- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Empire Technology Development LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00896 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 25–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted Li-based combinations; claim 29 was not shown unpatentable over Li, Siam, and Tiirola.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of wireless data communication systems at the physical and media access control (MAC) layer.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–34). Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2022 ¶ 22 (adopting “Petitioners’ and Dr. Valenti’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”) On the complete record, we determine Petitioner’s proposed level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’120 patent and the prior art of record. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“court in the parallel litigation issued a final claim construction. Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-Reply 3–5. The district court construed “idle power consumption” as “a power consumed by the mobile station when the mobile station is powered on and waiting to send.” Ex. 1050, 12. The parties propose that we construe the claims to match the district court’s final construction. See Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-Reply 3; Tr. 26. We agree and adopt the district court’s final claim construction of “idle power consumption” as “a power consumed by the mobile station when the mobile station is powered on and waiting to send,” for the reasons set forth below.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“2. Additional Claim Terms For purposes of institution, we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 25, 27, and 28 over Li and Siam” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On the full record, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s argument that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine Li and Siam to reduce total power consumption including idle power consumption (Li) and circuit power consumption (Siam). Both Li and Siam describe a need for reducing energy consumption in wireless devices. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 18; Ex. 1006, 875–76. Both references further describe switching from MIMO mode to another operating mode to reduce power consumption and optimize battery life. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 19; Ex. 1006, 875 (“[W]e dynamically adjust the ‘transmission mode’ . . . so as to minimize the total energy consumption.”). In sum, the references teach the same technique, i.e., mode switching, to achieve the same goal, i.e., reducing energy consumption, in similar devices, i.e., wireless devices. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Accordingly, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that one skilled in the art would have combined the Li and Siam with a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 91, 92.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,798,120 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,798,120 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 7–12, and 17–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–6 and 13–16 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted Watanabe combinations were unsupported.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute and applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. PO Resp. 6. We find that Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Thus, we apply Petitioner’s proposal in our analysis.” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we construed “determin[ing] a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length” as “requiring determining a viewing window for different times of the video.” Inst. Dec. 21. Neither party disputes this construction. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1–7. We maintain this same construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Thomason are in the same field of endeavor. Thomason describes a camera and method for correctly orientating pictures from the camera. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 2 29–40, Figs. 3a–3b. In particular, Thomason is interested in rotating and cropping images to reduce the effect of poor orientation. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 34, 36). Pacurariu likewise describes aligning and resizing/cropping of a captured image to correct poor orientation. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 3, 45–56, Figs. 5A–5C. The preponderance of the evidence also supports that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the Pacurariu’s teachings with Thomason to predictably improve Thomason. Thomason teaches correct rotation of video data and makes use of rotation sensor to correct rotated images. Pet. 19–21 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–77). Pacurariu similarly uses sensors and measures tilt angle of the camera. Id at 21–22 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51–52, Fig. 6; Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). Pacurariu further teaches that its tilt data angle can be stored for each “video frame.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 52). Petitioner, with support from credible testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos, explains how the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu could be successfully combined. Id. at 23 (citing, for example, Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). A person of ordinary skill in the art could have known that Thomason’s system could be improved by saving rotation data for each video frame and correcting images on a frame-by-frame basis. Id. at 23–24. The testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos is credible in this regard. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–81. Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents”). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8–9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6, 7.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“evaluating nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence of nonobviousness, also referred to as secondary considerations. Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential). We first consider whether Patent Owner has demonstrated “that its products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 33. If not, that “does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. (quoting Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75).” slip op. at 62
Patent outcomesUS 11,336,832 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,336,832 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Meulen and Chao; claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Meulen does not disclose transforming an image captured by its camera.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 19–20). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“From the outset we note that the words of the claim recite “non- uniformly shift[ing] the pixels” and do not recite a “non-linear” transformation. This favors Petitioner’s position, which is based directly off the definition of “non-uniform,” over Patent Owner’s position, which substitutes “non-linear” for “non-uniform.” Generally, then, we would determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term in the context of the entire Specification. Here, however, the ʼ413 patent does not mention “uniform” or “non-uniform” shifting of pixels anywhere except in the claims. The Specification, therefore, provides limited guidance, by itself, as to the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. Nonetheless, even reviewing the portions of the Specification cited by the parties, we see no clear or unambiguous effort to limit the challenged claims to require only non-linear transformations in which the pixels to which a transformation is applied do not have the same amount of shift. is not non-linear. Pet. Reply 1. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the center circle of Figure 2B maintains the original circular shape after the transformation is applied to the image which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that no two pixels will have the same amount of shift. Pet. Reply 1–2. We agree. In Figure 2B of the ʼ413 patent, the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest. Ex. 1001, 4:19–21. After the input image goes through linear scaling (step 204) and then non-linear warping (step 206) the circles become more vertically compressed as they approach the top and bottom edges and more horizontally stretched as they approach the left and right edges. Id. at 4:22–30. But “the center circle is fully corrected so that it maintains the original circular shape of the corresponding circle in the input image 212.” Id. at 4:23–25. This means that at least some pixels, such as those of the center circle, undergo the same amount of shift after being transformed.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“readable instructions” of claims 1 and 2 must occur in a particular order. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the step of “determine a portion within the input image” must occur after “obtain[ing] an image” and before “apply[ing] a transformation to the input image.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the specification does not require such an order and, in fact, describes an embodiment where such an order is not followed. Pet. 3. We determine that the “determine a portion within the input image” step does not need to occur after the “obtain an image” step and before the “apply a transformation to the input image” step. As Patent Owner itself points out, claims 1 and 2 are apparatus and system claims respectively, and an ordering of the limitations of such claims is not necessary. PO Resp. 17. Even if we were to treat the apparatus and system claims as reciting the steps of a method, “as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We see nothing in the claims that would cause us to break this general rule. Patent Owner argues that the claims imply a “specific order because the ‘determine a portion’ requirement operates on ‘the [obtained] input image’ and defines the ‘portion’ that is necessary for the 23; Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Although the steps are recited in a specific order in the claim, as they necessarily must be, the claim does not expressly specify that the certain steps must occur before or after other instructions, nor does logic imply such a requirement. For example, if certain characteristics of the image are known before the image is obtained (e.g. the size, dimensions, resolution, aspect ratio, or content etc.) the determination of the portion of the image could be made before the image is obtained. These characteristics may be based on the specific device taking the image or the subject matter of the image, both of which may be known before the image is captured or obtained. It is, therefore, not necessary that the image be obtained in order for a portion of the image to be determined. Similarly, we do not find the written description to expressly or implicitly specify an order the claimed step of “determine a portion of the input image.” For example, the written description of the ʼ413 patent states that in Figure 2B “the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction as the frame boundary is approached.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–22. Patent Owner emphasizes that this disclosure implies that an input image is obtained before the center portion is chosen. PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:63–64, 4:19–22). But the description of this embodiment does not expressly recite an order. For example, the description of Figure 2A explains that “an input image is obtained” in step 202, “the image is then scaled” in step 204, and a “non-linear warping is then applied” in step 206. Ex. 1001, 3:63–4:3. This description does not mention “determin[ing] of a portion of the image” as a separate step or as part of the listed steps, and therefore, does not specify an order in which this step must occur. is configured so that some areas of the image are fully corrected geometrically, while some other areas are distorted. . . . [T]he center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction.” Id. at 4:17–19. This excerpt from the ʼ413 patent, which the Patent Owner specifically relies on (PO Resp. 19), also does not specify an order in which the determination step (choosing of the region of interest) takes place. Moreover, because the ʼ413 patent states that the warp module is configured so that some areas are fully corrected while others are not, the determination step could take place at the time the warp module was configured, presumably before the image was obtained. Finally, the ʼ413 patent states that “in the case, of video, the area may dynamically change between images (e.g. to follow a moving object).” Ex. 1001, 4:34–36. Patent Owner argues that this description “requires first obtaining the image in order to locate the object that is being followed.” PO Resp. 19–20. This embodiment is related to the case of video or a moving object, which the challenged claims do not mention. We, therefore, decline to limit the scope of the claim based on this embodiment. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence we determine Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Meulen and Chao. For example, Petitioner argues that “[i]t would have been obvious that when performing image scaling, pixels from the input to output positions are shifted based on a scaling factor.” Pet. 91. Meulen teaches scaling but does not provide the details regarding scaling. E.g., Ex. 1007, 1:55–56, 4:37–49. We agree that in light of Meulen’s disclosure of scaling, a POSITA would have looked to other references, such as Chao, for further details on how to perform scaling. Dr. Katsaggelos provides credible support, testifying that “Meulen mentions ‘compression and/or scaling,’ and provides details on how to perform compression. But Meulen does not disclose the details of how to perform scaling. A POSITA when faced with Meulen and having the knowledge about scaling would have been motivated to turn to a prior art reference that discloses the details of scaling.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 262. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no motivation to combine other than asserting that it involves combining prior art elements. PO Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 92). As explained above, however, Petitioner does more than just assert that the motivation involves combining prior art elements. Instead, Petitioner explains that Meulen discusses both compression and scaling, and provides details regarding compression but does not provide details on how to scale. Pet. 91–92; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–262. Thus, Meulen teaches that scaling was a known technique. See Hybritech, (“a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”). Dr. Katsaggelos testifies that, in this situation, a POSITA would have looked to Chao for details regarding scaling. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–263. We determine this establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Meulen’s teachings with Chao. Patent Owner draws a distinction between Meulen and Chao, arguing that “Meulen is concerned with modifying content from a media source to be displayed on a device’s screen while Chao, by contrast, is directed to changing the aspect ratio of a document intended for printing.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 89–90). Patent Owner’s argument is contradicted, however, by Chao’s disclosure which states that “after all the background and foreground elements in the image have been resized . . . [t]he image may be output by displaying the image on or as part of: a display screen such as a computer monitor, camera screen, printer screen, printed page, projected image, or the like.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 32. Patent Owner argues that Meulen’s system avoids distortion near the middle where the user’s focus is more likely to be, while Chao, on the other hand, is directed to avoiding distortion of stylized borders on differently sized pages. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:26–29; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 25; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 91–92). This argument reads the prior art too narrowly and does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner does not rely on Chao for its teaching of avoiding distortion near the borders of the image, but rather on its teaching of scaling the image while maintaining the design intent of the original image. Ex. 1008 ¶ 22; Ex. 1014 ¶ 67. Thus, Petitioner is applying Chao’s techniques of scaling (regardless of where the area of 92. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Chao’s approach of stretching/shrinking only the background and uniformly scaling entire foreground objects is suitable for graphic design but incompatible with Meulen which is concerned with adapting externally derived media source content for display on a fixed size screen. PO Resp. 37–38 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 93). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner relies on Chao’s teaching of stretching/shrinking of background elements and applies that stretching/shrinking to Meulen’s images displayed on its screen. Pet. 91–92 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 28, 63; Ex. 1002 ¶ 263). The fact that Chao applies its teaching to graphic design does not prevent a POSITA from applying those teachings to Meulen’s media content displayed on its screen.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,015,413 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,015,413 - Giesecke+devrient GmbH / Giesecke+devrient Currecy Technology GmbH et al. v. Lumenco, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00839 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3, 4, and 7–11 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish random mirror selection.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. For example, the ʼ863 patent provides, as relevant background, a discussion of anti-counterfeiting devices made up of arrays of lenses used to display unique images, placed on currency and labels for retail products. Ex. 1001, 1:31–43. The ʼ863 patent also discusses using lenses to create holograms. Id. at 2:7–20. Similarly, the prior art in this field, such as Fuhse847, relates to the use of lenses and mirrors to create hologram images for security purposes. Ex. 1022, 1–8. These descriptions demonstrate, consistent with Petitioner’s proposed definition, that a POSITA would need an educational background to understand optics, lenses, and mirrors along with professional experience with optical security features to understand the creation holograms and images using lenses and mirrors for the purpose of preventing counterfeiting of currency and other valuable products. Patent Owner’s proposed definition differs from Petitioner’s in that it includes “or a similar field” when describing the education level of a POSITA and it includes “with diffusive light” when describing the experience level of a POSITA. As to the first difference, the addition of “similar field” introduces vagueness and unnecessary uncertainty into the definition. Patent Owner does not explain what aspects of computer science would make it a field similar to the others listed, or what additional engineering coursework would suffice to make a person a POSITA. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 25. Nor does Patent Owner explain, generally, what makes a field “similar” to the ones listed or how to make that determination. As to the second difference, the addition of “with diffusive light”” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not move to exclude Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.62; Pet. Reply 25 (arguing that Patent Owner waived its ability to challenge Dr. Hesselink’s qualification.). At the hearing, Patent Owner explained that its argument that Dr. Hesselink is not a POSITA “goes to [the] weight” of Dr. Hesselink’s testimony. Tr. 37:8. In any event, Patent Owner’s argument is based on its proposed definition of a POSITA, which we do not adopt. We, therefore, are not persuaded that Dr. Hesselink testimony should be given little or no weight.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require express construction.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner agrees “that the terms do not require construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition.” PO Resp. 13. We do not need to construe any terms explicitly to reach our decision on institution. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“teaches the preamble and all of the limitations of claim 1. Pet. 12–34. Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to automate the computations for designing micro mirror arrays in Fuhse847 with Rich’s teaching of a processor running software. Id. at 14–17. Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions regarding the preamble, limitations 1b–1e, and the motivation to combine Fuhse847 and Rich. See generally PO Resp. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence and are persuaded that the combination of Fuhse847 and Rich teaches the preamble and undisputed limitations 1b–1e, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Fuhse847 and Rich in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,448,863 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,448,863 - Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 20, 2023 · IPR2022-00236 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 10–13, and 21 are unpatentable over Osanai and Tokuhiro; claims 2, 6, and 22 were not shown unpatentable because key limitations were not established.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal. Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a person with an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering and two years working in the field, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and three years working in the field.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“constructions” from the related proceedings. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1019). Patent Owner states that it does not seek construction of any terms in the ʼ035 patent and “agrees with Petitioners that all terms of the ʼ035 Patent have their plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 13. We determine no terms need to be construed to resolve the disputes between the parties.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“determine that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Osanai and Tokuhiro in the way proposed by Petitioner. Petitioner provides sufficient support for its allegation that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Osanai and Tokuhiro. For example, Dr. Alpert credibly explains that “it would have been obvious to use Tokuhiro’s teaching in Osanai’s data register buffer to achieve the same benefit achieved by Tokuhiro’s device, i.e., reduce the number of steps needed to determine the read delay by basing that determination on timing information determined during write leveling.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 126. This is because, as Dr. Alpert explains, Tokuhiro’s leveling technique uses timing information determined during write leveling for write operations to determine the delay for subsequent read operations. Id. ¶ 122 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:16–26, 16:1–28). Thus, Tokuhiro’s technique reduces the number of steps because it uses previous measurements and calculations from prior write leveling instead of making additional measurements and calculations to determine the delay for read operations. As for reducing power consumption and circuit area, Tokuhiro itself states “[a]ccordingly, the delay times Dt1 and Dt2 from the input of the two signals to the output thereof can be efficiently set without increasing the 24:26–29. Dr. Alpert provides credible testimony that Tokuhiro’s leveling technique allows for “using a common structure for implementing write and read delays [that] would improve power consumption for Osanai.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 127 (citing Ex. 1006, 21:15–24:42, Figs. 16, 17). We determine that evidence from Tokuhiro and Dr. Alpert sufficiently demonstrates that there would be benefits from using Tokuhiro’s technique in combination with Osanai. In terms of Petitioner’s argument that combining Tokuhiro with Osanai would improve signal fidelity, decrease timing skew among components and lower the load perceived by the memory controller (Pet. 40–41), we agree with Patent Owner that the reasoning provided is somewhat conclusory. The portions of Tokuhiro cited in support of this argument do not mention signal fidelity or lowering load, although they do mention adjusting for timing skew. See Ex. 1006, 1:63–2:28. Overall, however, considering the other two reasons provided, we determine Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Osanai and Tokuhiro.” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Osanai and Tokuhiro teach the limitations of claim 1 and that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Osanai and Tokuhiro.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 9,824,035 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,824,035 - Google LLC v. Mindbasehq, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2021-01252 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 20–32, 41, and 42 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 14–19, 33–40, and 43–46 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As Petitioner argues, and we agree, the claims of the ’680 patent do not support Patent Owner’s arguments as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Reply 8–9 (citing Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 23–26). Claim 1 recites, for example, “intangible data elements representing words,” including “effect data elements representing at least one among verbs standing alone and in combination with other words.” Ex. 1001, 35:31–33 (claim 1). Other claims recite, for example, “linked words,” “dictionary routine for automatically classifying and storing words,” “dictionary routine links all sets of synonyms,” “words having at least two different meanings.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 36:12 (claim 12), 36:41–42 (claim 14), 36:47–48 (claim 16), 36:52–53 (claim 17), 36:64–65 (claim 19). In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues that these words in the claims “are, at most, high school level grammar concepts,” so “[n]o complex linguistic or lexicographic knowledge is needed to understand or implement these claims.” Sur-reply 5. However, Petitioner is not asserting that complex knowledge is necessary for a person of ordinary skill in the art, and Patent Owner’s arguments appear to at least somewhat concede that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had some linguistic or lexicographic knowledge.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“’680 patent, and focus entirely on the purported database design and functionality of the ’680 patent, without further explanation. Moreover, although Dr. Ranka testifies that “LLL is used to interpret or organize text according to agreed-upon rules” and “can be useful in identifying parts of speech in sentences and the like” (e.g., groups of text) (Ex. 2003 ¶ 18), Patent Owner does not acknowledge that that is precisely what the ’680 patent describes. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 3:28–32 (“The MINDBASE system can also differentiate between multiple uses of the same word for different parts of speech. For example, some words like ‘book’ can be a noun, verb, or an adjective.”); see Reply 9. We are also persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments in Reply, supported by testimony from Dr. Jansen, as to how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have gained LLL experience in June 1997, and credit this testimony. See Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 14, 29– 31). Moreover, Petitioner provides testimony from Dr. Jansen regarding the level of ordinary skill as reflected in the prior art that explains how its proposed level of skill in the art relates to the ’680 patent. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 56–101; e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 56 (“[Natural language processing] systems utilize lexical databases like the database disclosed by the ’680 Patent.”); ¶ 58 (“That basic premise [a theory and system of natural language processing] tracks exactly the Mindbase technology, which claims to put ‘[t]he mind’s view of a data structure . . . directly into a computer.’”) (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 1a); ¶ 73 (“those skilled in the art of [natural language processing] were implementing systems that performed the same functions as the challenged claims of the ’680 Patent . . . [and] lexical databases that categorized words by parts of speech and analyzed the relationship between those words were recognized as a central part of any [natural language processing] system”). Patent Owner contends that Dr. Jansen’s testimony does not meet Petitioner’s burden because it is wholly conclusory. PO Resp. 8–9. According to Patent Owner, Dr. Jansen provides only a single citation to the ’680 patent (to Figure 1(a)), which is insufficient to show that the ’680 patent includes teachings equivalent to lexical databases, computational linguistics, and computational lexicography. Id. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Petitioner provides over 55 paragraphs of testimony from Dr. Jansen in support of its proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 56–101; see also Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 23–31. Throughout this testimony, which is directed to a discussion of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, Dr. Jansen refers back to the ’680 patent in discussing natural language processing and lexical databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 56 (“[Natural language processing] systems utilize lexical databases like the database disclosed by the ’680 Patent”), ¶ 58 (“[t]hat basic premise [a theory and system of natural language processing] tracks exactly the Mindbase technology, which claims to put ‘[t]he mind’s view of a data structure . . . directly into a computer.’”), ¶ 59 (“[l]ike the ’680 Patent, the database described by Pin-Ngern is organized by parts of speech, and ‘includes noun, verb, adjective, and adverb sections.’”), ¶ 73 (“Thus, well before 1997, those skilled in the art of [natural language processing] were implementing systems that performed the same functions as the challenged claims of the ’680 Patent.”). And, as Patent Owner acknowledges, Dr. Jansen cites to Figure 1(a) of the ’680 patent, which is “a pictorial description of” the “MINDBASE format” which “is based on the completely detailed information people have in their minds instead of the ‘verbal shorthand’ that people generally use when speaking or writing.” Ex. 1001, 2:66–3:2 (“FIG. 1 is a pictorial description of this process.”). We, therefore, find that the record more strongly supports Petitioner’s” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“analogous art to the claimed invention. PO Resp. 9–11. A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). References are selected as being reasonably pertinent to the problem based on the judgment of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Id. (“[I]t is necessary to consider ‘the reality of the circumstances,’. . . –– in other words, common sense –– in deciding in which fields a person of ordinary skill would reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the problem facing the inventor.”); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term, including “dictionary routine” and “automatically classifying and storing.” As will be discussed below in connection with the analysis of claim 14 (Section III.E.7), we determine that, whether these terms are construed in the sense of using a dictionary lookup function, or initially creating the dictionary, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Conlon teaches these limitations.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 6,665,680 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,665,680 - Google LLC v. Mindbasehq, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2021-01251 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 20–32, 41, and 42 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 14–19 and 33–46 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations fail to teach required limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We, therefore, find that the record more strongly supports Petitioner’s proposed definition of ordinary skill in the art, rather than Patent Owner’s, which appears to selectively ignore large portions of the description provided in the ’433 patent. We, therefore, find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the ’433 patent and by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, although we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, we would reach the same conclusion under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Moreover, Petitioner provides testimony from Dr. Jansen regarding the level of ordinary skill as reflected in the prior art that explains how its proposed level of skill in the art relates to the ’433 patent. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 56–101; e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 56 (“[Natural language processing] systems utilize lexical databases like the database disclosed by the ’433 Patent.”); ¶ 58 (“That basic premise [a theory and system of natural language processing] tracks exactly the Mindbase technology, which claims to put ‘[t]he mind’s view of a data structure . . . directly into a computer.’”) (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 1a); ¶ 73 (“those skilled in the art of [natural language processing] were implementing systems that performed the same functions as the challenged claims of the ’433 Patent . . . [and] lexical databases that categorized words by parts of speech and analyzed the relationship between those words were recognized as a central part of any [natural language processing] system”). Patent Owner contends that Dr. Jansen’s testimony does not meet Petitioner’s burden because it is wholly conclusory. PO Resp. 8–9. According to Patent Owner, Dr. Jansen provides only a single citation to the ’433 patent (to Figure 1(a)), which is insufficient to show that the ’433 patent includes teachings equivalent to lexical databases, computational linguistics, and computational lexicography. Id. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Petitioner provides over 55 paragraphs of testimony from Dr. Jansen in support of its proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 56–101; see also Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 23–31. Throughout this testimony, which is directed to a discussion of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, Dr. Jansen refers back to the ’433 patent in discussing natural language processing and lexical databases. See, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 56 (“[Natural language processing] systems utilize lexical databases like the database disclosed by the ’433 Patent”), ¶ 58 (“[t]hat basic premise [a theory and system of natural language processing] tracks exactly the Mindbase technology, which claims to put ‘[t]he mind’s view of a data structure . . . directly into a computer.’”), ¶ 59 (“[l]ike the ’433 Patent, the database described by Pin-Ngern is organized by parts of speech, and ‘includes noun, verb, adjective, and adverb sections.’”), ¶ 73 (“Thus, well before 1997, those skilled in the art of [natural language processing] were implementing systems that performed the same functions as the challenged claims of the ’433 Patent.”). And, as Patent Owner acknowledges, Dr. Jansen cites to Figure 1(a) of the ’433 patent, which is “a pictorial description of” the “MINDBASE format” which “is based on the completely detailed information people have in their minds instead of the ‘verbal shorthand’ that people generally use when speaking or writing.” Ex. 1001, 2:65–3:2 (“FIG. 1 is a pictorial description of this process.”). We, therefore, find that the record more strongly supports Petitioner’s proposed definition of ordinary skill in the art, rather than Patent Owner’s, which appears to selectively ignore large portions of the description provided in the ’433 patent. We, therefore, find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the ’433 patent and by the prior art of record, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, although we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, we would reach the same conclusion under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“As discussed above, we are not persuaded that the ’433 patent is as limited as Patent Owner argues. Regardless, Conlon was published in the Information Processing & Management journal, and relates to constructing a lexical database, including the organization of the lexical database and the design of the tables that comprise the database. Ex. 1005, 415 (Abstract). As Petitioner points out, Conlon uses an Oracle RDBMS to store and collect information, and manipulate databases using Oracle’s SQL forms. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1057 ¶ 55). Miller’s WordNet is described as “Related Research” in Conlon, and Beckwith is related to WordNet. Ex. 1005, 417; Ex. 1016, 302 (stating in the Abstract “WordNet is the lexical database; LexPert is the suite of software tools used to build and access the database”); see also Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 56–57. We are persuaded by, and agree with, Petitioner’s arguments that Conlon, Miller, and Beckwith all are in the same field of endeavor as the ’433 patent. See Reply 10–12. Patent Owner also argues that there are “four reasons to show that [Conlon, Beckwith, and Miller] are not reasonably pertinent to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] of the ’433 Patent.” PO Resp. 9–10. These four reasons are: 1) There is no literal mention of the technology of the proffered prior art within the ‘433 Patent. 2) There is no mention of innovating database system technology within the proffered prior art. 3) [Petitioner] has not shown that it is possible to substantively relate the ‘433 Patent disclosure with the technology of the proffered prior art. 4) Dr. Ranka, a data systems expert both currently and in 1997, provides extensive evidence that the technology of the ‘433 Patent, as well as a POSITA, do not relate to the technology of the proffered prior art. PO Resp. 9–10. Patent Owner again contends that “[t]he art of the ’433 Patent pertains to creating and managing a computer database system,” but Patent Owner does not provide further explanation as to the problem faced by the inventor of the ’433 patent. See id. at 10. Rather, Patent Owner’s arguments essentially repeat its arguments made with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art, which, as discussed above, we do not find persuasive. As Petitioner points out, one problem faced by the inventor of the ‘433 patent “was storing and relating a particular type of data in a database.” Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1057 ¶¶ 28, 58–59). For the reasons set forth by Petitioner, which are unrebutted by Patent Owner, we also agree that Conlon, Beckwith, and Miller are reasonably pertinent to this problem. See id. Accordingly, we determine that Conlon, Beckwith, and Miller are” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term, including “dictionary routine” and “automatically classifying and storing.” As will be discussed below in connection with the analysis of claim 14 (Section III.E.7), we determine that, whether these terms are construed in the sense of using a dictionary lookup function, or initially creating the dictionary, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Conlon teaches these limitations.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 6,510,433 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,510,433 - Western Digital Corporation / Western Digital Technologies, Inc. et al. v. Martin KusterSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2020-01391 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 12, and 14–19 are unpatentable: claims 11 and 12 are anticipated by Hsiao, and claims 11 and 14–19 are obvious over He and Cheng or He, Cheng, and Hiller.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill does not differ materially from that presented by Mr. Welch. Both require a bachelor’s degree in many of the same fields and roughly one to two years of experience with USB protocols or USB product development. The arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner do not indicate that the outcome of this case would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s description, which we determine to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Proof of conception must be by “corroborating evidence which shows that the inventor disclosed to others his ‘completed thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art’ to make the invention.” Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 601 (CCPA 1950)); see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (corroboration requirement “arose out of a concern that inventors testifying in patent infringement cases would be tempted to remember facts favorable to their case by the lure of protecting their patent or defeating another’s patent”). Similarly, an inventor’s testimony alone is insufficient to establish an earlier reduction to practice. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Instead, a party seeking to prove an actual reduction to practice must proffer evidence corroborating that testimony. Id. at 1170. The sufficiency of corroboration is determined according to a “rule of reason.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This, however, does not dispense with the requirement that some independent evidence provide corroboration. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 360. The requirement of “independent” corroboration requires evidence other than the inventor’s testimony. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 3. Discussion We find that Patent Owner has not met its burden of establishing that Mr. Kuster conceived and reduced to practice his invention prior to the filing dates of Hsiao or He. By itself, Mr. Kuster’s testimony is insufficient to establish that he reduced his invention to practice prior to the November 23, 2010, filing date or Hsiao or the June 2, 2010, filing date of He. “Throughout the history of the determination of patent rights, oral testimony by an alleged inventor asserting priority over a patentee’s rights is regarded with skepticism, and as a result, such inventor testimony must be supported by some type of corroborating evidence.” Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Price, 988 F.2d at 1194). Patent Owner has failed to provide sufficient independent evidence corroborating Mr. Kuster’s testimony.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with this argument. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Moreover, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” so the fact that it would take some creativity to carry out the combination does not defeat a finding of obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421; see also ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The rationale of KSR does not support [the] theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B.”). We find there is support for making this combination of He and Cheng in the testimony of Dr. Baker that addition of a controller is “conventional” in USB flash drives. Baker Decl. ¶ 167. We find that for the reasons given by Dr. Baker, a person of ordinary skill would have added a controller to He. We determine that the combination of He and Cheng teaches each limitation of claim 11. We address Patent Owner’s argument that there are objective indicia of obviousness, infra. We conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated that claim 11 would have been obvious over He and Cheng.” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner
“attorney argument, not evidence.” Pet. Reply 26. We agree. Patent Owner does not back up its argument with testimony or other credible evidence. To demonstrate long-felt need, a patentee must point to an “articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem” which were, before the invention, unsuccessful. Tex. Instruments v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993). All Patent Owner proves, if anything, is that after the USB 3.0 specification issued, a number of companies rushed in to provide contacts that met the new standard. Patent Owner does not demonstrate that they failed where Mr. Kuster succeeded. In fact, there is no evidence that Mr. Kuster ever commercialized his invention.8 8 Victorinox never paid for the work Mr. Kuster did on the USB 3.0 memory device, and to Mr. Kuster’s knowledge, never marketed the product. Kuster Dep. 22:21–24:13. Patent Owner contends “Mr. Kuster’s invention filled the existing need for a durable yet slim USB flash drive compatible with USB 3.0 that was easy to manufacture.” PO Resp. 77. But instead of presenting independent evidence of failure of the others to solve known technical or manufacturing problems, Patent Owner relies on generalized statements concerning the need for USB 3.0 connectors and solutions by others that Patent Owner contends have not been successful. PO Resp. 74–77. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Kuster’s alleged invention filled a long-felt need where others failed.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,693,206 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,693,206 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Huawei Digital Technologies (Cheng Du) Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 10, 2022 · IPR2020-01130 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8 and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Dubrovsky and Dubrovsky with Campbell, respectively; claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“request in Petitioner’s Moshchuk-Gribble combination is a URL for an HTML root page, neither the Content-Type field of the HTTP header nor the URL extension would indicate whether the requested Web page contained executable content. PO Resp. 10–16. Dr. Davis provides credible testimony that because, in Moshchuk, the file that is provided in response to the request is an HTML root page, the HTTP header for the file would have merely indicated that the returned file is an HTML file, which is not a file type associated with being an executable, and would not have indicated whether the file contains active or passive content. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 94–100. Similarly, Dr. Davis provides credible testimony that “[a] POSITA would have known that the URL for an HTML file would have generally included an extension of .html or .htm” and that such extensions would not have been associated with executables. Id. at ¶ 106. Thus, Dr. Davis concludes “[t]he resulting Moshchuk-Gribble combination therefore would not have been able to determine if a requested Web page was an active page or a passive page based on the analysis of the URL.” Id. at ¶ 107.” slip op. at 36
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“The contentions from the Petition, taken together with Dr. Nielson’s initial testimony and the underlying disclosure from Gribble show that the Petition relies specifically on examining Gribble’s content-type HTTP header to determine whether the associated file is an executable. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments in the Reply Brief relying on file headers generally, or those relying on other types of headers, such as the HEAD section or element, or other fields of the HTTP header, such as the Content-Script-Type field, are new arguments not presented in the Petition. Because these arguments were not raised in the Petition, it is impermissible to raise them in the Reply Brief. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide3 at 73–75.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Based on the evidence of record and the parties’ arguments, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the Dubrovsky-Campbell combination teaches the limitations of claim 9. Initially, we note that we agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to look to known ways of identifying file types, such as Campbell’s method of examining the file extension and the file header. We give credit to Dr. Nielson’s testimony in this regard that both Dubrovsky and Campbell recognize that executables were a frequent source of malware but that Dubrovsky does not provide specific details regarding how a file would be determined to be executable. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 404–405. Because Campbell does provide these details, Dr. Nielson credibly testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combined Campbell’s techniques of identifying executables with Dubrovsky. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 404–406. We agree with Petitioner that Campbell teaches that a file’s header can be used to determine that the file is an executable. Campbell teaches that spyware contains certain patterns that can be used to identify the nature of the file. Ex. 1013, 5:9–12. Campbell provides an example of a .CAB file that includes a header having a certain format. Id. at 5:12–13. Campbell explains that spyware scanners have access to spyware signature lists that can be compared with characteristics of spyware headers to identify spyware so that the spyware can be blocked. Id. at 13–24.” slip op. at 61
Patent outcomesUS 10,027,693 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,027,693
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.