migraine patients (or “subject having refractory migraine”) are considered refractory if they have a documented inadequate response (in a medical chart or by treating physician’s confirmation) to at least two preventive medications (from a different cluster, defined below). Refractory migraine patients can also be considered refractory if they have a documented inadequate response (in a medical chart or by treating physician’s confirmation) to two to four classes of prior preventive medications (from different cluster[s], as defined below), e.g., inadequate response to two classes of prior preventive medications, inadequate response to three classes of prior preventative medications, or an inadequate response to four classes of prior preventative medications. Ex. 1001, 18:59–19:5. Thus, a “subject having refractory migraine” should be construed as: a migraine patient having a documented inadequate least two preventive medications from a different cluster. Id.” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “understand the term “adverse event” to be limited to “serious” events. Ex. 2004, 1; Ex. 1208, 1; Ex. 1209, 6; Ex. 1210, 8. The only evidence to the contrary is the testimony of Dr. Grosberg. Ex. 2037 ¶ 45. Because Dr. Grosberg’s testimony is inconsistent with the evidence he relies upon, we decline to give it substantial weight. We recognize that the Specification of the ’160 patent includes language imposing some degree of severity on the “adverse event.” Specifically, the adverse event must be significant enough to cause treatment to be “interrupted” because the event made the treatment become “intolerable by the patient.” But, we find no support in the record for imposing an additional severity requirement by effectively limiting the term “adverse event” to “serious adverse events.” Accordingly, we decline to construe the term “adverse event” to mean “a serious undesirable experience associated with the use of a treatment” as proposed by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 12. We do not find it necessary to further construe the term “adverse event” to resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “d) Conclusion regarding Sun’s disclosure of the claimed patients For the reasons discussed supra §§ II.F.1.a–c, we find that Petitioner” slip op. at 40

    Patent outcomesUS 11,028,160 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,028,160
  • Apple Inc. v. Logantree, LPAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00040 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30–32, 36, 39–42, 45–51, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over the grounds decided.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 8. In proposing a different level of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not explain why its proposed skill level is more appropriate.13 PO Resp. 18. In addition, the parties’ proposed definitions are substantially similar. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “We determine that we need not expressly construe “movement sensor” to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs, 200 F.3d at 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent the parties raise claim construction issues in addressing the asserted grounds, we address such issues below.” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “any weight. Reply 29–30. First, Petitioner contends that the Patent Owner Response does not provide a single citation to Dr. Madisetti’s declaration, Exhibit 2005. Id. at 29. However, Patent Owner explains that the Patent Owner Response mistakenly cites to Exhibit 2001 instead of Exhibit 2005 due to a filing error and confirms that Dr. Madisetti’s declaration is persuasive. Petitioner also argues that Dr. Madisetti’s testimony in Exhibit 2005 is not based on underlying facts because, in the 60-paragraph declaration, only paragraphs 32–35 and 59 have any citations. Reply 29. Petitioner also asserts that Dr. Madisetti refused to answer questions and provide clarification during his deposition. Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1040, 30:3–20, 52:2–14, 78:16–84:4). Patent Owner states that it served a supplemental declaration in response to Petitioner’s Objection to Evidence months before the deposition of Dr. Madisetti.14 Sur-reply 20. On this record, we decline to discount Dr. Madisetti’s testimony in its entirety as suggested by Petitioner. Instead, we consider Dr. Madisetti’s testimony, as we do all expert testimony, in accordance with governing law and Board rules. E. Ground 1: Asserted Obviousness Based on Allum, Raymond, and Conlan” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner. Allum’s and Conlan’s design schemes, although different, are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, in addition to the pushbuttons, Conlan’s monitor includes a movement senor for detecting a full range of a subject’s movement and a memory in which data obtained by the monitor can be stored and later retrieved for evaluation. Ex. 1010, 2:60–63, 3:56–58, 4:47–49. As such, Conlan combines the pushbuttons for a user to tell the device about the user’s condition with a movement senor and a memory that enables the device to tell the user (or another person) about the user’s conditions (i.e., the user’s movements). Furthermore, even if Conlan did not disclose using two design schemes together, the differences in the design schemes identified by Patent Owner would not prevent one of ordinary skill in the art from considering combining the references. Rather, as Petitioner asserts, adding Conlan’s pushbuttons would allow the resulting device to gather additional data relating to a particular event, such as a feeling of dizziness, that pertains to the subject’s balance or movement. See Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1010, 6:38–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–79); see also id. at 34 (arguing that “switches 22, ‘dizziness,’ and, when depressed, the switches 22, 23 ‘cause that occurrence to be recorded in the internal memory of the monitor’”). We are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize such additional data to be beneficial to Allum’s diagnostic and rehabilitative tool for people prone to abnormal falling and wishing to improve movement control.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 6,059,576 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,059,576
  • PTAB · Jul 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00802 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 59 is unpatentable as anticipated by Brumfield, Marcus, and Chandran; the motion to amend proposing substitute claim 62 is denied because claim 62 is unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “We find this argument unpersuasive. As Patent Owner notes, Petitioner’s expert provides a definition of POSITA that is very similar to that recited by Patent Owner in its Motion to Amend, substantively differing only in the number of years of experience of the engineer at issue. This congruity supports the conclusion that the level of ordinary skill in the art may be recognized in the prior art itself. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “In our Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the “portion of the preamble reciting ‘for compressing bone’ is not limiting to the claim” and found that other terms did not require construction. Dec. 8–9. We agreed with Petitioner that “[t]he phrase ‘for compressing bone’ merely identifies an intended use.” Pet. 20; Dec. 9. Patent Owner does not dispute this interpretation. See generally PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that “the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Therefore, having considered the entire record developed during trial, we adhere to the preliminary construction that the limitation “for compressing bone” does not impose a structural limitation on claim 59 and that the other terms do not require construction.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Patent Owner disputes the Petition generally but Patent Owner does not identify any error in Petitioner’s foregoing arguments. Accordingly, we adopt the factual statements regarding the specific teachings of the references as findings of fact. See generally In re NuVasive, 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Board need not make specific findings as to claim limitations that Patent Owner does not dispute are disclosed in the prior art). We have reviewed Petitioner’s analysis and the underlying evidence cited in support and conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations of claim 59 are disclosed by Brumfield.” slip op. at 26

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “For the reasons discussed below, Patent Owner has shown that proposed substitute claim 62 meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. For the reasons discussed below, however, Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claim 62 is unpatentable over prior art. Therefore, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 8,303,589 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 8,303,589
  • Painteq, LLC v. Orthocision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · May 24, 2023 · IPR2022-00335 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 26–28 and 31 are unpatentable; proposed substitute claims 32–35 are also unpatentable, so the revised motion to amend is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “Accordingly, even in the absence of any argument from Patent Owner,” slip op. at 16

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “2. Claim 26 Claim 26 recites “[a] method for repairing a sacroiliac joint.” Ex.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

      “2. Combination of Stark and Stoffman In presenting this alternative challenge and combining Stark with” slip op. at 38

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “Accordingly, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the” slip op. at 87

    Patent outcomesUS 10,426,539 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 10,426,539
  • PTAB · Aug 17, 2022 · PGR2021-00050 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7 are unpatentable over Greenhalgh; claims 8–9 are unpatentable over Greenhalgh alone or with Lynn. Substitute claims 20–28 lack written-description support.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “The parties generally agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a mechanical or biomedical engineer with several years of 6 We note that a Second Dr. Serhan Declaration is referenced in one of Patent Owner’s exhibit lists, but this document was never filed in this proceeding. See Tr. 33:15–25. experience or an orthopedic surgeon or neurosurgeon with experience designing or developing medical devices. Pet. 18–19; PO Resp. 31. On this record, we adopt the parties’ definition of the level of skill in the art. We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “We note that “act upon” is not defined in the Specification of the ’575 patent. “Act upon” appears for the first time in claim 1 of the ’575 patent. The Specification describes that “the cage assembly may comprise an expander such as an expansion screw or a shim which, when inserted, selectively expands the body of the cage assembly to a desired size.” Ex. 1001, 4:26–29. The Specification further describes that “translation of the elongate expander proximally toward the trailing end expands the cage body by separating the at least a portion of the upper portion from at least a portion of the lower portion.” Id. at 6:56–59. (emphasis added). We determine that “expander expands the cage” is construed in light of the Specification to mean that the expander acts upon both the upper and lower portion of the cage to move the upper and lower portions further apart. We note, however, there is no requirement that each portion is moved away from the longitudinal expander by the same amount.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “The Specification does not define “unobstructed” or “obstructed.” Based on the disclosure in the Specification, the prosecution history, 7 and the annotated Figure 5A and 5B above, the term “unobstructed” is understood to mean that there are no obstacles or structures lying in the path of the window created by the upper portion, lower portion, and elongate expander that would impede the view through the window. Figure 5B does not show any features that impede the view through the aligned window and thereby shows an “unobstructed view.” Tr. 40:20–41:11, see id. 41:5–6 (“Figure 5B shows nothing extending into the window, and that’s the only 7 Petitioner explains that “the plain meaning of an ‘open’ window is well understood to be a state allowing passage through the window.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, Patent Owner expressly defined “unobstructed” during prosecution to “mean there are no features lying in the path and blocking the window.” Id. at 21–22. Patent Owner acknowledges that the term “unobstructed” was added during prosecution in order to distinguish over Baynham (US 2007/0270968 Al, published Nov. 22, 2007). PO Resp. 36–37; Ex. 1002, 29–30. The only example of an obstructing feature identified during prosecution is an axle (or jack screw) that extends down the center of the opening which acts like a bar. Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1002, 29–30); see Tr. 41:5–8 (“Figure 5B [of the ’575 patent] shows nothing extending into the window, and that’s the only support that there is. There’s no[] qualifying language in the specification that would allow a retreat to specify a particular amount that was considered acceptable.”) support that there is.”). Unobstructed does not refer to the entirety of each window, but rather where they overlap relative to one another. We determine that “unobstructed” means “there are no features lying in the path and blocking the window.”” slip op. at 15

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “disclose bidirectional cage expansion. We note that “bidirectional” does not 8 Newton’s third law states that for every action (force) in nature there is an equal and opposite reaction. appear in the language of claim 1 of the ’575 patent nor does it appear anywhere in the Specification of the ’575 patent. All that is required by claim 1 is for the cage body to expand, which requires “the expander to act upon portions of the upper portion and the lower portion to expand the cage body by separating at least a portion of the upper portion from at least a portion of the lower portion.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–31. Thus, separation of the upper portion and lower portion upon the longitudinal translation of the elongate expander is all that is required to meet the claim element.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 10,709,575 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,709,575
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.