• Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 6, 2020 · IPR2019-00030 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Beich; claims 1–4 are also unpatentable over Ogino alone, but claim 5 is not shown unpatentable on that ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We construe claim terms to the extent necessary. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “supported by the cited evidence. We are persuaded, instead, that “the image plane and the sensor are taught by the ’568 patent to be coincident,” and “[t]hus, there is no ambiguity in the ’568 patent about where the image plane is located or that TTL is measured to the image plane,” as Petitioner argues in its Reply. Reply 13 (Ex. 1026 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003, 33–35). Patent Owner acknowledges as much, noting that “as these terms[, i.e., the image plane and the sensor,] are used in the specification of the ’568 patent, the image plane is the surface of the sensor.” Sur-reply 2. We find that the ’568 patent discloses that the electronic sensor corresponds to or is coincident with the image plane and thus, the TTL could be measured with respect to either the sensor (electronic or film) or the image plane and reach the same result. Based upon the complete trial record, we maintain our construction of TTL from the ’1140IPR and the ’1146IPR3, which encompasses “the length of the optical axis spacing between the object-side surface of the first lens element and one of: an electronic sensor, film, and an image plane corresponding to either the 3 The panel authorized, and the parties filed, supplemental briefing to address this construction before it was adopted in both the related ’1140IPR and ’1146IPR, and that the parties responded to this construction in the hearing in this proceeding (with citations to the transcript). See, e.g., Paper 28 (PO’s demonstratives), 5; ’1140IPR, Paper 31; ’1146IPR, Paper 30; see also Trial Practice Guide Update 13–14 (July 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf; Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. f’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it adopted its own claim construction in the final decision because the parties had notice and an opportunity to be heard). electronic sensor or a film sensor.” See ’1140IPR, Paper 37, 18; ’1146IPR, Paper 37, 14.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Patent Owner’s expert testimony as to the disjointed nature of optical lens assembly design experience and manufacturing experience, we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention having only design experience would be so completely unaware of manufacturing considerations so as to preclude taking into account the very general guidance of Beich. See Reply 24–25. Beich teaches that a lens designer should have a basic understanding of the manufacturing process, which would include the limits for fabricating lens elements in an optical lens assembly. Ex. 1020, 7. We are persuaded that the information conveyed in Beich would have been understood, known, and applied by the ordinarily skilled lens designer (see Reply 4–6 (citing Ex. 2014, 4, 9, 11, Fig. 9.2)), irrespective of whether such person had manufacturing experience. Stated differently, although an ordinarily skilled designer of an optical lens assembly may not have had any real-world manufacturing experience, we are persuaded that such person would still have taken into account manufacturing concerns. Although there are differences between the definitions proposed, our conclusions rendered in this decision do not turn on selecting a particular definition for the level of ordinary skill in the art, for the reasons discussed above. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’568 patent and the asserted prior art. We agree with Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill except for Patent Owner’s arguments about manufacturing discussed above. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “As noted by Petitioner, The Handbook of Optics discloses that “[i]n the case of both negative and positive lens elements, it is good policy to avoid element forms wherein the center-to-edge thickness ratio exceeds three for positive elements.” Ex. 1019 § 34.15. Thus, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s fourth reason that the cited disclosure provides evidence that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have selected a particular diameter for the first lens element disclosed in Ogino in conformance with manufacturing considerations known to the ordinarily skilled artisan. We are further persuaded that, from the selection of that particular diameter, a Z1 value for the object-side surface and a Z2 value for image-side surface at the minimum usable edge of the first lens element can be obtained and, in turn, circumferential edge thickness L1e can be obtained. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003, 42; Ex. 1005, 15:1–3). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s supporting reasoning that “a POSITA would understand the manufacturing benefits of maintaining the lowest possible center-to-edge thickness ratio since ‘the preferred shape of a molded element is one that has fairly uniform thickness.’” Id. at 42 (quoting Ex. 1018, 92) (citing Ex. 1003, 48). Based on our review of the complete record, we find that the record supports Petitioner’s contentions concerning claim 1. Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Ogino.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,857,568 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,857,568
• Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2019 · IPR2018-01140 · APJ Marc S Hoff · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 13 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ogino; claims 14 and 15 are unpatentable as obvious over Ogino and Chen II.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “claims 1 and 13 of the ’032 Patent are anticipated by Ogino. Petitioner has also demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14 and 15 of the ’032 Patent are unpatentable over the combination of Ogino and Chen II. The chart below summarizes our conclusion. References Claims Claims Claims 35. Shown Not shown Challenged U.S.C. Unpatent- Unpatentable able Ogino 1 and 13 1 and 13 § 102 Ogino, Chen 14 and 15 14 and 15 § 103 II 1 and 13-15” slip op. at 40

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “that Ogino and Chen II disclose substantially different lens systems. PO Resp. 36. As Petitioner points out, both Ogino and Chen II describe mobile phone camera systems with all lenses being aspheric; a first lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; a second lens with negative refractive power; a third lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power; a fourth lens with a meniscus shape with positive refractive power; and a fifth lens with a meniscus shape and with a negative refractive power. Pet. Reply 22; Pet. 41–44. We agree with Petitioner that such a skilled artisan, possessing an applicable college degree, approximately three years experience in designing multi-lens optical systems, “experience in analyzing, tolerancing, adjusting, and optimizing multilens systems, and experience with lens design software such as CodeV, Oslo, or Zemax,” would have the appropriate knowledge to perform routine modifications to a lens design. Pet. Reply 24; Pet. 7; PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Moore testified that such a skilled artisan “would be able to use the computer program [i.e. CodeV or Zemax] to optimize lens designs.” Pet. Reply 24; Ex. 1025, 29:25–30:9. Dr. Moore testified that the skilled artisan would “tell the [lens design] program that you want to vary certain parameters of a lens . . . . And then the program, through a fairly complicated algorithm, then actually goes through and varies them and determines how to make a better lens. You determine as a lens designer what you’re trying to improve.” Ex. 1025, 28:13–23.” slip op. at 38

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the skilled artisan would have understood that third, fourth, and fifth lenses also contribute to vignetting in Ogino. PO Resp. 38. We credit Petitioner’s argument that Dr. Moore’s conclusion regarding vignetting in the third, fourth, and fifth lenses is unreliable because it is based on assumptions not specified in Ogino. Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. For example, Ogino does not provide lens diameters or vignetting apertures for the lens assembly of Example 6 that would vignette the light beams on the third, fourth or fifth lens elements. Pet. Reply 17; Ex. 1026 ¶ 11. Additionally, Dr. Sasián testifies that vignetting is a result of the second lens. Pet. Reply 17–18; Pet. 54; Ex. 1003, 59.” slip op. at 36

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Effective Focal Length (EFL) Petitioner asserts that while the specification of the ’032 Patent does not offer an express definition for the term “effective focal length,” “its meaning is well known in the art, as exemplified in Li (Ex. 1007), which states that “[t]he focal length of a lens assembly [is] also referred to as the effective focal length [(]EFL).” Pet. 9–10 (internal parentheses omitted); Ex. 1007, 2:59–61. Patent Owner, in response, does not dispute Petitioner’s construction of “effective focal length,” stating that the Petition does not turn on the construction of the term. PO Resp. 20. Having reviewed the evidence of record, we agree with Petitioner that Li supports construing the term “effective focal length” as “the focal length of a lens assembly.” We adopt this construction.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 9,402,032 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,402,032
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00692 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1–14 as anticipated by Best and obvious over Best, and claim 15 as obvious over Best, Mills, and Bonella.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “construction “requires two layers of IC packages, in which a first IC package (the Board’s ‘carrier’) contains one or more second IC packages (the Board’s memory chips).” PO Resp. 39. Petitioner counters that “[t]he Board’s construction does no such thing.” Pet. Reply 18–19. We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s argument is predicated upon the erroneous assertion that “[e]ach memory chip in the Board’s ‘carrier’ requires a different IC package (i.e., a second IC package) that encloses at least one memory die.” PO Resp. 39. Each memory chip does not require its own integrated circuit package. On the contrary, it may be, as Best discloses, a die enclosed with another die in a single IC package. Having considered the arguments and evidence, we maintain our construction of “memory module” to mean “a carrier that contains one or more memory chips,” where “carrier” encompasses an integrated circuit package.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Otherwise, we determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary. Here, the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We have reviewed the arguments provided by Patent Owner and determine such arguments are insufficient to have Mr. Maltiel’s declaration excluded in its entirety. Rather, it is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to be accorded evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); and Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In giving more weight to prior publications than to subsequent conclusory statements by experts, the Board acted well within [its] discretion.”). Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that we should give the entirety of Mr. Maltiel’s declaration no weight.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “8–14. Pet. 30–37, 44–49. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we have considered and which we address below, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, which we adopt as our own findings and conclusions, that claims 1–14 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Best.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 8,874,831 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,874,831
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00561 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–7 were held unpatentable as obvious over Averbuj and Tsern; trial as to claim 1 was terminated based on collateral estoppel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that “collateral estoppel does not apply to the application of the claim 1 limitations in assessing dependent claims 2–7.” Id. at 2. Patent Owner further asserts “[a] party seeking to apply collateral estoppel based on a prior action must show that (1) the identical issue was actually litigated; (2) the issue was actually decided in a final decision on the merits; (3) the issue was necessary to the final decision; and (4) the party being estopped was adequately represented in the prior action [i.e. “the United Access test”].” Id. at 2 (citing United Access Techs., LLC v. CenturyTel Broadband Services LLC, 778 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). We agree that this is the proper test to use to assess the applicability of collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, we note United Access applies collateral estoppel in a different context and suggests that issue preclusion can be applied in an obvoisness challenge, even if the final decision on the original issue was considered under an anticipation challenge. In particular, in United Access it was noted that “[i]ssue preclusion [traditionally called “collateral estoppel”3] applies to issues litigated in prior disputes . . . [and, thus, i]t thus makes no difference that the earlier no-damages-due-to-competition ruling arose in a case under the Truth in Negotiation Act and that this dispute arises under the False Claims Act and the common law.” United Access, 778 F.3d. at 726. The “issue” of whether Averbuj teaches the limitations of claim 1 is identical to the issue in and has been litigated in the ‘970 IPR which found that Averbuj anticipates the limitations of claim 1.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 16

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the ‘434 Patent would have been someone with “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). Patent Owner asserts through its declarant: [A Person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been] working on the design of memory devices, would have at least a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least five years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Master of Science degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and at least three years of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. Also alternatively, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Doctorate degree in Electrical and/or Computer Engineering, and have at least one year of industry experience designing memory devices and controllers. I agree with Petitioner’s expert that the memory industry requires a POSITA with industry experience. Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 32–33. 16 Neither party has argued that the difference between the parties’ articulated level of skill should change the analysis as to patentability. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill, above, and acknowledge that, commensurate with that articulation of the level of skill, the level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Pet. 41. In other words, Petitioner asserts that because a BIST unit can be incorporated into a chip mounted on a PCB and because memory module 12 is part of the BIST unit, memory unit 12 is mounted on a PCB. We disagree. Unlike claim 1, which simply requires the memory unit is “on” the PCB, claim 2 requires that the memory module be a “physically separate component” and “mounted” on the PCB. Petitioner has not shown sufficient support for its broad reading that a module which is a circuit embedded in a larger circuit included in a chip may be considered a physically separate component mounted on a PCB. Claims 3–7 depend from claim 2, and the Petition fails to provide additional prior art disclosures that cure the deficiency with respect to claim 2; that is, disclosure of separate components 22 mounted on a printed circuit board in Averbuj. Pet. 41–48. Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, its assertion that claims 2–7 are anticipated by Averbuj.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,001,434
• SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00577 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7, 8, and 10–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Halbert and Amidi; the other asserted grounds did not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Neither party has argued that the difference between the parties’ articulated level of skill should change the analysis as to patentability. Therefore, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of skill and acknowledge that the level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. 10 Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Analysis We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any term of the claims.” slip op. at 11

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “written to or read from simultaneously. Pet. 37–41. In particular, Petitioner asserts that Halbert’s directing of data, during a write operation, from the system memory data bus to registers 126 and 128 in successive clock cycles means that data being received by the memory devices corresponding to registers 126 and 128, respectively (e.g., ranks 140 and 142, respectively), occurs in successive clock cycles. Thus, according to Petitioner, “those memory devices associated with register 126 (i.e. Rank 140) receive data transmission from the system memory controller in the first clock cycle, but not in the second clock cycle . . . [and] those memory devices associated with register 128 (i.e., Rank 142) receive data transmissions from the system memory controller in the second clock cycle, but not in the first clock cycle.” Id. at 38. Therefore, according to Petitioner, Halbert does not, and cannot, write to the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 simultaneously, because the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 do not receive data concurrently. Id. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner asserts8 while data is sequentially latched onto registers 126 and 128, that data is then concurrently, not sequentially, written to memory device array 140/142—such operation is illustrated in Fig. 4, 8 Patent Owner chose not to request additional briefing to address this ground and arguments in the Preliminary Response are generally waived (Paper 8, 2–3), however, we acknowledge these arguments due to the unusual circumstance created by the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS. 15 above. Thus, all of Halbert’s memory devices are selected or enabled concurrently such that Halbert can write to all of its memory devices simultaneously. This is not, and is exactly counter to, the Petitioner’s assertions that the memory devices in ranks 140 and 142 receive—and thus, store—data sequentially. Prelim. Resp. 27–28. We agree. Petitioner has not explained how latching data to registers 126 and 128 is data transmission between a memory controller and a memory module when registers 126 and 128 are outside of the memory module. Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments and evidence with respect to claims 2, 3, 7, 8, and 10–12 do not cure this deficiency.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Based on Petitioner’s citations to specific prior art disclosures and supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that it would have been obvious to modify the teachings of Halbert with Amidi’s teachings to include rank select functionality. Pet. 64– 66. For example, Petitioner asserts: 19 To employ this chip select functionality of Amidi in the system of Halbert would have been only the arrangement old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yielding no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, i.e., the predictable result of operating each rank at desired times, and well within the level of ordinary skill to achieve. EX1003 ¶¶175-176. Moreover, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use the chip select functionality of Amidi in the system of Halbert to permit the use of lower density, and therefore cheaper and more readily available, memory in the system of Halbert, while using the existing address and data signal lines of Halbert. EX1019, ¶[0008]; see also id., ¶¶ [0002- 0012]; EX1003 ¶177. A skilled artisan would also have been motivated to include such prior art chip selection signals in Halbert in order to follow the traditional design of memory ranks including the use of traditional memory devices and the traditional address signals, as Halbert explains. EX1005, 3:55-57; EX1003 ¶178. Furthermore, Halbert suggests such a use by disclosing that “[m]any other variations on the illustrated embodiments are possible. For instance, . . . [t]he illustrated examples also show two ranks of memory, but other numbers of ranks are also possible.” EX1005, 9:20-26. Skilled artisans at the time would have understood that, in case the number of ranks is increased, chip/bank select signals would need to be used to activate some but not all of the ranks. See, e.g., EX1019 at FIGS. 5, 6A-6B (showing logic circuitry to generate chip select signals for” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,516,185 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,516,185
• Superior Communications, Inc. v. Voltstar Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00067 · APJ Christa P Zado · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4, 11, 12, 16–18, and 20–22 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious over the stated combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for petitioner

    “The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review. (Emphasis added). The language of the statute makes clear § 315(e) applies to grounds the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during an “inter partes review . . . that results in a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).” The statute does not refer to grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised during reexamination. Because the prior proceeding was a reexamination proceeding under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 311, not an inter partes review under post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 311, and did not result in a final written decision under § 318(a), Petitioner is not estopped under § 315(e) from bringing this inter partes review.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Section 315(b) provides that: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Patent Owner alleges a privy of Petitioner, AT&T,10 was served with a complaint on or about February 29, 2012 and Petitioner was served with a complaint on or about February 1, 2013. PO Resp., 9; see also Prelim. Resp. 8. Petitioner does not dispute that it was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’833 patent more than one year prior to filing the Petition in the instant proceeding. Pet. 3–5. Petitioner argues, however, that the instant proceeding is not barred under § 315(b) because the district court action resulting from the earlier-filed complaint was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), leaving the parties “as though the action had never been brought.” Pet. 5 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation Ltd., Case IPR2012-00022, slip op. at 17 (PTAB Sept. 2, 2014) (Paper 166)); see also Ex. 1008 (dismissal order). As we have noted in previous Board decisions, the “Federal Circuit has consistently interpreted the effect of such dismissals as leaving the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Oracle v. Click-to-call, Case IPR2013-00312, slip op. at 17 (PTAB Oct. 30, 2013) (Paper 26) (precedential); Macauto U.S.A. v. Bos GmbH & KG, Case IPR2012-00004, 10 Patent Owner adduces insufficient evidence that AT&T is a privy of Petitioner. In any event, the action against AT&T was consolidated with the action against Petitioner (PO Resp.), and both actions were dismissed, in a single consolidated order, without prejudice (Ex. 1008). slip op. at 15 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2013) (Paper 18) (citing Graves v. Principi, 294 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bonneville Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. Baram, 165 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Because the effect of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is to render the prior action a nullity, such action does not give rise to a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “J. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Patent Owner filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 29), Petitioner filed an opposition thereto (Paper 32), and Patent Owner filed a reply (Paper 33). Patent Owner seeks to exclude paragraphs 4–13 of the Declaration of Andrew S. Flior (Ex. 1018, “the Flior Declaration”), which relate to prior art searches relating to the ’833 patent obtained by Mr. Flior’s law firm. This evidence relates to arguments we need not, and do not, address regarding whether Petitioner is estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) from bringing this inter partes review. See supra Section II.D. Because we do not rely on, or reference, paragraphs 4–13 of the Flior Declaration in our Final Written Decision, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 65

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “For purposes of our determination below, we determine the level of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the ’833 patent is consistent with the assessment provided by Dr. Horenstein, which Patent Owner does not dispute. Accordingly, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art asserted by Petitioner. Also, we are guided by the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,910,833 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,910,833
• Ebay Inc. / Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Ltd. et al. v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 19, 2018 · IPR2016-01829 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 6, and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Hermann, the BootMagic User Guide, and the ACPI Specification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In assessing the probative value of an expert opinion, [the Board] must consider three factors: (1) the interest in the outcome of the case, (2) the presence or absence of factual support for the expert’s opinion, and (3) the strength of any opposing evidence.” EC Data Sys., Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No. 2014-008203, 2014 WL 7171966, at *4 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2014) (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Ex Parte Magna Elecs., Inc., No. 2013-004164, 2014 WL 2360424, at *3 (PTAB May 28, 2014) (expert who “was employed by Patent owner when he provided the expert opinion . . . has a substantial interest in the outcome of the case”). Given Mr. Rafizadeh’s admitted personal and financial interest in the outcome of this case, we give his testimony less weight. We therefore find that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’677 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and between about two to four years’ experience in computer operating systems, programs and databases, and/or graphical user interfaces or virtualization. slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner

    “In assessing the probative value of an expert opinion, [the Board] must consider three factors: (1) the interest in the outcome of the case, (2) the presence or absence of factual support for the expert’s opinion, and (3) the strength of any opposing evidence.” EC Data Sys., Inc. v. J2 Global, Inc., No. 2014-008203, 2014 WL 7171966, at *4 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2014) (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also Ex Parte Magna Elecs., Inc., No. 2013-004164, 2014 WL 2360424, at *3 (PTAB May 28, 2014) (expert who “was employed by Patent owner when he provided the expert opinion . . . has a substantial interest in the outcome of the case”). Given Mr. Rafizadeh’s admitted personal and financial interest in the outcome of this case, we give his testimony less weight. slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s arguments are not persuasive because nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where, as here, the ground of unpatentability is based upon the teachings of a combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test for obviousness is whether the combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “attorney argument, Patent Owner provides no evidence that these commercial systems utilize the claimed invention. See id. at 44–47; Pet. Reply 20–22. Patent Owner, for example, does not map any of the limitations recited in claim 1 to any particular feature of these commercial systems. See id. Assuming, arguendo, that these services use the claimed invention, Patent Owner has not presented any evidence that the claimed invention contributes to the commercial success of these systems. Patent Owner argues that “the fast switching afforded by the [’]677 [p]atent has provided each of these companies with the ability to provide their customers with an incredible amount of data at the tip of their fingertips at amazing speeds.” Id. at 48. The quote from AWS’s website, however, indicates that its cloud service constitutes “a broad set of infrastructure services” and other items. Ex. 2025. The allegedly “fast switching afforded by the ’677 patent,” even if true, therefore, would be only one feature of a much larger system. Patent Owner does not show these services employed the same switching technique, and does not quantify any switching speeds. Even assuming, however, some switching mechanism is employed by these services, “[w]hen the thing that is commercially successful is not coextensive with the patented invention—for example, if the patented invention is only a component of a commercially successful machine or process—the patentee must show prima facie a legally sufficient relationship between that which is patented and that which is sold.” Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Polaris Industries, Inc. v. Artic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392, and stating “[p]ut another way, ‘objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate in scope with the claims which the evidence is offered to support.’” (quoting In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 7,356,677 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,356,677
• Ebay Inc. / Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Ltd. et al. v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 18, 2018 · IPR2016-01828 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable as obvious over the Partition Magic 3.0 User Guide because it teaches or suggests all claim limitations, and the secondary considerations lack evidentiary support and nexus.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Reply 6. At oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel and Patent Owner’s counsel both agreed that the district court’s construction in the Lead Case with respect to the claim term “virtual cabinet” was acceptable. Tr. 18: 18–20; 25: 6–8, 17–20; 28: 10–13; 31: 8–15; 39: 1–5; 40: 5–8; 41: 13–17. The district court construed the term “virtual cabinet” as follows: “‘virtual cabinet,’ ‘cabinet record,’ and ‘virtual cabinet record’ each means ‘virtual storage device, capable of containing, typically through the use of virtual table of content pointers, all (or partitions of) shared (or non-shared) operating systems, application software (both OS dependent and No-OS embedded), databases and memory.’” Ex. 1010, 32–33. The district court’s construction of “virtual cabinet” is derived from the ’400 patent’s definition of the term “cabinet.” See e.g. Ex. 1001, 2:47–52; 5:24–29. The ’400 patent equates the terms “cabinet,” “Cabinet Record,” and “Virtual Cabinet.” Id. at 2:46–47; 5:22–24. Because the district court’s construction of “virtual cabinet” is reasonable and is based upon the express definition of “cabinet” found in the ’400 patent, we accept and adopt the district court’s construction.” Our analysis does not require the express construction of any additional claim terms.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “preamble of claim 1 should be considered limiting.” PO Resp. 21. We note that this is the opposite position Patent Owner took in the Lead Case, where Patent Owner argued that the preamble is not limiting. See Ex. 1010, 20–21. In the Lead Case, the district court found that the preamble of claim 1 was not limiting. Id. at 25. We agree with the district court. As the district court pointed out, “[t]he preamble simply states the intended use of the” graphical user interface—i.e., “for displaying means for allocating a computer device’s resources to multiple operating system environments, partitioned on individual virtual cabinets, on said computer device.” Id. Moreover, the district court noted “[t]here is nothing in the prosecution history that establishes that the preamble was used to overcome a prior art rejection” and, “[t]o the contrary, the patentee expressly distinguishes the prior art using limitations found in the body of the claim, not using the preamble.” Id. Even if the preamble were limiting, however, we would still not be persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the graphical user interface taught by Figure 3.7 of the 3.0 User Guide “is limited to partitioning hard disk space, and fails to allocate any other computer resources such as memory” (PO Resp. 22) because those arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the preamble, which does not recite allocating all of a computer device’s resources or allocating memory specifically. On the contrary, the preamble is satisfied if any of a computer device’s resources are allocated to multiple operating system environments.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill is unreasonably high. Pet. Reply 11–12. Petitioner argues that Mr. Rafizadeh, a named inventor on the ’400 patent, would not qualify as a POSITA under Patent Owner’s proposed standard, because Mr. Rafizadeh did not start working on virtualization until 1997, and would not have had four years of experience in virtualization as of the filing date of the ’400 patent application. Id. (citing Ex. 1026, 22:4–6; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 21–22). Moreover, Petitioner argues, the other individuals Mr. Rafizadeh believed to be POSITAs at the time of the invention—such as Parviz Moayyad, Peter Druschell, and Jeff Barnes—all had been working on virtualization for only two years as of 1999, and thus would not have qualified as POSITAs under Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill. Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1026, 54:11–20, 56:2–10). Petitioner also notes that Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Rosenberg, proposed a definition of a POSITA that did not require four years of experience in virtualization. Id. (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 33). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill is unreasonably high. The educational background and experience of those working in the field, including the inventor, are factors considered, among others, in determining the appropriate level of ordinary skill. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, however, Patent Owner proposes years of experience in computer virtualization beyond that held by the inventor and other acknowledged skilled artisans working in the field at the time of the claimed invention. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed years of experience in virtualization and find that a POSITA would be a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or the equivalent, having between two to four years of experience in computer operating systems, programs and databases, and/or graphical user interfaces or virtualization.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Our construction of “virtual cabinet” requires only that a virtual cabinet is capable of containing operating systems, application software, databases and memory, and that this is accomplished typically by using content pointers. See also Ex. 1001, 2:47–52. The 3.0 User Guide teaches that “partitions will be like file cabinet drawers in which you can separate your operating systems, applications, and data files” (Pet. 29–30, quoting Ex. 1005, 3), and that “you should create primary partitions to install operating systems” (Pet. 29, quoting Ex. 1005, 38), allowing users “to make the currently selected partition the active partition” (id., quoting Ex. 1005, 79). The 3.0 User Guide also teaches that “[a] primary partition may contain any operating system (OS) as well as data files, such as applications and user files.” Pet. Reply 16 (quoting Ex. 1005, 126). Thus, we are persuaded that the primary partitions illustrated in Figure 3.7 and taught by the 3.0 User Guide are “capable of containing . . . operating systems, application software . . ., databases, and memory,” as required by our construction, thereby teaching the recited “cabinet selection button bar graphically representing at least one virtual cabinet.”” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,690,400 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,690,400
• DISH Network, LLC v. TQ Delta, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2018 · IPR2016-01469 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 are unpatentable over Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413; claims 4, 14, 16, and 18 are unpatentable over Bowie and Morelli.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that “maintaining synchronization” requires timing synchronization by correcting errors or differences between timing references. The claims of the ’268 patent do not recite “synchronization signal” or “synchronization frame” but refer only to “maintaining synchronization” during low power mode without specification as to the method of synchronization. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:6–17 (claims 1 and 2). Indeed, claims 2 and 12 do not recite any particular synchronization signal or synchronization frame as a limitation.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “In light of the arguments and evidence presented, we are not persuaded that this term requires an express construction. Patent Owner’s proposed construction does not add necessary clarity to the claims, as it merely replaces “full power mode operation” with “transmission and/or reception of data during normal operation.” The parties, however, do not dispute the meaning of “full power mode operation.” Accordingly, an express construction is not necessary to resolve the disputes between the parties.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelOther

    “We determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary. Here, the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner notes, Morelli expressly discusses the receiver receiving while the transmitter is in low power mode. Reply 8–9; Ex. 1005, Fig. 6A (block 102), 15:46–52; 16:29–34). Thus, Morelli does not disclose mere boilerplate language that is not specific or nonenabling, but specifically discloses a transmitter 12 and receiver 16 in Figures 6A–9 where the receiver remains on while the transmitter is off. Reply 7–8. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument regarding Morelli’s Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI). PO Resp. 31–32, 33–34 (discussing RSSI). We do not agree with Patent Owner that Morelli’s teaching regarding using RSSI to determine whether to enter or exit a low power (“sleep”) (Ex. 1005, Abstract) could indicate that the receiver in Morelli is performing the RSSI function to determine when data is “available to be received,” but not actually using the receiver to receive data during the transceiver’s low power mode. Id. Such speculation is belied by the express teachings of Morelli. As Petitioner argues, Morelli states that “it is equally possible to have either the transmitter 12 or receiver 16 be designed to enter a sleep mode as described herein while the other is always in an active mode” (Ex. 1005, 21:51–54). Pet. 23, 40–41. We are also persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that Morelli is enabling, as it discloses in Figures 6A–9 and accompanying embodiments that the data received by the receiver is provided to MAC 30 to determine if the received packet requires a response necessary to switch the transmitter from sleep to active mode. Reply 9; Ex. 1005, Figs. 1 (control signal on line 38), 6A (block 102), 15:46–52, 15:59–62, 16:29–34; see also Pet. 40–41 (citing Ex. 1005, 1:45–50, 6:43–51, 8:16–20, 8:46–59, Fig. 2, 8:60–9:57, Fig. 3, 14:6–64, 19:7–10, 21:51–54). As Petitioner argues, in the case when Morelli determines that a response is not required, the receiver in Morelli is on and actively receiving data to make the determination based on the data received, while the transmitter is off or sleeping. Reply 8–9; Ex. 1005, Fig. 5A, 15:46–52; see also Pet. 40–41. We also note that Petitioner has provided testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to configure a circuit in accordance with the operation of Morelli and Bowie combined. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 152–153; Pet. 41; Reply 8–9. Accordingly, we determine that Morelli provides sufficient detailed disclosure teaching of a receiver in full power mode and the transmitter in low power mode as required in the challenged claims.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,094,268 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,094,268
• Amazon.Com, Inc. / Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. v. Ac Technologies S.A.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Nov 14, 2017 · IPR2015-01802 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing

  Granted rehearing and held claims 2, 4, and 6 unpatentable as obvious over Rabinovich because the wireless-network limitation encompasses a connection through a wireless hub.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Ex. 1002, 3:41–49. Thus, the ’680 patent itself does not limit the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that our construction of “computer unit” requires limiting the recited “wireless network” to an ad hoc network. Specifically, dependent claims 2 and 4 each recite “wherein the at least one computer unit and the at least two data storage units are connected over a wireless network.” Dependent claim 6 recites a similar limitation. We construed “computing unit” to encompass any computing device. Dec. 6. We did not, as Patent Owner contends, “construe[] both the ‘computer unit’ and ‘data storage units’ as hosts” (PO Br. 3). Although our construction encompasses Rabinovich’s hosts, it does not require the recited “computer unit” and “data storage units” to be hosts. Moreover, even assuming that both units are Rabinovich’s “hosts,” dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 require only that they be “connected over a wireless network,” not “between” or “directly connected to each other,” as Patent Owner contends (PO Br. 3). Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that two hosts “connected over a wireless network” necessarily requires a wireless connection “between” two hosts. Id. Based on our review of the ’680 patent, we construe “connected over a wireless network” as broad enough to encompass a connection through a wireless hub. Because we determine that the “wireless network” recited in dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 need not be an ad hoc network, Patent Owner’s argument that Rabinovich’s replication method would have been unsuitable for use over an ad hoc network does not persuasively rebut Petitioner’s showing. Having considered the arguments and evidence of both parties, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that dependent claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Rabinovich.” slip op. at 7

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “We decline to assess the merits of Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude. Even without excluding the identified evidence, we have concluded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 4, and 6 are unpatentable. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 8

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,904,680

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.